Peace journalism and Thailand's southern insurgency: a comparative analysis of the conflict coverage in Bangkok Post and The Nation. by Indradat, Arpapat
		
Peace Journalism and  
Thailand’s Southern Insurgency 
     : A comparative analysis of the conflict coverage  
    in Bangkok Post and The Nation   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arpapat Indradat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  A thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements for  
                  the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Bournemouth University 
       Media School 
         May 2015 
		 ii	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright Statement 
 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that 
its copyright rests with its author, and acknowledgements must always be made of the use of any material 
contained in, or derived from, this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		 iii	
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors, Professor Stuart Allan and Dr. Chindu 
Sreedharan, who constantly encouraged me in my academic progress and worked with me closely in writing this 
thesis. Their support, patience, attention and particularly their belief in me over the past few years have been 
extremely helpful and I am grateful. I also wish to thank Bournemouth University for providing me with the 
opportunity and educational support to conduct this research. 
 
Since the essence of the study is based upon the interviews of journalists and editors, I am truly thankful for 
every interviewee who shared their personal opinions and experiences. Their dedication to their work and their 
participation contributed to a large aspect of this research.  
 
Most importantly, I wish to thank my parents, who gave me life, raised me, taught me and provided me with 
endless support. Their unconditional love and care and their faith in me has enabled me to overcome many 
obstacles in my life including the journey to complete this degree. I wish to thank my friends for their mental 
support and the friendship I needed throughout the duration of the course.  
 
Finally, I wish to thank my grandfather, who raised me and also inspired me to pursue a doctoral degree. This 
thesis is dedicated to you.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		 iv	
Abstract 
Since 2004, Thailand has experienced a resurgence of violence in the three southern border provinces. This 
conflict has worsened the relationship between the majority Thais and the minority Muslims, with serious 
ramifications for the education, economy and health care system of the region. The Thai media have been blamed 
for exacerbating the situation, with critics claiming that newspapers reporting on the conflict often expresses 
prejudice, negativity and bias in providing only one side of the story. This thesis assesses these and related 
criticisms through the lens of ‘Peace Journalism’ in order to examine the guiding tenets of war journalism while, 
at the same time, exploring the basis to propose alternative approaches to reporting. In methodological terms, the 
empirical case study draws on a content analysis of pertinent coverage produced by two English-language 
newspapers (Bangkok Post and The Nation) reporting on the three major incidents during the first year of the 
southern conflict as well as semi-structured interviews with journalists and editors in order to better understand 
how and why they present the conflict in the ways that they do.  
Key findings indicated that the coverage of the two English-language newspapers shared the same main elements 
of war and peace journalism, with the former's emphasis on elite interests, visible effects of war, and a here and 
now perspective, and the latter's emphasis on multiparty-orientations, victim-centred priorities, and the causes 
and consequences of the conflict. Both newspapers relied firstly on the 'elite' group as main news actors and news 
sources, with a secondary focus on 'people', which suggests that the voices of people affected by the incidents 
were not neglected in their reportings. The analysis of labels revealed that, compared to Bangkok Post, which 
tended to use labels with neutral terms, The Nation used wider range of labels that include both emotive and 
negative terms.  
In sum, the study revealed surprising evidence of more peace journalism elements in the conflict coverage. This 
is because both newspapers under scrutiny perform objective journalism that involves investigative reporting and 
the engagement of all sides in the coverage. In addition, the situation of the three incidents affected the war and 
peace approaches in the coverage, see from the increasing trend of peace journalism over the course of three 
incidents. The semi-structured interviews revealed that the organisational principles and the format of the 
newspapers guided the way the journalists report the conflict. To improve the conflict coverage,  journalists need 
support from their organisations in order to increase their level of expertise and experience in covering the 
southern conflict. The thesis concludes with recommendations on improving the quality of newspaper reporting 
on this conflict. 
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Chapter	1 
Introduction 
 
The news media play a significant role in modern societies. They supply news and information to the 
general public, providing multiple perspectives through news articles, commentaries and editorials in a 
manner that can influence public opinion (McQuail 2010). In this way, the news media have become a 
mediator connecting people with social reality. In a wider sense, the news media provide a means for 
social institutions to convey their selected versions of events and conditions to the public (Ibid.). 
 
However, as the media are a cultural institution with their own interests and rules for shaping 
perceptions of reality, information could be distorted according to their own purposes or those of other 
social institutions. The purpose of the messages they convey can either be neutral, intend to inform, or 
represent an attempt to manipulate or control public opinion (Ibid.). Shaw (1979) argued that the media 
are persuasive in focusing public attention and determining the importance placed on specific issues. 
McCombs and Shaw (1972) posited that the audiences’ attention is manipulated by the content the 
media chooses to present. The media, thus, have the capability to influence our view of the world by 
choosing what reality to report and how to report it during the process of news production. Rarely, if 
ever, is this a neutral process and it is the duty of journalists to ensure that the information they present 
is accurate, fair, balanced and truthful.  
 
Given the pervasive nature of conflicts in the modern world and the changes in the communication 
technologies today, the media play a significant role in informing the public about wars and conflicts 
around the world. Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2010, p.4) mentioned that "...media are becoming part of 
the practices of warfare to the point that the conduct of war cannot be understood unless one carefully 
accounts for the role of media in it. This is what it means to speak of war as mediatized." In this sense, 
the media not only act as a medium between the public and the social reality, but they can also 
influence the public by choosing which reality of war and conflict to report, and how to report them to 
the public. The reality of war is produced and presented through the media, and thus war these days 
cannot exist without the media dimension (Ibid.).  
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In conflict situations, journalists will inevitably face difficulties because all sides will seek to control 
the media, whose information can be either unreliable or censored (Goretti 2007). Reporting conflicts 
can represent both a personal risk and an ethical challenge. In many cases, the media emphasise only a 
brief background of the reality. Conflicts are often inaccurately represented, and in some cases, the 
media are manipulated in an effort to win support for a particular position, or to demonise enemies of 
this position (Lynch 2010). Therefore, the mediatisation of war is important because "perceptions are 
vital to war" and "it is through media that perceptions are created, sustained or challenged" (Hoskins 
and O'Loughlin 2010, p. 4).  In the context of this research, the perception of the public is important as 
it is perceived to be one of the causes of the conflict – a point that I will revisit to discuss later in this 
chapter. 
 
The traditional way of covering conflicts, which scholars such as Galtung (2002) and Lynch and 
McGoldrick (2005) termed as ‘war journalism’, treats the notion of conflict as ‘news value’ (Galtung 
1986, 1998, 2002). War journalism focuses on dehumanising the enemy and the visible effects of 
violence, confining conflicts to a closed time and space, and focusing only on the current situation, not 
on its causes and effects (Ibid.). It works as a propaganda tool, which seeks to have a strong impact on 
public perceptions and behaviour, and usually leads to a situation where the public value violent 
responses to conflict, and ignore non-violent alternatives (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005).  
 
As an alternate to war journalism, peace researchers and activists developed another model for 
reporting conflicts: peace journalism. Peace journalism arguably allows the media to play a productive 
and socially responsible role in conflict situations and to the public in ways that help contribute to 
peaceful solutions, instead of exacerbating the situation (Galtung 1998; Lynch and McGoldrick 2005). 
Peace journalism suggests new ways for journalists to explore the background of a conflict in order to 
help its audiences understand the dynamics of the conflict, seek out the causes and solutions to the 
situation, and give voice to all parties involved (Galtung 1998, 2002; Lynch and McGoldrick 2005).  
 
This research is borne out of my interest in peace journalism, and the reporting of a conflict in southern 
Thailand, which represents a case study for this thesis. Thus, this thesis explores the coverage of 
Thailand’s southern insurgency on its first year of occurrence. Since 2004, Thailand has experienced 
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long-running and on-going violence. The southern conflict is considered deep-rooted, and is based on a 
complex historical background, in which various political, religious, cultural and ethnic issues all play 
an important part. Of particular interest here is that the Thai media have been criticised by many 
observers – including reformists and media professionals – as one of the factors worsening the 
situation. Reports of the southern conflict often express prejudice and a negative tone, and provide only 
one side of the story: key characteristics of war journalism.  
 
This research examines these criticisms of the Thai media. It looks at the practices of two major 
English-language newspapers in Thailand in order to establish how the two newspapers represent the 
conflict. The study aims to explore the war and peace frames these newspapers use, the factors 
influencing the strengths and weaknesses of their news production, the possible alternative ways of 
reporting the conflict, and the consequence of all this in terms of how the quality of the journalistic 
practices in this case may be improved. The argument here is that peace journalism can provide a better 
means of reporting conflict, and can help bring about peaceful solutions. 
 
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part explains the background of the research: both 
contextualising Thailand’s southern conflict, and providing a critique on the Thai media and their 
reporting. The second part sets out the research objectives and the research questions. The third part 
explores the scope of the research, which includes a brief background of the three case studies and an 
overview of the two English-language newspapers. The fourth part sums up the content of the 
subsequent chapters in this thesis.  
 
 1.1 Background of the research 
Since January 2004, Thailand’s three southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat have 
experienced an upsurge of violence. From January 2004 to January 2015, the region underwent more 
than 14,741 attacks, resulting in 6,321 fatalities and 11,408 injuries (Deep South Watch Incidents 
Database 2015). Historically, the three southern provinces were part of the Great Patani until the region 
was incorporated into the Thai state in the early 20th century. This, however, separated Muslims of 
Malay descent from the mainstream Malay culture. The vast majority of Muslims in Thailand reside in 
its southernmost provinces - Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat - which are connected to the Malaysian border. 
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Although Muslims represent only 4-5 percent of Thailand’s population, they constitute the largest 
religious minority in the country. Most Muslims from the South are Malay in origin and share common 
ethnic identity, cultures, traditions and religious beliefs with the Malays (Knodel et al. 1999). 
 
The Thai government sought to enforce the assimilation of the Muslim minority into the mainstream 
Buddhists culture, which caused anger among the southern Muslims, and provided a breeding ground 
for insurgent activities carried out by armed political groups (McCargo 2006a, 2008; Jitpiromsri and 
Sobhonvasu 2006; Croissant 2007). According to Yusuf (2007), the Muslims in the south hold strict 
Islamic values. They consider Islam as one distinct identity and regard their enforced assimilation by 
the state as unacceptable. This resulted in the growth of many resistance movements over many 
decades. 
 
Thailand’s southern insurgency is considered to be one of the country’s most serious and complicated 
conflicts. The upswing of violence in 2004 was particularly important in terms of the growing threat 
posed by radical Islam in the region due to the changing patterns, the scale of well-planned attacks, and 
the increasing numbers of casualties (Albritton 2010). The Thai government believes that the violence 
was organised by a minority of extremists, and that social grievances – unemployment, lack of 
education, limited resources and infrastructure, and drugs problems – were the main factors behind it 
(Jitpiromsri and Sobhonvasu 2006). The southern violence has had a large impact on Thai society, and 
has worsened the relationship between the majority Buddhists and the minority Muslims in Thailand. It 
has also greatly impacted upon the education, economy and healthcare systems in the southern region.  
 
Many commentators have endeavoured to establish the motivations behind the violence, only to arrive 
at very different views. Aiewsrivongse (2004) characterised the southern conflict as 21st century 
peasant rebellions, with no clear and specific purposes or targets. Chakapia (2004 in Jitpiromsri and 
Sobhonvasu 2006, p. 111) claimed that the principle cause of the southern conflict is the government’s 
use of forceful means to solve the problem. Wasi (2004 in Jitpiromsri and Sobhonvasu 2006, p, 111) 
considered that the motivation was concentrated on issues of conflict, power and religious ethics. 
Satha-Anand (2006) believed that the root causes were historical. Jitpiromsri and Sobhonvasu (2006) 
argued that the attacks were caused not by social problems, but by ideological beliefs. 
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Separatist movements have been presented in Thailand's southern region for decades, but the current 
one dates back to 2001. However, the scale of the incidents of 2001-2003 was not as large. In fact, little 
attention was paid to it until 4 January 2004, which is the media’s common reference point for the start 
of the insurgency. According to Jitpiromsri (2013), from 1993 to 2003, there were 722 recorded 
insurgency-related incidents, yet fully 3,000 incidents occurred in 2004 alone. Abuza (2009) contended 
that to date the start of the insurgency to a specific point in 2004 is in part politically motivated and 
journalistically convenient.  
 
The Campaign for Popular Media Reform (CPMR) believes that media organisations are key to the 
resolution of the conflict because these organisations play a vital role in shaping and affecting public 
perceptions (Deep South Watch 2007). The media inform the public in other parts of the country of the 
events that occur in the southern border area. The events are reconstructed: journalists convey their 
version of reality to their audiences, guiding the public’s understanding of the situation, and it is 
difficult for the audiences not to be influenced by the information with which they are presented.  
 
The reporting of the insurgency has been widely criticised by media observers, who believe the 
coverage is dominated by war journalism (Deep South Watch 2007; Media Monitor 2005). The focus is 
on elite voices and details of death, injuries and damage, while the voices of local people are hardly 
heard. The main characteristics of reporting often concentrate on the ‘here and now’, sensationalising 
details of the attacks and casualties while ignoring the very deep-rooted dynamics and possible 
solutions, resulting in widespread assumptions that the problems have been caused by the lack of 
patriotism among southern Muslims (Media Monitor 2005). These perceptions, arguably influenced to 
a large extent by the reporting of the situation, are believed to have further widened the gap between 
the Muslim minority and the rest of the country and inevitably influence the perceptions of the majority 
of Thais with regard to events in the south. 
 
Media Monitor (2005) found that prejudice against Muslims is overt in Thai newspapers. Voices of 
those affected by the conflict are often ignored, and southern Muslims are negatively represented in 
connection to terrorism, insurgency and brutal violence. In other words, if we consider the traditional 
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formula of ‘who, what, where, when, why, and how’, the ‘why’ appears much less frequently than the 
remainder in coverage of the southern conflict (Ibid.). The 'why' aspect of the reporting is rarely seen 
because most media people lack the ability to investigate the events they cover.1 This suggests either an 
inability or lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Thai press to explore the causes of the incidents.  
 
On the other hand, criticism of the Thai media also comes from the other side. In an anonymous open 
letter to the Thai media (2013),2 the authors, who call themselves 'the freedom fighters of Patani', 
expressed their resentment over the representation of the southern conflict that reflects "extreme 
prejudice and biased reporting." The criticism includes: the labelling of the actors as "southern villains 
or terrorists',  the rare opportunities and news spaces they have to express their opinion and 
communicate with the Thai public, the over-reliance on information from the Thai government, and the 
provision of one-sided historical facts. From this, the Thai media not only deliver news and 
information from the southern area to the Thai public but also influence the views and attitude of the 
society, which is widely perceived as biased and prejudiced.  
 
In the model of peace journalism, the role of the media not only lies in reporting war, but also in 
helping to foster peace and reduce conflict. Moreover, in the case of Thailand, freedom of the press has 
been reduced since 2004, when the government increased its control over the media through various 
means. Such limits in freedom of expression posed major challenges for peace journalism and Thai 
media practices by limiting access to local sources and forcing journalists to rely mostly on 
institutional voices for their reportage. It should be stated, though, that despite these limitations, the 
Thai media continue to be regarded as one of the better organised and freer media in the region 
(McCargo 2000).  
 
Attempts to improve the quality of the reporting have been made. Media professionals have expressed 
their concern over such negative representations. They asked the press to be more aware of the 
consequences of their role, and demanded a change in reporting style (Deep South Watch 2007). The 
criticism that the Thai media contribute to exacerbating the violence in the south and creating conflict 
in Thai society led the Thai Journalist Association (TJA) to set up the Issara News Center (INC) in 
2005 with the aim of training journalists in reporting the southern conflict in a less biased manner. 
	 7	
Twenty newspapers in Thailand participated, sending reporters and journalists to the INC for courses 
and workshops.3 The TJA found that most Thai journalists lacked the skill of reporting sensitive issues 
related to religious, cultural and ethnic conflicts, and that the journalists had limited access to sources 
in the conflict area (Ruangdit 2007). The training included: promoting the idea of peace journalism, 
promoting process-based reporting, pairing journalists from Bangkok with local journalists, and raising 
awareness of the background and history of the conflict.  
 
The INC was a success in the first year. Many Thai newspapers used its resources and it was widely 
commended on a national scale for its reliable and objective reporting (Ruangdit 2007). However, the 
political crisis of 2006 interrupted the work of the centre. Journalists were asked to return to Bangkok 
to work for their newspapers to report the national crisis. Today, the INC has been restructured and is 
under the Issara News Agency (INA), which is a news agency focused on objective reporting. 
Kanwerayothin (2006) studied the performance of the centre by focusing on the coverage of the two 
hostage incidents in 2005 and 2006, and found that the INC encountered problems in relation to a lack 
of human resources, capacity, commitment and understanding of peace journalism. Kanwerayothin 
speculated that, because the idea of peace journalism was still new, many reporters and journalists did 
not understand it very well, and continued to use war-oriented headlines. This assessment, however, 
does not mean that peace journalism has failed; rather, it can be viewed that a good start has been made 
in promoting peace journalism in the practices of the Thai media during the early years of the conflict.  
 
As mentioned before, this research is borne out of my interest in exploring peace journalism in this 
specific setting. Most studies show that the Thai media have a tendency to support the government's 
southern administration, which often propose harsh security measures, and ignore the background of 
the conflict and the voices of the local people. The study thus attempts to investigate the conflict 
coverage in this specific setting, particularly in the English-language newspapers, to see how the 
violent incidents were reported during the first year of the current insurgency. The study was carried 
out by conducting a content analysis of the coverage of two English-language newspapers. Semi-
structured interviews with journalists and editors who covered the conflict were also undertaken in 
order to understand how they characterise the conflict, and to what extent peace journalism can provide 
a basis for better and more accurate journalistic practices.  
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 1.2 Research objectives and Research questions 
The objective is to explore how the Thai media represented Thailand's southern conflict in its first year 
of occurrence. By analysing news content in the selected newspapers and interviewing people involved 
in making the news, this study hopes to provide new insights into Thailand’s southern conflict and how 
the conflict is reported. The findings are expected to indicate the problems of conflict reporting in 
Thailand, and to propose an alternative way of promoting peace journalism. Such journalism is 
expected to contribute to the understanding about the social responsibility of the media in reducing and 
not exacerbating the conflict. Further, it is hoped that this study will help inform long-term conflict 
reduction and reconciliation strategies as well as contributing to the development of the media 
profession in Thailand in terms of the broader public good. The research questions of this thesis were 
formed out of these objectives as follows: 
 
RQ1. How has the coverage of the two English newspapers in Thailand (Bangkok Post and 
The Nation) represented the southern conflict?  
 
RQ2. To what extent do these two newspapers follow war-oriented and/or peace-oriented 
approaches in covering the southern conflict? 
 
RQ3. What are the journalists and the editors’ perceptions of the factors influencing the 
strengths and weaknesses of the conflict’s coverage? 
 
RQ4. What can be an alternative way of covering the conflict in this specific context? 
 
RQ1 and RQ2 explore how the English language media in Thailand interpreted and represented the 
southern conflict by analysing the representation of the conflict in their news coverage. To answer 
these questions, the analysis considers the application of war and/or peace journalism in the news 
content, which includes an analysis of the news actors, news sources, and the language used in 
referring to the events and actors. RQ3 and RQ4 aim to investigate the journalistic practices, the media 
environment, and the organisational conventions in the production of the southern conflict news, and to 
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see how these factors influence/challenge the performance of journalists in reporting the news in this 
context. These questions were designed to indicate the factors contributing to and challenging the 
making of news with the hope of finding a possible alternative for covering the conflict. The answers to 
RQ3 and RQ4 will be drawn from the semi-structured interviews with journalists and editors involved. 
 
The details on the theoretical frameworks and methods used in this study will be provided in Chapter 5, 
Research Methodologies. 
 
 1.3 Scope of the research 
This section explains the scope of the research, the background of the three case studies, and the 
significance of those events in order to answer why, of all possible incidents, these three specific events 
were chosen. The study looks at the performance of the two leading English-language newspapers in 
Thailand – Bangkok Post and The Nation – with an emphasis on their coverage of three major incidents 
of violence in 2004. Seven days of coverage will be analysed for each incident. The significance of the 
three case studies is discussed below. 
 
  1.3.1 Three case studies and the significance of the three events 
Arsenal raid incident (4th January 2004)  
This incident began when hundreds of young men raided an army ammunition depot at Narathiwat 
Rajanakarin Army Camp in Joh Airong District, Narathiwat Province, and made off with more than 
400 weapons, including RPGs, machine guns and rifles, and killed four soldiers at the scene. Twenty 
schools in 11 districts across the southern region were burnt down on the same day. The attacks, which 
required specific military skills and training, were considered well-coordinated and well-planned. The 
incident quickly escalated into large-scale violence, and is generally considered to be the first incident 
of the current southern insurgency. After the attacks in January, a hard line response including martial 
law was imposed in the three southernmost regions, and additional army troops were sent there, 
resulting in up to 30,000 soldiers being based in the area. 
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Kruese Mosque incident (28th April 2004)  
The violence broke out when insurgents launched well-planned attacks on 11 government locations and 
security checkpoints in Pattani, Yala and Songkhla provinces. After the attacks failed, 32 insurgents, 
mostly young Muslim teenagers, sought refuge in the Kruese Mosque. The military was later ordered 
to attack the mosque and gunned down all insurgents. The incident resulted in the death of all 32 
insurgents, and great damage to the holiest mosque in the region. This incident caused anger among the 
Muslims for two major reasons. First, local people believed that the actions of the police and the 
military represented an insult to Islam by attacking their holiest and most sacred mosque. Second, 
because those young militants were poorly armed (most of them carried only machetes) and died in 
consequence of an order to kill, they came to be regarded as martyrs (shahid). Thai authorities reported 
that 108 insurgents and five security officials were killed in this incident, and an additional 17 
insurgents were arrested. The religious overtone of the incident symbolised the fracture between the 
Buddhist Thais and the Muslim Thais in the country, and is believed to have generated more mistrust 
between the two communities.  
 
Takbai demonstration incident (25th October 2004) 
On 25th October 2004, around 2,000 people, mostly Muslim youths, demonstrated in the district of 
Takbai, Narathiwat Province. The demonstration was held against martial law and to demand the 
release of six Muslim youths, arrested by the police under accusation of involvement in supplying 
weapons to the militants. 
 
Tensions arose when the authorities failed to negotiate with the protesters and the police called for 
army reinforcements. The security personnel used gunfire and teargas to control the situation, seven 
demonstrators were killed by gunshots. Later that day, hundreds of demonstrators were arrested. The 
army ordered their shirts to be taken off, and for them to be bound with their hands tied behind their 
backs. The demonstrators were then thrown into trucks in order to take them away for interrogation at 
the Army Camp in Pattani, approximately 4 hours away. They were stacked five or six deep in the 
unventilated trucks. By the time they reached their destination, 78 of them had died from suffocation, 
making 85 deaths in total. The Takbai incident was considered as the bloodiest clash since a new wave 
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of separatist insurgency had been launched in Thailand’s southern region in January 2004 (The Nation 
2005).  
 
Significance of the three events 
The southern insurgency represents a pressing concern for the whole ASEAN community (ICG 2005).  
The violent incidents posed challenges not only to the Thai government on national security issues, but 
also to the Thai media and their reporting on the long-lasting national conflict, which concerns the 
ethnic and religious beliefs of the a minority.  
 
The three major incidents in 2004 were selected because they were internationally known and were 
considered to be the most serious events of 2004, which was the year that represented the start of the 
current southern insurgency. Moreover, the Kruese Mosque incident and Takbai demonstration 
incident also brought into question human rights issues, and the Thai government was widely criticised 
by international forums such as Human Rights Watch and the United Nations Human Rights Council. 
The Takbai demonstration incident caused worldwide uproar and condemnation, and had a particular 
impact on the relationship between Thailand and neighbouring Muslim countries given its religious 
connotations (Human Rights Watch 2007; Asian Human Rights Commission 2009). Stating that no 
other incident could match the scale of the Kruese and Takbai incidents, McCargo (2008, p. 3) 
described them as "the two worst days of violence", which greatly undermined the legitimacy of the 
state and boosted the militant movement.  
 
For the purposes of this study, an examination of how the arsenal raid incident was reported can help 
demonstrate how the two English language newspapers treated the first outburst of the insurgency, 
while an analysis of the two subsequent events can illustrate how the newspapers reported events when 
the insurgency was at its peak.  
 
  1.3.2 Background: Bangkok Post and The Nation 
This research focuses on the two English-language newspapers because these are the main ‘quality’ 
newspapers in the country, which, despite modest circulations compared to the Thai-language 
newspapers, are considered to wield a disproportionately powerful influence in shaping public opinion 
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(Prado 2010). The newspapers are widely read by the country’s middle and upper class citizens, 
including the political elite and opinion leaders. Furthermore, international news organisations draw on 
the resources of these two newspapers for their own reporting of the southern conflict. As a result, the 
way in which these newspapers reported the events can influence how the world understood and 
responded to the situation.  
 
A pragmatic consideration for the choice also needs to be mentioned: copies of the English language 
newspapers were easily attainable, and the use of Thai language newspapers may create problems of 
inaccurate translation when translated into English for the analysis. A brief background of the two 
newspapers is provided as follows. (See more details in Chapter 3, the Thai mediascape) 
 
Bangkok Post  
Bangkok Post was founded by Alexander McDonald, an American editor, and his Thai associate, Prasit 
Lulitanond, in 1946. It is staffed with a mix of foreigners, and is considered a conservative press.4 
Bangkok Post now belongs to Post Publishing Public Co. Ltd, whose main activity is the publication 
and distribution of English daily newspapers, magazines and books. Post Publishing's main publication 
is Bangkok Post, which has a circulation of 80,000 copies a day, and holds 55% of the market (Forum-
Asia 2005). Post Publishing’s newspapers also include: Post Today (a Thai-language business daily 
newspaper), Student Weekly (a weekly English-language newspaper for students), and M2F (a Monday 
to Friday Thai newspaper on urban lifestyles). Its digital media include the Bangkok Post website, Post 
Today websites and M2Fjob.com (Post Publishing 2013). Compared to The Nation, Bangkok Post is a 
smaller organisation, with a less complicated system of news production.  
 
The Nation  
The Nation was founded in 1971 by Thai editors, Suthichai Yoon, Thammanoon Mahapaoraya and ML 
Sunida Kittiyakara. The newspaper underwent significant change in 1991 after it hired a team of 
journalists who left Bangkok Post over reporting principles. It has a reputation of being liberal-minded, 
and has presented itself as an alternative English-language newspaper.5 It is currently operated by 
Nation Multimedia Group Plc, one of the biggest media organisations in Thailand, and has a daily 
circulation of 70,000 copies, with a market share of 45% (Forum Asia 2005).  
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The Nation Group’s main business involves the publication and distribution of magazines and 
newspapers, production of books for English education, production of television and radio 
programmes, and supervision of The Nation’s official news website. Its printed materials include the 
Daily Express (English), Krunthep Turakij (a Thai business newspaper), Kom Chad Luk (a Thai 
newspaper), Nation Channel (Thai & English TV), Nation Radio (Thai), Nation Weekend (Thai news), 
NJ (Nation Junior), Connect, Biz Book, Biz Week, Phuket Gazette, and OK Nation.  
 
 1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 1: Introduction explains the background of the research including its objectives, research 
questions, and scope of the research. 
 
Chapter 2: Thailand’s Southern Conflict: History and Current Situation explains the background and 
history of the ongoing conflict, looking at both past rebellions, and the rise of the current insurgency. 
The chapter later focuses on the year 2004 and the major incidents that occurred during that year. The 
chapter explains the theories behind the causes and the return of the violence from different 
perspectives, and ends with an overview of both the current situation and prospects for the future. 
 
Chapter 3: The Thai Mediascape summarises the history of journalism in Thailand, with a focus on the 
Thai print media and English-language newspapers. The chapter explains the background of the two 
English-language newspapers under scrutiny, Bangkok Post and The Nation. It also presents a critique 
of the Thai media, and the problems with the reportage of the southern conflict, and how these led to 
the establishment of the Issara News Center (INC) in a bid to introduce peace journalism into 
journalistic practices in Thailand.  
 
Chapter 4: The Literature Review on Peace Journalism examines the concept of conflict reporting, and 
focuses on the problems posed by war journalism. Later, it advocates peace journalism as an alternative 
means of conflict reporting, which emphasises the socially responsible role of the media. The literature 
review on peace journalism includes discussions and criticisms as well as its application to the 
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reporting on several conflicts from different parts of the world. The chapter ends with the discussions 
on the practice of peace journalism in the context of Thailand's southern conflict and its literature. 
 
Chapter 5: Research Methodologies: Content Analysis and Semi-structured Interview provides an 
overview of the theoretical frameworks and the methods of the study. The chapter justifies why the two 
methods – a content analysis and a semi-structured interview – are suitable for this inquiry, and how 
they can provide answers to the research questions. The theoretical frameworks that inform the 
research methods are presented and discussed. A brief overview of the two methods and how they are 
applied for this research are presented, and the methodological limitations of the study are provided.  
 
Chapter 6: The Representation of the Southern Conflict in News Coverage presents the findings from a 
content analysis of the two English-language newspapers to answer the question of how the conflict 
was reported. This chapter illustrates how the news coverage of the southern conflict supports specific 
elements of war and peace journalism. The empirical analysis reveals the prevailing war and peace 
journalism elements and frames, the dominant news actors and news sources, and the use of language 
to characterise the events and the actors of the incidents. Later, the comparison of the findings between 
the two newspapers under scrutiny are presented and discussed.  
 
Chapter 7: The Study of the Production of the Southern Conflict News puts forth the findings from 
semi-structured interviews. The chapter summarises main points derived from the interviews with 
some of the journalists and editors involved. The main points include: the perception of the conflict, the 
process of the production of the southern conflict news, the policy of the two newspapers in the 
production of the southern conflict news, and limitations in the news production process. The chapter 
later presents the recommendations for better journalistic practices in this context as proposed by the 
interviewees. 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusions provides a summary of the key answers to the research questions, including 
conclusions and discussions of major issues arising from this research. The chapter explains the 
significance of the study and the implications of the study for future research. The chapter ends with 
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the recommendations for the Thai media with regard to how the quality of its conflict reporting can be 
improved. 	
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Chapter 2 
Thailand’s Southern Conflict: History and the Current Situation 
 
Islamic insurgent movements have been a focus of domestic and regional concern in Southeast Asia for 
many years, with campaigns in Indonesia’s Aceh, the Philippines’ Mindanao, and Thailand’s south all 
providing examples of this. In the cases of Thailand and the Philippines, the movements occurred in 
countries where Muslims are not in the majority (Chalk 2001; Rabasa 2003). As Rabasa (2003) noted, 
the conflicts are derived from the disaffection of the Muslims in areas that used to be independent, but 
are now part of non-Muslim majority states: a source of discontent intensified by feelings of socio-
economic and political grievance. According to Funston (2008), Thailand used to represent a good 
example of the successful integration of the Muslim minority. However, the situation has changed 
considerably since early 2004, with the problems still ongoing today.  
 
Thailand has experienced insurgencies from the Muslim minority for over 100 years. However, the 
current wave of violence is different in many ways. First, the degree and scope of violence is hitherto 
unmatched. Innocent people, both Buddhists and Muslims, have been killed; with the methods of 
killing becoming professional, military-like and very well planned. Second, the incidents occurred in 
order to provoke fear amongst the general public (Abuza 2009, 2011). The insurgency greatly impacted 
upon the education, healthcare, economy and infrastructure of the region, and also brought into sharp 
focus issues regarding human rights, corruption and democracy. Most fundamentally, though, this 
insurgency grew out of the antipathy of Malay Muslims to the Thai state, and created huge divisions 
within one nation.  
 
This chapter, then, explains the complex background and history of Thailand’s southern conflict. It 
begins by detailing the history of the conflict: from the creation of the Thai nation to exploring past 
rebellions and the rise of the current insurgency. Details of major incidents in 2004 and a brief 
summary of violent situations between 2004 and 2014 are provided. Later, the chapter draws upon 
theories regarding the causes of the conflict and its resolution. It ends with a summary of the current 
situations, and an outlook for the future.  
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 2. 1 The history of the southern conflict 
This section explores the history of the southern conflict, from the incorporation of the former 
Malaysian state of 'Patani' into the Thai state, and then looks into Thai-nation building, especially the 
policy of assimilating the Muslim minority into Thai culture, which is believed to be the main cause of 
the past rebellions. 
   
  2.1.1 The history of ‘Patani’: from ‘Patani’ to ‘Pattani’ 
The history of conflict and tension in Thailand’s southern region can be traced back over a century. 
The three southernmost provinces formed part of the Great Patani after the fifteenth century before 
being incorporated into the Thai nation in the early 20th century. Patani was a Malay sultanate and 
centre of Islam in Southeast Asia. In ancient times, it represented a centre of Islamic learning, culture, 
diversity, and trade, and was a major power in the Malayan Peninsula (Suhrke 1970; Le roix 1998; 
Cline 2007; Funston 2008; Montesano and Jory 2008; Abuza 2009; Liow 2009). However, while 
'Pattani' refers to a modern Thai province, 'Patani' carries Malay nationalist connotations, and refers 
both to the historic sultanate and its wider area, including territories divided administratively today into 
the province of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and adjacent parts of Songkhla (McCargo 2008; Montesano 
and Jory 2008). The name ‘Patani’ is still used by the Malay Muslims in support of the independence 
and autonomy of the region (Funston 2008; Abuza 2009; Liow 2009).  
 
Between the Ayuddhaya and early Bangkok periods, Patani was a self-governed tributary state. While 
Thai historians claim that it was always a vassal state to Siam, Malay historians argue that it used to be 
an independent sultanate (McCargo 2008). Some historians suggest that Patani was under the rule of 
Ayuddhaya only when it was weak. However, the tributary relationship of the traditional Southeast 
Asian states was not that of colonies. Instead, the tributary states retained their autonomy, rule and 
ownership of their land: power was in local hands, meaning that the people enjoyed both freedom and 
protection (Puaksom 2008).  
 
Siam first intervened directly in the internal affairs of Patani when appointing its new governor. The 
relationship between Siam and Patani changed dramatically in the early Bangkok period at the time of 
King Rama II: when the status of the latter metamorphosed from tributary state to 'provincial city of 
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Siam' (Ibid.). Consequently, Siam was able to control, manipulate and appoint Patani’s government. As 
Puaksom (2008, p. 77) noted, Patani had now completely "lost its sovereignty and its tributary status".  
 
Under King Rama V (King Chulalongkorn), great administrative reforms centralised Bangkok’s power 
at the time of Western colonialism: when Britain was expanding its influence and power over the 
Malaysian Peninsula (Aphornsuvan 2007, 2008; Puaksom 2008). Patani came under Thai rule as a 
result of administrative centralisation in 1902: confirmed by the signing of the Anglo-Siamese treaty of 
1909, when Siam was forced to give up the four southern Malay states – Kedah, Pelis, Kelantan and 
Trengganu – in order to preserve its independence.6 As a result, Patani was bound within the modern 
territorial state: borders were fixed, power was centralised, and Patani now found itself an integral part 
of the Siamese state (Puaksom 2008). The dissatisfaction of Malay Muslims started to grow in 
consequence. 
 
The reforms aimed to decentralise the old power of the southern region by reorganising Patani into 
seven districts under a single administrative collective unit called ‘monthon Pattani’ (a group of 
provinces), governed by officials from Bangkok. These included: the removal of the rajas and 
aristocrats of Patani and their replacement with Thai bureaucrats, tax concessions, the replacement of 
traditional law with the Siamese legal code, and the introduction of a new educational system 
(Aphornsuvan 2007). King Rama V also recommended that the ‘Thai-isation’ policy be launched in 
order to prepare the officials who would take posts in the area, with the aim that they would eventually 
become Thai both in mind and manners (Puaksom 2008). Thailand was then highly centralised, with all 
of its provinces administered by Bangkok-elected officials (McCargo 2008).  
 
In reference to the Malay Muslims of Patani, Syukri (1985 cited by Apornsuvan 2007, p. 29) stated that 
1902 was regarded as "The year of the ultimate fall of the country of Patani, the loss of the sovereignty 
of its rajas, the destruction of the right of suzerainty of the Malays in the country of Patani." The Thai 
state then had full rights and power over the former Patani region; hardly surprisingly, this was 
strongly opposed by Patani’s leaders (Le Roix 1998; Puaksom 2008). That said, the cultural and social 
identities of the Malay Muslims were largely unaffected: "The Thai government divided the area into 
seven provinces which were governed by appointed bureaucrats under a centralized administrative 
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structure, but still managed dissidence more or less by leaving the Muslims alone” (Croissant 2007, 
p.2). However, the Thai state gradually began to push the creation of Thai national identity for Malay 
Muslims, especially in 1921, when the national curriculum was first used in the region (Abuza 2009). 
 
  2.1.2 The Thai nation building and the Thai-nisation of the Malay Muslims 
The incorporation into the Thai state of the former Patani region separated Muslims of Malay descent 
from Malay culture. The Thai government sought to forcibly assimilate the Muslim minority into 
mainstream Buddhist and Thai culture. The assimilation policy changed the Malay Muslims’ way of 
life, and they had to endure pressure from the Thai state while seeking to preserve their religious and 
cultural identity (Apornsuvan 2007; Abuza 2009). Suhrke (1977) highlighted the Malay Muslims as an 
example of the dilemmas of a small minority group faced with a majority-directed integration policy.   
 
The three pillars of Thai national identity – ‘Nation, Religion and Monarchy’ – provide a reminder that 
the structure of Thai society was created specifically to dilute other ethnic identities, and instead 
celebrate Buddhism as the national religion (Liow 2009). As we have seen, the ongoing southern 
conflict is largely a result of Thai nation-building through policies which caused a great deal of anger 
and resentment among the Muslim minority. As Aphornsuvan (2008, p. 94) stated:  
 
 “Political conflict and violence between the minorities and the state often come as a result of 
 state expansion, which attempted to introduce the values and institutions of the dominant 
 ethnic group into minority communities and made the majority 'national’ culture a 
 prerequisite for full entry to the nation.” 
 
The Thai state now had more control over Muslim minority issues, resulting in growing resentment and 
hostility among that minority towards it. Education, especially in the Thai language, represented a vital 
means with which to enforce the assimilation policy – so much so that there is now almost total literacy 
in Thai among the Muslim population. This includes funding and instruction in secular subjects within 
the framework of Muslim religious schools (Albritton 1999). Compulsory state education was first 
implemented in 1921; followed by the closing of Islamic schools, which led to deep resistance to both 
the study of the Thai language and the government itself.  
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According to McCargo (2008, p. 5), Malay Muslims viewed the state educational system as "an agent 
of assimilation intended to eradicate their Malayness." Moreover, the intervention of local rules and 
customs meant that hitherto cherished institutions such as masjid and pondok (traditional Malay 
religious schools) were replaced with central rules and regulations.7 All of this fostered growing anger 
and resentment amongst southern Muslims, sowing the seeds of a breeding ground for the insurgent 
activities of armed political groups in subsequent decades (McCargo 2006a, 2008; Jitpiromsri and 
Sobhonvasu 2006). 
 
In June 1932, the system of absolute monarchy was overthrown and replaced with one of a 
'Constitutional Monarchy.' The system of monthon8 was abolished; and Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and 
Satun were incorporated into Siam. A change to the system of ‘constitutional monarchy’ brought with 
it a little hope to the Muslim minority, because it allowed them to practice their rights and gain 
recognition under Thai democracy (Ishii 1994).  
 
Nevertheless, the Muslim minorities had to endure further hardship during the Second World War, 
when they faced economic deprivation and severe insecurity, while corruption among government 
officials led them to lose hope in the Thai government. The Second World War also gave rise to Thai 
Nationalism, with the Phibun government implementing a strict Thai-nisation policy, a policy of 
nation-building based solely on the Thai race. Phibun aimed to reform and reconstruct the social and 
cultural aspects of the country to create what he regarded as modern and civilised practices, but this 
allowed for little tolerance of minority and local cultures.9  
 
The policy of nation-building included the creation of a national history, and in tandem, the removal of 
most local histories: including the history of the Malay Muslims. Malay Muslims and other ethnic 
groups “were labeled as minorities and were forced to relinquish their own cultural and religious 
practices in order to become Thais” (Apornsuvan 2007, p. 11). The terms ‘Southern Thais’ and 
‘Islamic Thais’ were employed as a result of this policy, which aimed to tone down the distinctiveness 
of ethnic Malays, and to emphasise the Thai-ness of the Muslim minorities. In other words, although 
Thailand was willing to tolerate religious differences, it did not consider that there should be other 
important differences among its citizens (Aphornsuvan 2007; Funston 2008). 
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Under Phibun’s government, the Muslim minority endured its most severe amounts of political 
oppression, resulting in the emergence of the radicalisation movement of the Malay Muslims 
(Apornsuvan 2007, p. 43).  The most sensitive change involved the abolition of Islamic judges and 
Islamic laws relating to family (especially marriage, divorce and inheritance law) in 1944, and their 
replacement with Thai civil laws (Ibid.) Chaloemkiat (2004 cited in Aphornsuvan 2008, p. 108) 
asserted that “the most disturbing were Thai attempts to convert Muslims to Buddhism”. Phibun’s 
administration attempted to forcibly assimilate the Malay Muslim minority by discriminating against 
Malay language and culture for the sake of Thai nationalism.10 
 
In 1945, following the Second World War, the government of Khuang Aphaiwong implemented the 
Islamic Patronage Act of 1945, with the aim of restoring the south and reforming Phibun’s policies 
(Aphornsuvan 2007). The new policies included: the reform of Islamic affairs, the reappointment of 
Chularatchamontri,11 the restoration of Islamic family law, and of the rights to observe Friday as a 
religious holiday. This is considered to have represented a positive development in the relationship 
between the Muslim minority and the Thai state. As Scupin (1998, p. 35) stated: “Through the 
Patronage Act the 'ulamd', the mosque councils, and the madrasas were centralized under the authority 
of the Chularajmontri… The Chularajmontri would advise the monarchy and be considered the 
spiritual leader of the Muslims in Thailand." 
 
The brief period between 1945 and 1947 represented the beginning of an open dialogue between the 
two; however, such patronage policies could not stop growing Malay Muslim nationalist sentiment and 
disaffection from the Thai rule (Aphornsuvan 2008). Forbes (1982, p. 1067) considered that, following 
the Phibun period, the new government gradually became aware of the need to reach the Muslim 
minority. It emphasised Thailand's religious plurality, and that Muslims were expected to act as loyal 
Thai citizens. Thus an attempt to negotiate and bring the Malay Muslims under Thai patronage was 
made. For example, a commission was sent in 1947 to investigate the situation in the south and provide 
sympathetic support to the Muslims (Aphornsuvan 2008). In that year, the Provincial Islamic Council 
of Pattani, led by Haji Sulong, had drafted a ‘seven-point demand’ concerning political rule and the 
rights and religious affairs of the Muslims.12  
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The government could not accept all the demands, especially the idea that a particular ethnic group 
could demand separate rights or regional autonomy. The most that it could do was accept that the 
Muslim minority could become part of the Thai nation as ‘Thai-Muslims’ (Aphornsuvan 2008, p.112). 
However, the subsequent coming to power of the ‘Revolutionary Party’ (Khana Patiwat) resulted in 
more troubles for the Malay Muslims. The seven-point demand was ignored: all hope of dialogue with 
the government was now at an end (Aphornsuvan 2008, p.115). With the subsequent government when 
Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat came to power, the conflict instead intensified, with the assimilation 
policy strengthened through the resettlement of ethnic Thais in the South, and the assertion of control 
over Islamic religious schools (Funston 2008). This resulted in the emergence of Malay organisations 
such as BNNP (1959), BRN (1960) and PULO (1968)13 (Forbes 1982; Scupin 1998; Cline 2007; 
Funston 2008).  
 
PULO (The Patani United Liberation Organization) was the largest and most prominent active 
separatist organisation during the 1990s but has since lost its influence as a result of effective 
government action and declining support from Malaysia (Chalk 2001; Rabasa 2003). These groups, as 
Reynolds (2004, p. 11) stated, “have called for the provinces to be incorporated into Malaysia. They 
complain of heavy-handed treatment from the police and armed forces but stress that most Muslims 
want only respect for their culture and peace in the region.” After decades of oppression, the Muslim 
minority had now started to act against the Thai state by setting up organisations with the political goal 
of negotiating with the government.14 
 
  2.1.3 The Muslim minority 
The vast majority of Muslims in Thailand reside in its southernmost provinces - Pattani, Yala, 
Narathiwat – which are adjacent to the Malaysian border. Although Muslims represent only 4-5% of 
the Thai population, they constitute the largest religious minority in the country and differ significantly 
from wider Thai society (Knodel et al. 1999). Thai Muslims are not homogeneous, but they do all share 
faith in Islam.15 The majority are Sunnis following Shafi schools (Bajunid 2005). Thai Muslims are 
comprised of 'Malay Muslims', who speak Malay and reside primarily in the southern border provinces, 
and 'Thai Muslims' (or Thai Islam), who reside in central and north Thailand. Historically, the Muslims 
of south Thailand resided in a cultural region embedded within Malay culture, whereas the Muslims of 
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central and north Thailand have been influenced by Buddhist traditions, thus making it easier for them 
to assimilate into Thai culture (Scupin 1998). 
 
After 1902, when Pattani became a Thai province, the distinction between the Muslim minorities from 
the former Patani and Thai Muslims from other parts of the country became more obvious 
(Aphornsuvan 2007, p. 10). The Malay Muslims call themselves 'Jawi': a term which has long been 
used by the inhabitants of old Patani in order to designate themselves (Le Roix 1998). Most Muslims 
from the south are Malay in origin: sharing a common ethnic identity, language, culture, traditions and 
religious beliefs resembling those of the Malays. McCargo (2008, p. 5) noted that the southern region 
is distinguished by "an intense regional pride and a profound religiosity." 
 
In this sense, their Malayness is not merely racial or ethnic, but is instead the faith which binds the 
Muslims altogether (Ibid.). They hold strictly Islamic values and regard Islam as one distinct identity 
(Yusuf 2007; McCargo 2008; Liow 2009). They consider themselves as Malays, as Muslims, as people 
of Patani; and in all three distinct identities, clearly distinguish Muslims in the south from the rest of 
Thailand (McCargo 2008). To the Muslims, Islam is more than just a religion: it is also a religious 
system, way of life, ideology and form of civilisation.  
 
For this reason, the preservation of their identity has become the principal task – individual and 
communal – necessary to maintain their practice of Islam (Bajunid 2005; Yusuf 2007). Yusuf (2007, p. 
321) referred to the uniqueness of the Malay Muslims as ‘ethno-religious Islam’: they place a very 
strong emphasis on the ethnic aspect of their faith, give primacy to their ethnic identity, and view their 
life experience from the perspective of religious aspects. In this sense, ethnicity and religion cannot be 
separated, resulting in the formation of an ‘ethnicised view of Islam’ (Ibid.). 
 
The Muslim population maintains quite an ambiguous position in Thai society, with their customs, 
language and religion marking them out as an ethnic minority (Suhrke 1970). Around 80% of Malay 
Muslims have never been assimilated culturally and psychologically into predominantly Buddhist 
Thailand (McCargo 2008). Not only do they carry a strong sense of religious identity, but they also live 
as a minority in a non-Muslim state where the identities between them and the majority overlap, 
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particularly as a consequence of assimilation or integration policies (Bajunid 2005). However, instead 
of initiating a military and political struggle against the Thai Buddhist state, more Muslims have 
strengthened their religious ties and are involved in revitalising their Islamic identity (Scupin 1998, p. 
255).  
 
While other minority groups can merge within the main Thai society by using the common Thai 
language, Malay Muslims have found it harder to blend in. Most have little knowledge of Thai 
language. According to Aphornsuvan (2007), older generations of Malay Muslims do not want to learn 
Thai for fear of becoming Buddhists. They speak the Yawi dialect, not Thai. Normally, those who 
speak Thai are considered as thoroughly integrated citizens, whereas those Malay-speaking Muslims 
are considered not as aliens, but as a minority within Thailand (Albritton 1999, p. 237). As Albritton 
(1999, p. 244) highlighted, "It is precisely this level of integration and sense of ‘Thai-ness’ that permits 
the luxury of political competition within the Muslim community." In other words, the level of 
integration of Muslims into Thai society depends largely on the extent to which they integrate Thai 
culture and language.  
 
The Thai-nisation of the Malay Muslims was, then, considered as a threat to the fundamental tenets of 
Islamic life and culture, especially when it came to enforcing education on the part of the Thai 
government. However, the low education standard of the Malay Muslims led them to experience 
economic deprivation and unemployment (Suhrke 1970). Smythe (1960, p. 282) noted that the 
government effectively treated Malay Muslims as colonial subjects: Thai officials from Bangkok, who 
do not speak their language, had to use interpreters to talk with them in the same way as colonial 
powers communicated with their colonies.  
 
The growing difficulties facing Malay Muslims in Thailand have also occurred in tandem with material 
and moral advantages being enjoyed by the majority Muslim population in neighbouring Malaysia (Le 
Roix 1998). Not unnaturally, this caused immediate resentment among Malay Muslims, who felt a 
sense of profound deprivation in comparison with their Islamic neighbours across the border (Scupin 
1998). As a result, many Malay Muslims hold dual nationality, and they see Malaysia as an alternative 
where they can find work or seek exile in (McCargo 2008).  
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The perception of Malay Muslims is that they were colonised by Siam, treated as second-class citizens, 
and regarded as inferior because of the discrimination imposed from Bangkok by ethnic Thai officials 
(Funston 2008). Nonetheless, Albritton (2010) argued differently, claiming that most devout Muslims 
in the region consider that the state sufficiently accommodates the Muslim minority, and has granted 
all of the essentials necessary for Muslim life.16  
 
 2.2 The history of the past rebellions 
The first violent clash between the Muslim minority and the Thai authority occurred in 1922 when the 
Muslims refused to pay land taxes to the government. The cause of this rebellion stemmed from the use 
of the Compulsory Primary Education Act, which required all Malay Muslim children to attend Thai 
primary school (Aphornsuvan 2008). This rebellion caused King Rama VI to revise Islamic learning 
and taxation of the Malay Muslims in the south (Ibid.). This showed that the Thai authorities had 
become aware of the emerging sense of Malay Nationalism in the southern region (Ibid.). The 
accession of the new constitutional government in 1932 changed the situation for Malay Muslims, with 
the constitution providing the opportunity for them to enjoy a public space in which to speak their 
needs. The tensions between them and the Thai authorities thus reduced for a brief period, though 
mistreatment by the ministerial and provincial government still existed (Ibid.).  
 
However, the 1932 constitution gave an opportunity to the Muslim leaders to criticise the government’s 
policy and its authority: such criticism was considered unacceptable by government officials. The Thai 
officials sent from Bangkok to the south were those considered as incompetent and those involved in 
illegal business and corruption (Funston 2008). As Aphornsuvan (2008) noted, complaints and 
petitions regarding the cruelty and unjust practices of the Thai officials, particularly the police, were 
also regularly being made and organised. This period marked the rise of Haji Sulong, the Muslim 
leader who started to negotiate with the government, and who was considered a symbol of the Malay 
Muslims’ struggle against the Thai state.17 
 
Sulong provided an example of the willingness of Muslim leaders to enter dialogue and negotiate with 
the Thai government. The resistance movement was mostly a reaction to the government’s mishandling 
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of the conditions in the south (Ibid. p.122). Sulong and his associates were later arrested and charged 
with treason. His arrest offended Muslim sensibilities so much that a huge crowd of Malay Muslims 
gathered at the court for his trial.  
 
This later resulted in a clash between the police and Malay Muslims in the ‘Duson ngor rebellion’ of 
1948.18 The event represented the turning point of the whole conflict, and was swiftly followed by the 
Khuang government’s rejection of the seven-point demand posted by Sulong. Aphornsuvan (2007, 
p.46) stated that the government used Sulong “to justify systematic suppression of the Muslim 
opposition” and Sulong was a significant figure in the revival of Malay nationalism at the time of the 
birth of democracy in Thailand, signifying the transition from the old raja to the new generation. 
 
 2.3 The rise of the current insurgency 
This section looks into the beginning of the current southern conflict violence from the peaceful era to 
the first wave of violence in 2004, with the main focus on the three major incidents in 2004. This 
section ends with a summary of the violent incidents over the past ten years. 
 
  2.3.1 The peaceful era 
Outbreaks of violence then declined greatly between the 1980s and 1990s, due to a number of 
contributory factors. These included the establishment of new conflict resolution institutions, such as 
SBPAC (1981) or CPM43 (1980);19 more conciliatory security measures; wider understandings of 
cultural pluralism; better understanding on the part of government leaders; and improved relations with 
Malaysia (Funston 2008). The new policy included 1981’s Tai Rom Yen (Peaceful South) Project, 
overseen by Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond. Croissant (2007, p.2) underscored that: "It was not until 
General Prem Tinsulanonda became prime minister in March 1980 that the government enacted any 
serious attempts to bring order to the reigning chaos." 
 
General Prem’s government (1980–88) supported Muslim cultural rights and religious freedoms, 
offered the insurgents a general amnesty, and implemented an economic development plan for the 
South (Ibid.).  At the time, attitudes towards ethnic minorities had changed from assimilation to 
integration: a new concept of ‘Thainess’ included the celebration of cultural differences, local history 
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and knowledge, and greater religious freedom including the use of Islamic names and the building of 
public prayer rooms (Funston 2008). Muslim representatives also at last started to play roles in Thai 
politics.  
 
  2.3.2 The year 2004: escalation of the insurgency 
Violence resumed in 2001, when attacks on police outposts, episodes of arson, and organised weapon 
thefts increased; however, the scale of the attacks was much smaller in comparison with the events of 
2004. According to Jitpiromsri (2013), from 1993 to 2003, there were 722 records of insurgency-
related incidents. In comparison, fully 3,000 incidents occurred in 2004 alone. As a result, 2004 was 
marked as the start of the current insurgency when violent incidents increased in terms of the number 
of victims and the scale of the attacks. However, the violent events were confined to the area of Pattani, 
Yala, Narathiwat, and four districts of Songkhla (see Figure 2.1 and 2.2).  
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Figure 2.1: Map of regions affected by low-intensity conflict in 
 Thailand's Deep South (Source: McCargo 2009a, p. 55). 
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 Figure 2.2: The number of violent incidents in Thailand's southern border provinces occurred 
 between 1993 and 2010. (Source: Deep South Watch, 2012, 4 April 2012. Available from: 
 http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/3077 [Accessed 18 November 2014]. 
 
Figure 2.2 indicates that the number of violent incidents occurring prior to the year 2004 was 
considerably low, while the number of violent incidents in the year 2004 was twenty times higher than 
in 2003, making it a remarkable year for the current insurgency. Abuza (2009, p.53) stated that 
activities from 2001-2003 were of a level low enough to merely blend into the overall criminality of 
the region, but to date the start of the insurgency to a specific point in 2004 is in part "politically 
motivated and journalistically convenient." In this sense, the raid on the army camp in January 2004 
marked the rise of the current southern conflict, and provided the common media reference point for 
the start of the insurgency. 
 
Assassinations, shootings, bombings and arson attacks on temples, schools and government buildings 
now began to occur on a daily basis (Albritton 2010). The Thai state struggled to comprehend an 
insurgency which could not be identified in any organised form. It featured no leadership, nor any clear 
political objectives (unlike in the cases of the separatist movements in the Philippines and Indonesian 
Aceh). Some scholars are sceptical as to whether the current insurgency will become internationalised 
and transformed into any kind of regional or global jihad (Connor 2006, p.153). However, the Thai 
government often downplays the political motives of the insurgency, stating that violent incidents are 
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the result of ordinary crime.20 
 
   2.3.2.1 Major incidents in 2004 
Since January 2004, a low-level insurgency has developed into a full-scale campaign of violence. For 
the first time, a religious aspect of the conflict was highlighted by the killing of Buddhist monks and 
innocent local Buddhists. As a result, the killings of monks in the Muslim-dominated area has 
worsened the relationship between Buddhists and Muslims in the country.  
 
The three major events of 2004 involved the arsenal raid (4th January), Kruese Mosque incident (28th 
April), and Takbai incident (25th October). McCargo (2008) believed that all three major incidents 
were designed to discredit and humiliate the Thai state and to worsen the relationship between the Thai 
state and the Muslim minority. The first incident, McCargo (2008) argued, highlighted the 
complacency and incompetence of the Thai army; the second bore witness to the excessive eagerness 
of the Thai authorities to violate the ancient Kruse Mosque; and the third demonstrated the cruelty of 
the security forces. All three major incidents in 2004 were selected for this research because they 
played an important role in the rise of the current southern insurgency. The details of each incident are 
provided in the following section.  
 
Arsenal raid incident (4th January 2004) 
An unexpected raid on the Fourth Development Battalion’s Narathiwat Army Camp is generally 
viewed as marking the beginning of the current southern insurgency. The incident started when 
hundreds of young men burnt down 20 schools across the region and raided an army ammunition depot 
in Narathiwat Province. They made off with more than 400 weapons, including RPGs, machine guns 
and rifles and killed four soldiers at the scene. In Yala, attackers burnt rubber tyres and planted fake 
explosives on the roads.  
 
These were very well-planned attacks, which required military skills and training. The government 
admitted that the attacks were well coordinated. Moreover, the incident contained a religious overtone 
when Buddhist soldiers were separated from Muslim soldiers and killed (The Nation, 7 January 2004). 
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Prime Minister Thaksin criticised the soldiers for negligence and expressed emotionally that those 
soldiers “deserved to die”, drawing much criticism from the Thai public for his comments.  
 
After the arsenal raid incident, the situation deteriorated, and daily killings increased. Victims included 
innocent local people. Attacks were made against monks, Buddhist temples, and even local Muslims 
who associated with the Thai government. The killing of monks brought religious aspects into the 
picture. The government employed a hard-line response, implementing martial law in the three 
provinces and deploying additional army troops. Some 30,000 soldiers were stationed in the region. 
The police and army tightened up their security measures, and, according to Funston (2008), some 200 
suspected Malay Muslim insurgents were abducted by security forces. Between 4th January and 27th 
April 2004 (the period between the arsenal raid and the Kruese Mosque incidents), attacks were quite 
limited and remarkable in their lack of sophistication (Abuza 2009). Only five bombings and three 
arson attacks occurred, resulting in 31 dead and 42 wounded. The victims were mostly government 
officials.  
 
Kruese mosque incident (28th April 2004)  
This incident occurred when a group of young Muslim men planned coordinated attacks on police 
posts at 11 government locations and security checkpoints in Pattani, Yala and Songkhla provinces. 
After the attacks failed, 32 militants, mostly young Muslim teenagers, sought refuge in the Kruese 
mosque, which local Muslims regarded as the holiest mosque in the region. The eight-hour conflict 
ended when the military was ordered to attack the mosque, and gunned down all attackers, killing all 
32 Muslims and greatly damaging the mosque.  
 
In total, 108 attackers and five security personnel were killed and 17 were arrested on that day. 
Although the government sought to downplay the incidents by calling the attackers ‘local bandits’, the 
attacks were nonetheless well coordinated. The independent commission conducted by the National 
Reconciliation Centre (NRC), which was set up to investigate the incident, found that the authorities 
“failed to launch genuine negotiations for the surrender of the militants." 21 
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The incident provoked both a controversial military and police response, and huge anger among the 
Muslims. Local people believed that the actions of the police and military amounted to an insult to 
Islam: their holiest, most sacred mosque had been desecrated. Moreover, of the 108 attackers killed and 
17 arrested, most were poorly armed teenagers who died as a result of a shoot-to-kill order. Although 
the events took place at various locations across the region, the Thai public named it the ‘Kruese’ 
incident after the name of the mosque. The bodies of the dead Muslim men were buried unwashed and 
without prayer. Thus, they have come to be viewed by local Muslims as shahid (martyrs). Moreover, 
the fact that the Army stormed the mosque and killed the Muslim attackers inside raised religious 
issues in Thai society. As Satha-anand (2006, p. 33) noted, the sanctity of the mosque was violated, and 
"the political cost of such an act in the eyes of Muslims, both in Thailand and abroad, has turned out to 
be almost incalculable." 
 
After the attacks, the army found printed material entitled 'Berjihad di Pattani' (The Struggle for 
Patani)22 on one of the bodies, which arguably signifies the arrival of radical Islam in the region. Some 
scholars proposed that the Kruese incident and Dusun ngor uprising of 1948 are symbolically 
connected.23 The religious undertone of the incident symbolised the fracture between the Buddhist 
Thais and the Thai Muslims, leading to ever-widening mistrust and misunderstanding between the two 
communities (McCargo 2009b, 2009c).  
 
From 28th April to 24th October 2004 (between the Kruese mosque and Takbai incidents), a new 
pattern emerged: militants began to attack those they believed to be supporters of the state, including 
Muslim 'collaborators.'A total of 51 people were killed, both Buddhists and Muslims; 78 people were 
injured (Abuza 2009, p.63). 
 
Takbai demonstration incident (25th October 2004)  
On 25th October 2004, around 2,000 people, mostly Muslim youths, demonstrated in the district of 
Takbai, Narathiwat Province. They were protesting against martial law and demanding the release of 
six Muslim youths, arrested by the police under the accusation of involvement in supplying weapons to 
militants. The authorities failed to negotiate with the demonstrators, and the police instead called for 
Army reinforcements. Later, the security forces used gunfire and tear gas in an attempt to control the 
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situation. Seven demonstrators were killed by gunshot wounds. Later that day, hundreds of 
demonstrators were arrested. The army ordered the protestors’ shirts to be taken off and their hands to 
be tied behind their backs, after which they were loaded into trucks to be taken for interrogation at the 
Army Camp in Pattani, approximately 4 hours away. The demonstrators were stacked five or six deep 
in the unventilated trucks. By the time they reached their destination, 78 of them had died from 
asphyxiation in addition to the seven who died from gunshot wounds. 
 
The Takbai incident resulted in domestic and international indictments of the Thai state as a key 
perpetrator and major cause of the southern problem, and many questions were asked about the 
excessive use of force by the government (Askew 2007; Funston 2008; Abuza 2009). The death of 78 
demonstrators in transit to an army camp appeared like a massacre rather than merely an incompetent 
military response (Abuza 2009). The public called for justice, resulting in the appointment of an 
independent fact-finding commission. Their findings confirmed the mishandling and lack of 
professionalism by the Thai security forces (Funston 2008, p. 29).  
 
The conflict then deteriorated further due to a culturally insensitive remark from Prime Minister 
Thaksin, who blamed the militants for Takbai, claiming that many of the protesters appeared to be 
drug-addicted and in a similar state to those involved in the Kruese incident. He added that the deaths 
had occurred because the transit took place during the month of Ramadan, and advised the OIC 
(Organization of Islamic Cooperation) to go back and read the Koran properly.24 
 
  2.3.3 Summary of violent incidents from 2004-2014 
Since 2004, several major incidents of violence have occurred in the region. The major incidents in 
2005 include: the killing of an Imam in Narathiwat, which led to the exodus of Malay Muslims to 
Kelantan (Malaysia); two marines being taken hostage and later killed after villagers accused them of 
killing members of their village; and a monk and two temple boys being killed inside Phromprasit 
temple in Pattani. The major incident of 2006 was the Gujingruepo incident in Narathiwat when two 
female Buddhist teachers were separated from their Muslim colleagues and taken hostages by villagers. 
The villagers demanded the release of the two suspects arrested for the killing of the two marines in 
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2005. The two teachers were severely beaten before being rescued by the armed forces, teacher Kru 
Juling later died of her injuries seven months later.  
 
On 16th September 2006, Prime Minister Thaksin was ousted by a bloodless coup led by Army Chief 
General Sonthi Boonyaratglin. His complete mishandling of the situation in the south was among a 
number of factors which greatly diminished his public support. The new Prime Minister, Surayud 
Chulanont, issued a public apology for Thaksin’s administration of the south; and promised new 
initiatives, including the dropping of charges against the 58 Takbai protesters, the abolition of 
blacklists, a promise to adopt Malayu as a working language, an improved relationship with Malaysia, 
the resolution of the conflict through peaceful means, and the re-establishment of the SBPAC and CPM 
43.25 
 
Despite these promises, the violence continued to increase. Only a few of the promises were actually 
implemented. As Abuza (2011, p.4) stated, “However, little was actually done, furthering popular 
mistrust of the government. Moreover, the insurgents did not seem to care who was in charge in 
Bangkok and were unwilling to give the central government a chance. Violence soared in 2007, 
peaking at an average of more than four people a day being killed by May.” The worst years of the 
violence so far were considered to be those of 2006-2007 (Ibid.).  
 
The major incidents of 2004-2006 from the start of the current insurgency until after the 2006 coup can 
be summarised as follows: 
 
2004 
4 January 2004 – The arsenal raid incident 
22 and 24 January 2004 - Three Buddhist monks (in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat) were killed, marking 
the first time that monks had been targeted. 
12 March 2004 - Muslim lawyer, Somchai Neelapaijit, defending many cases for accused southerners, 
‘disappeared’.  
28-29 March 2004 - 39 government buildings in Pattani, Songkhla and Yala were torched in 
coordinated attacks. 
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28 April 2004- The Kruese Mosque incident 
17 September 2004 - The first high-ranking official, a judge, was killed in Pattani. 
25 October 2004 – The Takbai demonstration incident 
 
2005 
3 April 2005 - Three bomb attacks in Songkhla, including at Hat Yai International Airport. 
14 July 2005 - Synchronised attacks at various locations in Yala by up to 60 attackers causing 
blackouts and chaos, and resulting in the issuing of an emergency decree on July 16. 
30 August 2005 - Villagers claimed that officials had killed their religious leader (Imam). Protests 
resulted in the exodus of 131 villagers to Malaysia. 
20 September 2005 - Two marines were held hostage at Tanyong Limo, Narathiwat. Later, they were 
beaten to death. 
18 December 2005 – Around 1,000 villagers from Narathiwat seized two schools and held two teachers 
hostage, demanding the release of two villagers detained by police.  
 
2006 
18-19 January 2006 - Arson attacks across the four provinces. 
2 March 2006 - More than 20 locations in Songkhla and 18 in Patani suffered arson attacks. 
19 May 2006 - Two female Buddhist teachers were separated from their Muslim colleagues and 
severely beaten. One of the teachers later died from her injuries in January 2007. 
15 July 2006 - 20 bombs exploded in Narathiwat, 18 in Pattani and 12 in Yala, killing three people and 
injuring many more. 
16 September 2006 - 5 people were killed, including the first Westerner in the conflict, and 
approximately 60 injured, as a result of 6 explosions in Hat Yai. 
 
As we can see from the summary provided above, between 2004 and 2006, violent incidents in the 
region continued and increased in terms of both number and scale of attacks; the targets included 
innocent people such as monks or school teachers. Figure 2.3 presents the number of monthly incidents 
and the number of deaths and casualties from January 2004 to April 2014. 
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 Figure 2.3: Comparison of monthly fatalities and injuries across 114 months  
 (January 2004 –April 2014). (Source: Deep South Watch (2015). Available at: 
http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/dsj/6631 [Accessed 12 February 2015]. 
 
 
 Figure 2.4: Comparison of fatalities and injuries from the southern violence between Buddhists and 
Muslims people from January 2004- April 2014. (Source: Deep South Watch (2015).  
 Available at: http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/dsj/6631 [Accessed 12 February 2015]. 
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Figure 2.4 indicates that between January 2004 and April 2014, there were 14,128 incidents of 
violence, causing a total of 6,097 fatalities and 10,908 injuries. The majority of the dead were Muslims 
(3,394 deaths: 53.97%), while 2,213 of those killed (38.45%) were Buddhist. Conversely, most of 
those injured were Buddhist civilians (6,024 injured: 59.05%); while there were 3,211 Muslim injuries 
(31.47%). This all signifies that although the reasons behind the southern insurgency involved hostility 
towards the Thai state and its officials, the targets were no longer limited to Buddhist Thais. Local 
Muslims, especially those with some connection (perceived or otherwise) with the state, were also 
targeted.  
 
 2.4 Understanding the southern conflict and its dynamics 
In order to understand the dynamics of the current southern conflict situation, this section aims to 
explain theories on the causes of the conflict posed by several scholars and also includes their proposed 
resolutions. This section ends with a summary of the current situation and the future outlook. 
 
  2.4.1 Theories behind the return of the violence 
Since 2004, the escalation of violence in Thailand’s southern border region has raised questions over 
the causes and factors behind the incidents. Scholars and academics have put forward various theories 
aiming to identify the domestic, historical, political and ideological dimensions of the attacks: the 
discourse surrounding the causes of the violence varies considerably. The key explanations revolve 
around religious and ethnic differences, historical grievances, governance, and poverty in the southern 
border area.  
 
The Thai government prefers to view the conflict as a struggle for territory, and insists that the 
perpetrators are either common bandits or some renewed version of old separatist groups, while the 
National Reconciliation Center (NRC) perceives it in terms of abstract principles: calling for truth, 
justice, equality and transparency (McCargo 2006a; Sagunnasil 2006). As Aphornsuvan (2008) 
highlighted, views on the subject are polarised, with one group, containing foreign academics and 
journalists, depicting it as a result of the government’s mishandling of Muslim minority issues, while 
the opposing group features mainly Thai academics, whose views are conditioned by loyalty to the 
state and a sense of nationalism. Despite the differences in assumptions and theories, all groups 
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(academics, officials, Muslims and Buddhists) agreed on one point: the ‘separatism movement’ 
emerged from the centralised administrative policies launched by the Buddhist Thai state.  
 
Many scholars have identified radical Islam as a clear threat to the region, due to the changing patterns 
cited above, the scale of well-planned attacks, and the increasing number of casualties. Suggested links 
between the conflict and the international jihadist movement, involving such groups as Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI), might appear at first glance to be persuasive (Cline 2007; Yusuf 2007; Funston 2008; 
McCargo 2008; Albritton 2010). However, Cline (2007, p.284) argued that although the southern 
insurgency does provide a base for a wider jihadist group, such linkages do not appear to exist: many 
of the grievances remain more ethnic than religious, and much more local than regional or 
international. McCargo (2008, p. 188) agreed that the violence was inspired by the separatist 
movement in the region, and that "a ruthless and well-organised militant movement was responsible for 
most of the violence taking place in the Southern border provinces", but the conflict is not part of the 
global war on terror.  
 
Scholars did agree, though, that radical Islam has played some role. Jitpiromsri and Sobhonvasu (2006) 
contended that the factors behind the attacks are not social, but borne of ideological beliefs from 
radical Islamic movements, which distinguishes the current situation from past separatist movements. 
Another Thai scholar, Sagunnasil (2006), argued that the southern conflict is derived from a 
radicalisation of Islam. Sagunnasil used the 'Berjihad di Patani' leaflet found at Kruese Mosque, which 
urged Muslims to fight against the Thai state, as evidence for this viewpoint. The leaflet together with 
the suicidal actions of the militants at Kruese, according to the scholar, are proof that the radical 
ideology of jihadist doctrine had arrived, which explains the change in tactics of the militants since 
early 2004.  
 
Abuza (2009) argued that the insurgency in the south was not related to the global war on terror, and 
would have happened at around the same time even without the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001. 
Abuza believed that the insurgency was motivated by Wahhabism.26 However, as many scholars 
believed, the fact that Prime Minister Thaksin supported the US and its policy in the war on terror may 
have played a part in further infuriating Muslim minorities in Thailand; and may therefore be one of 
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the reasons behind the returning of violence. During Thaksin’s first term (2001-2005), the security 
situation in the South deteriorated hugely (Ganjanakhundee and Pathan 2004). Thaksin is said to have 
used a heavy-handed policy to control the situation, including extrajudicial killings and by constantly 
shuffling security officials in the region. 
 
Some commentators pointed to actions by the Thaksin administration as the key reason: in particular, 
the dissolution of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC), a multifunctional 
agency acting as an intelligence agency and mediator between the Thai state and Muslim population 
(McCargo 2006a, 2008; Cline 2007). As SBPAC had been successful in integrating Muslims and 
acting as a social, cultural and political forum where Muslims could raise complaints and express their 
grievances, its dissolution had a very significant affect: a key institutional apparatus on the border “that 
formerly guaranteed a level of equilibrium and dialogue between the state and Muslim communities of 
the border provinces” (Askew 2007:p.x) had been dismembered.  
 
Funston (2008, p. 23) claimed that the ‘war on drugs’ in 2003 provided a basis for the violence: around 
2,500 people were subject to extrajudicial killings, with Thaksin’s mishandling of the situation having 
"revived the traditional feeling of discrimination." The then Prime Minister Thaksin also exhibited a 
lack of sympathy for Malay Muslims, as his remarks after the Kruese and Takbai incidents 
demonstrated. McCargo (2006b) focused specifically on Thaksin’s role saying that Thaksin chose the 
southern region as a battleground for his attempted seizure of power from the palace or the ‘network 
monarchy’27; and the tensions between his networks and those of the palace helped trigger off the 
violence.  
 
Pathmanand (2006) concurred, stating that Thaksin exploited southern violence in order to stir up 
nationalist sentiment, and provoked Buddhists against the Muslim minorities as a way to preserve his 
electoral popularity among the Thai majority. Thaksin knew that most Buddhist Thais would be easily 
influenced by patriotism; so he led the new wave of Thai nationalism by deploying hardline policies 
and military methods with which to fight the insurgency. However, as Abuza (2009, p. 64) argued, this 
counter-insurgency policy was a failure, and was a victim of "political interference, rapid transitions in 
the military leadership, unclear lines of authority, and a state of political denial." 
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Many Thai intellectuals shared the assumption that the recent violence was very strongly related to 
historical discontent (Albritton 2010). As McCargo (2008) posited, the conflict is a ‘war over 
legitimacy’: Thai rule over the region has long since lacked legitimacy and a sense of justice for the 
Muslim minority – meaning that historical and political grievances, rather than religious ones, continue 
to predominate. McCargo’s explanation is worth quoting at length:  
 
"Patani Muslims do not rebel because of deep-rooted socioeconomic or psychological 
grievances, and nor are they primarily animated by jihadist ideologies. Their cause is a 
political one that centers on local questions of legitimacy; they want to regain control of 
territory they believe to be theirs, and doing so involves violently rejecting the claims of the 
Thai state on that territory (McCargo 2008, p. 187)." 
 
However, Aiewsrivongse (2004) considered that separatist movements from the past had nothing to do 
with the current insurgency: they merely gave support but did not take any concrete action. He 
characterised the incidents as a 21st century peasant’s revolt, arising from a desperate need for 
resources and development in the region, but with no specific purposes or target. Satha-Anand (2006) 
countered that the root causes are historical. Abuza (2009, p. 29) pointed out that the Buddhist and 
ethnic Chinese communities dominated the southern Thai economy, whereas Malay Muslims remain 
plagued by lack of education, healthcare, welfare or employment. Abuza highlighted a strong sense of 
“internal imperialism and relative deprivation” (Ibid.) among the Muslim population, whose social 
grievances include education, assimilation, social justice, morality and institutionalised racism (Abuza 
2009, p.32). 
 
Other arguments focus on local issues such as ethnic-religious conflict.  Reports from the International 
Crisis Group and US State Department suggested that the insurgency is driven by these ethno-religious 
grievances. Yusuf (2007, p.320) emphasised the nature of a local conflict rooted in a clash between two 
ethnic groups - Thai Buddhism and Malay Islam - with the latter in the minority, and adopting a 
Malay-Muslim, nationalist and separatist stance. In this sense, ethno-religious identity is indeed a large 
determining factor in the forming and shaping of the conflict.  
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Funston (2008, p. 19) highlighted the traditional factors of Malay Muslims’ perceptions of 
discrimination and mistreatment by the Thai state, which was reinforced by Thaksin’s administration, 
and claimed that this sense of injustice "has been powerfully exploited by the insurgents." Croissant 
(2007), also stated that structural factors – historical concerns, religious differences, and social and 
economic marginalisation – have resulted in local grievances and a conflict between two ethnic groups, 
with the Muslim minority only rebelling when they perceived their cultural identity to be under threat 
from the Thai authorities.  
 
Thus according to this argument, the political and cultural discrimination by government officials in 
favour of the Buddhist majority, together with economic deprivation, were the main reasons behind the 
conflict. Albritton (2010), however, asserted that the fracture between the Buddhist Thais and Muslim 
minority is not primarily religious but ethnocentric, represented by orientations to Malay or Thai 
culture and identity. On the other hand, Askew (2007, p.4) proposed that the violence is simply the 
product of Thailand’s disorderly state: a key problem which many governments have long since failed 
to resolve. 
 
Interestingly, McCargo (2009b) noted that religious tolerance in Thailand is declining because of the 
growing sense that Buddhism is under threat from Islamic insurgents in the south, which has increased 
anti-Muslim fears and sentiments among majority Buddhists. The connection can be drawn here 
between the Thai media and the representation of the conflict and its result in creating fracture between 
the two communities, which is the main focus of this study. The growing sense of fear of the Buddhist 
majority toward the Muslim minority is partly affected by the way the media present the conflict, and 
shape the perception of the majority Thais on the southern issues. This point will be further discussed 
in Chapter 3, the Thai mediascape. 
 
Overall, this section explored theories on the causes of the southern conflict in order to provide a 
background for the understanding of the southern conflict and its dynamics. The next section explains 
possible resolutions of the conflict as proposed by several scholars. 
 
  2.4.2 Southern conflict: Towards the resolution 
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Several scholars and academics have considered different solutions to the southern conflict. McCargo 
(2010, p.279) evaluated a multitude of perspectives from academics, NRC members, politicians, 
ministers and former Prime Ministers,28 only to find that each had arrived at broadly the same 
conclusion: “…Security responses, arrests and emergency legislation were unlikely to contain the 
violence. Governance in the region had to be urgently restructured." In other words, a hardline 
response is unlikely to solve the conflict. Jitpiromsri and McCargo (2010, p. 180) also proposed that 
the Thai state should address the distinctive character of the region and explore the details of proposals 
for ways of letting the Muslims run their own affairs.  
 
In this sense, these scholars suggested that new local governance should be restructured according to 
the distinctive character of the region, with locals allowed to participate in its running. McCargo 
(2009a; 2010) suggested some forms of autonomy, but to the Thai people, the word ‘autonomy’ means 
‘independence’, which poses a potential threat to national integration and even national security, 
meaning that it has long been considered as ‘off the table’.  
 
Another solution proposed is that the Thai government take the issue of the southern insurgency more 
seriously as a national matter because, right now, the Thai government does not seem to see the 
conflict as a prime consideration (Jitpiromsri and McCargo 2008; McCargo 2009a). Abuza (2011, p. 
25), too, considered that the government has not pushed for the reforms that could make a real 
difference and would start to win the hearts and minds of the people. The lack of professionalism of the 
Thai authorities and continued violations of human rights are still pressing issues, which continue to 
create mistrust among the locals. Moreover, Abuza proposed that as long as the violence continues, the 
insurgency will remain a low priority for the Thai government, which is focused on national political 
disputes and is reluctant to adopt a more conciliatory approach to the conflict.  
 
In order to bring about future stability in the southern region, scholars agree that the Thai government 
needs to stop its overemphasis on military responses. As Croissant (2007, p.1) underscored,  the 
"immediate consequences of the counter-insurgency such as the erosion of respect for human rights 
and other political rights and the deepening political divide in Thai society..." has become not a 
solution, but a cause of the continuing violence. Therefore, the Thai government needs to combine 
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measures which stress the political, cultural, and economic root causes of the problem; and continue to 
foster economic development and education, all of which will gradually restore stability to the region 
(Chalk 2001; Croissant 2007).  
 
Jitpiromsri (2011, p.15) focused on the need to get at the root causes of the problem – which are issues 
of ethnicity, identity and religion – and to directly deal with these issues by creating new forms of 
governance. He concluded that the conflict can only be resolved through peaceful means and such 
changes must be associated with the process of creating and broadening a public space between the 
various parties involved.  
 
In sum, scholars share the common opinion that the Thai government should take the southern conflict 
more seriously; the southern administration needs to be tackled at the root causes of the conflict with 
the aim of restoring political, cultural and economic stability to the region; and most importantly, all 
the changes should be put forward by peaceful means. 
 
 2.5 Current circumstances and the future  
On 10 February 2013, five soldiers were killed by a car bomb, and the insurgents took the dead 
soldiers’ rifles. The incident was widely discussed, as video footage was released to the public. The 
Thai Army attacked the insurgents’ military base three days later, resulting in the death of at least 17 
Muslim insurgents, including a commander.  
 
However, 2013 was also notable for the first peace talks. The Thai government and the Barisan 
Revolusi Nasional (BRN) – one of the main insurgent groups operating in Thailand’s southern border 
provinces – began negotiations in Kuala Lumpur on the 28th February.29 The government and BRN 
representatives signed an agreement entitled, ‘General Consensus on the Peace Dialogue Process’, 
which agreed to talks on a peace dialogue facilitated by Malaysia in order to end the ten-year-long 
conflict. This agreement amounted to the first formal public engagement between the government and 
a separatist group in the history of the conflict – a significant step toward a peaceful resolution. 
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Pathan and Tweedie (2013) noted that it also represented the first-ever tacit acknowledgement on the 
part of the Thai government that both the conflict itself and the potential of a negotiated solution to it 
are inherently political. International Crisis Group (ICG) analyst Matthew Wheeler also claimed that 
the peace process represented a new phase in a conflict he termed "the most effective insurgency in 
Thai history".30 Other separatist groups – the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and 
Barisan Islam Pembebasan Pattani (BIPP) – have also shown an interest in engaging in talks.  
 
However, in August 2013, BRN broke off formal contact, stating that Thailand had failed to answer 
their demands. The next round of peace talks was postponed indefinitely, with the BRN announcing 
that they would not return to the negotiating table unless both the Thai parliament agreed to its five 
demands, and Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, placed peace negotiations on the national 
agenda.31 Chingchit (2014) believed that the peace talks were undermined because of "a lack of 
command and commitment by the representatives of both sides, the uncertain and contested role of 
Malaysia, and the Army’s entrenched interests and stronger role." 
 
Moreover, it is widely thought that the senior BRN leader, Hassan Taib, who joined the talks, no longer 
has command over young militants operating on the ground; and given that the violence has continued, 
it can only be an indication that not the whole of BRN is fully committed to peace negotiations (Ibid.). 
Meanwhile, the government had to shift its focus to the prolonged anti-government protests in 
Bangkok from November 2013; the government’s only real focus was on restoring clam and staying in 
power.  
 
After months of political turmoil, the Thai military seized power in a coup on 22 May 2014. After this, 
the military government under General Prayuth Chan-ocha came to power and the peace talks with 
BRN were put on hold. The military-led government announced plans in August 2014 to hold another 
round of peace talks with the separatists. In September 2015, a round of informal peace talks between 
representatives from Thailand and the 6 insurgent groups was held in Malaysia; however, until now, no 
formal peace talks between the government and the BRN have taken place.  
 
The process of peace talks has been widely discussed by academics, activists and media 
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professionals.32 Pathan (2014) commented that Thailand under the leadership of General Prayuth plans 
to take a different strategy from the former government by 'dictating' the terms to the BRN and other 
separatist organisations and not the other way around. At the same time, the BRN is not yet prepared to 
come to another round of talks. For that reason, plans for the next round of peace talks right are still on 
hold and violent situations in the region remain on-going. Nevertheless, the Deep South Incident 
Database (DSID) revealed a downturn in the frequency and degree of violent incidents in 2014, with a 
decrease in the number of incidents, deaths and casualties.33 This fall in the number of violent incidents 
proves that there is still hope that the peace talks may be able to help bring about a resolution of the 
conflict in the future.   
 
To sum up, this chapter explored the dynamics of the southern conflict and its history. The chapter 
reviewed the past rebellions, the rise of the current insurgency via the major incidents in 2004, and 
theories behind the return of the violence from various perspectives and commentators. It concluded by 
providing information on the current situation, including the abortive peace talks between the Thai 
government and the BRN in 2013. Although talks were only held on three occasions, and the latest 
round was indefinitely postponed due to Thailand's political situation, the concept of finally ending the 
ten-year-long conflict through peace negotiations is widely supported by the Thai public. 
 
The next chapter provides a background of the Thai media, especially within the context of Thailand's 
southern conflict. 
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Chapter 3 
The Thai mediascape 
 
In 2004, after PM Thaksin came to power, freedom of expression in Thailand became difficult because 
his government’s policy included increased intervention and control of the Thai media. It was the year 
that the Thai media started to criticise the government’s handling of the southern conflict, although at 
the same time, the Thai media was also widely criticised on the ground that their reporting of the 
southern conflict was one of the reasons triggering violence. Since this research focuses on the 
reporting of the conflict situations in southern Thailand in 2004, it is important to look at the 
background of the Thai media to understand the relationship between the media and politics at the 
time. Moreover, an understanding of the history of journalism in Thailand and the background of 
newspaper businesses, including English-language newspapers, is crucial to understand the unique 
characteristics of the Thai media and its influence on Thai society.  
 
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part explains the history of journalism in Thailand. The 
second parts focuses on Thai print media, especially the background of English newspaper businesses 
in Thailand. The third part explores freedom of expression in Thailand, with a focus on the year 2004. 
Finally, the last part sets out a critique of Thai media and the southern conflict.  
 
 3.1 The history of journalism in Thailand 
This section explains the history and development of Thai journalism with a focus on the newspaper 
business. 
  3.1.1 The establishment of the newspaper business 
Journalism in Thailand developed under the influence of several political, economic, social and 
ideological factors. Newspapers were important means of conveying the ideological beliefs that caused 
changes in Thai society. The printing press came to Thailand with the Western missionaries in the mid-
1800s. The first publishing in the Thai language began during the reign of King Rama III, when printed 
material was used to teach Thai to the English settlers. Dr. Dan Beach Bradley, an American 
missionary, was a pioneer of the printing press in Thailand and established the first Thai newspaper, 
The Bangkok Recorder (1844-1845), with machinery imported from India. Other newspapers in this 
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period were the Bangkok Calendar, printed in English from 1847 to 1850 by J. H. Chandler, and the 
Bangkok Daily, printed by Dr. Samuel John Smith (McCargo 2000; Forum-Asia 2005; Siriyuvasak 
2007). The Bangkok Recorder, which served the upper class society more than the general public, was 
considered the first step in the history of Thai newspapers. However, it ceased publication after just 
two years because of its small circulation and the limits on freedom put in place by King Rama IV, 
who accused the missionaries of using the newspapers to publish false stories (Siriyuvasak 2007). 
 
King Rama IV later set up a printing press of his own and started to print the Royal Gazette or 
Ratchakijjanubeksa in order to publish official announcements, to counter missionary propaganda, and 
to clarify issues published in The Bangkok Recorder, which was re-opened in 1864 by Dr. Bradley 
(McCargo 2000; Forum-Asia 2005; Siriyuvasak 2007). Ratchakijjanubeksa was considered by Thai 
people to be the first Thai language newspaper. The King’s relatives also established a privately owned 
newspaper called Darunovadh, intended to give information to its readers without comment or political 
opinion. Darunowadh was considered the first newspaper to be published for the wider public. The 
early period of the Thai printing press was under the influence of the King and the royal family. Most 
of the content was from royal sources. Readership was limited at that point, comprising the royal 
families, upper class society, and foreigners. Thus, in the beginning, the Thai press depended largely on 
the support of the monarchy, but this gradually changed.  
 
  3.1.2 Thai media before the 1932 revolution 
During the reign of King Rama V, freedom of the press became more open when many newspapers 
were owned by members of the public and more newspapers in Thai, Chinese and English were 
launched. The content changed from royal matters to more open criticism of the ruling class and the 
government, along with other types of article such as news stories, features, and entertainment pieces. 
The Thai press, which had initially served the upper classes and foreigners, then started to serve the 
common Thais. Educational reform caused an increase in literacy levels, which also expanded 
readership. Even though the independent newspapers were faced with bankruptcy and competition 
from the royal-owned newspapers, they gained more popularity among the masses. However, freedom 
of expression was still limited. Often the owners of these newspapers were accused, tried and 
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imprisoned because they stated their political opinions and asked for the rights of expression 
(Siriyuvasak 2007). 
 
During the reign of King Rama VI, newspapers were able to access the masses to a greater extent. It 
was called the ‘Golden Age of Thai Journalism’ because the country’s economy was good and people 
had a better education (Ibid.). Because the King studied in Europe, he was influenced by the culture of 
exchanging opinions and ideas, and so he welcomed fair criticism of his government (Ibid.). During his 
time, journalism as a profession began to grow, and daily news and political news started to attract 
public attention.  
 
Criticism was allowed in the news coverage, and the competition between newspapers to attract readers 
was high. However, it was still a case of freedom under an absolute monarchy. The popularity of the 
monarch declined as a result of the emergence of a new class of educated and literate Bangkok people 
(McCargo 2000). The first law to control the press came into effect in 1922 and was called, ‘The 
Document and Newspaper Law of 1922’ (Siriyuvasak 2007). This period showed the development of 
Thai society: the readership of newspapers expanded and more freedoms of expression were granted. 
 
  3.1.3 Thai media after the 1932 revolution 
The rise of democracy in Thailand started with the changeover from the system of an ‘Absolute 
Monarchy’ to a ‘Constitutional Monarchy’ by the People’s Party. It was the first time that the rights to 
speak, write and advertise were guaranteed to the people by the Constitution of 1932. This period also 
marked the start of a relationship between journalists and politicians. Politicians and social elites built a 
good relationship with newspapers in order to use them as a means of disseminating their propaganda 
(McCargo 2000; Wongtheerathorn 2008). When Field Marshal Phibun came into power, he had 
absolute control over all newspapers and used them to promote his policy of Thai nationalism. Phibun 
borrowed the propaganda techniques used by Hitler and Mussolini to create his own cult, and passed a 
number of authoritarian laws, which gave his government the power of almost unlimited press 
censorship (Wongtheerathorn 2008). 
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The first Printing and Publishing Act was enacted in 1941 during Phibun’s administration. It was seen 
as draconian and there were various failed attempts to abolish it before it was finally replaced by the 
Press Registration Act (Siriyuvasak 2007). The media in Thailand were continuously threatened under 
the authoritarian regime of Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat from 1959 to 1963, a period known as the 
‘Dark Age of Thai Journalism’ (Ibid). The media were controlled under Announcement No. 17, which 
wielded absolute control over the press. There were no guarantees of the rights to speak, write or 
comment, and those who offended the King or criticised the government were punished. 
Announcement No. 17 was considered a symbol of the diminishment of press freedom in Thailand 
(Wongtheerathorn 2008). 
 
The revolution of 14th October 1973 by students and the people brought about the end of the military 
dictatorship and the dark age of Thai journalism. The press was guaranteed complete freedom, which 
was unprecedented in the nation’s history (Siriyuvasak 2007). Many new newspapers with various 
political perspectives were established. However, the freedom of the Thai press flourished only until 
the bloody coup of 6th October 1976, when the Printing Act and Revolutionary Announcement No. 42 
were implemented to control the freedom of the press (Ibid.). Many newspapers were shut down and 
strict censorship was enforced. Once again, Thai journalism was under the control of the military. 
 
The conflict between the left-wing students and the government in October 1976 ended years later. 
From 1980, the press started to enjoy more freedom. Major changes in the structure and policy of 
newspapers and the newspaper business were developed and flourished. Newspapers which held strong 
political views, such as Daily Mirror; focused on opinion and criticism, such as Matichon or The 
Nation; or produced business and financial news, such as Manager or Bangkok biz News, were first 
introduced to the Thai public. The newspaper market flourished along with the country’s economic 
growth and media became a major business, which served the interests of the urban middle-class 
(Forum-Asia 2005). The newspaper business started to use new production and communication 
technology. The growth of the advertising business was now closely related to the newspaper industry, 
which relied heavily on sale revenues and income from advertisements (Ibid.).  
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Thai journalism, thus, went through good and hard times. The development of journalism depended 
largely on the support of the monarchy in its early period. Power changed to the hands of the 
governments in the second period and politics played a key role in the early 1900s. Then, the 
newspaper business became more economically led. The development of Thai journalism revolved 
around social, political and economic factors, including technological developments in printing and 
telecommunication. 
 
 3.2 Thai print media: newspapers 
While other media, such as radio and television, are either owned or operated by the state, subjected to 
the influence of the state, and often considered conservative in their reporting, Thai newspapers 
represent the primary privately-owned source of current news for most Thais (Tunsarawuth 2006; 
Article 19 2009). While Thai newspapers are the primary source of news that is more critical of the 
government, they are also subject to the highest number of defamation cases (Article 19 2009). The 
Thai print media has had a close relationship with Thai politics and has performed an important role in 
the Thai political scene since its establishment (McCargo 2000; Siriyuvasak 2005, 2007; Paireepairit 
2012). McCargo (2000, p. 165) believed that the Thai media could be unreliable because it has long 
functioned as a means for different groups to advance their political and economic interests and ideas, 
which means that the political or power groups use their connections with media owners for their 
personal and political interests, and that "the unreliability of the Thai press is deeply rooted in its 
history, organisational culture, newsgathering system and working practices." 
 
The Thai print media are dominated by large corporations and big publishing companies, such as 
Matichon Plc, Post Publishing Company, Nation Multimedia Group, Manager Group, Vacharapol 
Company and GMM Grammy (Paireepairit 2012). These companies also own TV and radio stations 
and book and magazine publishing businesses, and their owners often have close personal relationships 
with politicians and the government. 
 
The Asian economic crisis, which hit Thailand in 1997, heavily affected the Thai press, especially the 
print media. Many newspapers closed and others were taken over. According to Forum-Asia (2005), 12 
out of 25 newspapers were shut down, mostly Thai-language newspapers such as Siam Post and also 
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the English language newspaper Asia Times. Today, there are 32 Thai-language newspapers on the 
market. Matichon, Siam Rath, Kaosod and Naewna are considered to be the quality publications, 
focusing mainly on politics and economics. Phujatkarn Daily, Krungthep Thurakij, Post Today, Than 
Sethakij and Prachachat Turakij are business newspapers. 
 
The most popular Thai-language newspapers are Thairath, Daily News and Kom Chad Luek. Their 
styles of reporting are highly sensational with big headlines and pictures, and their sales base is daily 
rather than monthly or yearly subscription. These newspapers play a large part in the Thai newspaper 
market because their daily circulations are the highest, and thus they depend on creating sensational 
headlines to draw attention. There is no investigative reporting in the Thai newspapers (Article 19 
2009), and this reflects the reading culture of Thai people, who favour dramatic and sensational 
headlines with a lot of pictures and less content. Also, the majority of Thai politicians and political 
journalists are unable to read English well, so they rely mainly on the Thai language press (McCargo 
2000). 
 
   3.2.1 English-language newspapers in Thailand 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the two major English-language newspapers in Thailand are 
Bangkok Post and The Nation. The rise of English newspapers was considered a sign of a more incisive 
and critical press, and both newspapers sought to practice objective journalism to an international 
standard (Ibid.). They presented themselves as an alternative to Thai newspapers. They were seen as 
accurate and reliable, with a mix of a foreign and local staff, and an investigative reporting style. Both 
newspapers share the same target audiences: the elites and educated Thais and foreigners in Thailand.  
 
However, the market of the English-language daily newspapers in Thailand is limited by the relatively 
small number of English-speakers, and 90 per cent of the sales are made in Bangkok (Forum-Asia 
2005). Their sales are mostly through subscription, and the readers of these newspapers mainly 
comprise the middle and upper class and expatriates. International news organisations such as CNN 
and the BBC also draw resources from these two English newspapers. The main focus of both 
newspapers is Thai politics and international news, but they also have sections on business, travel  
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and entertainment. Compared to Thai-language newspapers, the English-language newspapers in 
Thailand have more reports on international and Southeast Asian news and are considered to be 
amongst the leading newspapers in Asia (Prado 2010). 
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Table 3.1: The differences between Bangkok Post and The Nation 
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Bangkok Post 
Bangkok Post was founded by an American editor, Alexander MacDonald, and his Thai associate, 
Prasit Lulitanond, in 1946. In the newspaper’s early days, the news managers and shareholders were 
mainly foreign. Before then, the only English-language newspaper in Thailand had been the Bangkok 
Times, which had closed during the Second World War. During the dictatorship of Phibun, Macdonald, 
a former US agent, was ordered to leave the country, and Bangkok Post was accused of supporting the 
opposition and not government policy (Post 2013). Another newspaper, Bangkok World, was 
established to counter the monopoly of Bangkok Post. However, due to declining sales, it did not 
negatively affect Bangkok Post, and later closed down in mid 1980s (Post 2013).  
 
Bangkok Post is considered a conservative publication. It is staffed by a mix of foreigners and Thais 
and belongs to the Post Publishing Public Co. Ltd., whose main activity is the publication and 
distribution of English daily newspapers, magazines and books. Bangkok Post is the company’s main 
newspaper, with a circulation of 80,000 copies a day, representing 55 per cent of the market (Forum-
Asia 2005). Bangkok Post claims to be Thailand’s number one English-language newspaper in terms of 
readership, circulation sales and advertising sales (Post 2013).  
 
The newspaper has four main sections. The first section includes local, regional, and international news 
and analyses as well as sport news. The second is a business section, which includes business, finance 
and stock market news. The third section is ‘Outlook’, which features lifestyle, public interest, social, 
entertainment, travel, and fashion news as well as general features. The fourth section is classified 
advertisements. Bangkok Post has expanded its coverage of business news through the launch of Asia 
Focus as a separate section. Asia Focus covers business and investment news in Asia and ASEAN and 
also covers lifestyle news. This news section was a part of the newspaper’s strategy to increase 
coverage of ASEAN and regional news in line with the beginning of the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) in 2015.  
 
The Post Publishing’s newspapers include Post Today, a Thai-language business daily newspaper; 
Student weekly, a weekly English-language newspaper for students; and M2F, a Monday-Friday 
newspaper on urban lifestyles. Its publication of international magazines includes Elle, Elle 
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Decoration, Cleo, Marie Claire, Martha Stewart Living and Science Illustrated. The company’s book 
publishing house, Post Books, also publishes best-selling international books translated into Thai, as 
well as books written by their reporters and columnists and other well-known Thai authors (Post 2013).  
 
Today, the company’s news and information businesses have been expanded to include broadcast and 
digital media, including Bangkok Post and Post Today websites, which aim to be the world’s windows 
on Thailand (Ibid.). The Bangkok Post website is "the most visited English-language news portal in 
Thailand" (Post 2013, p.17). Applications on mobile devices have been launched and the company has 
expanded its multimedia presence with the launch of Thai-language TV and radio programmes. 
Compared to The Nation, Bangkok Post is a smaller organisation. 
 
The Nation 	
The Nation was founded in 1971 by three Thai editors: Suthichai Yoon, Thammanoon Mahapaoraya 
and ML Sunida Kitiyagara. Each had worked at Bangkok Post before: Yoon as a proofreader, sub-
editor and later editor of domestic news; Mahapaoraya as an editor of domestic news; and Kitiyagara as 
an editor of social news (Sabpaiboon 2001). The three fell out with the Bangkok Post management over 
reporting principles, believing that Bangkok Post should not focus on reporting international news but 
should find a balance between domestic and international news (Ibid. p.36). Yoon believed that 
Bangkok Post, as a newspaper published in Thailand, should aim to serve the Thai public and should 
focus on presenting news in Thailand. Yoon said of his time working at Bangkok Post that the staff 
were mainly foreigners. Only a few were Thais who knew how to speak and write in English, so the 
main problem he faced was a problem in communication (Ibid. p.33). The Thai staff working at 
Bangkok Post had no decision-making power regarding policy or the objectives of the newspaper (Ibid. 
p.37).  
 
The Nation started from the idea that Thailand should have an English-language newspaper which was 
owned and managed by Thai people, and which challenged Bangkok Post (Ibid. p.40). The former 
name of The Nation – ‘The Voice of the Nation’ – claimed that the newspaper followed a principle of 
freedom of news and freedom of opinion with the objective to be ‘Thailand’s independent newspaper’. 
The aim of this classification was to differentiate the newspaper from Bangkok Post, which presented 
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itself as a foreign newspaper, and therefore focused more on international news and avoided Thai 
political news, instead producing news that favoured US policy (Ibid. p.349).  
 
The Nation has a liberal approach and comes across as more critical of the government and more likely 
to address cultural values. It is more multifaceted, more sensitive and more respectful of a diversity of 
viewpoints (Prado 2010). Today, The Nation is operated by the Nation Multimedia Group Plc, one of 
the biggest media organisations in Thailand, and has a daily circulation of 70,000 copies and a market 
share of 45 per cent (Forum Asia 2005). The Nation Group’s main businesses are the publication and 
distribution of magazines and newspapers, the importation and production of books for English 
education, the production of television and radio programs, and the production of The Nation’s official 
news website. The Group’s print materials include The Nation, Daily Express, Krunthep Turakij (a 
Thai business newspaper), Kom Chad Luk (Thai newspaper), Nation Channel (Thai and English TV), 
Nation Radio (Thai), Nation Weekend (Thai news), NJ (Nation Junior) Connect, Biz Book, Biz Week, 
Phuket Gazette and OK Nation.  
 
Nation Group Plc. claimed that The Nation is the only English-language newspaper which acts as a 
voice for the Thai public with national and regional recognition (Sabpaiboon 2001, p.346). The Nation 
Group has expanded its businesses into other broadcast and digital media: for example, the launch of 
The Nation website and the launch The Nation’s TV and radio programs which include Nation Channel 
– the first 24-hour news channel in Thailand – in 2000. 
  
The two English-language newspapers in Thailand have been different from the beginning in terms of 
objectives, reporting principles and management style. While Bangkok Post is seen as a conservative 
publication, The Nation is seen as having a liberal approach and is more open. All of their unique 
characteristics have made them distinct as the two major English-language newspapers in Thailand 
today. For that reason, the two newspapers’ reporting of the southern conflict, which is the main focus 
of this study, is different in terms of reporting styles and journalistic practices. 					
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 3.3 Freedom of expression and the Thai media 
Thai newspapers seem to enjoy more liberty under the law than other forms of Thai media. Compared 
to neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia, they are regarded as well-organised, and contribute 
greatly to the openness and dynamism of Thai society and freedom, even if they do remain subject to 
government supervision and intervention from time to time (McCargo 2000). Article 19 (2009, p.1) 
commented on the Thai media and the freedom of expression that:  
 
"Although the right to freedom of expression is guaranteed in the Constitution, the exercise of 
this right for both individuals and the media is restricted by both long-established and newly 
enacted legislation. The existence of these laws, and long history of government ownership 
and control over the broadcast media have limited this right in practice." 
In this sense, it may seem that the Thai press and public enjoy guaranteed freedom of expression, but in 
reality, that freedom is limited due to the old rules and laws and the unique characteristics of the Thai 
press system.  
 
The Thai press has distinct characteristics. The journalism that appears on its pages often lacks analysis 
and context, and information is mostly obtained from inside connections. The personal ties between 
journalists and politicians often influence reporting, and the Thai press is mostly Bangkok-centric. All 
of this constitutes a significant problem in the newsgathering process and has made the meaning of 
news in Thailand different from that in other countries (McCargo 2000, p. 2). This is possibly the result 
of a unique characteristic of the Thai society, which influences the actions of its citizens. Rojanapruek 
(2000) commented that people who work in the media have information and knowledge but do not 
have the right to express their opinions, especially if those opinions differ from those held by their 
organisation.  
 
The freedom is limited and controlled by the organisations, by their relations to power and politics, and 
in particular by the Thai cultural norm of respecting elders (Ibid.). McCargo (2000) commented that 
the system in Thai media organisations is based on hierarchism or seniority relationships. Juniors do 
not hold important positions in the organisation. In this system, the juniors are irrelevant and voiceless 
and have to respect and obey the seniors, and they do not have right to criticise them.  
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The duty of journalists is to document the incidents and not to give opinions. As McCargo (2000, 
p.168) stated: “Given that reporters are largely powerless in the Thai context, the political power and 
influence of the media rest largely in the hands of columnists, editors and owners.” In this sense, the 
Thai cultural value of 'respecting the elders' is inevitably reflected in the Thai journalistic practices. As 
such, it seems that young journalists and reporters have limited freedom to comment on issues, and the 
power rests in the hands of people in a higher position.  
 
The news production process is also centralised to Bangkok, which has led to the marginalisation of 
people from the rest of the country and their disenfranchisement from the political movement in the 
capital. Another distinct character of the Thai press is that news and comment are considered the same, 
something which is a significant obstacle and challenge to the professionalism of Thai journalism 
(Ibid.). The freedom of expression of the Thai media is thus limited by not only the law but also the 
complicated structure, culture and practices of the Thai media itself. 
 
  3.3.1 The Constitutions and mass media  
Freedom of expression for individuals and for the media is guaranteed under the 1997 Thai 
Constitution. The 1997 Constitution was considered a symbol of Thai democratic reform when it was 
drafted by the elected Constitutional Drafting Assembly. It is sometimes called the ‘People’s 
Constitution’ (Klein 1998; Aphornsuvan 2001; Kittayarak 2003; Albritton and Bureekul 2004). The 
Constitution was a political reform that involved and had the strong support of the Thai people (Klein 
1998; Aphornsuvan 2001; Albritton and Bureekul 2004).  
 
Forum-Asia (2005) observed that the 1997 Constitution was a significant step towards freedom of 
expression in Thailand because it coincided with the Asian economic crisis, which changed the 
structure of the Thai media. Prior to this constitution, Thailand had passed 15 other constitutions since 
the changeover to a Constitutional Monarchy in 1932, which reflects that past government 
administrations were insufficient, corrupt and opaque (Ibid.). This, together with the economic crisis in 
1997, forced Thailand to create its most progressive and revolutionary constitution (Klein 1998; 
Kittayarak 2003).  
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Section 37 of the 1997 Constitution (see Appendix I) guarantees an individual’s rights and liberty of 
communication by lawful means; section 39 protect the right of public members and the media to 
report news and express views that are not against professional code of ethics; and sections 40 and 41 
declare that communication and broadcast should be used for the benefit of the public. Despite these 
assurances, by 2004 the rights and freedom of expression guaranteed by the 1997 Constitution were 
disregarded and violated by the Thaksin administration after he came into power in 2001. 
 
The 2007 Constitution, which replaced the 1997 Constitution, and was drafted by the military junta that 
ousted Thaksin in 2006. The drafting processes had been widely criticised and faced much controversy 
because the Constitutional Drafting Assembly was appointed by the junta, which implemented laws 
that made criticism and opposition to the constitutional referendum a criminal act, an action which was 
widely criticised domestically and internationally (Ganjanakhundee 2007).34 
 
Under section 45 of the 2007 Constitution, the rights and liberties of expression of people and the mass 
media are guaranteed. The Constitution prohibits any person holding a political position to own or hold 
shares in a newspaper, radio, television or telecommunication business as a means to exercise political 
power over the media, as happened in Thaksin’s regime. The law also allows the barring of importation 
of any publications that are deemed lèse-majesté 35 or contrary to public morality.  
 
  3.3.2 Limited freedom of expression during the Thaksin administration 2004-2006 
Thailand used to be a leader in press freedom in Asia, and was ranked 29th among 192 countries in the 
annual survey of press freedom by Freedom House (FH) in 2000 (Chongkittitavorn 2007). This 
changed after the forming of Thaksin’s government, when Thailand’s rating dropped to 107th in the 
2006 survey due to the restrictive measures imposed on the media (Ibid.).  
 
Thaksin Shinawatra is a former businessman who owns a business empire, which includes mass media 
and telecommunication companies. His business focus and CEO-style leadership changed Thailand 
after he won the election in 2000, and he was re-elected for a second term in 2006. His administration 
of media policies had been widely discussed, particularly with regard to how he used his power to 
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control the media by announcing policies and campaigns to make it harder for journalists to perform 
their role as watchdogs (McCargo 2000; Siriyuvasak 2005).  
 
During Thaksin’s premiership, the Thai media were heavily politicised and came under strong 
government supervision. Journalists, activists and academics were sued for criticising Thaksin’s 
administration and his business. Thaksin used his considerable financial resources to censor criticism 
and compromise the media, and to pass defamation laws and other legal measures “to threaten and 
punish the media so to create a climate of fear and to silence them” (Siriyuvasak 2007, p.11). 
Following a military coup, the Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy 
(CDRM) ousted Thaksin but did not end the limitation of freedom of expression introduced under 
Thaksin’s regime.  
 
In fact, the coup leaders forcefully tightened and suppressed freedom of expression using various 
means of censorship in order to muffle the voices of Thaksin’s supporters (Siriyuvasak 2007). An 
example was the use of the new Cyber Crime Act, passed in July 2007. The Act bans any criticism of 
the monarchy and the military,36 and mainly focuses on the information available on the Internet, such 
as websites or forums, thus banning the voices of Thaksin and his supporters (Ibid.). After the coup, 
Thailand ranked 126th in the FH survey, which was the worst ranking in the Thai press’s history 
(Chongkittitavorn 2007). 
 
  3.3.3 The intervention of the media: the use of defamation law against the media 
As discussed in an earlier section, the Thai media have a close relationship with Thai politics, and there 
is significant political intervention in the functioning of the media. The media have been used by 
political or business groups for their own or for mutual interests, and have been subjected to close 
supervision and control when they criticised the government. The use of the defamation law by 
Thaksin’s administration is a good example of this. Thailand’s defamation law has been subjected to 
broad discussion due to its nature and strong penalties. It is often of concern that the Thai newspapers 
are subjected to close government supervision (Tunsarawuth 2006). According to Article 19 (2009), 
defamation is a key part of the legal framework restricting speech that is critical of the government, 
businesses and prominent individuals in both its criminal and civil aspects.  
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A special case in Thailand’s defamation law is 'lèse-majesté.' In Thailand, defamation is a criminal 
offence, which has been in force since 1957, and has not been subjected to any major changes since. 
This law represents a direct threat to the freedom of the press and those who criticise the government, 
and, because of this threat, newspaper readers have no access to news and information that exposes 
government wrongdoing unless the newspapers have solid evidence to prove their allegations. The 
interference in the media has created a fear-factor, which lessened the opportunity for the media to act 
as a watchdog for society (SEAPA 2010). 
 
Between 2004 and 2006, Thaksin used defamation lawsuits and various means of intervention against 
those who criticised his administration for buying out the media. According to Siriyuvasak (2005), the 
Thaksin regime controlled journalism by using state power to direct the flow of information and 
influence news agendas, using financial support and advertisements, and creating fear for those who 
were critical of the government. The intervention in Thai newspapers came in the form of structural 
interference in the newspaper companies.  
 
One of the most prominent examples of this was the buying of large numbers of shares in the Nation 
Multimedia Group by the relatives of the Transport Minister, Suriya Jungrungreangkit (Thaksin's 
government), amounting to more than 10 per cent of the Group’s shares, and thus making the family 
the third largest shareholder (SEAPA 2010). This raised the concern that it would have a negative 
impact on the English-language broadsheet’s independent stance. Another method of press intervention 
was political interference through management control over the editorial line. The most famous case 
was the removal of the Bangkok Post’s editor, Veera Prateepchaikul, who was also the chairman of the 
Thai Journalist Association (TJA), when he allowed criticism of Thaksin to be published (Ibid.). The 
removal caused widespread criticism of how Thaksin used his political power to interfere in the 
editorial policy, and SEAPA issued a statement to “call on Thaksin’s government to demonstrate 
fairness and more openness by allowing Thai media to function responsibly and independently and to 
adhere to the spirit of media freedom and reform mandated by the 1997 Constitution." 
 
The defamation case against Supinya Klangnarong37 also attracted particular attention nationally and 
internationally to how the law had become the weapon of choice for controlling defiant voices and 
	 62	
provoking a climate of fear and self-censorship in Thailand. Other forms of intervention included the 
buying of advertisers by business groups that had a close personal connection with Thaksin or his 
family, which resulted in a fear of publishing comments critical of his administration, because the 
newspaper business was financially reliant on advertising revenues from those companies (Hayes 
2007). 
 
As we have seen, Thaksin used various forms of intervention to restrict freedom of expression in the 
Thai media when he was in power. Thaksin's intervention with the media and his southern 
administration caused widespread criticism and these two are among the reasons for the coup d’état 
which ousted him in 2006. At the end of his term, the media broke the rules, and openly criticised the 
government (Siriyuvasak 2007). From this, we can see that the year 2004, which is within the timeline 
of this study, was the time when the freedom of expression of the Thai media was challenged and 
limited due to Thaksin's administration and political situation. Bangkok Post and The Nation, which are 
the two English-language newspapers and the main focus of this study, have inevitably been affected 
by this difficult time. The context of this study lies in the time when the freedom of the media was 
limited and in the year when the southern incidents first started. The combination of these factors has 
proved to be a challenge for the newspapers and an interesting background from which to explore the 
representation of the conflict in this setting. 
 
 3.4 Thai media and the southern conflict: the critique 
The Campaign for Popular Media Reform (CPMR) in Thailand believed that the media are one of the 
key forces for the resolution of the southern conflict because they play an important role in shaping and 
affecting people’s perceptions of the issue (Deep South Watch 2007). It is the media that provide Thai 
citizens with access to information about the conflict. Because the violence occurs in Thailand’s 
southern border region, people in other parts of the country are dependent on various forms of 
journalism for information. 
 
Journalists convey their versions of the events unfolding in the south to their audiences, and the 
public’s understanding of the situation is guided by the media. In other words, the media convey a 
selective perception of reality (McQuail 2010). The media choose the reporting style and determine 
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which events to report; and it is hard for people to challenge or reject the information that the media 
provide.  The Thai media’s response to the insurgency has been widely criticised. In many instances, 
the reports on the conflict express prejudice and a negative tone, and fail to focus on solutions – all of 
which potentially influence the way the majority of Thais view the events in the south. Aiewsrivongse 
(2004a) condemned the Thai media and their reporting of the southern conflict stating that if anybody 
is to apologise to the local people in the south, as well as all the officers who were harmed, the media 
have to be among the first because "you are the one throwing gasoline into the fire." 
 
Furthermore, a study of the portrayal of Muslims in Thai newspapers by Latifi (1999) showed that the 
Thai media present more negative impressions of Thailand’s Muslim minority than positive ones. That 
is to say: the news in the Thai media regarding the insurgency often presented an image of the southern 
Muslims as terrorists and separatists, or part of a resistance movements and lawless society. 
Interestingly, a study conducted by Media Monitor (2005) revealed the same results: that prejudice 
against Muslims is obvious in Thai newspapers; that the inequality in the allocation of ‘voices’ in Thai 
newspapers is clearly seen (the voices of those affected by the conflicts were often missed); and that 
southern Muslims were negatively represented in connection to terrorism, insurgency and violence. 
Media Monitor (2005) further claimed that the Thai media faced difficulty in reporting such complex 
issues: the ‘why’ in the traditional formula of ‘who, what, where, when, why, and how’ appears least 
often. This point suggests flaws in the Thai media in terms of failing to explore the causes of the 
incidents. These findings were again echoed in 'An open letter to the Thai media' from Al-Hakim 
(2013), in which the author expressed criticism of the Thai media in their representation of southern 
Muslims. It is interesting to see that the Thai media and their representation of the southern conflict 
have been criticised  over the course of 10 years, suggesting an ongoing problem in the reporting of the 
conflict and a gradual increase in awareness of the issue. 
 
Generally, the reporting of the conflict mainly concentrates on the violence – sensational details of 
attacks and casualties. In addition, the source of information often appears to be limited to the Thai 
authorities because it ignores the dynamics of the deep-rooted conflict on both sides, which often leads 
to the belief that the problems arise from southern Muslims, who want to separate from Thailand. This 
way of reporting is likely to have resulted in a false perception of the conflict and in potentially 
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widening the gap between the Muslim minority and the Thai majority. It was because of such failings 
of the Thai press in reporting the complex issues of the conflict that media campaigners demanded a 
change in reporting style (Deep South Watch 2007).  
 
The response of the media to the southern conflict today is different from during the early years of the 
conflict. At present, the insurgency attracts less national coverage, despite the fact that the Thai media 
agreed that the southern insurgency is one of the most serious issues concerning the nation’s unity 
(Thammasathien 2010). In his paper, Thammasathien (2010) argued that the reporting of the southern 
insurgency is “problematic and unreliable” for three reasons: 1) the tendency of the Thai press to 
emphasise the drama without examining the root causes; 2) the problem of the news gathering system 
from the conflict area; and 3) biased coverage that results from the press allowing the coverage to be 
influenced by the government.38  
 
In her doctoral thesis, Changkamol (2013) conducted an analysis of six newspapers and their reporting 
of the southern conflict in 2008, and found that the newspapers still lacked investigative reporting; that 
the root causes and invisible effects of the violence were missed out; that the newspapers relied on a 
few leading people and elites as their main reference sources; and that the coverage was mostly 
categorised as ‘war journalism’. Another doctoral thesis by Kularb (2013, p.v) revealed that the news 
coverage tends to support the state’s administration and policy in solving the southern conflict and 
undermines other interpretations and proposed solutions.  
 
To conclude, this chapter presented an overall picture of the media scene in Thailand, which included 
the emergence of the Thai print media and a history of journalism in Thailand, the background of the 
Thai and English newspapers, and a critique of the Thai media. The critique and the findings of this 
study clearly show that there is something wrong in the reporting of the southern conflict and that the 
Thai media and their practices are part of the reason for this failing. The Thai media, as we have seen, 
have not been doing their job properly. Due to a variety of reasons, including political intervention, 
lack of journalistic skills, lack of historical background of the conflict, flawed newsgathering 
processes, dependence on authority, and nationalistic feelings, the Thai media’s reportage has resulted 
in a biased and prejudiced representation of the conflict.  
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Because of this way of reporting, the Thai majority can be seen to have a misperception of the bigger 
picture of the conflict. The media have the power to correct this misperception, which would contribute 
to finding a solution for the conflict. For that reason, peace journalism should be considered as an 
alternative way for the Thai media to report on the southern conflict and a method of reporting that can 
help to resolve the conflict in one way or another. The following chapter presents a review of the 
literature on peace journalism.  
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Chapter 4 
The Literature Review on Peace Journalism 
 
There has always been criticisms of the way in which war has been reported, but the search for an 
alternative has proven difficult. During the 1970s, peace researchers, activists and academics began to 
develop a new field in journalism: peace journalism. The aim of peace journalism is to provide an 
alternative to the traditional way of reporting war. The term peace journalism was coined by Johan 
Galtung, a Norwegian scholar and peace researcher, who envisioned peace journalism as a self-
conscious, working concept for journalists covering war and conflicts (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005; 
Lynch 2007; 2008). The Gulf War in 1991 and the changes in war reporting during that period played 
an important role in starting a critical debate about conflict coverage, which has contributed to the 
interest in peace journalism in the past decades (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005).  
 
The starting point for this research is my personal interest in peace journalism, which I see as a better 
practice for reporting war than traditional journalism. In this research, peace journalism is both a 
normative ground and an analytical tool. As a normative ground, peace journalism with its main 
concept that the media can play a social responsibility role in transforming conflicts with their 
reporting is the main focus of this research. As an analytical tool, the peace journalism framework is 
used for conducting a content analysis of the conflict coverage (more details in Chapter 5, Research 
Methodologies).  
 
The first part of this chapter focuses on conflict dynamics and theory, before moving on to the flaws of 
traditional journalism in reporting conflict. Peace journalism is then presented as a viable alternative. 
Its theory and practice will be discussed, as will the practices of peace journalism in various global 
contexts. The chapter further explores peace journalism in the context of Thailand’s southern conflict 
and ends with a review of the criticisms made against peace journalism. 
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 4.1 Reporting conflict 
This section explores conflict dynamics and theory and then moves on to explore war journalism and 
the flaws of traditional war reporting. The section ends by proposing peace journalism as an alternative 
concept for reporting conflict. 
 
  4.1.1 Conflict and its dynamics: theory and practice 
The idea behind peace journalism is to report conflict in a way that will help lessen the conflict. As 
such, it is important that journalists who engage in peace journalism have an understanding of the 
conflict and its dynamics. This section explores the concept of conflict and conflict resolution in 
relation to peace journalism as proposed by scholars and peace researchers. 
 
The definitions of conflict are varied, but generally it has to do with a situation of disagreement over an 
issue. Conflict is when the goals of various parties stand in each other's way to such an extent that they 
are incompatible (Lynch and Galtung 2010). According to Howard (2001, 2003), conflict can be 
defined as a situation where two or more individuals or groups try to pursue goals or ambitions which 
they believe they cannot share; this situation is not necessarily negative, and does not have to lead to 
violence. In many circumstances, however, conflicts are unavoidable, especially when the causes and 
motivations are complicated, deep-rooted, or considered unsolvable, or when human lives are at risk. 
Conflicts often link to war, but not all unstable situations lead to armed conflict or war (Howard 2001, 
2003). Since media is "an active part of any conflict" (Tehranian 2002, p. 2), in conflict situations, 
journalists will face difficulties since all sides in the conflict will try to control the media, and the 
information presented can be unreliable or censored (Goretti 2007). Therefore, the reporting of conflict 
can be both a personal risk and a challenge to journalistic ethics.  
 
In terms of conflict resolution, Howard (2003) stated that professional journalists do not seek to reduce 
conflict, but by providing information, the media make the public far better informed about the conflict 
behind the violence, thus assisting in resolving it. This also is the main ground of peace journalism 
with its focus on finding the causes and motivations for a conflict and on depicting the truth from both 
sides (Galtung 1996, 1998, 2000b; Lynch and McGoldrick 2005). Peleg (2006) defined conflict as a 
human interaction that involves parties with incompatible interests. He further argued that the 
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relationship between peace journalism and conflict theory is reciprocal and contributive, and that 
conflict theory can contribute to and support the consolidation of peace journalism (Ibid. p. 5).  
 
Some scholars have studied the relation between conflict theory and peace journalism. Blaesi (2004), 
for example, conducted a study on the role of conflict stages and the implementation of peace 
journalism and found that the pre-condition of different stages of conflict can impact the chances of 
successful peace journalism practice. Kempf (2005) studied the de-escalation oriented coverage of the 
post-war conflicts and found that the level of conflict escalation may have an impact on the readers’ 
response to the conflict, and that the cognitive framework such as the background or conceptualisation 
of the conflict can produce an impact as well.  
 
Overall, the literature presented above shows that an understanding of conflict dynamics is crucial for 
journalists who wish to involve peace journalism in their practices. With conflict analysis, journalists 
can examine the causes of the conflict, seek out players with other points of view, and deliver 
information for the public’s better understanding of the issue. 
 
  4.1.2 War journalism 
To better understand what peace journalism is, one needs to look at the opposite concept of 'war 
journalism'. The study of war and the media coverage of conflict – or ‘war journalism’, as peace 
scholars have labelled it – existed long before the emergence of peace journalism (Keeble et al. 2010, 
p.2). Much of conflict coverage is dominated by war journalism, which focuses on conventional news 
values: negativity, personalisation and emphasis on the elites (Galtung and Vincent 1992, p.7). War 
journalism sees negativity, as well as information gained from the elites, as the news value that can sell 
the stories (Galtung 1998). From this, we can see that the main characteristics of war journalism are a 
focus on war and violence and a focus on the elites, without exploring the causes or the solutions of the 
conflict. 
According to Galtung (1996, 1998, 2002), war journalism dehumanises the enemy; focuses only on the 
visible effects of the violence; is oriented by propaganda, elitism and victory; and tends to concentrate 
on institutions and official sources. Such reportage concentrates on the visible consequences of 
violence such as death toll, damage, and the reporting of untruths by the enemy. War journalism only 
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focuses on the conflict at the time without giving any background on the formation of the conflict. As 
Galtung (2002, p.2) stated “[T]he task of peace journalism is to make conflict transparent;  the task of 
war journalism is to make war secret.” Moreover, war journalism is characterised by taking one side; 
using military triumphalist language; focusing on action; and giving a superficial narrative with little 
context, background, or historical perspective (Knightley 2000).  
 
Because most news stories only deal superficially with the 'why' or the reasons behind the conflict and 
so "...without some exploration of underlying causes, violence can be left to appear, by default, as the 
only response that 'makes sense'" (McGoldrick 2006, p. 4). Echoing this view, the war focus in war 
journalism is characterised by "...calling for hatred and more violence to avenge and to storm 'them'” 
(Lynch and Galtung 2010, p. 16). Therefore, these qualities of war journalism can affect its audiences 
by creating an ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy, provoking fear, and suggesting that the only way out is to 
use war or violence since it defines the conflict as something that needs to be ‘won’ through violent 
means. 
 
Traditional war reportage centres around the notion of conflict as news value, while what is believed to 
be good journalism is based on ‘fairness’, ‘balance’ and ‘accuracy’ (Lynch 2002, 2007, 2008; Lynch et 
al. 2005). The most important distinctions between war and peace journalism is that war journalism 
represents conflict as confined to a closed space and closed time, while peace journalism presents 
conflict by making it transparent and less harmful to the psychological wellbeing of the news 
consumers (Lynch 2010). Pilger (2010, p. xi) believed that the main difference between war and peace 
journalism is that "[w]ar journalism reports what power says it does. Peace journalism reports what it 
does."  In war situations, often the media are committed to the interests of power and not the common 
people who are at the receiving end of the violence, and news and opinion always come from the top 
and not the bottom – in other words, the media report conflict by citing ‘authorities’, while the voices 
of those suffering from the violence often go unreported.  
 
Furthermore, the conflict is "conceptualised, reductively, as war and violence, and that a war is 
reported much like a sports game..." (Lynch and Galtung 2010, p. 5). That is, in war journalism, the 
conflict is often regarded as war and violence. Kempf (2002. p 60) echoed this view by stating that 
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"war discourse reduces conflicts to force and violence", and that war is often reported the same way as 
sport. Galtung (1998) compared war journalism and peace journalism to sport journalism and health 
journalism, respectively. Like sports journalism, war journalism is zero-sum. It focuses on the ‘game’ 
per se, who is winning, who is losing – one side wins, the other loses. The result of this war/sport style 
of reporting is that the readers do not understand the causes and goals of each party. Peace journalism, 
on the other hand, is seen as health journalism, which focuses not just on the disease itself but describes 
its cause and also its possible remedies (Ibid.).  
 
 From this ground, the aim of peace journalism is to explore the background of conflict formation so as 
to provide a better understanding of the conflict.  It seeks out causes and solutions, and gives voices to 
all sides involved. Galtung came up with the opposing framework classifications of war and peace 
journalism based on four broad practices and orientations as shown in table 4.1:  
 
	 71	
 
    Table 4.1: War and Peace Journalism model 
 (From Lynch and McGoldrick (2005, p. 6) as informed by Galtung's 1998 war and peace 
journalism framework) 
Table 4.1 illustrates that war and peace journalism are seen as two opposing frameworks and they 
follow two different approaches to report an event. Lynch and Galtung (2010, p. 52) stated that "They 
are two angles, two discourses, with underlying cognitive and normative assumptions. Both are based 
on reporting facts." In war journalism, the main features are war/violence oriented; propaganda-
oriented; elite-oriented; and victory-oriented. On the other hand, the main features of peace journalism 
are conflict/peace oriented; truth-oriented; people-oriented and solution-oriented. Apart from these 
orientations, Galtung’s classification of war and peace journalism involve the use of language: that the 
language of war journalism is demonising, victimising and emotive, while the language of peace 
journalism will avoid those characteristics. 
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 4.2 Peace Journalism as an alternative way of conflict reporting 
This section explains the concept of peace journalism and its theoretical framework. 
  4.2.1 What is Peace Journalism? 
Peace journalism is derived from the insight first offered in The Structure of Foreign News by Galtung 
and Ruge (1965)39 that news content is governed by representational conventions, which produce 
discernible patterns of inclusion and omission. They proposed that the gatekeeping decisions on 
particular stories can be shown to be taking place according to discernible patterns, and that news is a 
systematic process, which inhabits and upholds its own conventions for presenting the reality. 
 
Galtung (1996, 1998, 2002) used the media distortion of reality theory as his departing point. In sum, 
the theory holds that news does not present all facts, but only some facts (often distorted), because 
journalists function as gatekeepers, deciding what should be kept in and what left out.  News stories, 
thus, only present surface realities and there are always contradicting narratives.  Often the media are 
also manipulated in an effort to win the support of the public. This results in an inaccurate 
representation of the conflict. Further, as Galtung argued, war journalism leaves out the most important 
part of the story – how a conflict might be transcended. Thus, war journalists fail in their job to inform 
themselves and their public about what they can do to lessen the conflict.  
 
Peace journalism, for its part, is about helping journalists to become more sensitive to a broader and 
more complex view of events, and educating them about ways of reporting to defuse – and not escalate 
– the problem (Galtung 1998, 2002; Lynch and McGoldrick 2005). As Galtung proposed, the idea of 
peace journalism is to report the conflict with the objective of promoting conflict resolution, in line 
with the ideals of good journalism such as truthfulness, objectivity, neutrality and detachment. Peace 
journalism is a way for the media to fulfil their social responsibility and transform the conflict. 
Fundamentally, it aims to escape from war journalism practises that construct the conflict as a polarised 
and zero-sum game (Galtung 1998; 2002).  
 
Peace journalism advocates reporting truthfully on the views of all sides of the conflict, as opposed to 
reporting just details of the violence and propaganda (Galtung 2002). In this sense, a peace journalist 
would move beyond event-based reporting to process-based reporting by exploring the deeper and 
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more complex issues to help the readers to understand all possible causes of the conflict and by 
reaching out to people from all parties involved in the conflict to be their voice.  
Galtung (1998, p. 8) proposed that “peace journalism is a journalism of attachment to all actual and 
potential victims”. Attachment, to Galtung, meant being attached to all sides of the conflict – not just to 
one side. In other words, journalists who engage in peace journalism will give space to all the voices in 
the conflict to create a balanced news story. In this sense, peace journalist works in the same way as 
objective journalists who cover all sides of a story, report the views of all people concerned, without 
interpreting the content (Galtung 2002, p.2).  
While Galtung’s (1998) meaning of ‘attachment’ means attached to all sides of the conflict, Bell (1998, 
p. 16) gave a definition of his term 'journalism of attachment' as a journalism "that is aware of its 
responsibilities, that will not stand neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong, the victim and the 
oppressor". Bell (1998) who had experience of covering the Bosnian ethnic cleansing between 1994-
1995, argued that it is hard for journalists to remain impartial and that objectivity is "illusion and 
shibboleth (p.16)." His basic idea, which challenges the notion of objectivity in journalism, is that 
journalists should take sides and look for the truth on who is right or wrong in order to preserve 
morality in journalism. In this sense, 'journalism of attachment' stresses the moral and social 
responsibility role of the media. It closely aligns with the concept of 'peace journalism' that journalists 
should expose the truth of all sides, and include background of the conflict in their reporting.  
The concept of peace journalism was further developed by Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick 
(2005), who adapted Galtung’s framework. They came up with the list of 17 do's and don'ts for 
journalists, which is used widely by many peace journalism contributors. The list, according to Lynch 
and McGoldrick (2005, p. 5), aims to provide a more accurate representation of the conflict, and allows 
journalists to “update the concepts of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting."They saw peace 
journalism as a possible road map that “...traces the connections between journalists, their sources, the 
story they cover and the consequences of their journalism” (Ibid.) and a set of tools that “both 
conceptual and practical [are] intended to equip journalists to offer a better public service (Ibid.)."  
McGoldrick (2000, p.19-20) defined peace journalism as “a new form of journalism…which looks at 
how journalists could be part of the solution rather than part of the problem." Lynch (2007) believed 
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that if journalists on both sides of the conflict paid more attention to the conflict and its effects, their 
reporting would be more accurate. Lynch and McGoldrick (2005, p.5) defined peace journalism as: 
"…when editors and reporters make choices, about when to report and how to report it, which 
creates opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent, development 
responses to the conflict."  
From the above definition, peace journalism aims to provide a deeper understanding of a conflict 
situation to the society so that they view it, and respond to it, after considering the more complex – and 
arguably reliable – narrative (instead of surface reality). Journalists are actively encouraged to think 
about the consequences of their reporting and there is an emphasis on their social responsibility. They 
are expected to point out solutions wherever possible. The underlying objective, thus, is to change 
conventional journalistic routines in order to help create peace for society.  
 
Other kinds of journalism that relate to the concept of peace journalism are, for example, 'conflict 
sensitive journalism' (Howard 2003), 'constructive conflict coverage' (Kempf 2002, 2005, 2007), and 
'Human rights journalism' (Shaw 2012). I will come back to discuss these concepts later in this chapter. 
In addition, the principles of peace journalism are not limited to news text. They can be applied to other 
forms of reporting, such as photojournalism (Aslam 2011), or what Allan (2011) called 'Peace 
photography'. Ottosen (2007) agreed with this view when he proposed that by exploring visual 
elements in the news, such as photographs or cartoons, it could potentially lead to a more critical and 
investigative reporting of wars and conflicts, which will further strengthen the practice of peace 
journalism. In this sense, peace journalism can be applied to other forms of news, such as photos, 
cartoons or TV reports.  
 
  4.2.2 Theoretical framework of peace journalism 
The theory that supports peace journalism is the 'framing theory'. Many scholars proposed that, 
theoretically, the framing theory forms the foundation of war and peace journalism (Lee and Maslog 
2005; McMahon and Chow-White 2011; Fong 2009; Ross 2007). According to Entman (1993), frames 
contain key ideas, stock phrases, and stereotypical images to reinforce a particular interpretation, and 
through repetition, placement, and reinforcement, the text and images provide a dominant 
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interpretation more readily perceivable, acceptable and memorable than other interpretations. In other 
words, framing is how the media select particular issues and highlight them in the media text in the 
process of news making (Entman 1993). As Entman (1993) put it: 
"To frame is to elect some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation" (Entman 1993, p. 50-51). 
Framing also relates to the agenda-setting theory as McCombs, Shaw and Weaver (1997) suggested 
that framing is the extension of agenda-setting – or as they put it, ‘second level agenda-setting’. The 
first level of agenda-setting deals with the selection of issues by the news media, while framing deals 
with the selection of elements within a particular issue. As Ghanem (1997, p. 8) put it, "...traditional 
agenda setting posits that the media tell us what to think about, and framing deals with the issue of the 
media telling us how to think about an issue." In other words, framing is when journalists write a news 
story by choosing particular topics from among other topics and giving the meaning to the topics in 
whatever way they want to express it.  
 
Further, Scheufele (1999) proposed that framing is both a macro and a micro level construct. At the 
macro-level, the term framing is used to refer to a mode of representation that journalists use to present 
their information to the audience, while at the micro-level, it refers to how the audience use the 
information presented and how they form impressions regarding the issues. De Vresse (2005) stated 
that frame-building in the news refers to factors that influence the structural qualities of the news 
frame. The outcomes of this process are the frames manifest in the text, and frame-setting refers to the 
interaction between media frames and an individual’s knowledge and predisposition.  
 
The study of framing often explores the extent to which and under what circumstances the audience 
reflects the frame made available to them. The consequences of framing can be at the individual or 
societal level (Weaver 2007). At the individual level, framing can affect attitudes on issues based on 
certain frames, and on a societal level, it may shape social level processes, such as decision-making or 
collective actions (Ibid.). At a methodological level, framing can be studied by a systematic content 
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analysis or a more interpretive textual analysis. The study of framing is more concerned with ‘how’ the 
issues or objects are presented in the media rather than ‘which’ issues are reported (Ibid.).  
 
In the same way for peace journalism, the peace journalists have to make choices about what issue to 
report and how to report the conflict in a way that can create opportunities for the public to consider 
and to value non-violent responses to the conflict (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, p. 5). In this sense, 
framing is generally concerned about the presentation of issues to influence the public's perception, 
which is similar to the peace journalism model as it sets out guidance for journalists of what to include 
and not to include in news reporting in order to influence the public with the ultimate goal of finding a 
resolution to the conflict.  
 
 4.3 Peace Journalism in perspectives  
This section looks at different approaches and perspectives of peace journalism posed by different 
scholars.  
 
 Conflict sensitive journalism 
Howard (2003) combined conflict analysis techniques together with peace journalism and proposed 
that conflict sensitive journalism is the journalism that is sensitive to conflict. The main idea is that 
conflict can be reduced though good reporting and "news reports can be constructive, by making 
citizens better informed, and possibly safer, by also reporting on efforts to promote conflict reduction 
(p.15)." Howard (2003, p.5) defined conflict sensitive journalists as follows: 
 
 "…(a conflict sensitive journalist) applies conflict analysis and searches for new voices and  
new ideas about the conflict. He or she reports on who is trying to resolve the conflict, looks 
 closely at all sides, and reports on how other conflicts were resolved. A conflict sensitive 
 journalist takes no sides, but it is engaged in the search for solutions. Conflict sensitive 
 journalists choose their words carefully."  
 
The conflict sensitive journalist will analyse the conflict situation and provide information that makes 
the public well-informed, as well as proposing a possible solution to the conflict. Compared to peace 
	 77	
journalism, 'conflict sensitive journalism' puts more focus on analysing the conflict but shares the same 
goal of reporting in a way that leads to the resolution of the conflict.  
 
 Ethically responsible journalism 
Taking media ethics as his departing ground, Tehranian (2002) explored peace journalism in the global 
conflict setting with an attempt to call for the standard of global media ethics, and to answer the 
question of whether it is possible to develop peace journalism based on global media ethics in a world 
that is dominated by government and commercial media monopolies (Ibid. p.58). Most media ethics 
are performed professionally at the individual level; however, in this globalised world, as Tehranian 
(2002) argued, the media ethics need to be performed at all institutional, national and international 
levels.  
For that reason, a standard of global media ethics is required, and it should be "a pluralism of content to 
reflect the diversity and complexity of the world" (Ibid. p.58). Most of the stories are told by powerful 
media sources, which will inevitably lead to a hegemony of opinion; peace journalism and media ethics 
cannot survive in such an environment (Ibid). From this, Tehranian (2002) concluded that, "ethically 
responsible journalism is a sine qua non of peace journalism" (Ibid. 58), and for “peace journalism to 
take on a sustained life, the voiceless around the globe must be empowered” (Ibid. p.79). 
 Peace journalism through conflict theory: the role of media as a third party 
Taking conflict theory as an approach, Peleg (2006) proposed that many insights of conflict theory can 
support peace journalism and can be used as a powerful tool for journalists and readers to explore 
conflict and bring about its resolution. In his study, Peleg (2006) used conflict theory with its focus on 
analysing the structure and players in the conflict and found that peace journalism has a role as a third 
party because it can facilitate both sides to get to know and to understand one another more deeply, and 
to bring about a creative solution to the conflict.  
 
Fisher (1997), too, saw the media as a third party in the conflict. He stated that protracted conflicts 
usually require a third party to mediate or facilitate interaction between the rival parties because the 
conflict might generate mistrust preventing the parties from communicating directly. The functions of 
the third party in the conflict can be described as "balancing the situational power of parties and 
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synchronizing confrontation efforts, pacing the phases of the dialogue, promoting openness [and] 
enhancing communication" (Ibid. p. 143). Peleg (2006, p. 1) concluded that peace journalism as a third 
party can best enhance aspects of reconciliation and resolution by changing the norms and habits in 
reporting conflict and, in this way, the media will act as facilitator, mediator, or arbitrator between the 
sides in the conflict.  
 
 Constructive conflict coverage: escalation and de-escalation model 
Kempf (2002, 2003, 2005, 2007) also used conflict theory to explore conflict coverage and came up 
with escalation and de-escalation models of conflict coverage. The field of psychology was also 
applied to explore the responses of audiences towards these two models. Constructive conflict coverage 
explores the transformation of conflict at each stage, and looks into the causes of the escalation-
oriented form of conventional war reporting in order to find answers of how it can be transformed in to 
de-escalation oriented coverage (Kempf 2003).  
 
Kempf (2005) claimed that because of the structural constraints during wars and crises, only a small 
number of journalists frame a conflict in a firmly de-escalation-oriented way. He proposed several 
constraints that can impact on audience responses to peace journalism (Ibid. p.3).40 In his view, 
journalism and the media play an essential role in the social construction of reality that can be fulfilled 
through the types of news coverage they choose, which can be an impetus both to escalation or de-
escalation. In this sense, to produce good journalism, journalists need knowledge, competencies and 
qualifications that go beyond journalistic practices (Kempf 2007, p.5).  
 
 The complexity of media and conflict reality and the practical use of peace journalism 
Blaesi (2004) believed that peace journalism cannot be practical unless conducted under the real 
circumstances of today’s media. In order to find the circumstances in which journalists can actually 
work in times of conflict, it is important to focus on the news production process. Blaesi (2004, p.2) 
based his study on the qualitative analysis of interviews with German journalists and proposed that the 
production process can be described as 'a complex interaction of six factors', which are: structural 
aspects of the media, conflict situation on-site, personal features of the individual journalist, the 
political climate, lobbies, and the audience.  
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The findings revealed that peace journalism can be used at its best in conflicts where neither one’s own 
country nor its close allies are involved. If one’s own country is involved, then the practice of peace 
journalism will be harder due to the consequence of political climate and the negative consequences 
that one can face during the time of conflict (Blaesi 2004, 2007). Blaesi concluded that the model of 
peace journalism should be used but also adapted to the complexities of media realities in different 
conflict situations.  
 
Blaesi (2007) conducted another study in an attempt to find how the different stages of conflict (non-
violent, violent and aftermath) can affect the practice of peace journalism, and to determine which 
stage is best for putting peace journalism into practice. The finding showed that peace journalism 
practice is harder in times of war because the psychological processes that take place in a society in 
wartime cannot be simply switched off. Consequently, the model can be used best in the nonviolent 
stage of conflict (Ibid. p.8). He concluded that peace journalism must be implemented in societies in 
times of peace and only then it will have an increased chance of sustainable realisation in wartime. 
 
 Three conceptual frameworks and Peace Journalism  
Hackett (2006) analysed three conceptual frameworks and their relationships with journalism and other 
relations in order to determine whether the use of peace journalism is possible, and for these three 
models "to help identify the tasks, challenges and potential strategies for peace journalism movement" 
(Ibid. p.1). These three models are the ‘Propaganda Model’ (Herman and Chomsky 2002), ‘Hierarchy 
of Influences’ (Shoemaker and Reese 1996) and ‘Journalistic Field Model’ (Pierre Bourdieu 1993).  
The findings concluded that all models help identify the tasks, challenges and potential strategies for 
the peace journalism movement differently. Nevertheless, they have limitations because all three 
models were developed in the context of Western nation states, which assumed that each operated 
within a well-established institutional setting with a stable relationship with mass audiences and in a 
stable economic and political situation (Ibid. p.10). Consequently, all of these models may have less to 
offer for the implementation of peace journalism in other countries, and, within the dominant Western 
countries, social and economic changes have affected the face of journalism and the notion of 
‘objectivity’ has declined (Ibid). 
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 Human Rights Journalism: a close concept for a non-violent approach 
Shaw (2012) explored the dimensions of peace journalism with human rights journalism and claimed 
that human rights journalism has "the potential to complement PJ to make it more global, long term, 
pro-active and sustainable in just peace-building" (Ibid. p.47). According to Shaw (2012, p. 46), human 
rights journalism is "based on human rights and global justice, a journalism that challenges political, 
economic, social and cultural imbalances of society at both local and global levels". 
 
In the same way as peace journalism, human rights journalism has elements of critical conflict analysis 
and stresses a non-violent approach, which will lead toward the solution of the conflict. Also, Shaw 
(2012) maintained that human rights journalism complements the four orientations of peace journalism 
as proposed by Galtung (1992; 1996) and supported by Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) in terms of 
having a focus on people, truth, solution and peace, or a win-win orientation.  
 
Nevertheless, Shaw (2012, p.46) claimed that the solution-oriented aspect of human rights journalism 
goes further than that of peace journalism as it aims to end 'triple win' (both parties and the community 
as 'the third side'). Thus the human rights journalism approach not only supports the peace journalism 
model but also adds four other values to the model: "global rather than selective reporting; a bias in 
favor of vulnerable voices; a proactive (preventive) rather than reactive (prescriptive) approach to 
reporting; and an attachment to, rather than detachment from, victims of violence" (Shaw 2011, p.116). 
 
These attributes of human rights journalism will enable peace journalism to lay justifiable claim to 
observing the values of "humanitarianism, truth, holism and empowerment (ibid)". In this sense, 
human rights journalism extends peace journalism to include human rights and the victims of human 
rights violations at all levels, and proposes further solutions to conflict that include not only the parties 
that represent the sides in the conflict but also the communities in which the conflict takes place as a 
whole.  
 4.4 Challenging peace journalism: the critique 
This section looks into the criticisms and the counter-criticisms of peace journalism. 	
  4.4.1 Criticism 
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Peace journalism has been criticised by scholars and media professionals on different levels namely: 
structural, theoretical, and conceptual. At the structural level, peace journalism ignores the structural 
constraints of journalism (Fawcett 2002; Hanitzsch 2004, 2007). Hanitzsch (2007, p.1) stated that 
peace journalism is "based on an overly individualistic perspective and ignored the many structural 
constraints that shape and limit the work of journalists...", which means that the conduct of peace 
journalism is not a matter of an individual but it involves a process of news production and other 
organisational and institutional factors. In the article "Why Peace Journalism isn't news", Fawcett 
(2002, p. 221) supported this view by saying that it is necessary to consider the power of the 
"...discursive structures, as well as the power of the political and professional cultures within which 
journalists operate." 
At the theoretical level, peace journalism is to a large extent drawn from ‘naïve realism’ and based 
largely on the assumption of powerful, causal, and linear media effects (Hanitzsch 2004, p.483). It 
overestimates the power of the media and underestimates the impact of personal communication (Ibid. 
p.489). Despite being a peace journalism supporter, Keeble (2010) criticised the peace journalism 
theory for placing an emphasis on the professional response and argued that journalism is best seen as 
political practice, a political strategy to change the society. According to Keeble (2010, p. 51), "the 
dominant strand in PJ theory focuses too closely on the notion of journalism as a privileged, 
professional activity and fails to take into account the critical intellectual tradition which locates 
professions historically and politically…" Keeble called for a radical form of journalism, especially 
peace journalism, since he saw it as a political practice. 
 
At the conceptual level, Hanitzsch (2007, p. 7) argued that peace journalism is "rather a mistitled 
concept", and that many principles of peace journalism are the elements embedded in "good and many-
sided journalism." In this sense, peace journalism is seen as "old wine in a new bottle" (Hanitzsch 
2007, p. 2), and the activists may consider using another form of public communication intended to 
serve a particular cause such as public relations (p.7). Lastly, Hanitzsch (2004) suggested that 
journalism cannot be engaged actively in the peaceful settlement of conflict as that is the responsibility 
of politicians and the military (p. 484). Journalism can contribute to the peaceful settlement of 
conflicts, but its potential influence is limited because "a peaceful culture is the precondition of peace 
journalism rather than its outcome (Hanitzsch 2007, p.7)." 
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Peace journalism is largely criticised because it challenges the traditional journalistic notion of 
objectivity. Loyn (2003) argued that the job of the reporters is to witness the truth and such a 
commitment can only be kept by adhering to objectivity, which is the only sacred goal. Such a goal is 
possible if and when the reporters "preserve their position as observers not players" (Loyn 2007, p.3). 
Journalists should do their job in reporting the truth and should preserve their position as observers, not 
players. In this sense, peace journalism might also confuse journalists about their roles as neutral 
disseminators of facts because the journalists’ tools should only be sharpened and not altered (Loyn 
2007, p.5). Loyn (2007, p.1) claimed that the opposite of peace journalism is good journalism, and 
peace-making is not the business of a reporter.  
 
Nevertheless, the supporters of peace journalism also agreed on peace journalism’s controversial issue 
of objectivity. Shinar (2007, p. 4) saw that one of the professional reasons that causes peace 
journalism’s lack of popularity is the principle of objectivity. Kempf (2007), too, stated that some 
peace journalism supporters seem to underrate values of objectivity, neutrality and detachment (Ibid. 
p.2), which are the professional norms of good journalism, and that turning away from the call for 
objectivity endangers the acceptance of the peace journalistic project (Ibid. p.7).  
 
  4.4.2 Counter-criticism 
Advocates of peace journalism have responded to the criticisms mentioned above. Kempf (2007) 
claimed that peace journalism focuses on the social responsibility role of the media, which will lead to 
good journalism. As such, he replaced Loyn's (2007) dichotomy of "good journalism or peace 
journalism" with the formula of "good journalism = responsible journalism = peace journalism" 
(Kempf 2007, p.3). Lynch (2013, p. 51) also agreed with this view by stating "peace journalism 
embodies an approach to reporting conflicts that can be regarded as good journalism." On the issue of 
'structural constraints', the supporters of peace journalism agree that it requires structural change at a 
different level in order for its implementation to become more effective (Blaesi 2004; Tehranian 2002; 
Hackett 2006). 
In direct response to David Loyn's (2003, 2007) criticism, Lynch (2007), the main supporter of peace 
journalism, viewed that Loyn lacked critical awareness in general, and that Loyn refused to 
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acknowledge the structural characteristics of news representations of conflicts. Lynch (2007, p. 7) 
argued that making news involved the ‘framing’ of facts, and that some facts are kept while others are 
not. Peace journalism is only one form of framing with objectivity, and, in this sense, Loyn 
misrepresented the dividing lines in the debate over peace journalism because he focused too much on 
the facts. On Loyn’s criticism against journalists seeking to become ‘active’ players in the stories they 
cover, Lynch (2003, p. 5) argued that journalists are always involved because it is their responsibility 
to choose which facts are reported. As to Hanitzsch (2004, 2007), Lynch (2007) argued that his 
conventionalist view still lacked critical engagement with conflict and peace issues. 
 
In response to the criticism that news reporting and peace-making are different things, Peleg (2007, p. 
5) stated that the two can be brought together by modifying one to accommodate the other in order to 
deliver a report with a peace objective. In defending against Hanitzch’s (2004) argument that peace 
journalism seeks to divert political responsibilities from politicians to journalists, Peleg (2007, p.5) 
explained the matter by saying that the task of peace-making is not only the responsibility of the 
politician, but also that of the population at large. Peace journalism does not see its audiences as a 
"passive mass that needs to be enlightened" (Hanitzsch 2007, p.6), but its purpose is to enhance the 
readers’ ability to form a judgment and interpret the facts when a wider range of accounts are presented 
for them to consider (Peleg 2007, p.7). Peace journalism is also not "an old wine in a new bottle" 
(Hanitzsch 2007) because it escapes the confines of conventional journalism, and is not merely a more 
elaborate version of it (Ibid. p.7). Peleg's argument in defence of peace journalism is worth quoting at 
length: 
 
"Peace journalism is not merely good journalism; it is different journalism and a departure 
from the traditional way of covering news stories, particularly conflict and violence, not only 
in nuances and emphases but in substance. Peace journalism is not to report what is seen but 
to report what can be seen; not simply to reflect reality but to explore reality and unearth what 
is not ostensibly reflective: to wisely utilize structural and organizational imperatives and to 
be subdued by them; to regard and cultivate readers’ interests but not to be manipulated by 
them. This is the profound shift in the nature of journalism that the new philosophy offers 
(Peleg 2007, p.7)." 
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As for the notion of objectivity, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) argued that journalists are involved no 
matter what; they cannot be completely objective. When reporting the conflict, they see only parts of 
the reality so it is a matter of making choices of what to report (Ibid). Lynch (2007, p.7) maintained 
that peace journalism does not call on the journalists to cross the line and set out to involve themselves 
but to allow their journalism to be based on their observer status. Lynch and Galtung (2010, p. 52) 
further claimed that the main issue is about the selection of which story to report and how to report it 
within the context of the event. They stated: "Objectivity is not the issue. Selection is the issue, the 
criteria applied and the codes and the context in which the event is placed and interpreted (Lynch and 
Galtung 2010, p. 52)." 
 
Furthermore, Hackett (2011, p. 42) stated that PJ constitutes an epistemological challenge to the 
objectivity regime and challenges dominant news values. However, peace journalism can legitimately 
present itself as "a more complete and accurate form of journalism than the standardised and stunted 
practices of 'objectivity'", but the normative dimensions of objectivity, for example, ethics of truth-
telling on matters of public interest, should be maintained (Ibid, p. 61).   
 
Peleg (2007) stated that objectivity is a noble idea but completely unsustainable. Journalists should 
take to it in a more realistic way by looking for neutral perspectives on any controversial issue and 
should carefully study and report opinions from all sides. This does not mean that journalists have no 
stance on the issues of the conflict, but that their personal opinions should be left out and not interfere 
with the facts (Ibid. p.5). Lastly, Bell (1998) claimed that it is hard and impractical for journalists who 
report on wars to remain objective. 
 
 4.5 Peace journalism in practices 
The first part of this section looks into the implementation of peace journalism in different international 
conflict settings. The second half looks into the Thai media and their practice of peace journalism 
including a review of Thai literature on peace journalism. 
 
  4.5.1 Peace journalism in the international context 
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Several studies have been conducted on peace journalism in various contexts over the past decades. 
This section presents an overview of these studies, which reflects the attempt to promote peace 
journalism in different conflict settings.  
 
Most research on peace journalism has been conducted by looking at different conflict settings in 
different parts of the world with the use of a content analysis and interviews. Findings vary because 
every conflict setting has a different social and economic background, political structure, and media 
organisation structure. Perez (2000) presented an in-depth analysis of media coverage of the war in Iraq 
as a case study in order to determine how the war was presented through the US media. The study 
applied Galtung’s peace journalism discourse with the cognitive linguistic frames of George Lakoff 
(2002), with the assumption that the combination of the two approaches would give a full 
understanding of how the situation is interpreted in a certain way, and how that can help identify a 
peaceful solution. The study concluded that journalists can apply peace journalism endlessly to cover a 
variety of issues, not just in conflict reporting, and that the peace discourse and cognitive linguistics 
frame can be applied more generally in peace media.  
Orgunes and Terzis (2000) explored the reporting of the conflict between Greece and Turkey. The 
authors investigated the role of the media in the conflict by interview method with the objective of 
finding some institutional, technical and cultural factors that influence the media’s disposition in the 
coverage of conflict, and to identify possible solutions. Their findings revealed that the history of 
nation-building played an important role in shaping the national identities of both nations, and that the 
mass media of both nations were used "to reinforce the myth of the unitary state, on one hand by 
emphasising the similarities among the members of the nation, and on the other hand by creating a fear 
of the ‘other’…" (Ibid. p.408). Stereotypes and negative images designed to dehumanise the ‘other’ 
were also used (Ibid.).  
 
Both national media played an important role in the preservation of their national identities and in 
fuelling the conflict "by shaping social attitudes and political decisions in times of conflict" (Ibid. 
p.409). The interviews revealed that the main constraints for the solution-oriented way of reporting are: 
the national ideology seen in the media culture; the commercialisation of the media; changes in media 
ownership; and the interlocking interest between the media, politics, and business factors (Ibid. p.405). 
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These constraints left the journalists with only a limited choice of how to report the conflict, and they 
used these constraints as an ‘excuse’ when confronted with their diffidence and submission to the 
system (Ibid. p.417). The interviewees also suggested that to find a solution to the conflict, an in-depth 
communication between the media of the two countries is needed (Ibid. p. 405). 
 
Using the case study of the Northern Ireland conflict, Fawcett (2002) involved nationalist and unionist 
newspapers in Northern Ireland, which joined together in peace journalism initiatives, to examine the 
conciliation and conflict framework. The case study illustrated how rhetorical and narrative structures 
shaped and constrained the way in which newspapers report conflict (Ibid. p.213). The paper concluded 
that the rhetorical and narrative forms used by news media facilitate certain frames or discourses by 
shaping and constraining the manner in which newspapers report conflicts (Ibid. p. 221). At the same 
time, those structures can position newspapers as both politicians and storytellers in their coverage of 
conflict, which suggests that newspapers are likely to act in the manner which they believe best suits 
their purpose. Fawcett (2002, p. 221) proposed that, to promote peace journalism and a win-win 
framework, it is necessary to address the power of these discursive structures, as well as the power of 
the political and professional cultures within which journalists operate.  
 
Considered pioneers in using the peace journalism framework as a mode of analysis, Lee and Maslog 
(2005) studied Asian newspapers and the coverage of conflict by examining the extent to which four 
Asian regional conflicts involving India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines were 
framed as either war or peace journalism based according to Galtung’s framework. The findings from a 
content analysis suggest that, overall, the news coverage of conflicts in these countries is war-oriented. 
The Indian and Pakistani coverage of the Kashmir issue shows the strongest war journalism 
framework, while the coverage of the Tamil Tiger movement and the Mindanao conflict showed some 
application of a peace journalism approach (Ibid. p.311). The three main indicators of peace journalism 
are the avoidance of demonising language, a nonpartisan approach, and multiparty orientation (Ibid. p. 
311). The war journalism indicators are a focus on the here and now, an elite orientation, and a 
dichotomy of good and bad. 
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In 2010, Lee conducted another study comparing the news coverage of three Asian conflicts: India and 
Pakistan’s dispute over Kashmir, the Tamil Tigers movement in Sri Lanka, and the Indonesian civil 
wars in Aceh and Maluku (Lee 2010, p. 361). What distinguished this study from others is that the 
author chose to include vernacular newspapers in the analysis. The findings showed that peace 
journalism is subjected to structural limitations in this context and that structural changes are needed 
for it to be adapted to suit a mainstream approach. The conclusion was that characteristic forms in the 
media and institutional constraints, such as language, story, type, production source and contextual 
variables (the conflict’s length and intensity), shape the patterns of war and peace journalism (Ibid.). 
 
Spencer (2005) examined the role of the news media in a range of international conflict situations, by 
focusing on how conflict-oriented reports tend to reinforce violence rather than propose solutions to 
conflicts. The study explored news coverage of conflict situations in Vietnam, Rwanda, Bosnia, the 
Middle East, Northern Ireland and Iraq. The findings revealed that the reports lacked any attention to 
conflict prevention and that “news coverage is all too often concerned with entertainment and drama at 
the expense of detailed analysis and deconstruction… this has negative consequences for public 
understanding about how others are perceived” (Ibid. p.2). The media have a great impact in shaping 
political decisions and public policy, and by focusing on moral and ethical questions about journalistic 
responsibility, Spencer further stated that “journalists are viewed as humans first and journalists 
second” (Ibid. p.5). Hence the journalistic responsibility is more important for people than journalistic 
practices or any other interests.  
 
Goretti (2007) explored how peace journalism is applied in the conflict in Uganda by studying the 
media coverage of the two main newspapers – one government newspaper and one private newspaper – 
in northern Uganda over a period of three years. The findings showed that most of the coverage on the 
conflict was written in the form of news stories, which showed that the journalists play an important 
role in keeping people informed about the war, and that people’s perception can be shaped easily 
depending on how the journalists report the conflict (Ibid. p.1) The findings from a content analysis 
showed that the government paper expressed bias and confrontation in its report, while the private-
owned newspaper was more balanced and used various sources for its reports, which were written in a 
more conciliatory tone (ibid.).  Coverage of peace initiatives could still be seen to a reasonable extent 
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but the coverage still focused more on the government’s peace efforts (Ibid.).The study suggested that 
journalists should take their responsibility seriously especially during times of crisis because the 
reporting of conflicts differs from the reporting during normal conditions and is "fraught with ethical 
challenge (Ibid. p. 8)." Thus the journalists should never forget their duty to serve the public instead of 
individual or group interests, and that the ability to weigh stories and make quick judgment of what to 
report is important because many conflict situations are urgent (Ibid.). 
 
Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2008) explored war journalism in the article "War Journalism in the Threat 
Society." 'Threat society' is a historical change that took place after the Global War on Terror, which 
created public fear that has become a permanent state of mind, and leading to a "culture of fear 
challenging journalism in a more dramatic way than perhaps ever before" (Ibid. p.2). This culture of 
fear "seriously challenges conflict and peace journalism in many new ways (Ibid. p.1)." The authors 
explored the consequences of this culture of fear on war and peace journalism by exploring the 
Norwegian media coverage of the Iraq war to find the extent to which peace journalism is suitable for 
presenting global situations and whether it had enough potential to change the global news agenda. The 
findings revealed that because the Global War on Terror has much more encompassing effects than any 
previous war, the peace journalism strategies seem to be deficient and impractical in many ways 
because the coverage focuses on situations of military violence and how they are reported, and it could 
eventually lead to open violence (Ibid. p. 14).  
 
Ross and Alankus (2010) examined the headlines and contents in the print media in both Turkish 
northern and Greek southern Cyprus to see how they reported the 'Cyprus problem'. The Cyprus 
problem is an on-going conflict on the island of Cyprus between the population of Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and it is believed to be one of the most intractable conflicts in the 
world. Ross and Alankus (2010) argued that even though they were provided with more opportunities 
for more open and inclusive coverage and more chances for reconciliation, the press – both inside and 
outside the conflict – did little to promote the constructive foundation of peace (Ibid. p.243). The press 
reinforced the fundamental differences between the two sides by stressing their identities, which was a 
failure to serve as a medium for reconciliation and peace-making. The research concluded that the 
press was one of the reasons obstructing the reconciliation of the conflict (Ibid. p. 254).  
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To conclude, different conflict settings have different degrees of peace journalism implementation. 
Various studies have been conducted to show the attempts to promote and develop peace journalism in 
different conflict settings around the world. The common method of research is to explore the local 
media and their conflict coverage within the perspective of peace journalism in order to determine how 
the media report the local conflict, and whether or not the reporting leads towards the resolution of the 
conflict (Orgunes and Terzis 2000; Fawcett 2002; Lee and Maslog 2005; Lee 2010; Spencer 2005; 
Goretti 2007; Ross and Alankus 2010). The method used in these studies, especially the analysis of the 
13 WJ/PJ elements as used in Lee and Maslog (2005) and Lee (2010), have inspired the methods used 
in this present research. 
 
  4.5.2 Peace journalism in the context of Thailand’s southern conflict 
This sub-section looks at the implementation of peace journalism into Thai media practices and ends 
with a review of peace journalism literature within the context of this study.  
 
   4.5.2.1 Attempts to promote peace journalism into Thai media practices 	
As previously mentioned in Chapter 1 (1.1) and Chapter 3 (3.4) on the criticism of the Thai media, we 
can see that the Thai media have been criticised widely for their reporting of the southern conflict and 
have been considered as one of the factors instigating a continuation of violence and creating 
misunderstanding between the Thai majority and the Muslim minority. The Thai Journalists’ 
Association (TJA) and media professionals were aware that the Thai media lacked the skills in 
reporting the conflict. The Thai media has an inadequate understanding of the social and cultural 
differences and history behind the conflict, which resulted in them presenting a false perception and 
misunderstanding among the general public.  
 
The TJA saw the idea of peace journalism with its emphasis on the social responsibility role of 
journalists and the focus on reporting on causes and consequences of the conflict as a good solution to 
this problem (Ruangdit 2012). In 2005, the first pilot project on peace journalism, the Issara News 
Center (INC), was set up with the main objective to promote peace journalism in Thai journalistic 
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practices and to provide knowledge and information on the conflict to journalists and reporters 
covering the conflict. 
 
The TJA called for participation from 20 newspapers in Thailand to send their reporters and journalists 
to join the centre and provided them with the courses and workshops to promote peace journalism. 
Because of the political situation in 2006, which ended with the coup that ousted Prime Minister 
Thaksin, the newspapers asked their reporters and journalists to withdraw from the centre and return to 
Bangkok to report on the political crisis; the project was then put on hold and later dissolved.41 The 
Issara News Center was later integrated into the Issara News Agency (INA) under the Thai Press 
Development Foundation in 2007. Until now, the news agency still produces community news, social 
policy news and southern conflict news, as well as workshops and post-professional training for 
journalists. 
 
Another attempt to promote peace journalism in the context of Thailand's southern conflict is Deep 
South Watch (DSW), which was a platform organisation established in 2006. The objective of DSW is 
to promote peace in the southern border provinces and to provide political space for various parties in 
the conflict to present their needs and roles. The aims of DSW "...are not only to create a realistic and 
comprehensive understanding of the conflict, but it is also expected that these practices will help to 
lessen the justification for use of violence from all parties..." In other words, the aim is to use non-
violent means to constructively transform the conflict.42  
 
The work of DSW involves sharing news and articles on the southern conflict to persuade people to 
understand the situation and support peace as a solution; providing the platforms on which sides 
involved in the conflict, particularly those in the conflict area, can have their voices heard; and 
disseminating knowledge, collecting data on the incidents, and creating public learning spaces through 
forums, workshops and seminars. In 2010, DSW set up the Deep South Journalism School to provide a 
young generation of journalists with the skills and training needed for good journalistic practices in 
order for them to disseminate the voices of people in the conflict area to the greater Thai public.43 
 
The establishment of the two centres – the Issara News Center (INC) in 2005 and the Deep South 
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Watch (2006) – shows that peace journalism has been applied to Thai media practices since the early 
years of the southern conflict. This suggests that the Thai media see peace journalism as a beneficial 
practice that could lead to the resolution of the conflict, or at least, improve the journalistic practices of 
the journalists who cover the conflict. For 10 years, peace journalism has gained a lot of interest from 
Thai media professionals and academics. Books and articles have been published and researches have 
been conducted. The next section provides a review on peace journalism literature in this context. 
 
   4.5.2.2 Reviewing of peace journalism literature in the context  
   of Thailand's southern conflict 	
Under TJA publications, Jamlongrach (2007) gave a background and history of the INC in ‘The Red 
News field’ (Sa-nham-kao-see-dang). He concluded that the media team sent to the conflict area found 
that reporting of the conflict in the mainstream media contrasted with the reality they experienced, and 
they agreed that the problem was with the reporting style in the Thai media. He proposed a new 
guidance, taken from the peace journalism model, in reporting the conflict. The main focus was on 
giving information on the religion, culture and history of the region, and also on balancing the 
reportage by covering all sides of the conflict. He claimed that the most important thing was to analyse 
the incident and provide the public with process-based reporting because Thai society still lacks 
meaningful understanding of the conflict.  
 
In the book  'When the sky is gloomy and the Chedi is broken in the deep South' (Mue-fa-mon-chedi-
hak-tee-pak-tai), Peetatawatchai (2007) showed 'the other side of the story’ in order to promote a better 
understanding of the social and cultural life of the southern Muslims to the Thai public. Each chapter 
focused on different aspects of lives in the conflict area. There were, for example, stories about the 
villagers in the conflict area and their everyday lives, the life of a victim of Takbai, a Thai temple in a 
Muslim community, or the life of a Buddhist doctor in the local hospital. This was an attempt to put the 
everyday lives of local people in the area firmly into the public eye, something which had never been 
seen anywhere else.  
 
In 2009, the TJA published the first handbook for journalists in Thailand with the focus on giving 
guidance of how to report a conflict.  The ‘Handbook for journalists reporting in conflict situation’ 
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(Ku-mue-rai-ngarn-kao-nai-sa-ta-na-garn-kwam-kad-yaeng) was written by Aiamsamrarn and 
included information on the southern conflict situation between 2004 and 2009 and a brief history of 
the conflict. The author collected stories and lessons from the experienced journalists in the field to 
present a picture of what it was like to report from the conflict area; how journalists should prepare 
themselves before going to the conflict zone; and how to report in a balanced manner. 
In 2012, the Academic Institute of Public Media under the Thai PBS (Thai Public Broadcasting 
Service) published another handbook for Thai journalists, called 'Handbook for reporting toward 
conflict resolution: the case of the disturbance in the three southern border provinces'. The book was 
based on a collection of researches, academic papers, seminar papers and interviews with journalists 
who worked in the conflict area. The chapters includes, for example, conflict reporting, peace 
journalism, and the BBC guidelines for reporting conflict and casualties. From this, we can see that 
different media institutions in Thailand saw the importance of putting peace journalism, and its idea of 
reporting conflict with the goal of bringing about peace, into the Thai journalistic practices. 
At the academic level, few researches have been conducted on the Thai media and their reporting of the 
southern conflict. In her doctoral thesis, 'Journalism and the Path to Peace in the South of Thailand', 
Changkamol (2013) focused on the role of newspapers in reporting the southern conflict. The research 
used a mixture of methods including content analysis, in-depth interviews and participant observations, 
and focused on the news coverage and articles from six major newspapers in 2008. The coding sheet of 
the content analysis was adapted from Galtung’s peace journalism theory. The findings showed that the 
news coverage relied mainly on authority sources; focused mainly on what happened; and emphasised 
the visible effects of the violent incidents. The thesis addressed a number of concerns regarding the 
problems of employing peace journalism in the Thai media, and proposed a four-point model for peace 
journalism by Thai journalists.  
In another doctoral thesis, 'Mediating Political Dissent: A study of Thai news organisations and 
southern conflict reporting', Kularb (2013) examined the interplay between journalism and political 
and social institutions in Thailand in the context of the conflict. The study focused on Thai-language 
newspapers, and used content analysis and interviews to examine news content and news production 
practices. Kularb argued that the news coverage of the conflict still largely drew on the authority’s 
perspectives, but that a change “…in the discursive contention and political consensus, as well as 
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diversity and complexity in Thai news ecology could provide opportunities for the counter-hegemonic 
accounts to emerge and facilitate healthy democratic debates about the southern conflict” (Kularb 
2013, p. V).  
The literature on peace journalism in the context of Thailand’s southern conflict presented above 
indicates that Thai media professionals and academics see peace journalism as a good alternative and a 
useful technique for reporting in this context. We can see from the previous section (4.2.1.1) that peace 
journalism has been implemented and applied into practice on different local contexts; however, its 
success is dependent on a different development in political, economic and social structures, and 
especially the media institutions. For the Thai media, the attempt to put peace journalism into practice 
is clearly seen, for example, by setting up centres to educate and train journalists on the idea of peace 
journalism and to share knowledge on the background of the conflict; by publishing books and stories 
from 'the other side'; and by establishing guidelines for journalists and reporters to follow.  
All of these suggest that the idea of peace journalism is largely welcomed in the Thai media scene. 
However, while a few studies have been conducted on the performances and output of the Thai media 
and their reporting of the southern conflict, the number is still limited. This is especially so with regard 
to the study of the output of the English-language newspapers and their reporting of the southern 
conflict. For that reason, this research has been designed to fill this gap.  
 4.5 Conclusion 
The literature presented in this chapter shows that there have been attempts to promote peace 
journalism in different parts of the world. Since it is a new field, more research should be conducted at 
different levels and in local contexts to find a more practical version of peace journalism. Promoting 
peace journalism in a local context is also a challenge, since it requires the adaptation of the model 
because of the differences in the conflict’s historical background, its socio-political-economic 
background, and the structures of the relevant media organisations.  
 
This research arises from my interest in peace journalism, particularly in the context of Thailand's 
southern conflict. It aims to fill the gap created by the lack of studies on the performance of the 
English-language newspapers in terms of this conflict. The results of reviewing relevant literature 
provided in this chapter, together with a review of the background of the conflict (Chapter 2) and an 
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analysis of the Thai media (Chapter 3), have informed the research questions of this study. The study 
looks for answers to 'how' the conflict is represented from the perspective of peace journalism, 
including 'to what extent' the peace journalism concept was used in the news reports, and 'why' the 
conflict is reported in this way. The ultimate aim of this research is to look for recommendations on 
how to improve news coverage in this context. The methodologies of this research were formed in 
order to find answers to these questions and achieve this objective. The theoretical approaches as well 
as discussions on the methods will be presented in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 5 
Research Methodologies 
Content analysis and Semi-structured interviews 
 
This research looks at the southern conflict in Thailand through the lens of peace journalism. Given the 
criticism that the Thai media have exacerbated the conflict with their journalistic practices, the attempt 
here is to understand the specific nature of the coverage in the Thai press, and to suggest ways in which 
the Thai media can present the situation in a more constructive manner. As mentioned in the literature 
review chapter, peace journalism, despite the many criticisms levelled against it, has the potential to 
offer a more conflict-sensitive coverage that could help the peace process. As set out in Chapter 1, 
Introduction, understanding the nature of conflict coverage in this specific conflict setting is an 
essential objective of this research. To understand the conflict coverage in this specific context, the 
objectives are spread across the following four research questions: 
 
RQ1. How has the coverage of the two English newspapers in Thailand (Bangkok Post and 
The Nation) represented the southern conflict?  
 
RQ2. To what extent do the two newspapers follow war-oriented and/or peace-oriented 
approaches in covering the southern conflict?  
 
RQ3. What are the journalists’ and the editors’ perceptions of factors influencing the 
strengths and weaknesses of the conflict coverage? 
 
RQ4. What can be an alternative way of covering the conflict in this specific context? 
 
To answer the research questions, this inquiry used an interpretive approach.  The objectives were to 
understand how the two newspapers presented the southern conflict in Thailand, and to learn the Thai 
journalists’ and editors’ perceptions of the coverage they produced. As argued earlier in the 
introduction chapter, media practitioners socially construct reality based on professional and personal 
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ideology, corporate interest, organisational norms and values and news schema formats (Van Dijk 
1988; Fiske 1994). Thus, the way editors and journalists represent the conflict is arguably governed by 
the professional norm and individual perceptions of the conflict. 
 
Two methods are used in this study. The primary method is a content analysis of selected news reports, 
aimed at profiling the coverage of the conflict in the Bangkok Post and The Nation English 
newspapers. RQ1 and RQ2 are addressed by this method. The secondary method is semi-structured 
interviews with journalists and editors involved in the coverage of the conflict. The interviews aim to 
provide answers to RQ3 and RQ4 by eliciting perceptions on the southern conflict, the process of news 
production, and the challenges in covering the conflict. Furthermore, the interviews explore the 
journalists' and editors’ views on alternative ways of reporting the conflict.  
 
This chapter provides a justification for the two methods. First it presents the theoretical approaches, 
and then it explains the implementation of these methods for the purpose of this study.  
 
 5.1 Theoretical approaches 
In this study, two theoretical approaches were applied. The first approach is the mass communication 
theory, and its concept of media power that focuses on the use of media language, and on how the 
media represent a conflict situation. The mass media has become a new mediator connecting people 
with social reality so the media have a crucial role in distributing knowledge and information. McQuail 
(2010, p. 81-82) proposed the 'mediation concept' of the mass media, which refers to the mediation of 
contact with social reality or how the media prevents a version of an incident, which the general 
populations could not directly observe by themselves.  
The term ‘mediation’ could be defined in a variety of ways, ranging from neutrality and informing to 
negotiation or an attempt to manipulate and control (McQuail 2010). In this sense, the media not only 
act as a mediator portraying the reality of the society but also forge the elements which are held in 
common with others. In other words, they provide a shared perception of reality to the public.  
Thomson (1990) proposed ‘mediated quasi-interaction’ to explain the relationship that constitutes a 
mass communication, which consists of distinguishing characteristics. Firstly, participants are not 
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inclined to know each other, and messages are produced for a large number of anonymous receivers. 
Secondly, mediated quasi-interaction is a one-way communication and lacks mediated feedback from 
the audience. In this way, the media is a means for social institutions to convey their selected versions 
of events and conditions to the general public; however, the messages are only one-way 
communications.  
 
McQuail (2010) claimed that the most remarkable idea is that the media sought out institutional 
advocates as channels for reaching the general public and for conveying their chosen perspective on 
events and conditions. Since the media are a cultural institution with their own interests and rules in 
shaping the perception of reality, their supply of information could be distorted to a varying degree 
according to their own purposes or those of other social institutions. Therefore, the reliability of the 
media as purely neutral is questionable. 
  
Under the premises of this study, the notion of media will be divided into two main areas: societal and 
cultural perspectives. This division is derived from the underlying assumption that society and culture 
could not exist without each other. I consider the mass media to be a mediator of reality on the grounds 
that the events which happen in the southern part of Thailand are conveyed to the audience through the 
media which decide on what and how to represent the southern conflict.  
 
The second theoretical approach is the framing theory, which, as mentioned earlier in 4.2.2, is the 
theory that supports peace journalism. Johnson-Cartee (2005, p. 161) saw news writing as framing and 
proposed that when writing the news, journalists use their knowledge of the issues they are reporting 
along with their professional experience and social theory. Framing in news media is important in 
shaping both the public’s and the decision maker’s knowledge of the world, as it increases the 
perceived importance of particular issues by highlighting them, while conversely, makes some issues 
appear less important by ignoring them (Nelson and Oxley 1999). Framing is how the media report 
particular issues and highlight them in the media text in the process of news making (Entman 1993). It 
is based on the assumption that an issue characterised in the news can influence the perception of its 
audience (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).  
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Therefore, framing theory can be applied as the research method with the objective of investigating the 
patterns appearing in the news content and to determine how certain issues are selected and 
highlighted. At the theoretical level, as stated earlier in 4.2.2, framing theory is a foundation of both 
war and peace journalism (Lee and Maslog 2005; McMahon and Chow-White 2011; Fong 2009) 
because framing, in the same way as the war and peace journalism model, deals with the presentation 
of issues in terms of what to include and not to include in the news reporting. For that reason, framing 
theory was utilised in this study to examine the presentation of news within the context of war and 
peace journalism. 
 
This study aims to explore how the media presented the southern conflict and to what extent war and 
peace journalism were applied in the news reports. Mass communication theory and framing theory 
were taken as the theoretical approaches to form the methods specifically designed for this study. The 
reason for this is that mass communication theory can be applied to explore the representation of 
conflict in this specific context, and how the reality is constructed and presented by the media. On the 
other hand,  framing theory can be applied to determine the extent to which war and peace journalism 
were put into practices in the writing of the news stories covered in this study. This sub-section 
explains the theoretical approaches chosen for this study, the next section will explain how the methods 
were used to answer the research questions. 
 
 5.2 Methods: Answering the RQs 
As mentioned in the introduction, the study aims to explore the representation of the conflict in the 
news coverage. Two research methods – content analysis and semi-structured interviews – were 
applied to answer the RQs.  
 
RQ1 and RQ2 can be answered by a content analysis of the conflict coverage using the war and peace 
journalism (WJ/PJ) framework created by Galtung (1996; 1998), together with an analysis of news 
sources, news actors and labels. The framework, which included 13 indicators of war journalism and 
13 indicators of peace journalism, was used as an approach to investigate the representation in news 
content and the elements of war and peace journalism applied in the coverage. The classification of war 
and peace journalism was applied to each news story in order to determine which WJ/PJ elements were 
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foremost in the new stories. The 13 WJ/PJ framework comprised two themes: approach-based and 
language-based. The approach-based criteria focus on the method and procedure when writing news 
story. It includes the following (also see Appendix II): 
 
• reactivity (waits for war to break out before reporting) and proactivity (starts reporting long 
before the war starts) 
• visibility of the effects of war (reports on damages, number of casualties and deaths) and 
invisibility effects of war (report on effects on society, culture and people).  
• elite orientation (focuses on elites as the main actors and sources) and people orientation 
(focuses on common people as the main actors and news sources) 
• differences (focuses on the differences that led to the conflict) and agreement (focuses on the 
agreement that can lead to the resolution of the conflict) 
• here and now (reports on conflict as it is) and cause and consequence (reports on the causes 
and consequences of the conflict) 
• good and bad dichotomy (labels the good and bad sides of the conflict) and avoidance of good 
and bad dichotomy (avoids the labelling good and bad sides) 
• two party orientation (one party wins and one party loses) and multiparty orientation (gives 
voices to many sides and parties involved in the conflict) 
• partisan (biased towards one side of the conflict) and non-partisan (does not take sides; 
remains neutral) 
• zero-sum orientation (one goal to win) and win-win orientation (many goals; solution 
oriented) 
• discontinuity of report (stops reporting when the war is over) and continuity of report 
(continues reporting on the aftermath of the war that includes the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation phases)  
 
The language-based criteria focus on the style of language used by journalists when reporting on 
conflict. It includes the use and the avoidance of: 
• victimising language (the language that tells what has been done to people) 
• demonising language (the language that portrays certain parties as wicked and threatening)  
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• emotive language (the language that is able to arouse intense feelings) 
The application of the 13 WJ/PJ framework in the content analysis will enable me to explore both the 
WJ/PJ elements and the extent to which these elements were used in the news coverage (see further in 
5.2.1.2). The study of news actors will look into the main news actors of each news story to determine 
the prominence placed on each category (see further in 5.2.1.3). The analysis of news sources will 
show which sources the newspapers most relied on when writing their news reports (see further in 
5.2.1.4). The analysis of labels will examine the use of words in referring to the southern conflict 
phenomenon, the three incidents, and the actors of these incidents, in order to ascertain how the 
newspapers describe the conflict and the people involved (see further in 5.2.1.5).  
All of these analyses can lead to a better understanding of how the conflict is presented. Overall, the 
content analysis will help explore the conflict coverage and answer RQ1 & RQ2 on how the two 
newspapers represented the southern conflict and the extent to which the newspapers engaged in war or 
peace journalism approaches in their reporting.  
RQ3 and RQ4 will be answered by semi-structured interviews with journalists and editorial staff from 
the two newspapers and one expert from the media organisation. The research questions were designed 
in order to understand the interviewees’ perceptions of the southern conflict, the process of news 
production, the difficulties or limitations in covering the conflict, and whether there is an alternative 
way in reporting the conflict. The study attempts to use the interview method to gain insightful 
information from journalists and editors who have experience in covering the conflict. The questions 
were semi-structured in order to encourage full answers from the subjects’ own experiences and 
knowledge. This approach generates a more detailed and insightful answer, which leads to an 
understanding of the wider sense of social and cultural aspects of the issue and suggestions for 
alternative ways of reporting conflict.  
 
The main questions revolved around the news making process, the questions of news value, reporting 
in times of crisis, the social and cultural factors that influence the production of news in this context, 
and the perception and understanding of peace journalism. 
 
  5.2.1 Content analysis  
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Scholars in media and cultural studies have given several definitions to content analysis. Weber (1990, 
p. 9) proposed that content analysis "is a research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid 
inferences from text." Krippendorff (2004, p. 18) stated that "Content analysis is a research technique 
for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of 
their use." Both definitions place an emphasis on 'valid inferences' from text. Krippendorff (2004, p. 
21-22) also took the context of the text used into consideration in terms of the analysis since he saw 
that recognizing meanings is the main reason for conducting content analysis.  
 
Traditionally, content analysis is seen as a quantitative method (Berelson 1952; Neuendorf 2002; 
Mayring 2004; Kohlbacher 2006).  Berelson (1952, p. 18) defined content analysis as "a research 
technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication." Neuendorf (2002), too, stressed the systematic, objective and quantitative analysis of 
messages, which lead to numerical findings. As she put it, "a content analysis has as its goal a 
numerically based summary of a chosen message set" (2002, p. 14). Kohlbacher (2006, p. 1) stated 
that: 
 
"...classical content analysis is essentially a quantitative method with the core and central tool 
being its system of categories...The simplest type of evaluation consequently consists of 
counting the numbers of occurrences per category."  
 
From the above, it can be seen that several scholars view content analysis as a quantitative approach 
that leads to valid, numerical findings by counting the frequency of a particular text component 
(frequency analysis). However, the method, which stresses quantification in classical content analysis, 
brings with it several limitations. Scholars have tried to compare and contrast the advantages and 
disadvantages of the quantitative approach to the qualitative one. Krippendorff (2004) and Mayring 
(2004) saw the importance of the textual content in content analysis, which cannot be measured solely 
by a quantitative approach. As Krippendorff (2004, p. 15) argued, "Reading is fundamentally a 
qualitative process, even when it results in numerical accounts." Also, the quantitative approach 
"ignored the textual content that defines and modifies the particular textual units" (Mayring 2004, p. 
267).  
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Patton (1990, p. 14) saw the ability to measure in content analysis as an advantage. This facilitated the 
comparison and statistical collection of data, which could lead to a broad, generalisable set of findings. 
On the other hand, the qualitative approach typically leads to detailed information about a much 
smaller number of people and cases, which enhances the researcher’s understanding of the cases and 
situations studied but reduces generalisability (Ibid.). 
 
Given the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches, several scholars have tried to bind the two 
methods. Mayring (2004, p. 267-269) stated that quantitative stages can be built into the qualitative 
analysis, which makes it possible to overcome the limitations of a 'quali' or a 'quanti’ approach – that 
is, it is possible for a content analysis to incorporate both components into the analytical process in a 
justified way. Weber (1990, p. 10), too, agreed with applying both methods in the same analysis when 
he proposed that the best kind of content analysis applies both qualitative and quantitative approaches 
to text analysis by including the frequency analysis and frequency of comments coded in each 
category.  
 
The use of the two components strengthens the researcher’s claims for the validity of the conclusions 
drawn where mutual confirmation of results can be demonstrated (Bryman 1988). Lastly, Patton (1990) 
suggested that significant patterns of results may emerge through the quantitative method, which 
allows researchers to use qualitative methods through in-depth study to find the meaning of those 
patterns.  
 
In line with the work of the scholars mentioned above, this study made use of a content analysis with a 
qualitative element added to it. As Weber (1990, p. 10) stated, the best content analysis studies use 
both quantitative and qualitative evaluations of texts. Similarly, Kelle and Erzberger (2004, p. 176) 
believed that linking both elements serves "to illuminate different aspects of social phenomena" 
because quantitative methods can be used to investigate the meaning of the social-structural factors of 
context, and qualitative methods can be applied to study the ways in which these contextual factors are 
interpreted (Ibid).  
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For the method used here, I draw on Bryman’s definition of qualitative content analysis. As he put it, it 
is an approach that “emphasizes the role of the investigator in the construction of the meaning of and in 
texts. There is an emphasis on understanding the meaning of the context in which an item being 
analyzed (and the categories derived from it) appeared" (Bryman 2004, p. 542). 
 
The quantitative component in the method employed for this study pertained to looking for the war and 
peace journalism elements in the coverage (see 5.2.1.2) including the number of news actors (see 
5.2.1.3), news sources (see 5.2.1.4), and labels (see 5.2.1.5), while the qualitative analysis strived to 
arrive at an evaluation of the ‘meaning’ being communicated in the text, in other words, the 
interpretation of the findings from a quantitative analysis in this study. 	
   5.2.1.1 Units of analysis 
The units of analysis were the individual news articles taken from the newspapers’ front pages and 
follow up pages, which included hard news reports and feature articles on the conflict. The analysis 
looked at headlines, sub-headlines and 25% of the whole news report. These elements were selected 
because I believe these units are sufficient to indicate the main points of the news reports. As Van Dijk 
(1988, p. 87) stated, "The importance of topics may be indicated by their expression in headlines or 
lead", which suggests that headlines and leads can reveal journalists' preferences towards certain 
explanations of reality.  
Moreover, most people do not have time to read the newspaper from cover to cover. Readers always 
skim the news, so the most important information is always presented first (O’Shaughnessy and Stadler 
2012, p.85). Similarly, McKee (2003, p.75) proposed that people do not consume text as a whole and 
textual analysis is more focused on recovering information about practices in sense-making so there is 
no need to study every element of every text for every question.  
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Date   Bangkok Post The Nation   Total  
(news) = 
Arsenal raid incident 
(5/01/04 - 11/01/04) 
34 news 
 
 35 news 
 
69 
 
Kruese Mosque incident 
29/04/04 - 5/05/04 
56 news 
 
 74 news 
 
130 
 
Takbai demonstration incident 
26/10/04 - 1/11/04 
42 news 
 
 57 news 
 
99 
 
Total  (news) = 132 news 
 
166 news 298 news 
  
Table 5.1: Data for content analysis from Bangkok Post and The Nation 
 
At the first stage of preparing the data, the number of news reports produced by both newspapers after 
each incident was reviewed to see how many articles were published on each day. The research did not 
look into the use of photographs, maps or editorials presented in the newspapers. In the second stage, I 
selected the news and feature stories on the conflict that accorded with the main objective of the 
research, i.e., a study of the representation of the conflict in news coverage. In order to observe the 
types of news and topics both newspapers presented in their reporting, I made records on the topics the 
newspapers presented in their reports. 
 
From my observations, I found 13 distinct news topics in the reporting of the southern conflict, which 
are: 'Violent incidents'; 'Law enforcement & Follow-up investigations'; 'Southern policy & Security 
measures'; 'Government's reaction'; 'Criticism'; 'International'44; 'Impact on lives'; 'Impact on socio-
economic aspects'; 'History'; 'Religion'; 'Aftermath'; 'Human rights'; and 'Solution'. The categorisation 
of news stories according to their topics and their types of news made it easier to understand how the 
two English-language newspapers presented the southern conflict.   
 
In the third stage, the 298 news stories were arranged in a form suitable for further analysis. One unit 
of analysis included a headline, sub-headline (if provided) and news content (25% of the whole story). 
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In each unit, each news story was arranged according to the publishing date and incident. The units of 
analysis differed in length and form and the number of news articles each newspaper published was 
also different, which has to be taken into consideration. 
 
   5.2.1.2 Analysis of WJ/PJ  
The analysis looked at the elements of WJ and PJ using the framework described, and a frequency 
analysis to support the results of each unit. The results of the analysis of WJ and PJ were measured on 
indexes. Each unit was assessed on the 13 indicators of war and peace journalism and a record was 
made when one indicator was found in one news story. 
 
The 13 indicators comprised two themes: approach and language based. The 10 approach based criteria 
refer to the outlook and procedure in the production of news stories in this context. They also refer to 
the style and form of the reporting. The approach based criteria include: reactive/proactive; reports on 
visible effects of war/reports on invisible effects of war; elite-oriented/people-oriented; focus mainly 
on the differences/focus mainly to the agreement; focus on here and now/report causes and 
consequences of the conflict; dichotomize between good and bad guys/avoid labelling of good and bad 
guys; two-party orientation/multiparty orientation; partisan/non-partisan; zero-sum orientation/win-win 
orientation; and stop reporting after ceasefire/continue to report the aftermath of the war.  
The language-based criteria refer to the use of language and words in the news texts, informed by the 
WJ/PJ framework. They include the use and avoidance of particular language components, which 
consist of: the use of victimising language/the avoidance of victimising language; the use of 
demonising language/the avoidance of demonising language; and the use of emotive words/the 
avoidance of emotive words.   
Later, the frequency of occurrence of each indicator was used for further analysis. That is, when the 
number of the PJ indicators is higher than that of the WJ indicators, the story would be marked as a PJ 
story, and when there is a higher number of WJ indicators than PJ indicators, the story would be 
marked as a WJ story. However, when the number of WJ and PJ elements is the same or differs by only 
one indicator, I would mark the story as 'balanced'.  
An example of the analysis of WJ/PJ can be explained as follows: 
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Example 1:  
Bangkok Post (Unit 6 of 132/6th January 2004) 
6/132 Only charred ruins greet pupils 
 
PJ2/PJ3/WJ13/PJ5 
 The 600 students of Muang Narathiwat school returned from their 
holidays yesterday and found just the charred remains of their 
school. 
While young students kept popping questions about what happened, 
the older ones simply stared in disbelief. Isma-aeh Masalaeh, a 10-
year-old Path-omsuksa 4 student, pointed to the second floor of the 
building and said: ‘The textbooks and the notebooks I kept in the 
desk drawer are all gone. I’m afraid those bandits will come back 
and burn down the school again.’ 
 
PJ2/PJ3/PJ5 
   Results = Peace Journalism 
The Nation (Unit 1 of 166/ 6th January 2004) 
1/166 20 schools torched, arsenal raided 
 
WJ1/ WJ2/ WJ3/WJ5 
 Unidentified raiders kill four soldiers in synchronised attacks 
throughout Narathiwat; Chivalit blames bandits 
PJ12/WJ13/WJ2/WJ3 
WJ6/WJ5 
 UNIDENTIFIED attackers simultaneously torched 20 schools and 
killed four soldiers while stealing more than 100 guns from an 
army camp in this southernmost province early yesterday. 
The well-coordinated terror campaign appears to be a major 
signal of defiance against authorities at the beginning of the year. 
Arsonists slipped into 20 schools in 10 out of the 13 districts in 
Narathiwat province at about 1.30am yesterday and set fire to the 
buildings. 
They also torched two unmanned police posts. 
     Five of the schools were razed, police and local military 
officials said. 
At about the same time, a group of gunmen attacked the armoury 
at the non-combat Narathiwat Rajanakarin Army camp in Joh 
Airong district, where they shot four soldiers dead before 
escaping with more than 100 assault rifles and pistols. 
 
WJ2/WJ5/WJ12/ 
WJ13/ PJ12 
Results = War Journalism 
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During the analysis, records were made when each WJ/PJ indicator was found. The findings contain 
various elements of both WJ/PJ, and in order to classify a unit of analysis into the WJ/PJ framework, 
each report was categorised according to the most frequently occurring themes. For example, in 
example 1: Bangkok Post, the most frequently occurring features were of peace journalism; thus this 
unit was categorised as PJ. In example 1: The Nation, the most frequently occurring features were of 
war journalism; thus this unit was categorised as WJ.  
 
After conducting a content analysis of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators in 298 news stories, a frequency 
analysis was conducted by counting the number of indicators used in the coverage in order to find the 
most frequent features of war or peace journalism used when writing news articles. A comparative 
analysis of the two newspapers was made to determine the similarities and differences between the two 
newspapers, and to identify the trend in reporting conflicts within the given period. However, I am 
aware of the limitation of an analysis of the 13 indicators of war and peace journalism in that the 
method only categorises news reports based on the frequency of occurrence of war and peace 
indicators. I decided to conduct another analysis on the side so that the findings from the second study 
can help me validate and cross check the data.  
 
The second analysis is on the four broad orientations of WJ/PJ (Galtung 1998) (see Appendix III). I 
look at the four main orientations of WJ and PJ, which are: war/peace; propaganda/truth; elite/people; 
and victory/solution (Galtung 1998). I categorised each news story into one of these four broad WJ/PJ 
orientations in order to determine the war journalism and peace journalism framework used by the 
newspapers in representing the conflict. In this sense, each news article is categorised into either a war 
or a peace journalism orientation. However, news articles that cannot be classified into any war or 
peace journalism orientation were marked as 'neutral' stories. 
 
The second analysis, therefore, is a subjective form of analysis since I use my understanding of these 
four frames of war and peace journalism to categorise each news reports to determine whether the 
article has a war, peace or neutral orientation. The method and the findings of the second analysis are 
presented in Appendix V. The findings of the analysis on the 13 WJ/PJ indicators will be provided in 
Chapter 6 (6.1.1).  
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   5.2.1.3 Analysis of news actors 
According to the PJ model, PJ news engages all sides of the conflict and is people-oriented more than 
elite-oriented, and truth-oriented more than propaganda-oriented. In this sense, it is important to look 
into the news actors included in each news story because the news actor is considered to be the main 
focus of the news story. News leads and headlines are structured to put a news actor first (Bell 1991, 
p.194). ‘Lead’ normally means the sentence that sums up the news story, the answer to the questions of 
‘who, what, when, where, why’ and ‘how’. This research looked at news leads in terms of the person 
mentioned in the lead of each news story to identify the main actor of each news report.  
 
In addition, Bell (1991, p.176) claimed that the lead is the most distinctive feature of news discourse 
and not the headline, as it is a ‘micro story’, which compresses the values and expertise of journalism 
into one sentence. Therefore, to understand how the lead works is to understand the nature of the news 
article. Most of what was said about the reports was summarised in the lead and in the same way as 
news values operate to "raise the most newsworthy information into the lead", so the lead concentrates 
the most newsworthy and important information of the story (Ibid.) Consequently, conducting a study 
on news actors will reveal the significance the newspapers placed on different categories of actors.  
 
This research used frequency analysis to determine the number of news actors. The same unit of 
analysis was used across the 298 news reports: 166 from The Nation and 132 from Bangkok Post. The 
analysis focuses on the main ‘news actor’, which for our purpose is the main person mentioned in the 
news lead, and recorded the number of times the same category of actor was mentioned in each of the 
three incidents. A comparative analysis of the two newspapers was conducted as the final stage to 
contrast and compare the differences and similarities between the newspapers in respect of the 
emphasis on news actors. The news actors were categorised into 10 groups, which were created 
following observation of the news content.  
 
The categorisation of the news actors reveals the sides involved in the conflict in relation to WJ or PJ. 
This meant that the category, which was most often mentioned, was the category on which the 
newspaper placed most emphasis. Whether the news story was categorised as either WJ or PJ also 
relied upon these categories to some extent. The process of categorisation started from listing the 
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names and professions most frequently mentioned in the news, and then later grouping them into 
categories as listed below: 
• High authority: refers to a person or people of authority in the government. In this research, it 
refers to the PM, Deputy PM, Minister or Deputy Minister, Army Commander, Police 
Commander. 
• Official source: refers to an authorised person or people from the state.  
• Opposition: refers to a person or group that has political opposition to a government. In this 
research, it can be an individual from an opposition party, or someone who has a view that is 
opposed to the government’s in this matter. 
• Religious group: refers to a person or group that involves or is employed in an organised 
religious group.  
• Academic: refers to an individual or a group representing work in academic fields or one who 
represents an academic institution.  
• Local: refers to an ordinary individual or group living in the community or area where the 
incident took place.  
• Local authority: refers to a person/people who work/s for an administrative unit of a local 
government or a government official based in the area.  
• Organisation: refers to an organised body of people with a particular purpose, such as human 
rights groups or student groups or an individual who represents the group.  
• Foreign source: refers to the sources outside the country. It can be either a foreign authority or 
foreign news sources.  
• Other: refers to those who do not belong in any of the groups mentioned above. 
 
An example of the analysis of news actors follows: 
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Example 2: 
Bangkok Post  
(Unit 23 of 132/9th January 2004) 
23/132 Sixth-graders greet news of trip to capital 
 
 About 500 sixth-graders from Narathiwat province whose schools 
were razed in arson attacks on Sunday will be flown to Bangkok to 
join celebrations for Children’s Day tomorrow. 
Organised by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, news of the trip put 
smiles back on the faces of some students whose classrooms were 
torched. 
However, for those left behind, the mood was less upbeat as many 
local events to mark the occasion had been cancelled due to the 
security concerns. 
News actor = Sixth-grade students = Local  
 
The Nation 
 (Unit 3of 166/ 5th January 2004) 
3/166 Govt approach ‘wrong from the start’ 
 
 THE GOVERNMENT cannot solve the problem of violence in the 
South if it continues to hold the wrong people responsible for it,  
Democrat Party chief adviser Chuan Leekpai said yesterday. 
Chuan called on the government to reassess the situation in the 
southern border provinces and admit that Muslim separatists remain 
active in the region. 
The government has underestimated the extent of the problem in the 
four predominantly Muslim provinces and misidentified Muslim 
separatists as mere bandits, he said. 
News actor = Democrat party chief adviser = Opposition 
 
Example 2 explains the process of the analysis of news actors. Normally, ‘lead’ refers to the first 
paragraph of the news article, which sums up the whole news story. In this analysis, I looked at the first 
person mentioned in the lead, and assigned them to one of the categories above. The frequency of 
occurrence of these categories was recorded for further analysis.  
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The findings of the analysis of news actors will be provided in Chapter 6 (6.1.2).  
 
   5.2.1.4 Analysis of news sources 
News sources are important in the production of news because they reveal the relationship between the 
source and the news medium, which is often a two-way process: that is, the media are always looking 
for content, and content is always looking for a space in the media (McQuail 2010, p.321). Normally, 
journalists have their own preferred sources, which also link to the prominent figures by institutional 
means, and a news report will be validated when it gives most weight to established authority as a 
source (Ibid.). 
 
Bell (1991, p. 190) also believed that "the more elite the source, the more newsworthy the story." Thus, 
it is in a journalist’s interest to present the cited sources in the most authoritative light. Individuals, 
opposition parties, minorities, the unions and the disadvantaged tend to be ignored as a result. This 
echoes the views of Becker (1967, p 241), who stated that source credibility and the right to be heard 
are "differentially distributed through the ranks of the system", and those of Allan (2010, p. 82) who 
indicated that "the higher up in this hierarchy the news source is situated, the more authoritative their 
words will be for the journal." 
 
For that reason, news value sometimes depends on who the source is: for example, when something 
became news just because someone elite said it (Bell 1991, p.193). McQuail (2010) mentioned that, in 
times of national crisis or conflict, the news media typically draw from official sources close to home 
so it is assumed that the sources most frequently used are the sources from high authority and officials. 
Bell (1991, p. 191) claimed that "quantitative research on news sources confirms the qualitative 
conclusions." Therefore, it is important to look at the distribution and the use of news sources since this 
shows which news sources are ‘preferred’ in the writing of the southern conflict coverage.  
 
The analysis was conducted by collecting the names of the sources mentioned in the news stories, 
categorising each name into each category, and, at the last stage, counting the frequency of each 
category (the same list of categories as in the analysis of 'news actors' was used). The difference 
between the analysis of ‘news actors’ and that of ‘news sources’ is that the chosen ‘news actors’ reveal 
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the importance placed by the newspaper on the main focus of the news, while the study of ‘news 
sources’ shows the source of information which the newspaper relied upon when writing the news. One 
can infer whether or not the main actor and the source of the news are correlated, and there is a 
possibility that the ‘news actor’ and ‘news source’ can be the same person in certain circumstances.  
 
In the analysis, the sources were categorised into the 10 previously defined categories; any source that 
could not be categorised was placed in the ‘other’ category. Frequency analysis was conducted to 
determine the number of times the sources were mentioned in the conflict coverage of each incident. 
The findings revealed the number of sources used and the frequency with which each source was 
mentioned according to the categories given. A comparative analysis of the findings from the two 
newspapers was conducted to identify the differences and similarities in their use of sources.  
The process of analysis of news source is shown as follows: 
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Example 3: 
Bangkok Post  
(Arsenal raid 4th January 2004) 
News source (High authority) Date  Quoted PP = Total 
PM Thaksin Shinawatra 
 
6/01/04/1 
7/01/04/2 
8/01/04/1 
8/01/04/6 
10/01/04/3 
11/01/04/2 
3 
1 
 
1 
2 
4 
11 
 
1 
4 
5 
3 
14 
1 
1 
5 
7 
7 
 
Total =   11 24  35 
 
The Nation  
(Arsenal raid 4th January 2004) 
News source (Religious group) Date  Quoted PP = Total 
Nimu Mikaje, 
Deputy chairman of the provincial Yala Islamic 
Committee 
10/01/04/1 1 2 3  
(Kruese mosque 28th April 2004) 
Nimu Mikaje, 
 
30/04/04/5 
3/05/04/6 
2 
2 
 
3 
2 
5 
 
Takbai demonstration 25th October 2004) 
Nimu Mikaje, 
 
281004/4 
291004/1 
1  
1 
1 
1 
 
 
Total =   6 6  12 
 
The records show, for example, the number of times Bangkok Post used the PM as a source of 
information. It includes the date and times the source was used for a quote or a paraphrased comment 
(in the example above as 'PP'). The PM as a news source was categorised as ‘High authority’. In the 
reporting of the arsenal raid incident, the PM was used as a news source at a frequency of 35 times, 
with 11 quotes and 24 paraphrases. The example from The Nation shows the number of times the 
deputy chairman of the Provincial Islamic Committee was used as a source in the reporting of all of the 
three incidents under scrutiny. The source was categorised as ‘Religious group’, with a frequency of 12 
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times, comprised of 6 quotes and 6 paraphrases. The number of times sources in each category were 
used was then used for further analysis of the representation of the southern conflict.  
The findings of the analysis of news sources will be provided in Chapter 6 (6.1.3).  
 
   5.2.1.5 Analysis of labels 
The analysis of labels is developed from the language-based criteria of the war and peace journalism 
framework (see 5.2.1.2), which looks at the selection of labels and language items used by the 
newspapers in their reporting of the conflict. In this study, I look at aspects of the labels used in the 
conflict coverage in order to determine how the two newspapers chose labels to describe the conflict, 
the violent incidents, and the actors.   
 
The southern conflict is partly a result of the difference in ethnic, cultural and religious practices, so the 
question of identity and difference was taken into account. The purpose of the analysis was to examine 
how the southern conflict phenomenon, the three incidents under scrutiny, and the Muslim minority, 
either as perpetrators or victims, were described in the news reports. Also, it is important to see the 
representation of ‘other’ or the ‘preferred representation’ in conflict coverage since it reveals how 
identity and the difference between ‘us and them’ is constructed and presented in the news reports, 
which may influence public perceptions of the Muslim minority and the conflict. The construction of 
the identity of ‘us and them’ led to a sense of belonging for one group and a sense of alienation for the 
other, namely because identity is about the "sameness and differences, about us and them, and defining 
one means defining also the other" (Pietikainen 2000, p.11).  
 
Moreover, the three major incidents in 2004 differed in their situations. To explain, the arsenal raid 
incident showed the Muslim minority as the perpetrators and the Thai state as the victim. The Kruese 
Mosque incident showed the Muslims minority as the perpetrators-turned-victims when the Thai state 
fought back and killed the Muslim perpetrators in the mosque. The Takbai demonstration incident 
showed the Muslim minority as the victims and the Thai state as the perpetrator.  
 
Together, these three incidents give a good balance in this analysis since they provide a ground for the 
representation of the incidents and of the ethnic minority in different situations: when they were either 
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perpetrators, victims, or both. Thus the difference in nature of the three incidents led to the different 
choice of labels in the news reports.  
 
In this analysis, labels describing the southern conflict phenomenon, the three incidents, and the actors 
were examined in order to analyse the different meanings of the labels used, and to determine whether 
bias, prejudice or inequality were shown in the conflict coverage. The frequency analysis of labels 
examined the most common labels chosen to describe the situations and actors, by looking at the 
number of labels and how often the same labels occurred, in order to identify how often the ethnicity 
and religious aspect of the actors was mentioned in the coverage.  
 
I looked for key labels referring to the conflict, the three incidents, and the actors in the coverage.  The 
qualifiers attached to the labels were also taken into the study. The key labels and qualifiers were 
grouped together with the date of the news article, and the frequency in which each was mentioned in 
each news reports in order to identify the pattern of labels used in the conflict coverage of both 
newspapers.  
 
Example 4:  
Data collection of Bangkok Post on the words 'militants' in the conflict coverage of the Kruese Mosque 
incident 
																																																									Bangkok	Post	
																																																								29/04/04-5/05/04		 																						Words	referring	to	actors	 Date	 		=	 		 Militants	 29/04/04/1		29/04/04/2		29/04/04/5		29/04/04/6		30/04/04/1		30/04/04/2		30/04/04/3		30/04/04/4		30/04/04/5		30/04/04/6		30/04/04/7	
6	 	8	 	1	 	1	 	3	 	3	 	2	 	4	 	1	 	1	 	2	
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	30/04/04/9		30/04/04/10		1/05/04/3		1/05/04/4		1/05/04/5		1/05/04/6		1/05/04/7		1/05/04/8		1/05/04/9		1/05/04/10		2/05/04/2		2/05/04/3		2/05/04/8		2/05/04/9		3/05/04/1		3/05/04/3		3/05/04/4		4/05/04/1		4/05/04/2		4/05/04/5		5/05/04/1		5/05/04/2		5/05/04/6		5/05/04/7		
	1	 	1	 	5	 	6	 	1	 	4	 	4	 	1	 	1	 	1	 	6	 	1	 	3	 	1	 	3	 	1	 	1	 	2	 	1	 	1	 	4	 	1	 	1	 	2		 Separatist	militants	 29/04/04/2		1/05/04/4		5/05/04/2			
1	 	1	 	1	
	
	 Southern	militants	 29/04/04/3		2/05/04/7		4/05/04/1		
1	 	1	 	1	
	
	 Machete-wielding	militants	 29/04/04/5		1/05/04/3	 1	 	1	 	
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	 Young	militants	 29/04/04/8		30/04/04/5		1/05/04/7			
1	 	1	 	1	
	
	 Islamic	militants	 30/04/04/6		2/05/04/3		
1	 	1	 		 Regional	militants	 1/05/04/1	 	 		 Teenage	militants	 1/05/04/4		 1	 		 Young	Muslim	militants	 1/05/04/8		 1	 		 Muslim	militants	 2/05/04/1		2/05/04/9		3/05/04/1		3/05/04/2		5/05/04/2		5/05/04/7		
1	 	1	 	1	 	1	 	2	 	1	
	
	 Armed	militants	 2/05/04/1			 1	 		 Suspected	militants	 3/05/04/1		 1	 	
 
Note: In this format, I put the number of the news report on each day after the date. For example, 2/05/04/9 refers to the 9th news 
story on 2/05/04. 
 
Example 4 explains how I gathered data for the analysis of labels. I counted the frequency of the label 
'militants' found in seven days of coverage. The adjectives or qualifiers that attached to the labels 
would be grouped separately such as 'separatist militants', 'southern militants' or 'young militants'. Then 
I looked into these adjectives/qualifiers and categorised them into groups based on how they were used 
to describe the main labels: either by their action (machete-wielding, armed), their religion (Islamic, 
Muslims), their age (young), their location (southern, regional), or by qualifiers that carry negative 
connotations (separatist) or neutral meaning (suspected).  
Later, I analysed the frequency of these labels used including the frequency of these qualifiers to 
identify how both newspapers described the conflict, the incidents and the antagonists in their 
coverage.  
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The findings of the analysis of labels will be provided in Chapter 6 (6.1.4).  
 
  5.2.2 Semi-structured interviews 
News stories are seldom produced by a single individual; typically, their production involves a range of 
people such as journalists, sub-editors and editors, at different stages in the process (Bell 1991, p.33). 
Therefore, in order to answer RQ3 and RQ4 on the nature of news production in this specific conflict 
setting, it is important to interview the journalists and editors from the two newspapers. Also, as 
informed by the framing theory, journalists not only use their knowledge of the news they are reporting 
but also employ their professional experience and social theory (Johnson-Cartee 2005, p. 161). 
Consequently, the interviews with journalists and editors can provide information on how they frame 
their news stories.  
 
The semi-structured interview is considered a suitable method because it usually involves close contact 
between the researcher and the interviewed subject, and is interactive, exploratory and developmental 
in nature in order to allow emergent issues to be explored (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). The perspectives 
of the interviewed subjects in the context and conditions of their situation are believed to give insight 
into their own perspectives and on the interpretation of their beliefs and behaviours and the 
understanding of the meaning they attach to them (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). In this sense, the interview 
approach will enable me to gain insightful information on the news production process and the 
journalists’ and editors’ perceptions of the southern conflict.  
 
Due to the open nature of the semi-structured interview, the interviewee has a fair degree of freedom 
and the interviewer can assert control over the direction of the interview when necessary. The 
interviewer may come across new information never anticipated before or may learn about the 
limitations of the study from the interview (Drever 2003, p. 3). Therefore, the interview data from a 
semi-structured interview is expected to be open as new ideas may come up during the interview.  
 
A semi-structured interview combines the advantages of both a structured and an unstructured 
interview, which will lead to the openness of data gathered when the prepared questions are answered 
and the new information on the issues is discovered. The advantage of this method is that it provides a 
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large amount of information, which is fairly flexible and diverse. However, the method also has its 
disadvantages since the flexibility of the interview may lessen the reliability of the research, and the 
nature of open-ended questions makes it difficult when analysing the data. The relationship between 
the research questions and the methods used can also inform the type of finding arising from the 
research, all of which will be explained in a clearer sense in later sections of this chapter.  
 
At the first stage of the interview, contact was initiated with the prospective interviewees: the editors 
and journalists from The Nation and Bangkok Post, as well as an expert from a media organisation. 
Their informed consent under the regulation of the Bournemouth University Research Ethics Code of 
Practices was obtained by explaining the nature and scope of the research so that both parties knew 
from the start what the interview was about and what would be recorded for further analysis. Informed 
consent confirms that the interviewee understands the extent of the research and its uses (Warren 2002, 
p.89).  
 
Once participation was agreed, appointments were made. All of the interviews were conducted in April 
2013. The interviews were more than a simple conversation because the rights and grounds to ask 
questions on specific issues had been sought, and the interviewees agreed to answer them. I planned the 
structure of the interviews in advance by setting the main questions, and considering ways to manage 
the direction of the interview. The interviews were recorded using an application on my mobile phone. 
The interview records were transcribed word-by-word and translated from Thai to English.  
 
The interviewees were informed of the interview’s purpose and the questions beforehand. The 
interviews were divided into three main parts. First, it started with the introduction outlining the 
importance of the study. Second, the interviewees were led through the interview questions to ensure 
that all of the important points would be covered. Lastly, at the end of the interview, the interviewees 
were asked if they had any other points or any further recommendations related to the study that they 
would like to add.  
 
The questioning strategy was semi-structured in order to encourage a full answer from the subject’s 
own experience and knowledge, which would shed further light on the complicated process of news 
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production and news gathering in this conflict. The main questions revolved around their perceptions 
of the southern conflict, their experience of reporting on it, their attitude towards and understanding of 
peace journalism, and their recommendations for future practice.  
 
   5.2.2.1 Interviewed subjects 
To ensure the credibility and reliability of the interviews, only subjects who were experienced with 
first-hand knowledge of the research topic were selected. They were chosen based on the objective of 
the study to explore the nature of the conflict reporting in English language newspapers in Thailand. 
Thus, the suitable subjects were editors and journalists from both of the newspapers as well as an 
expert from the media organisation. The selections were based on their experience of and 
responsibilities in the southern conflict.  
 
The differences between the organisations of the subjects is likely to provide useful information, and to 
show the difference in views or even contending perspectives. The credibility of the findings was 
enhanced when the interviewed subjects reflected a variety of perspectives leading to a more complete 
picture when these were brought together (Rubin and Rubin 2005, p.68). My previous personal contact 
with journalists from The Nation and Bangkok Post assisted in helping identify suitable subjects for 
interview from their organisations.  
 
In sum, seven semi-structured interviews were carried out. The interviewed subjects included two 
journalists and one editor from The Nation; two journalists and one editor from Bangkok Post; and one 
expert from the Thai Journalists’Association (TJA). All interviewees had experience of covering news 
on the southern conflict since 2004, and some were publicly considered experts in the field. Three 
interviewees used to work in the conflict area as ‘reporters’ sent from Bangkok and had taken part in 
the TJA’s Issara News Centre project when it was first launched in 2005 (see Chapter 4, 4.5.2.1). The 
perception of the expert in the field is important as this will show how an independent expert, not 
directly associated with either of the two newspapers, perceived the conflict (See Appendix VI for list 
of the interviewees).  
 
   5.2.2.2 Interview questions 
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The interviews began with preliminary questions about the interviewees' profiles, their responsibilities, 
their experience of working with the newspaper, and the area in which they specialised. After the 
introduction, the interview proceeded to the main questions. The goal of the interview was to 
encourage participants to talk about their perceptions, experiences and understandings rather than to 
elicit closed answers. The interview questions were combined with main questions, follow-up 
questions, and probes (Rubin and Rubin 2005, p.129).  
 
The main questions were designed to structure the interviews and cover all of the major points of the 
research questions and problems, while the follow up questions were asked to illicit explanation of 
concepts or events that the interviewees brought up. The combination of main questions, follow-up 
questions and probes was used in the interviews to encourage full and clear answers from the 
participants. The main interview questions were carefully and thoroughly designed so as not to restrict 
and predetermine the answers while at the same time covering all of the research’s areas of concern 
(Ibid., p.135).  
The main interview questions were:  
 
What is your perception of the nature of the southern conflict? 
What is the process of reporting the conflict in your organisation? What is the structure?  
How, in your opinion, is the conflict being reported? And why is it reported in such a way? 
What are the limitations/problems in reporting the conflict? 
What are other factors influencing the reporting of the conflict? (political influence; public 
opinion, etc..) 
Do you have any recommendations on how the reporting of the southern conflict can be 
improved? 
 
The interview questions revealed the interviewees’ perceptions of the southern conflict; the process of 
news production in their organisations, including the factors influencing the coverage and factors 
influencing the writing of news stories; and their opinions on the solution of the reporting, all of which 
was of help in answering RQ3 and RQ4.  
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   5.2.2.3 Interview data analysis  
Interview data analysis is the process of converting raw interviews into evidence-based interpretations 
that are the foundation of published reports (Rubin and Rubin 2005, p.201). At the first stage, the 
interviews were transformed into transcripts. I had to refine the concepts, themes and events, and then 
coded the interviews to be able to manage the key concepts and themes discussed.  
 
Transcription is the first and important stage in performing interview data analysis because the 
transcript needs to be as precise as possible. After transcription, a summary of each interview was 
made, which included the main points of the interview that addressed the research questions or any 
other new concepts or themes found in the interview. Analysis then took place: by coding the data; by 
putting labels on the concepts and themes found in the transcripts; by finding the concept that 
represents the idea that is important to the research questions; and by identifying themes for a summary 
statement to explain what is going on in the interview (Ibid. p.207).  
 
Relevant concepts and themes can be found throughout all data and the exact same themes can be 
found in different places because the interviewees do not usually give straightforward answers to the 
questions (Boeije 2010, p.47). Therefore, the transcribed interviews were more or less cut into pieces 
during the analysis. Different interviews were compared and contrasted with each other, and I had to 
decide the dominant topics and issues that relate to the same theme. The decision of what to code and 
how to define the key concepts is a crucial part of the analysis in which I compared how ideas are 
expressed across interviews in order to refine the meaning. At the last stage of interview analysis, all 
concepts and themes were put together and new information was shown in order to see how it could 
contribute to an understanding of the topics studied, and how it could answer the research questions.  
 
All interviews were carefully conducted, recorded, and translated from Thai into English. Each 
question and answer was transcribed word-for-word since accuracy is required when creating a 
description and explanation of the research setting or to set up the process with clarity and 
understanding (Rubin and Rubin 2005, p.71). In this research, word-for-word transcription was used as 
it provided a complete record of the original interview and thereby reliable data. The translation from 
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Thai to English was made and the accuracy was checked. The data were analysed using a qualitative 
interview analysis. The analysis started with preparing the data, making the data manageable, and at the 
same time keeping the original information without distorting it.  
 
The interview analysis started from intensive and repeated readings of the transcribed interviews; the 
readings were guided by prior theoretical knowledge and the research questions (Schmidt 2004, p.254). 
The aim of the interview analysis was to note the topics that were mentioned and the individual aspects 
of these topics, which could be related to the context of the research questions (Ibid). The data were 
summarised into topics, which categorised the important information for the study, and then allocated 
by relevance to the research questions. The interview data were later coded, a process in which 
particular passages in the text of an interview were ascribed to a particular category (Ibid. p.255). 
 
The categories found from the interviews were, for example, the perception of the southern conflict, 
southern conflict and the Thai media, the process of the news production of the conflict, and limitations 
and problems in reporting the conflict. These topics then lead to further analysis by contrasting the 
topics with individual aspects using the idea of categories previously developed (Ibid.). This stage 
focused on analysis of the individual’s perspectives to identify how they emphasise certain points, 
resist particular ideas, and argue certain issues as well as to see the connection they make with the 
different issues and their general tone. The aim of this was to develop an understanding and to see how 
each individual made sense of the interview topics.  
 
After categorising the individual data, I looked further at identifying group views, as a common point 
of view from interviewees may emerge after the data have been scanned. The interviewees from 
different newspapers may share the same view on certain issues, but have different views on others. 
The inter-relationships between people from the same group and different groups were taken into 
account, as was their personal backgrounds regarding different responsibilities and levels of 
experience. The variety of the respondents’ perspectives was significant and revealed their personal 
valuation and perceptions regarding the same issues.  
 
 5.3 Ethical consideration 
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The interviewees’ informed consent was obtained in order to ensure that they had a clear understanding 
of the nature of the research, and its possible implications for them. They were provided with 
information about the aims and objectives of the research; how the data would be collected, recorded 
and analysed; and what participation was required of them. There was a responsibility on myself as the 
researcher to be considerate, to keep the data collected confidential, to conduct risk assessments for any 
primary data collection, and to assure that all interview subjects willingly participated in the interviews.   
 
Due to the nature of the research, I was aware that information gained from the interviews may contain 
opinions on sensitive issues, which may prove risk to the interviewees in relation to data protection and 
personal safety. Therefore, the anonymity and confidentiality of the interviewees are required in order 
to assure that the information they provide cannot be traced back and their identities remain concealed. 
The method used to preserve anonymity and confidentiality in this research is the use of pseudonyms 
(see Appendix VI for the list of the interviewees).  
 
In addition, to ensure that my research process and findings, from both the content analysis of the 
southern conflict coverage and the semi-structured interviews, are trustworthy and valid, it is necessary 
for me to set forth that my background as a researcher from Bangkok did not affect the results of the 
study. Nevertheless, the qualitative researcher does not stand outside or above the study because 
research reflects the viewpoints of the observers and theory-laden (Denzin 2001). Even so, it is crucial 
to announce my best intention to remain as neutral as possible during the research process. The 
research process, as noted in this chapter, followed the research ethics regulations specified by 
Bournemouth University. 
 
 5.4 Limitations in methodology  
The limitations can be divided into two parts: the methods chosen and the scope and data of the 
research. First, with respect to the limitations of the research methodologies, namely a content analysis 
and semi-structured interviews, the following issues became apparent during the conduct of the study. 
This approach to content analysis proved advantageous in providing a rich source of data but it is a 
subjective form of critique that relies heavily on personal interpretations of the contents being 
examined. Given that the same contents can be interpreted differently according to the person 
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conducting the research, it was necessary for me to limit myself to identifying and evaluating those 
features that could be counted in a relatively straightforward manner.  
 
The findings from content analysis with both qualitative and quantitative approaches may converge, 
and there is no guarantee that the findings from both approaches can fulfill the requirements of the 
study. As pointed out by Kelle and Erzberger (2004, p. 174), the limitations of the integration between 
qualitative and quantitative research cannot be determined on the basis of a single model, and one 
cannot assume that the results of the qualitative and quantitative methods are fundamentally 
convergent, and may be used for reciprocal validation. Qualitative and quantitative results achieved 
under different conditions can be combined to give an appropriate general picture (Ibid.) 
 
Semi-structured interviews also have their limitations. While the method provides rich and diverse 
data, the flexibility of the interview may lessen the reliability of the research, and the nature of open-
ended questions will lead to various kinds of data, which are difficult to analyse, and so difficult to 
compare and contrast across different interviews. The structured nature of the interview strategy can 
help organise the order of the questions so that the interview does not go off topic. However, its 
drawback is that this flexibility may lessen the reliability of the data to some extent since the method 
depends almost entirely on the honesty of the interviewees and the proficiency of the researcher in 
managing the encounter. Therefore, the method can affect the validity of the research since it almost 
entirely depends on the interviewer and interviewee. It is hard to guarantee the honesty of the 
interviewed subjects and the efficacy of the interview also depends on my skill and experience. 
Moreover, it is necessary to acknowledge the limited number of the interviewees as the results of the 
findings could have been different if more interviews with journalists and editors were conducted. 
 
My choice of research methods may lead to questions over the reliability of the findings. Reliability is 
"the extent to which a measuring procedure yields the same results on repeated trials” (Neuendorf 
2002, p.112), and "reliability is presented when repeated measurement of the same material results in 
similar decisions or conclusions" (Wimmer and Dominick 1994, p. 178). By using a content analysis as 
a research method, the study may not provide repeatable results since no two researchers will interpret 
the data identically. In my effort to resolve this difficulty and secure the reliability of the data, as 
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mentioned earlier in 5.2.1.2, I conducted a 'second study' on the other framework of Galtung (1996; 
1998), comprised of four broad orientations of war and peace journalism. This will help to cross check 
and validate my findings from the analysis of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators. The method and the findings are 
provided in Appendix V. 
 
The second limitation is the scope and data of the research. Since this research was derived from my 
interest in exploring the conflict coverage of the two English–language newspapers on the three major 
southern conflict incidents in 2004, the primary focus on these newspapers intentionally overlooked 
Thai-language newspapers, which is not to deny their importance – or the obvious value of a 
comparative study between English-language and Thai-language journalism. Since most studies on the 
reporting of Thailand's southern conflict focus more on Thai language newspapers, this research was 
carried out in order to fill this gap. The study’s focus on The Nation and Bangkok Post was justified, in 
part, on the basis of their popularity among elite Thais with a high level of English proficiency as well 
as expats, politicians and foreign press agencies. The findings of the study apply only to these two 
English-language newspapers and not to other newspapers.  
 
Another limitation was the timeline of the research, which focused on three major incidents in 2004, 
the first year of the conflict. At the time of writing, the conflict in the southern region of Thailand has 
gone on for 10 years, with no end in sight. Clearly further research covering different incidents and 
timelines will be needed.  
 
The conclusions provided by the study (see Chapter 6) were limited to the given data and scope of the 
research, which leads to the question of the ‘generalisation’ of the findings, or external validity. 
Generalisation refers to "the extent to which they may be applied to other cases, usually to a larger set 
that is the defined population from which a study’s sample has been drawn” (Neuendorf 2002, p. 12). I 
have tried to avoid extrapolating from my data to characterise wider trends or patterns beyond what my 
evidence is able to support. The findings of this study may not be applied in a larger context, in my 
view, since it is a micro-study that focused on specific events within a limited time period, and only to 
two specific English-language newspapers, which are in no way representative of the Thai news media 
more generally.  
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This chapter explored the methodologies used in this research, which are a content analysis and semi-
structured interviews. It started by explaining the nature, the alternatives, and the limitations of both 
methods, and the reasons why both are considered suitable for the study. The research questions were 
brought up to show how these methods were operationalised in order to provide answers to them. The 
last section of this chapter explained the actual processes of conducting both the content analysis and 
the semi-structured interviews in the course of this research, and ended with identifying the limitations 
of the methods. We now turn to the findings of the study in Chapter 6.  	
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Chapter 6 
The representation of the southern conflict in news coverage 
 
This chapter introduces and evaluates the findings of my empirical study with a view to providing 
answers to the research questions. As explained earlier in Chapter 5, this study examines the news 
coverage produced by Bangkok Post and The Nation. The empirical analysis reveals the prevailing war 
and peace journalism frames, the dominant news actors and news sources, and the use of language in 
representing the incidents and the perpetrators. This chapter explains the findings from the content 
analysis of the news coverage. 
 
 6.1 Content analysis of news coverage 
A content analysis was applied to the study of conflict coverage in order to explore the representation 
of the southern conflict by the two English-language newspapers. The study applied Galtung's war and 
peace journalism concept and frameworks (1986; 1998) to identify the main indicators of war and 
peace journalism, the dominant news actors, the dominant news sources, and the use of language in 
representing the southern conflict and the perpetrators as they appeared in the two English-language 
newspapers.  
 
Since the study was on the reporting of the conflict, my preliminary assumption was that a high 
proportion of war journalism stories would be found in most of the news coverage. A second 
assumption could also be made, which is that the situations of each incident would affect the 
implementation of war and peace journalism in the coverage. That is, the reporting of the arsenal raid 
incident would have more WJ features, including a larger number of authority individuals as news 
actors and new sources, because the incident happened unexpectedly. I also presumed that the number 
of pro-peace elements would appear higher after the Kruese Mosque incident and Takbai 
demonstration because the consequences of these two incidents directly affected the lives of the local 
people, which also reflect the government's mishandling of the situations.  
 
The study focused on the reporting of the three major incidents in 2004, encompassing 21 days of 
reporting of a total of 298 articles: 166 from The Nation and 132 from Bangkok Post. The unit of 
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analysis are: 1) headlines; 2) sub-headlines; and 3) 25% of the individual news articles from front 
pages, follow-up pages and the dedicated southern conflict section. Other type of articles, such as 
'opinions', 'comments' or 'editorials', were taken into analysis only if they were placed under the 
southern conflict section. The two newspapers each had a specific news section on the southern 
conflict. For example, news stories on the southern conflict were placed in the 'Home' page under the 
'Violence in the South' section in Bangkok Post and in the 'Local' page under 'Southern violence', 
'Violence in the South' or 'Southern carnage' in The Nation.  
 
The first incident, the arsenal raid (5th January 2004), generated 35 reports from The Nation and 34 
from Bangkok Post; the second, the Kruese Mosque incident (28th April 2004), generated 74 reports 
from The Nation and 56 from Bangkok Post; and the last, the Takbai demonstration incident (26th 
October 2004), generated 57 reports from The Nation and 42 from Bangkok Post. The Nation produced 
34 more reports on these incidents than Bangkok Post. 
 
As previously mentioned in Chapter 5 (5.2.1.1), I first categorised the news data according to topics in 
order to gain the overview of the conflict coverage of both newspapers. The categorisation of news 
data of the two newspapers in the reporting of the three incidents is provided in tables 6.1 and 6.2. 
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Bangkok	Post	 Arsenal	raid		
(34	news)	
Kruese	Mosque		
(56	news)	 Takbai		demonstration											(42	news)	 Total	=	
(news	articles)	
News	Topics	 	 	 	 	Violent	Incidents	 8	 9	 5	 22	Law	enforcement	&		Follow-up	investigation	 5	 6	 2	 13	Southern	Policy	&	Security	measures	 5	 5	 3	 13	Government's	reaction	 3	 7	 5	 15	Criticism	 1	 6	 6	 13	International	 1	 2	 3	 6	Impact	on	lives	 7	 11	 8	 26	Impact	on	socio-economic	aspect	 1	 2	 3	 6	History	 -	 1	 -	 1	Religion	 1	 1	 3	 5	Aftermath	 -	 1	 -	 1	Human	rights	 -	 3	 2	 5	Solution	 2	 2	 2	 6	Total	=		 34	 56	 42	 =	132	news	
 
Table 6.1: The categorisation of news types and news topics in Bangkok Post's coverage of the three incidents 
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The	Nation	 Arsenal	raid		
(35	news)	
Kruese	Mosque		
(74	news)	 Takbai		demonstration		(57	news)	 Total	=	
(news	articles)	
News	Topics	 	 	 	 	Violent	Incidents	 4	 8	 5	 17	Law	enforcement	&		Follow-up	investigation	 5	 11	 6	 22	Southern	Policy	&	Security	measures	 2	 3	 4	 9	Government's	reaction	 1	 7	 4	 12	Criticism	 2	 3	 8	 13	International	 4	 8	 3	 15	Impact	on	lives	 10	 18	 10	 38	Impact	on	socio-economic	aspect	 2	 1	 3	 6	History	 2	 6	 -	 8	Religion	 -	 2	 7	 9	Aftermath	 1	 1	 -	 2	Human	rights	 -	 2	 3	 5	Solution	 2	 4	 4	 10	Total	=		 35	 74	 57	 =	166	news	
 
    Table 6.2: The categorisation of news types and news topics in The Nation' 's coverage of the three incidents
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Table 6.1and 6.2 show the categorisation of topics in the representation of the southern conflict by 
Bangkok Post and The Nation. The categorisation of news into topics shows that both newspapers 
employ both an event-based and a process-based reporting style of the conflict. The event-based style 
focused on violent incidents and major law and security issues that involved major leaders, which were 
presented in 63 articles in Bangkok Post and 60 articles in The Nation. On the other hand, the process-
based style of reporting, for example, news stories and articles on social, cultural and religious issues; 
the history of the conflict; and the aftermath and solution of the conflict, included 50 articles in 
Bangkok Post, and 78 articles in The Nation.  
 
Interestingly, the most commonly-occurring topic of the two newspapers in their reporting of the 
southern conflict is 'Impact on lives', which accounted for 26 articles in Bangkok Post and 38 articles in 
The Nation. This point shows that both newspapers presented the southern conflict from the local 
perspectives right from the first year of its occurrence, which is in contrast to my preliminary 
assumption that the reporting of the conflict would start off with a war journalism style of reporting. 
Violent incidents and law enforcement and follow-up investigation, however, were revealed by the 
analysis to be the second most commonly-occurring topics, which suggests that the event-based style 
of reporting was as well used.  
 
The categorisation of news stories into topics helps us to see the topics covered in the presentation of 
the conflict as well as providing an overview of the conflict coverage of the two newspapers. This 
suggests that both newspapers reported the conflict in terms of all types of news, not just the violent 
incidents, and this point will result in the analysis on the implementation of war and peace journalism, 
which will be illustrated in the next sub-section. 
 
The next sub-section will present an analysis on the implementation of war and peace journalism 
elements in the news. 
 
  6.1.1 Proportions of war-oriented and peace-oriented elements in the   
  news 
The proportion of war-oriented and peace-oriented stories was determined from a content analysis 
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method, which included an analysis of text and frequency. Content analysis was employed to examine 
each article’s headlines, sub-headlines, and the first 25% of the whole article’s content. As mentioned 
earlier in Chapter 5 (5.2.1.2), the research looked at the relative emphases on WJ/PJ by applying the 
WJ/PJ framework (Galtung 1968; 1998) to identify the proportion of WJ/PJ indicators used in each 
news report.  
Frequency analysis was applied (i.e. a record was made when each WJ/PJ indicator was found). This 
means that the number of WJ/PJ indicators in each news article may vary and one article may have 
both WJ and PJ indicators. I classified each news article under either war or peace journalism based on 
the results of the analysis. To explain, when a news article had more PJ indicators, it was classified as 
PJ. On the other hand, when a news article had more WJ indicators, it was classified as WJ. However, 
when the proportion of WJ and PJ indicators was the same or relatively close (i.e. the difference was by 
one indicator), the news story was classified as a balanced report.  
The findings revealed that, out of the 298 news pieces analysed, a total of 1,681 WJ/PJ indicators were 
found. Of these, 776 were WJ indicators, and 905 were PJ indicators (see figure 6.1).  
 
 Figure 6.1: The number of 13 WJ/PJ indicators found in all of the 298 news articles (not 
 separated by newspaper) on the three incidents  
14	
174	180	
29	
153	
30	 13	 8	 24	 0	 10	
65	 76	
2	
67	
147	
46	
184	
28	
258	
59	 51	 16	 1	 42	 4	0	50	
100	150	
200	250	
300	
WJ1	 WJ2	 WJ3	 WJ4	 WJ5	 WJ6	 WJ7	 WJ8	 WJ9	 WJ10	 WJ11	 WJ12	 WJ13	 PJ1	 PJ2	 PJ3	 PJ4	 PJ5	 PJ6	 PJ7	 PJ8	 PJ9	 PJ10	 PJ11	 PJ12	 PJ13	
	 134	
Based on the frequency count of 1,681, the three most prominent peace journalism indicators found 
were PJ7 (multiparty orientation) with 258 indicators, followed by PJ5 (report causes and 
consequences of the conflict) with 184 indicators, and PJ3 (people-oriented) with 147 indicators.  
 
Multiparty orientation (PJ7) refers to when a news report gives voice to many parties involved, which 
shows an attempt to include all sides of the conflict in the news. In Thailand's southern conflict, the 
various sides involved are the Thai government (e.g. the prime minister, ministers, army commander, 
police commander), the opposition parties, the senate, the attackers, local people, local authorities, 
religious institutions, national and international organisations, and neighbouring countries (Malaysia 
and Indonesia). When a news story gave voice to more than one side involved, PJ7 would be marked as 
one of the indicators. An example of this indicator is found in the following excerpt. 
 
                                         Muslims pray to bless soldiers 
                                     Thammarak vows to ensure return of peace 
Hundreds of Thai Muslims in Narathiwat yesterday prayed to bless army soldiers in search of 
bandits who raided a military camp in Cho Ai Rong district and killed four soldiers on Monday. 
The group was greeted by the Defence Minister Gen Thammarak Israngkura who reassured them 
that the government and military would bring peace to the South. 
 (Bangkok Post, unit 21/132, 9th January 2004) 
  
This example is a news report that was published four days after the arsenal raid incident. One of the 
article’s indicators is a multiparty orientation (PJ7) because it includes the voice of the people 
(Muslims) and the voice of the authority (Thammarak, Defence Minister) in the same story. The 
headline shows that the main actor of the story is 'Muslims' or the local people, while the sub-headline 
also shows an emphasis on high authority, both of which are key actors in the southern conflict. From 
this, it shows that Bangkok Post attempted to give space to different parties involved in the conflict and 
not just to the people in a position of high authority. 
 
The second most frequently-occurring PJ indicator was PJ5 (report on causes and consequences of the 
conflict), which is when a news article does not focus on a here and now perspective of the conflict but 
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gives information on the background and consequences of the incidents. An example of this indicator is 
found in the following excerpt. 
A symbolic date? 
The young separatists’ choice of April 28 as the date for Wednesday’s attacks was probably not a 
coincidence, an academic said yesterday.   
 Thammasat University political scientist Chaiwat Satha-anandha said clashes in Rangae district in 
Narathiwat on the same date in 1948 between Malay-speaking Muslim villagers and police were the 
climax of a revolt that left 400 villagers and 30 police dead. 
 (The Nation, unit 60/166, 30th April 2004) 
 
The news article from which this example was taken was published two days after the Kruese Mosque 
incident. The report focuses on the comment from a well-known scholar, Chaiwat Satha-anandha, who 
drew a link between the Kruese Mosque incident on the 28th April and the Dusun ngor incident, which 
coincidently happened on the same date (see Chapter 2 (2.2) for more details).45 The Nation focused on 
the historical background of the incident, indicating that the news story has a PJ5 focus, or that it 
reports on the causes and consequence of the conflict, which is one of the peace journalism indicators.  
 
The third most frequent PJ indicator found from the content analysis was PJ3 (people-oriented). This 
refers to when a news story focuses on common people or members of the public as an actor and/or 
main source of information. In this research, when reporting space was given to people, either as news 
actors or news sources, PJ3 is marked as one of the indicators of the story. An example of this indicator 
is found in the following excerpt. 
Sixth-graders greet news of trip to capital 
About 500 sixth-graders from Narathiwat province whose schools were razed in arson attacks on 
Sunday will be flown to Bangkok to join celebrations for Children’s Day tomorrow. 
 Organized by prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, news of the trip put smiles back on the faces 
of some students whose classrooms were torched. 
 However, for those left behind, the mood was less upbeat as many local events to mark the 
occasion had been cancelled due to the security concerns. 
(Bangkok Post, unit 23/132, 9th January 2004) 
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This example is an excerpt from a news report in the aftermath of the arsenal raid incident, when 20 
schools across the three southern border provinces were set on fire. The news article focuses on events 
that took place after the incident, when the students whose schools were burnt down were granted a trip 
to Bangkok for Children's Day (planned by the PM) as a way to support them after the incident. The 
focus on the common people makes it classifiable as people-oriented (PJ3), one of the peace journalism 
features of this news report.  
 
The three most prominent WJ indicators found in the 298 news articles were WJ3 (elite-oriented) with 
180 indicators, followed by WJ2 (focus on the visible effects of the conflict) with 174 indicators, and 
WJ5 (focus on here and now) with 153 indicators.   
 
Elite-oriented (WJ3) refers to when a news story focuses mainly on elites as actors and/or main sources 
of information. In this study, such elites include people in positions of high authority, political leaders 
or high-ranking military and police officials. An example of this indicator is found in the following 
excerpt. 
                                            Chettha backs force at mosque 
                                Minister says assault was not overreaction 
A rift over the deadly force used by security forces to end a siege at Krue Se Mosque has widened, 
with Defence Minister Gen Chettha Thanajaro speaking out in support of Internal Security 
Operations Command deputy director Gen Panlop Pinmanee, who was abruptly called back to 
Bangkok for disobeying orders. 
 (Ban   (Bangkok Post, 43/132, 30th April 2004) 
 
 
One feature of war journalism is the orientation on high authority as a main actor and source of 
information (WJ3). The above news article focuses on the reaction of the Defence Minister, expressing 
in support for the military action in the Kruese Mosque incident, which had taken place two days 
earlier. In this news report, high authority is both a main actor and a source of information. To explain, 
the news item mainly reported that the Defence Minister supported Gen Pallop, director of the ISOC 
and the person in charge of the mosque attack, with regard to the attack, which caused the deaths of the 
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32 Muslim assailants. The source of the news was taken from the Defence Minister’s public comment. 
Therefore, the focus on high authority as a main actor and source of information was the reason for 
identifying WJ3 as one of the indicators of this news story.  
 
The second most commonly-occurring indicator of war journalism was the focus on the visible effects 
of the conflict (WJ2), which refers to when the news article reports mainly on the death toll and 
casualties and gives details on the visible effects of the violence. An example of this indicator is found 
in the following excerpt. 
                                                                       78 perish in custody 
                                                 Protesters suffocated in military trucks;  
                                  More than 60 still missing; Activists demand PM’s resignation 
SEVENTY-EIGHT protesters died of suffocation or from convulsions after they were arrested and 
herded into trucks to be transferred to a military camp for detention following a clash on Monday in 
Muslim-dominated Narathiwat province.  
(The Nation, unit 113/166, 26th October 2004) 
 
The example above is taken from a news report published one day after the Takbai demonstration 
incident. The article focuses mainly on the death toll and number of missing people (eg. 78 perished in 
custody; more than 60 still missing; 78 protesters died), which is one of the features of war journalism. 
In reporting of the conflict, it is hard to avoid reporting the visible effects of the incident when the 
incident involved so many dead and injured people. Thus, WJ2 is one of the indicators found most 
frequently across the 298 news articles included in this analysis.  
 
The third most frequent war journalism feature was the focus on here and now (WJ5), which refers to 
when the newspaper concentrates only on what is happening in the conflict without giving details on 
the background, or when the report of the incident is presented in a breaking news format. An example 
of this indicator is found in the following excerpt. 
                                                     Pattani hit, martial law declared 
                       Troops mass for security and manhunt; M’sia sends reinforcements  
                             to border; Thaksin: Negligent commanders ‘deserved to die’ 
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THE GOVERNMENT imposed martial law in the three southern most provinces yesterday as a second 
day of suspected terrorist-inspired violence took the lives of two policemen.  
(The Nation, 4/166, 6th January 2004) 
 
The example was taken from a report on the arsenal raid incident, when Pattani (another province in 
Thailand's southern border) was under attack on the day after the incident and martial law was 
declared. The article reports on the 'here and now' and focuses only on what happened in the incident 
without giving information on the causes and consequences.  With the 'here and now' focus, 
newspapers report news on the conflict like an item of breaking news or report only on what happened 
in the incident so that readers will only get the sense of what is happening without knowing the 
background and context of the conflict.  
 
 
 Figure 6.2: The number of peace journalism, war journalism and balanced news stories as 
classified by the number of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators found in the 298 news stories 
 
In sum, the classification of WJ/PJ news stories based on 13 WJ/PJ indicators revealed that, out of 298 
news articles analysed, 141 (47.31%) were categorised as PJ news, while 105 (35.23%) were 
categorised as WJ news, and the remaining 52 (17.44%) as balanced stories (see figure 6.2). As 
explained earlier, the findings were based on the frequency of WJ/PJ indicators in the articles. A news 
item that had more PJ indicators would be classified as PJ, and a news item that had more WJ 
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indicators would be categorised as WJ. If the number of WJ and PJ indicators was the same or differed 
by only 1 indicator, the story would be classified as 'balanced'.  
 
The next section presents findings from the analysis on WJ/PJ indicators in Bangkok Post. 
   6.1.1.1 Bangkok Post: Findings  
In total, the study found 746 WJ/PJ indicators in the coverage of the three incidents by Bangkok Post: 
382 WJ indicators and 364 PJ indicators. These results confirmed my preliminary assumption that a 
high number of WJ features would be found in the coverage of the three major incidents. However, I 
expected that the number of WJ features would be far higher than this actual figure. In fact, the total 
number of WJ indicators is only slightly higher than the number of PJ indicators. This suggests that 
Bangkok Post might use the traditional way of war reporting, but at the same time, it also employed a 
peace journalism approach in its coverage. 
 
The results from the analysis of 13 WJ/PJ indicators can be summed up in the chart below (see figure 
6.3). 
  
 Figure 6.3: The number of each 13 WJ/PJ indicators found in 132 news articles (not separated 
 by incident) in Bangkok Post 
 
Figure 6.3 provides the results obtained from the analysis of the frequency of13 WJ/PJ indicators in 
132 news articles published in Bangkok Post. From the chart, it can be seen that the highest frequency 
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of WJ indicators is WJ3 (elite-oriented), with 106 indicators. When compared to its opposing indicator 
of PJ3 (people-oriented), the frequency of WJ3 is almost two times higher than the occurrence of PJ3 
(60 indicators), which indicates that Bangkok Post depended highly on high authority as both an actor 
and sources when writing its news reports. 
 
Surprisingly, the second highest frequency of indicators found is PJ7 (Multiparty orientations), with 
103 indicators, which shows that Bangkok Post gave a voice to other sides involved in the conflict. The 
fact that the number of WJ3 and PJ7 occurrences is relatively close suggests that Bangkok Post may 
have largely depended on sources from high authority but at the same time also reported from the 
perspective of other sides engaged in or affected by the conflict.  
 
The third most commonly-occurring indicator was WJ2 (the visible effects of war), with 84 
appearances. This finding confirmed my assumption that a high proportion of WJ2 indicators would be 
found in the reporting of incidents that caused deaths and damage to the society. Interestingly, the 
frequency of two opposing indicators, WJ5 (focus on here and now) and PJ5 (report on causes and 
consequences of the conflict) were relatively close at 78 and 75 occurrences, respectively. This 
suggests that Bangkok Post reported on the conflict with two main approaches: the reporting of violent 
incidents as breaking news, and the sharing of details on the background and history of the conflict in 
the news.  
 
From the analysis of language-based criteria (WJ11, WJ12, WJ13 and PJ11, PJ12, PJ13), the study 
found a high number of language-based war journalism indicators: WJ12 (demonizing language) with 
19 indicators and WJ13 (emotive language) with 29 indicators. This suggests that Bangkok Post 
applied a war-approach in the language used in its reporting. In contrast, the number of the language-
based peace journalism indicators was relatively low.46 The findings suggest that, in terms of the 
language used in reporting the conflict, Bangkok Post used war journalism language with an emphasis 
on the use of emotive and demonising language.  
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I categorised each news article as either a war, peace or balanced report according to the number of 
WJ/PJ indicators found in the coverage. In total, out of 132 articles from Bangkok Post, 56 are 
classified as WJ stories, 55 as PJ stories and 21 as balanced stories. 
 
 Figure 6.4: The ratio of war journalism, peace journalism and balanced articles from the 
 coverage of the three incidents in Bangkok Post as classified by the 13 WJ/PJ indicators 
 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the number of articles classified as war, peace and balanced journalism in the 
coverage of the three incidents. The findings confirm my preliminary assumption that the proportion of 
WJ news reports would be higher than PJ reports in the case of the arsenal raid incident because it was 
the first event of the current wave of the southern conflict and the newspaper had to rely largely on 
authority for its sources. However, in the second incident, the number of WJ news reports did not 
decrease as expected. In fact, the number of WJ and PJ news articles was approximately the same.  
 
To explain this point, I believe that the situation of the Kruese Mosque incident influenced the 
reporting style. That is, the Kruese Mosque incident featured attacks from both sides, first when the 
Muslim assailants attacked 11 official outposts across the region, and second when the Thai Army 
killed the attackers who retreated into the mosque. Therefore, in this reporting, Bangkok Post had to 
balance its reporting with accounts from both sides. At the same time, it could not avoid WJ features 
when reporting incidents that involved a series of attacks and a large amount of deaths, casualties and 
damage.  
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In the reporting of the Takbai demonstration, the results confirm my preliminary assumption that there 
would be less WJ news reporting than PJ news reporting because the incident showed the misuse of 
power by the authorities against the minority. The findings illustrated that Bangkok Post applied more 
of a peace journalism approach and less of a war journalism approach in the reporting of this incident. 
 
Next is the analysis of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators in each of the three incidents. 
 
 
 Figure 6.5: The total number of WJ/PJ indicators found in 132 news stories on the coverage 
 of the three incidents in Bangkok Post 
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 Figure 6.6: The frequency of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators found in the coverage of each of the 
 three incidents in Bangkok Post 
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Figures 6.5 and 6.6 present a closer analysis of the war and peace journalism indicators found in the 
coverage of each of the three incidents. The findings reveal an interesting trend on the use of war and 
peace journalism indicators across the three incidents.  
 
Regarding the arsenal raid incident, a total of 34 news articles were included in the analysis. The 
number of war journalism indicators identified was twice as high as the number of peace journalism 
indicators, with 140 WJ indicators in comparison to 74 PJ indicators. This finding confirms my 
preliminary assumption that more WJ features than PJ features would be found in the reporting of the 
arsenal raid incident. In addition, the nature of the situation made it more difficult to avoid WJ features 
when reporting the incident, which signified an attack on the Thai state. 
 
The indicator found in the highest frequency was WJ3 (elite-oriented), with 47 appearances,47 followed 
by WJ5 (focus on here and now) with 25 appearances.48 PJ3 (people-oriented) was found to be the third 
most commonly-occurring indicator with 22 appearances 49 (see figure 6.6). This finding indicates that 
Bangkok Post may have applied a large ratio of WJ features in its reporting, especially the elite-
oriented aspect. However, the use of PJ features, especially the focus on people, can also be seen in its 
coverage.  
 
Where PJ3 was one of the indicators in the coverage, three main voices were represented: the students 
and teachers whose schools were set on fire; the families of the soldiers killed at the arsenal depot; and 
the families and local people on the arrest of the Islamic teachers. In sum, the reporting of Bangkok 
Post on the arsenal raid incident was very much toward a war journalism approach because the number 
of war journalism indicators found in the coverage was twice as high as the number of peace 
journalism indicators. Nevertheless, an emphasis on local people can still be seen. 
 
With regard to the Kruese Mosque incident, 56 articles were included in the analysis. Interestingly, the 
study found the number of WJ and PJ indicators identified from the coverage was the same at 161 
indicators (see figure 6.5). Compared to the findings from the coverage of the arsenal raid incident, the 
number of WJ and PJ indicators found in the Kruese Mosque event coverage reveals a change in how 
Bangkok Post reported on the southern conflict. That is, more peace journalism indicators were found 
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in the newspaper’s coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident, which indicates that a more peace-
oriented approach to reporting was applied.50  
 
The indicator found in the highest frequency was PJ7 (multiparty orientation) with 43 appearances, 51 
followed by WJ5 (focus on here and now) with 40 appearances and WJ2 (the visible effects of war) 
with 35 appearances (see figure 6.6). Compared to the coverage of the arsenal raid incident, more focus 
and voices were given to other sides involved in the conflict, and a lot of focus was placed on the 
criticism on the government's mishandling of the situation. The criticism came from different sides: the 
Muslim community, the senators, the opposition, and international human rights organisations. Also, 
more attention was given to the local people, especially the families of the killed Muslim attackers, by 
focusing on how the violence affected their lives (invisible effects of the incident).  
 
The focus on here and now (WJ5) and the focus on the visible effects of war (WJ2) were the indicators 
found in the second and third highest frequency in this coverage, respectively.52 The incident was 
represented in a 'here and now' perspective, which is with a focus on what was happening in the 
incident with no background given. The nature of the situation made it harder to present the conflict 
without mentioning the violence and its visible effects. In addition, more than twice as many PJ5 (the 
focus on causes and consequences of the conflict) indicators were found than in the coverage of the 
arsenal raid incident. This point indicated that Bangkok Post engaged more of a peace journalism 
approach by presenting the background information of the incident in its coverage as news space was 
given to articles on the history of Kruese Mosque and reports on the consequence of the incident on the 
local people.53  
 
To conclude, compared to the findings from the coverage of the arsenal raid incident, the study of the 
coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident found a higher number of each of the 13 peace journalism 
indicators. I believe that what happened in the Kruese Mosque incident affected the way Bangkok Post 
represented the incident. Bangkok Post could not avoid war journalism reporting when having to report 
on a violent incident, but at the same time, it gave more voices to those involved in the conflict, and 
provided more space for criticism of and comments on the incident. The findings indicate that Bangkok 
Post adopted more of a peace journalism approach in its reporting of the Kruese Mosque incident.  
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From the coverage of the Takbai demonstration incident, 42 items of news were analysed. The study 
found an interesting trend whereby the number of WJ indicators dropped substantially to 81 instances, 
while the number of PJ indicators rose to 129 appearances (see figure 6.5). This implies that the nature 
of the situation guided the way Bangkok Post reported the incident.54  
 
The dominant indicators identified in the coverage of this incident were: PJ7 (multiparty orientation), 
which was also the indicator found in the highest frequency (45 indicators); WJ2 (focus on the visible 
effects of the violence), with 29 indicators; and WJ3 (elite-oriented), with 27 indicators. In the same 
way as in the coverage of the arsenal raid incident and the Kruese Mosque incident, the findings 
revealed the same dominant WJ indicators in the reporting of Bangkok Post: WJ2, WJ5, and WJ3.55 
Conversely, the dominant PJ indicators were PJ7 (multiparty orientation), which was also the indicator 
found in the highest frequency at 45 appearances, and PJ5 (focus on causes and consequences of the 
conflict) with 26 indicators.  
 
Nevertheless, because what happened in the incident signified the mistreatment of the Muslim minority 
by the Thai state, I assumed that a higher number of PJ3 (people-oriented) indicators and more reports 
from a people perspective would be found. In actual fact, reports which relied on the accounts of high 
authority (WJ3) were twice as prevalent as reports from the local perspective. This shows that Bangkok 
Post gave space and time to the voices of the people only to some extent but, at the same time, it still 
relied largely on high authority as the main news actors and sources. Articles with elite oriented 
indicators were mostly those on the government's reaction to the criticism it received in the aftermath 
of the incident. Moreover, articles with multiparty orientation indicators were predominantly those on 
the reactions and comments from different sides involved in the conflict: people affected by the 
incident, the Muslim community, academics, neighbouring countries, the opposition and senators, and 
international organisations.56 
 
In sum, a content analysis of the news coverage by Bangkok Post revealed an interesting trend in the 
appearance of WJ and PJ indicators. WJ indicators were most common in the reporting of the arsenal 
raid incident, and were least common in the Takbai demonstration incident. On the other hand, PJ 
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indicators were least common in the arsenal raid incident and increased continuously in each of the two 
subsequent incidents. The dominant war journalism indicators were WJ3, WJ2, and WJ5, while the 
dominant peace journalism indicators were PJ7, PJ5, and PJ3. This suggests that Bangkok Post 
engaged peace journalism practice in its conflict coverage right from the start of the southern conflict 
in 2004. 
The next section presents the findings from a content analysis of the conflict coverage of The Nation. 
 
   6.1.1.2 The Nation: Findings  
The findings of a content analysis of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators in The Nation’s coverage of the three 
major incidents in 2004 are summarised in the chart below (see figure 6.7). In sum, the study identified 
a total of 935 WJ/PJ indicators in the coverage: 394 WJ indicators and 541 PJ indicators. The number 
of PJ indicators was considerably higher than the number of WJ indicators, which suggests that The 
Nation's style of reporting was very much towards a peace journalism approach. 
 
  
 Figure 6.7: The number of 13 WJ/PJ indicators found in 166 news articles (not separated by 
 incident) in The Nation 
 
Figure 6.7 presents the results obtained from the analysis of 13 WJ/PJ indicators in 166 news articles 
on the three major incidents as reported in The Nation. From the chart, it can be seen that the highest 
number of indicators found is PJ7 (Multiparty orientation), with 155 appearances, which shows that 
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The Nation presented the voices of all sides involved in the conflict. The second highest number of 
indicators is PJ5 (focuses on causes and consequences of the conflict), with 109 appearances. The high 
number of PJ5 indicators suggests that The Nation presented information on the background of the 
conflict and the consequences in its reporting. The third highest number of indicators found was WJ2 
(focus on the visible effects of war) with 90 instances. This confirmed my assumption that a high 
proportion of WJ2 indicators would be found in the news coverage because it is hard to avoid reporting 
on the visible effects of war when reporting on violent incidents.  
 
The study revealed that the three most common PJ indicators were: PJ7 (multiparty orientation), PJ5 
(focus on causes and consequences of the conflict), and PJ3 (people-oriented). The three most 
frequently-occurring WJ indicators were: WJ2 (focus on the visible effects of war), WJ5 (focus on here 
and now) and WJ3 (elite-oriented). A closer analysis of and discussion on the use of WJ/PJ indicators 
in the reporting of each incident will be provided in the next part. It is also worth noting that the 
frequency of the three most prevalent WJ indicators was almost half the frequency of the top three 
occurring PJ indicators. This indicates that The Nation used more of a peace journalism approach in its 
reporting. Surprisingly, the findings also revealed somewhat similar trends with the findings from the 
coverage of Bangkok Post. That is, both newspapers shared the same dominant WJ and PJ indicators 
(WJ5, WJ3, WJ2 and PJ7, PJ5, PJ3). A more detailed comparison of the findings on the approaches of 
the two newspapers will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
On the language-based criteria (WJ11, WJ12, WJ13 and PJ11, PJ12, and PJ13), surprisingly, the study 
found a higher number of WJ language-based criteria compared with the PJ language-based criteria. 
The study found 46 indicators of WJ12 (demonising language), and 47 indicators of WJ13 (emotive 
language), while 29 indicators were found of PJ12 (avoid demonising language). This finding suggests 
that even though The Nation used a peace journalism approach to a large extent, it still used war 
journalism language in its reporting. I will discuss this point again in the analysis of language used later 
in this chapter.  
 
Next is the classification of the conflict coverage into war journalism, peace journalism and balanced 
reporting as classified by the use of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators. 
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 Figure 6.8: The ratio of war journalism, peace journalism and balanced articles from the 
 coverage of the three incidents in The Nation as classified by 13 WJ/PJ indicators 
 
Figure 6.8 presents the number of WJ news articles, PJ news articles and balanced reports as classified 
by the analysis of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators. Surprisingly, The Nation did not use a war journalism 
approach in its reporting of the arsenal raid incident as I expected. In fact, the number of PJ articles 
was higher than the number of WJ reports in the coverage of all three incidents under scrutiny. The gap 
between WJ news and PJ news grows wider from the arsenal raid incident to the Kruese Mosque 
incident and to the Takbai incident, suggesting that the longer the conflict continued, the more The 
Nation applied a peace journalism approach in its reporting of the incidents. 
 
In the coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident, as I mentioned earlier, I see the incident as a two-way 
attack by the Thai army and the Muslim assailants. Therefore, WJ news reporting is most prevalent in 
the coverage of this incident. Nevertheless, the number of PJ news articles was also high because the 
incident directly affected the lives of the locals. The nature of the Takbai incident influenced the 
reporting style because the incident signified the mistreatment of the Muslim minority and misuse of 
power by the Thai authorities. Consequently, there were twice as many PJ articles as WJ reports on this 
incident.  
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To better understand the reporting style of The Nation, I provided a closer analysis on the use of the 13 
WJ/PJ indicators in the coverage of each incident by The Nation in the next section. 
 
 Figure 6.9: The total number of WJ/PJ indicators found in 166 news stories on the coverage 
 of the three incidents by The Nation 
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 Figure 6.10: The frequency of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators found in the coverage of each of the 
 three incidents in The Nation 
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Figure 6.9 shows the total number of war and peace journalism indicators identified in the overall 
reporting on each incident, and figure 6.10 shows the frequency of each of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators 
found in the coverage of the three incidents. The findings confirm the results from the classification of 
news articles into war, peace and balanced stories as discussed earlier. That is, the number of PJ 
indicators found was higher than the number of WJ indicators in all of the three incidents under 
scrutiny. The findings clearly illustrate the pattern of WJ and PJ indicators used in all three of the 
incidents.  
 
In the arsenal raid incident, 35 news reports were analysed. From this analysis, the number of peace 
journalism indicators found was considerably higher than the number of war journalism indicators, at a 
ratio of 111 PJ indicators to 84 WJ indicators (see figure 6.9).  The study revealed that the indicator 
found in the highest frequency was PJ7 (multiparty orientation) with 27 appearances, followed by PJ5 
(focus on causes and consequences of the conflict) with 21 appearances and PJ3 (people-oriented) with 
19 appearances. As mentioned earlier, it is surprising to see that the dominant indicators are of peace 
journalism when I expected to see more use of a war journalism approach in the reporting of the 
arsenal raid incident.  
 
This point indicates that The Nation engaged in a peace journalism approach in its reporting of the first 
incident of the current southern conflict. The high frequencies of PJ7, PJ5 and PJ3 show that in the 
representation of the arsenal raid incident, The Nation gave space to voices from many sides involved 
in or affected by the conflict (PJ7)57, gave details and information on the background and consequences 
of the conflict (PJ5)58, and gave space for the people involved in or affected by the incident (PJ3).59 
 
The reporting of The Nation on the arsenal raid incident followed a peace journalism approach because 
the number of peace journalism indicators found in the coverage is twice as high as the number of war 
journalism indicators. On the other hand, the dominant war journalism indicator is the focus on the 
visible effects of the violence (WJ2), followed by the focus on here and now (WJ5), and elite-oriented 
(WJ3). The fact that the elite-oriented indicator was found in a low rate of occurrence signifies that The 
Nation relied less on sources from high authorities.  
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From the coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident, 74 stories were analysed. Interestingly, the number 
of WJ and PJ indicators was quite close at 194 PJ indicators compared to 182 WJ indicators (see figure 
6.9). Compared to the findings from the coverage of the arsenal raid, more than twice as many WJ 
indicators were found and almost twice as many PJ indicators. The indicator found in the highest 
frequency was PJ7 (multiparty orientation) with 61 appearances, followed by WJ2 (focus on the visible 
effects of the violence) with 41 appearances and PJ3 (people-oriented) with 39 appearances (see figure 
6.10).  
 
In the same way as the findings of Bangkok Post, multiparty orientation (PJ7) was the indicator found 
in the highest frequency. The voices of a variety of parties involved in the conflict were heard. It was 
the first time that The Nation expressed its own voice (comments and opinions) in the form of news 
reports on the front page under its southern conflict section. This shows an attempt to perform its social 
responsibility role by taking part in the resolution of the conflict. The Nation also placed stress on the 
peace initiatives that involve ways of working towards reconciliation and resolution of the conflict, 
which is the main goal of peace journalism.60   
 
Compared to the coverage of the arsenal raid, more space was given to all sides involved in the 
conflict. For example, more news reports from the perspectives of other countries, human rights 
organisations, and academics were included.61 Other countries and human rights organisations 
expressed their criticism of how the Thai government used excessive forces in the incident. The 
Muslim community and academics expressed their views on how the conflict could be resolved. Space 
was also given for the Thai government to share their reactions to the critics, while space was also 
given to the opposition parties and the senators. This clearly shows that The Nation tried to give space 
to all parties involved in the conflict, especially sides that expressed their criticism against the 
government. 
 
The second highest indicator found was WJ2, or the focus on the visible effects of the violence.62 The 
Nation did not report the details on the death tolls and damage plainly. The language style was 
emotional and moving as there were 38 language-based war journalism indicators found in the 
coverage. In my view, The Nation engaged in peace journalism to a large degree in its reporting but its 
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writing style of using emotional and provocative language, as well as the focus on the visible effects of 
the violence, made it harder to implement a peace journalism approach to its full extent.  
 
The Nation gave space to local people affected by the incident as can be seen from the fact that PJ3 was 
found to be the third highest indicator from its coverage of the incident.63 The voices of those included 
were as follows: the locals who witnessed the incident; the locals who were affected by the incident; 
the suspects, and local people giving their reactions to the incident. The representation of the conflict 
by focusing on the local people not only shows how The Nation saw the importance of voices from the 
other side of the story, but also shows the effects of the violence on the social and cultural level. The 
space provided for the suspects and the reaction of the locals on their arrests indicated an attempt to 
offer balanced accounts from both the Thai authorities and the locals, which provided opportunities for 
the readers to use their own judgment when reading the news. 
 
To conclude, the reporting style of The Nation became more obvious in this coverage. That is, in the 
same way as for the arsenal raid's coverage, the main WJ indicators were WJ2, WJ3, and WJ5. This 
point suggests a war journalism approach, especially in terms of the focus on the visible effects of the 
violence, the focus on elites, and the reporting of the incident as breaking news, all of which were very 
much unavoidable. However, the fact that the study found more peace journalism indicators, especially 
PJ7, PJ5 and PJ3, in higher numbers than the WJ indicators suggests that The Nation's style of 
reporting was more towards a peace journalism approach than a war journalism approach. 
 
For the Takbai demonstration incident, 57 news stories were analysed. The study found 128 WJ 
indicators and 236 PJ indicators. Again, PJ7 (multiparty orientation) was found in the highest 
frequency with 67 appearances, followed by PJ5 (focus on causes and consequences) with 50 
appearances, and WJ2 (focus on the visible effects of the violence) with 30 appearances (see figure 
6.10). The number of PJ indicators was more than twice as high as the number of WJ indicators in this 
coverage. As discussed earlier, I believe that the nature of the Takbai incident, which signified the 
mistreatment of the Muslim minority by the Thai state, guided the way The Nation reported the 
incident. As a result, a prominent number of PJ indicators is expected.  
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Multiparty orientation (PJ7) was found in the highest frequency.64 Most of the articles that featured the 
voices of high authority were those giving a reaction to the critics. Because what happened in the 
incident caused national and international uproar, more voices from the Muslim community, senators 
and human rights organisation were also heard, most of which were very critical of the government's 
mishandling of the incident. Space was also given to the witnesses and detainees who had first-hand 
experience of the demonstration.  
 
In addition, The Nation looked into the background of the conflict and asserted its own voice in the 
coverage. A focus on the causes of the conflict (PJ5) was applied by exploring the thoughts and ideas 
of experts in various fields, such as academics, religious group or politicians.65 Thus the readers were 
able to see the conflict through the eyes of various people and sides involved.66 This shows how The 
Nation explored the cause of the conflict from different perspectives, and also indicates that The Nation 
put itself as one of the actors in the conflict by giving its comments and standing its ground on 
criticising the government.  
 
These findings indicate that The Nation engaged in a peace journalism approach in its representation of 
the conflict. However, in the same way as in the reporting of the arsenal raid and Kruese Mosque 
incidents, the number of WJ2 indicators, or the focus on the visible effects of the violence, especially 
the details on the numbers of deaths and injured, was high.67 The Nation often used emotive and 
demonising language in its reporting, as can be supported by the fact that 42 war journalism language 
based indicators were found. 
 
In total, the number of PJ indicators was higher than the number of WJ indicators in the coverage of all 
three incidents. The analysis revealed that the dominant WJ indicators were WJ2, WJ5, and WJ3, while 
the dominant PJ indicators were PJ7, PJ5, PJ3. The study found the lowest number of WJ indicators in 
the coverage of the arsenal raid. The number increased in the coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident, 
and again, dropped greatly in the coverage of the Takbai demonstration. On the other hand, PJ 
indicators were found in their lowest numbers in the reporting of the arsenal raid, but they increased 
considerably in the reporting of the Kruese Mosque and Takbai demonstration incidents.  
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The next section provides a comparison between the findings from Bangkok Post and The Nation. 
 
   6.1.1.3 Comparison of the findings: Bangkok Post vs The Nation  
 
  Figure 6.11: A comparison of war, peace and balanced news stories of Bangkok Post 
  and The Nation as classified by the 13 WJ/PJ indicators 
 
Figure 6.11 shows the findings from a content analysis on the conflict coverage by the two newspapers, 
using the 13 WJ/PJ indicators (Galtung 1986; 1998). In the coverage of Bangkok Post, the number of 
war and peace articles were quite similar, which suggests that Bangkok Post engaged both war and 
peace journalism approaches in its representation of the conflict. The content analysis showed 56 war 
journalism reports, 55 peace journalism articles and 21 balanced reports (see figure 6.11). The details 
on the analysis on the coverage of each incident revealed that the stance began with more of a pro-war 
journalism approach to reporting of the arsenal raid incident, a mixture of both war and peace 
journalism for the Kruese Mosque incident (the study found the same number of WJ and PJ indicators 
in the coverage), and a pro-peace journalism approach in the coverage of the Takbai demonstration 
incident. In the coverage of The Nation, the study found 49 war journalism reports, 86 peace 
journalism articles, and 31 balanced reports (see figure 6.11). It is very distinguishable that the number 
of PJ news reports was two times higher than the number of WJ and balanced news articles. The 
analysis into the coverage of each incident in The Nation revealed that the number of PJ news reports 
was higher than the number of WJ news reports in the coverage of all three incidents.  
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In the reporting of the arsenal raid incident, both newspapers presented information on the related 
violent incidents, southern policy, law enforcement and the government's reaction, with the main focus 
on here and now (WJ5) and the visible effects of the violence (WJ2). The first day of reporting serves 
to illustrate this point as can be seen in Bangkok Post's headlines "Soldiers die, schools burn", and The 
Nation's "20 schools torched, Arsenal raided" (see Appendix IV (a)). In the conflict coverage of 
Bangkok Post, the study found twice as many war journalism indicators as PJ indicators (140 WJ 
indicators and 74 PJ indicators) (see figure 6.5). On the other hand,  in the conflict coverage of The 
Nation, the number of PJ indicators (111) was higher than the number of WJ indicators (84) (see figure 
6.9), suggesting that The Nation used a peace journalism approach to its reporting of the first southern 
conflict incident. The Nation published not only reports on the violent incidents and security measures 
but also news on social and cultural issues.68 The topics covered by The Nation include the impact on 
social and economic aspects, a possible solution, the aftermath and the history behind the conflict.69  
 
In the reporting of the Kruese Mosque incident, the number of PJ indicators found in both newspapers 
increased substantially (161 PJ indicators in Bangkok Post and 194 PJ indicators in The Nation), 
suggesting that a peace journalism approach was applied to the coverage. However, the number of war 
journalism indicators found in both newspapers was also high (161 WJ indicators in Bangkok Post and 
182 WJ indicators in The Nation). This indicates that it may be unavoidable to report violent incidents 
without using a war journalism style of reporting, especially with regard to the focus on the visible 
effects of the violence (WJ2), the focus on here and now (WJ5), and elite-oriented (WJ3), which were 
the three main WJ indicators used by both newspapers.  
 
Both newspapers published articles on different aspects of the incident and gave voices to different 
people involved in or affected by the incident. This can be seen in the fact that PJ7 (multiparty-
orientation) was the most recurrent indicator found from their coverage. The number of social and 
cultural reports in Bangkok Post increased on the following topics: impact on lives of the locals, impact 
on socio-economic aspect, history, solution and aftermath. This shows that Bangkok Post applied a 
peace journalism approach in its coverage.70 The Nation continued reporting news both on the incidents 
and on the various social and cultural issues.71 Apart from reporting on the violent incident, security 
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issues and southern policy, The Nation published 18 articles on the impact on the lives of the locals, 6 
articles on the history of the conflict, and 4 reports on possible solutions to the conflict. These topics 
are the main features of peace journalism.  
 
For the Takbai demonstration, the study found more PJ indicators than WJ indicators in the coverage of 
both newspapers. Bangkok Post had 81 WJ indicators and 129 PJ indicators, while The Nation had 128 
WJ indicators and 236 PJ indicators. This indicates that both newspapers applied a peace journalism 
approach in their news coverage. The main indicators used by both newspapers in their reporting were 
PJ7 (multiparty-orientation) and WJ2 (focus on the visible effects of the violence), which shows that 
although both newspapers reported on the visible effects of the violence, they also gave voices to 
different parties involved in or affected by the conflict in their coverage.72 The number of elite-oriented 
and people-oriented indicators found from the coverage of The Nation was relatively similar (25 elite-
oriented reports and 29 people-oriented reports), while elite-oriented (WJ3) was the second highest 
indicator found in the coverage of Bangkok Post. The Nation presented both reports on both the violent 
incident and the related social and cultural issues, while Bangkok Post presented more reports on the 
violent incident and security measures. 
 
To conclude, the study found that both newspapers shared the same main war and peace journalism 
indicators: WJ2 (focus on the visible effects of the violence), WJ3 (elite-oriented) and WJ5 (focus on 
here and now); and PJ3 (people-oriented), PJ5 (focus on causes and consequences), and PJ7 
(multiparty-orientation). The southern conflict involves violent incidents and damage to lives and 
society; therefore, WJ2 and WJ5 were found throughout the coverage. Also, the southern conflict is a 
national concern that involves issues of southern administration and security measures, so the 
dependence on high authority is unavoidable.  
 
Both newspapers implemented a peace journalism approach in their reporting of the southern conflict 
right from the first year of the incident, which contradicts my preliminary assumption that more of a 
war journalism style of reporting would be found. The main characteristics the peace journalism found 
in the reporting are the presentation of different voices, especially the voices of the local people, and 
the provision of information on the causes and consequences of the conflict. I found that the situations 
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of the incidents and the length of the conflict (in this study, a 10-month period) had an influence on the 
implementation of war and peace journalism in the coverage, as peace journalism reports were found to 
be at their lowest frequency in the coverage of the arsenal raid incident and at their highest in the 
coverage of the Takbai demonstration.  
In the following section, the findings from the second analysis on war and peace journalism 
orientations in the coverage are presented.  
 
   6.1.1.4 The second analysis on the four broad orientations of   
   WJ/PJ 
As stated earlier, I conducted another analysis on the four broad orientations of WJ/PJ (Galtung 1998) 
in order to cross check and to validate the data. Because I am aware that the 13 WJ/PJ framework may 
not be sufficient enough to categorise news story into WJ/PJ frames as it only reveals the number of 
WJ/PJ indicators found in the study and provides categorisation based solely on a count of the 
frequency of the indicators. The four main orientations of WJ and PJ are two opposing frames, which 
include: war/peace, conflict; propaganda/truth; elite/people; and victory/solution. In this sense, the 
second analysis is a subjective form of analysis based on my reading in order to find the 'main' 
orientation of the news story and determine whether it is pro-peace or pro-war.  
 
I categorised each news report into one of these four broad WJ/PJ orientations in order to identify the 
war journalism and peace journalism framework used by the newspapers in representing the conflict. In 
this sense, one news report is categorised into either a war or a peace journalism orientation. However, 
news articles that could not be classified into any war or peace journalism orientation would be marked 
as 'neutral' stories. The study indicated that, out of the 298 news items analysed, 150 reports were 
categorised as PJ, while 114 reports were categorised as WJ, and 34 reports were neutral (see figure 
6.12, see also Appendix V for details of the second analysis).  
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 Figure 6.12: The number of peace journalism, war journalism and neutral news reports from 
 the 298 news reports as classified by the four broad WJ/PJ orientations  
 
 
  Figure 6.13: Comparison of results between the analyses of the two WJ/PJ frameworks of the 
 298 news stories   
 
The findings from the two analyses revealed quite similar results (see figure 6.13). However, the two 
frameworks differed in their emphasis on war and peace journalism. That is, the 13 WJ/PJ indicators 
focus on the features of war or peace in the news reports, while the four broad orientations focus on the 
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WJ or PJ frame that the journalists used when writing the news. The use of two frameworks can help in 
cross-checking and validating the data in this study.  
 
The findings reveal a similar pattern. To explain, in the classification of war and peace journalism 
reports, the differences between the results of the two analyses were low, which means that the 
implementation of two the approaches was effective. That is, out of the 298 news reports, the number 
of PJ articles was the highest, ranging from 141-150 with a mean of 145.5, followed by the number of 
WJ articles, which ranged from 105-114 with a mean of 109.5, while the number of balanced/neutral 
articles ranged from 34-52, with a mean of 43.  
 
Based on the results, it can be concluded that the representation of the three major incidents from the 
southern conflict in 2004 featured more peace journalism reports than war journalism articles. This 
finding represents a surprising contrast to my preliminary assumption that the reporting would mostly 
involve a war journalism approach since it was covering three violent incidents.  
 
 
 Figure 6.14: The number of war journalism, peace journalism and neutral news stories as 
 classified by the 4 broad orientations of WJ/PJ on 298 news stories  
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 Figure 6.15: A comparison of the findings from the four WJ/PJ orientations found in the 
 conflict coverage in Bangkok Post and The Nation 
 
Figure 6.14 reveals the most recurrent WJ/PJ frame in the 298 articles analysed: war-oriented (72 
articles), followed by people-oriented (60 articles), and truth-oriented (49 articles). A comparison 
between the findings of the two newspapers was made (see figure 6.15). A 'war-oriented-frame was 
used as the main frame in the coverage of both newspapers: 36 articles in Bangkok Post and 36 articles 
in The Nation. Surprisingly, the study found the same number of 'war-oriented' reports, which suggests 
that a focus on war was used extensively by the two newspapers in their coverage of the southern 
conflict. The opposing 'peace-oriented' frame only contributed 8 articles in Bangkok Post and 13 
articles in The Nation, which indicates that both newspapers were less likely to use peace as the main 
frame when reporting the conflict. 
 
However, other categories of peace journalism orientations, such as 'truth-oriented', 'people-oriented' 
and 'solution-oriented', were used more than their opposing frames in the coverage of both newspapers. 
This suggests that there may be a small amount of focus on 'peace' reports, whereas other aspects of 
peace journalism, especially 'people-oriented' and 'truth-oriented', were utilised to a much larger 
degree. The study found 49 'truth-oriented' reports. From my reading, I found that both newspapers 
used a 'truth-oriented' frame mostly in their coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident.  
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The study found, 60 'people-oriented' articles, and 29 'elite-oriented' reports. Bangkok Post published 
approximately the same number of 'elite-oriented' and 'people-oriented' articles. In comparison to The 
Nation, 'elite-oriented' was the only frame for which Bangkok Post has more reports than The Nation. 
This indicates a high dependency by Bangkok Post on the elites as information sources, which can be 
supported by the findings from the first analysis that the 'elite-oriented' (WJ3) indicator was the most 
common in the coverage (106 indicators) (see figure 6.3). On the other hand, 'people-oriented' was the 
main frame applied in the conflict reporting of The Nation. The study found 38 'people-oriented' 
framed reports, and this can be supported by the findings from the first analysis, from which 155 
'people-oriented' indicators (PJ3) were found. 
 
Moreover, I consider the 'solution-oriented' frame to be the main feature of peace journalism as it 
shows how the media can proffer possible solutions to the conflict. The analysis identified 20 'solution-
oriented' articles, which means that a peace journalism approach was used in the reporting right from 
the first year of the southern conflict. Also, the analysis revealed that the 'war-oriented' frame was the 
most recurrently used by both newspapers, which is largely unavoidable when reporting on a conflict 
that involves death tolls and damage to society. As Lynch and Galtung (2010, p. 12) stated:  
 
  "[W]ill peace journalism also report violence? Of course. But it will report the violence by 
 all sides, and the suffering of all sides, not only their violence and our suffering. It will also go 
 deeper, reporting the invisible causes and effects of violence without falling into the trap of 
 confusing violence and conflict." 
 
This quote explains that violence can be reported but peace journalism treats violence as conflict, 
which involves reporting violence from all sides, and exploring the causes and consequences of the 
conflict. The study found a large number of 'war-oriented' reports, and the focus on a 'peace-oriented' 
approach may still be low. However, other aspects such as the orientations on truth and people indicate 
that peace journalism was applied to the conflict coverage right from the first year of the southern 
conflict, even though other 'peace' and 'solution' aspects were implemented to a lesser extent. 
 
	 164	
The findings of the second analysis on each newspaper can be found in Appendix V. The following 
section presents the findings from the analysis of the news actors. 
 
  6.1.2 Proportions of news actors 
The analysis of ‘news actors’, or as they are referred to in this study, ‘the main actor mentioned in 
news leads’, indicates the primary focus of the news article and thus, according to the journalist who 
wrote the report, the most important, authoritative or legitimate actor. According to Becker’s (1967, p. 
240) notion of the ‘hierarchy of credibility', the right to be heard is "differentially distributed through 
the ranks of the system". Allan (2010, p. 82) echoed this views by stating "the higher up in this 
hierarchy the news source is situated, the more authoritative their words will be". Therefore, 
conducting a study of news actors will show the significance the newspapers ascribed to each category.  
 
This mode of analysis was informed by peace journalism, which encourages journalists to engage all 
sides of the conflict in their reports. Consequently, a look into the main actors from the various articles 
can show the extent to which the newspapers gave prominence to each category. Moreover, whether a 
report is considered WJ or PJ also depends on the main focus of the story. The categorisation of news 
actors presents all of the sides involved in the conflict. The categories include: ‘high authority’, 
‘official source’, ‘opposition’, ‘religious group’, ‘academic’, ‘local’, ‘local authority’, ‘organisation’, 
‘foreign source’ and ‘other’.  
 
This research used frequency analysis to determine the proportion of news actors. The same unit of 
analysis was used for all 298 articles: 166 from The Nation and 132 from Bangkok Post. I looked at the 
first person mentioned in each story as the main actor (top of the ‘hierarchy of credibility’), and 
recorded the number of times the same category was mentioned in each of the three incidents.  
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  Figure 6.16: An overview of the ‘news actors’ used in the 298 news stories of  
  conflict  coverage of Bangkok Post and The Nation (not differentiated by newspaper) 
 
The findings from the analysis of 298 news reports show that the category of ‘news actor’ used most 
frequently was ‘high authority’, which accounted for the news lead in 79 articles. The second highest 
category was ‘local’ (53 articles), while the categories that were the least used were ‘local authority’ (9 
articles) and ‘academic’ (7 articles) (see figure 6.16). These results indicate the prominence put on each 
category of news actor when reporting the news, which reveals that both newspapers placed the most 
prominence on ‘high authority’ as the main focus of their reports.  
 
This finding can be supported by Becker’s (1967) notion of ‘hierarchy of credibility’, which explains 
that the people who are at the top of a social or institutional hierarchy are assumed to have greater 
credibility and better access to correct information than those among the bottom ranks, who are 
assumed to have less credibility and so be less likely to warrant journalistic attention. Surprisingly, 
‘local’ actors were found to be the second most prominent instead of the least, which suggests that both 
newspapers regard 'local' actors as an important category since the violent incidents in the south of 
Thailand mostly affected the local people. This suggests an attempt by both newspapers to engage all 
sides of the conflict, as 53 out of 298 articles placed ‘local’ actors as the main focus of their coverage. 
In sum, the number of times each category of actor was mentioned as a ‘news actor’ varied, with the 
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analysis revealing the high prominence placed by the newspapers on ‘high authority’, ‘local’ and 
‘official source’, while all other categories were used as the main news actors in fewer than 20 articles 
in total. 
 
Next we turn to consider the results of the analysis of story actors from each newspaper.  
 
  6.1.2.1 Bangkok Post 
 
         Figure 6.17: The frequency of ‘news actors’ by category found in the coverage of the 
  three incidents in Bangkok Post   
 
From the 132 articles analysed from Bangkok Post, the most frequently used main news actor was the 
category of ‘high authority’, accounting for 42 articles, followed by ‘official source’ (23 articles) and 
‘local’ (20 articles) (see figure 6.17). These results show that Bangkok Post first and foremost put the 
category of ‘high authority’ as the main actor in its reports on the southern conflict stories, with 
'official source' as the second most prominent category. This can be supported by the findings from the 
analysis on WJ/PJ indicators that 106 'elite-oriented' indicators were found from the coverage, 
suggesting the newspaper’s dependence on leaders and official sources. 
 
However, the category 'local', which is considered to be at the bottom of the hierarchy rank, was used 
as the main news actor more than any other of the remaining categories. This suggests that Bangkok 
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Post also placed prominence on 'local' perspectives in its reporting of the southern conflict incidents 
and how these incidents had a direct impact on the lives of the locals All other categories of actors 
were used as main news actors; however with a different degree of prominence. The remaining 
categories of actors were featured as follows: 'opposition' 11 articles, 'religious group' 8 articles, 'local 
authority' 8 articles, 'organisation' 6 articles, and 'academic' 1 article.  
 
   6.1.2.2 The Nation 
 
  Figure 6.18: The frequency of ‘news actors’ by category found in the coverage of the 
  three incidents in The Nation  
 
From the 166 articles analysed in The Nation, the most frequently used news actor was ‘high 
authority’, featuring in 37 articles, followed by 'other' in 34 reports, and 'local' in 33 articles (see figure 
6.18). The third most used news actor was ‘official source’ in 17 reports, followed by ‘organisation’ 
and 'foreign' in 12 articles each. 'High authority' was chosen as the main news actor in the reporting of 
all three incidents. However, the analysis found that 'local' was the second most frequently used news 
actor, which suggests that The Nation gave almost the same level of prominence to 'local' people as the 
focus of its reporting of southern conflict news.  
 
Other categories were all used as news actors with a different level of prominence. In the same way as 
with Bangkok Post, the least used categories were as follows: 'academic' 6 articles and 'local authority' 
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5 articles. However, it is important to note that the category 'other', which featured as the main news 
actor in 34 out of 166 articles, refers to when actors in news leads cannot be categorised into any of 
these groups or when there was no actors identified as the news leads. 
 
   6.1.2.3 Comparison of the findings: Bangkok Post vs The Nation 
 
 Figure 6.19: A comparison of the findings from the analysis of main ‘news actors’ used in 
 Bangkok Post and The Nation 
 
To clarify, the findings illustrate that both Bangkok Post and The Nation used ‘high authority’ as the 
main news actor, which confirms Becker's (1967) notion of hierarchy of credibility, whereby people of 
a higher rank in the system are seen to be more credible, whereas people with a lower rank tend to be 
heard less. However, the notion of hierarchy of credibility may not be applied to all of the findings as 
both newspapers also showed their commitment to giving voices to ‘local people’, considered as the 
lowest in rank of the hierarchy, by making them the main focus of their reports. This low-ranking 
group of actors accounted for the third highest number of news leads in Bangkok Post and the second 
highest in The Nation (see figure 6.19). 
 
All sides involved in the conflicts were put into focus in the news reports of both newspapers, albeit in 
differing degrees. However, one key point that both newspapers have in common is the significance 
they first attributed to 'high authority'. In contrast, the second category of actor was 'local' in The 
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Nation and 'official source' in Bangkok Post. This indicates that Bangkok Post placed the most 
prominence on 'high authority' and 'official sources' as its news leads, which can be supported by the 
findings from the analysis on WJ/PJ indicators whereby WJ3, or elite-oriented, was among the top 
three most used indicators. In The Nation, 'local' was found to be the second most used category of 
news lead, and this can be supported by the finding that PJ3, or people-oriented, was among the main 
PJ indicators of The Nation.  
 
The findings from the analysis on news actors indicates that all sides involved in the conflict, 
especially the local people, were given prominence as actors in the reporting, and that both newspapers 
engaged a multiparty orientation aspect of peace journalism in their conflict coverage to a large extent.  
  
  6.1.3 Proportion of ‘New sources’ 
Following the analysis of news actors, this section continues by studying the provider of information 
for the news reports. The analysis of ‘news sources’ was conducted by looking at all of the sources 
mentioned in the reports, either from direct or indirect quotations, by counting the frequency in which 
each source was used, and then categorising them accordingly. In the next stage, the number of times 
the same source was used in the reports was counted, which later provided insights into the sources 
used most or least frequently and, at the same time, explained the extent to which each newspaper 
engaged each type of source as well as their relative prominence in the coverage.  
 
The preferred source of information will later be drawn into the connection with how the southern 
conflict is represented in the news. A study of the sources used is important as it presents the 
relationship between various news sources, as well as the extent to which journalists relied on specific 
sources of information. The difference between the analysis of ‘news actors’ and the analysis of ‘news 
sources’ is that ‘news actors’ show the importance the newspaper put on the main focus of the news, 
while the study of ‘news sources’ shows which provider of information the newspaper relied on.  
 
Unlike the proportion of news actors in the last section, which showed a ‘hierarchy of credibility’ focus 
from both newspapers in writing up their news articles, the study of the relative prominence of 
different news sources reveals the distribution of sources used in the writing of reports by searching for 
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and collecting the names of the people who were the source of each article, and grouping the sources 
into the same categories as in the last section. In this sense, one can interpret whether or not the main 
actor and the source of the reports are correlated.  
 
 Figure 6.20: The total number of sources (by name) found from the conflict coverage of 
  Bangkok Post and The Nation (not differentiated by newspaper) 
 
In total, the findings from this analysis indicate that 699 sources (by name) were found from 298 news 
articles. The sources were mainly from the ‘local’ category (179 sources), followed by ‘high authority’ 
(107 sources), and ‘foreign source’ (79 sources) (see figure 6.20). In the analysis of news sources, 
‘high authority’ and ‘local’ are the top two most used categories, which was quite similar to the 
findings from the analysis of ‘news actors’.  
 
However, it is surprising to see that the newspapers used a large number of local people as sources, 
whereas the analysis of news leads shows the importance both newspapers placed on ‘high authority’ 
as the main news actors. This suggests to me that the newspapers may rely mostly on information from 
local people; however, when it came to writing the reports, they were more likely to put an emphasis 
on ‘high authority’ sources as being the most significant or newsworthy.  
 
Next are the findings on the analysis on news sources in Bangkok Post and The Nation. 
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   6.1.3.1 Bangkok Post 
In the reporting of the arsenal raid incident, the total number of sources used in the 34 articles was 68 
(see figure 6.21).73 Interestingly, there were 15 sources from the ‘high authority’ category but they 
were mentioned 149 times, which suggests that the highest prominence was given to this category. This 
can be explained by the fact that distinguished authority figures, for example, the Prime Minister, the 
Deputy Minister, the army commander and so on, played an important part in the dynamics of the 
southern conflict. As a result, they were most frequently used as providers of information. These 
authority figures had access to the information on the incidents, especially in the case of the arsenal 
raid, which was considered to be the first violent incident of the current southern conflict. Other than 
‘high authority’, the number of times other sources were mentioned was low.74 In the reporting of this 
incident, no sources from ‘organisation’ and ‘academic’ categories were used, and the ‘religious’ 
sources were mentioned the least. 
 
In the coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident, sources from all categories were used and the number 
of sources clearly increased (see figure 6.21).75 The use of ‘local’ sources was twice as high as the use 
of ‘high authority’ sources. This includes information from family members of the dead, the local 
residents, and the witnesses. In total, all sources were cited 447 times, and ‘high authority’ was cited 
the most frequently, at 132 times (see figure 6.22). Sources from the ‘local’ category were cited 100 
times, which implies that journalists used more information from the 'local' people in writing the 
reports of this incident. In my perspective, the Kruese Mosque incident directly affected the lives of the 
locals. The incident changed the dynamic of news reporting because of the effects on Thai society on 
many levels. Therefore, a new category of sources was used in the coverage, such as 'academics' and 
'organisations', which signifies that the nature of this incident presented new opportunities for new 
players to be involved in the conflict scene.  
 
In the reporting of Takbai demonstration incident, a total of 110 sources were used (see figure 6.21).76 
The highest number of sources proved to be ‘foreign sources', which implies that the southern conflict 
had reached a level of international concern by this time. 'Foreign sources' thus played an important 
role in the conflict scene by criticising and pressuring the Thai government in terms of its handling of 
the incident. The increase in the number and frequency of citations from 'organisation' and 'academic' 
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groups also serves to prove this point. The number of 'religious group' sources was doubled from the 
reporting of the Kruese Mosque incident as well as the number of citations (11 sources contributed 59 
citations) (see figure 6.22). This stresses the strong implication of the religious aspect in the southern 
conflict scene. 
 
One other important point is that the number of sources and frequency of the 'local' and 'local authority' 
categories was found to be relatively small even though the incident happened locally. This may reflect 
the seriousness of the southern conflict in that it was not merely a regional problem, but was taken to a 
national and international scale. Bangkok Post had to gain information from other players in the 
conflict scene. Nevertheless, the frequency analysis revealed that 'high authority' was cited in the 
highest frequency (14 sources contributed 113 citations), which indicates that Bangkok Post, regardless 
of the situations of each incident, put the most prominence on sources from high authority.  
 
 
  Figure 6.21: The number of sources used in the coverage of all three incidents from 
   Bangkok Post (by name) 
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  Figure 6.22: Frequency of sources mentioned in the coverage of all three incidents 
  from Bangkok Post (times) 
 
In addition, the situations of each incident influenced the selection of sources in Bangkok Post. For 
example, the Kruese Mosque incident directly affected the lives of the local people so the number and 
the frequency of 'local' sources used increased substantially in reporting this incident. The Takbai 
demonstration, meanwhile, caused wide criticism of the Thai government, which is reflected in the 
increasing use of 'foreign', 'religious', 'opposition', 'organisation' and 'academic' sources. Nevertheless, 
'high authority' source was consistently mentioned in the highest frequency regardless of the situation 
of the three incidents, which, in my reading, confirms the belief that no matter how much the 
newspaper tried to engage other sources, ‘high authority’ consistently proved to be its most crucial 
source of information.  
   6.1.3.2 The Nation 
In the reporting of the arsenal raid incident, the total number of sources used was 96 (see figure 6.23).77 
The 'local' source was found in the highest number and 'high authority' came second in the study. These 
findings are revealing because, in the first incident, I had expected that not all categories would be used 
as news sources, and that The Nation would base its stories and information mostly on information 
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gathered from ‘high authority’. In fact, the 'local' category was the main source of information for this 
incident, which shows that The Nation saw the importance of including the perspective of the people 
who were directly affected by the incident. Other sources include students, parents, teachers, school 
directors and local residents. However, the frequency of sources used shows contrasting results 
depending on the incident, whereas ‘high authority’ was cited the most frequently (see figure 6.24).78  
 
In the coverage of Kruese Mosque incident, there was a rise in the number of sources used in the 
reporting, with a total of 172 sources used (see figure 6.23).79 Again, the number of 'local' sources was 
found to be the highest with 51 sources, followed by 'high authority' with 25 sources. The number of 
other sources such as 'academic', 'religious group' and 'opposition', increased only slightly but doubled 
in frequency in terms of citations, suggesting that these players became more important in the conflict 
scene (see figure 6.24). Again, 'high authority' was cited the most frequently (25 sources with 211 
citations), which was only slightly different to the number of citations of 'local' source (51 sources with 
208 citations). This evidence suggests to me that The Nation awarded the same eminence to both ‘high 
authority’ and ‘local’ groups as news sources.  
 
In the reporting of the Takbai demonstration incident, the total number of sources used was 138 (see 
figure 6.23). The highest number of sources was from ‘local’ people with 28 sources, while the equal 
second most commonly used sources were ‘high authority’ and ‘foreign source’, each with 22 sources. 
The number and the frequency of citations of 'foreign' and 'religious' sources reached its peak in this 
coverage, 80 which suggests that what happened in the Takbai demonstration incident raised concerns 
among other foreign countries and the Muslim community. On the other hand, the number of 'local' and 
'local authority' sources dropped slightly, which may be a result of the Takbai incident having brought 
the conflict to a national and international level, even though it happened locally.  
 
'High authority’ once again came in first place in the frequency analysis (see figure 6.24).81 The result 
is noteworthy because it is fairly similar with the findings from the other two incidents. To conclude, in 
the reporting of all of the incidents, the highest number of sources used in the reporting was from 'local' 
sources. In terms of frequency, the sources mentioned in the highest frequency in all three incidents 
was 'high authority'.  
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           Figure 6.23: The number of sources used in the coverage of all three incidents from 
   The Nation (name) 
   
 
  Figure 6.24: Frequency of sources mentioned in the coverage of all three incidents 
  from The Nation (times) 
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To sum up, the total number of sources used in all the three incidents was 406 (see figures 6.23 and 
6.24). The highest number of sources in The Nation was ‘local’ (112 sources); the second was ‘high 
authority’ (60 sources); and the third was ‘foreign source’ (47 sources).82 In the frequency analysis, 
‘high authority’ sources were used most frequently. However, in my view, I can see an attempt by The 
Nation to give space to sources from the 'local' population as there were 112 sources that contributed to 
374 citations from this group. The number of citations was less than 'high authority' but only by a small 
extent. The distinctive style of the sources used and their relative prominence indicates that The Nation 
saw ‘high authority’ as a crucial source of information – relying on fewer sources, yet mentioning them 
more often - while still engaging with local sources to an almost equal level of significance.  
 
   6.1.3.3 Comparison of findings: Bangkok Post vs The Nation 
The total number of sources used by The Nation was 406 (counted by name), and by Bangkok Post was 
293. The Nation used more sources than Bangkok Post in almost all categories except ‘opposition’ and 
‘other’.83 In the same way as The Nation, Bangkok Post drew most of its sources from the ‘local’ 
population,84while ‘high authority’ sources were found to be the second most utilised in both 
newspapers.85 This reveals that both newspapers saw the importance of using information from ‘local’ 
sources when writing their reports on the southern conflict. 
 
The frequency of sources used can help to explain the extent to which the newspapers mediated the 
importance of each of their sources. Interestingly, both newspapers had the highest number of sources 
from the 'local' category, but the ‘local’ sources did not come first in this analysis. The sources that 
were mentioned most frequently in both newspapers were from ‘high authority’ at 394 times in 
Bangkok Post and 473 in The Nation, suggesting that the newspapers gave the highest prominence to 
sources from ‘high authority’. 
 
Following ‘high authority’ was the category of 'local', which frequently appeared in the articles even if, 
at times, they were relegated to a much lower point in the source hierarchy. For Bangkok Post, the 
number of times 'high authority' was mentioned was significant because ‘high authority’ was 
mentioned almost 5 times more often than the citations of sources from other categories.86 For The 
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Nation, the number of ‘local’ sources was the highest; however, it is significant to observe that these 
sources was not cited the most frequently - rather, the ‘high authority’ group was cited the most 
frequency. The Nation gave a higher prominence to ‘high authority,’ possibly because this category of 
news sources offered a greater degree of credibility. The Nation seemed to exert more effort in 
engaging all sides of the conflict in its news reports, even if not with the same prominence.  
 
In summary, the analysis of news sources can help to provide a better understanding of the dynamics of 
the southern conflict by showing the sides involved and their contribution to the coverage. Based on 
the findings, I can conclude that the coverage of the southern conflict predominantly relied on the 
information supplied by high authority figures. In my view, one reason for this was because those in 
positions of 'high authority' have greater access to information and also have high credibility. Another 
reason was because the southern conflict had by then become a national problem that was linked 
directly to the government's administration. Moreover, as McCargo (2000) stated, one of the distinct 
characteristics of the Thai press is that news and comments are considered to be the same, which is a 
significant obstacle and challenge to the professionalism of Thai journalism, and this could be one of 
the main reasons why 'high authority' figures were used as the most frequent news sources because 
their comments were treated as news. 
 
Surprisingly, sources from the 'local' category, even though in a lower position in the source hierarchy, 
contributed to the coverage of both newspapers to a great extent, especially in the reporting of the 
Kruese Mosque incident and the Takbai demonstration. Moreover, the fact that 'foreign' sources were 
found to be the third most popular source indicates that the southern conflict was not a merely a 
domestic affair as the Thai government claimed, but that it had been raised into a conflict of 
international concern, especially from neighbouring Islamic countries and international organisations.  
 
Also, source categories that criticised the state's administration, such as 'opposition' and 'organisation', 
as well as source categories that have expertise in the southern conflict issues, and in cultural and 
religious affairs, such as 'academics' and 'religious' categories, were all used as providers of 
information in the coverage by both newspapers, albeit with differing degrees of prominence. From the 
peace journalism perspective, I can see that both newspapers tried to engage all sides involved in the 
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conflict in their coverage, especially local people. This is one of the main goals of peace journalism in 
showing 'the other side of the story'. In my view, both newspapers engaged in peace journalism in their 
selection of sources of information for their coverage of the incidents under scrutiny.  
 
  6.1.4 The analysis on the labels of the southern conflict and the antagonists 
This section explores another practice used in reporting the news whereby the journalist's inclination 
toward certain definitions of the conflict, the specific incidents and the antagonists are analysed. The 
study of these ‘labels’ used in reporting the news will lead to an understanding of how the conflict and 
the antagonists, typically represented within the 'us versus them' dichotomy, are characterised and 
represented in the conflict coverage.  
 
As mentioned earlier, different situations affect the conflict coverage differently. Therefore, an 
examination of the findings regarding the labels used in describing the conflict, the specific incidents, 
and the antagonists could be useful in determining how these labels were used in the reportage of 
different conflict situations. In this respect, I made the following assumptions: the labels used in the 
arsenal raid coverage would be the most varied because it was the first incident of the conflict, and the 
news organisations did not know how best to refer to the event and the attackers; the labels used in the 
Kruese Mosque coverage would express strong sentiments and the negative denomination of the 
attackers, possibly containing religious undertones when describing the situation; and the labels used in 
the coverage of the Takbai demonstration would be more neutral because the Thai state’s mistreatment 
of the Muslim minorities had become widely known by that time and the incident affected the lives of 
the locals directly. 
 
   6.1.4.1 Labels of the southern conflict in the conflict coverage 
The study examined the labels that directly referred to the southern conflict phenomenon in the 
headlines, sub-headlines and the first 25% of the news story. The study found that there was a wide 
range of labels used to describe the southern conflict (see table 6.3). Interestingly, the labels used by 
both newspapers to describe the southern conflict phenomenon were quite similar. The most frequent 
labels used by both newspapers were 'violence in the South' or 'southern violence', which stress the 
violent nature and the location of the conflict. The label 'southern violence' was found in Bangkok Post 
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37 times in 132 news articles, or 64.91% of its total number of labels as found in the study, and in The 
Nation 26 times in 166 news articles, accounting for 50.98% of its total number of labels used. 
 
The second most frequently used labels were 'unrest' or 'southern unrest', which, again, stress the 
disruptive nature of the conflict and indicate public disorder. Bangkok Post used these labels 10 times, 
or 17.54% of its total labels used, while The Nation used these labels 8 times, or 15.68% of its total 
number of labels found in this study. The third most frequently used labels were generic terms used to 
identify the conflict as a problem: 'southern problems' in Bangkok Post and 'conflict and problems in 
southern Thailand' in The Nation. The study found these labels 7 times, or 12.28% of the total labels 
used by Bangkok Post, and 5 times in The Nation.  
 
However, The Nation used a wider variety of labels to describe the conflict, and some of these labels 
carry a negative meaning. For example, 'southern carnage', which refers to the killing of a large number 
of people in the South, was found 7 times, accounting for 13.72% of the total number of labels found in 
the study.  
 
In comparison, the top three main labels used to describe the southern conflict phenomenon in both 
newspapers used similar groups of words. The most common label referred to the conflict as 'violence'; 
the second most common label called the conflict 'unrest'; and the third most common label referred to 
the southern conflict as a 'problem'. Moreover, it should be noted that labels used to stress the political 
objective behind the violence were used sparingly. These included, for example, 'separatist insurgency' 
in Bangkok Post and 'Muslim insurgency' and 'southern separatism' in The Nation. This suggests that 
both newspapers were more likely to highlight the violent, disruptive and problematic nature of the 
conflict than the political impetus behind the conflict in their reporting. 
 
Another interesting point is that the metaphorical term 'southern fire', which was the label commonly 
used by the Thai-language media and newspapers (Kularb 2013), was not seen in any of the 298 news 
articles under scrutiny in this study of English-language newspapers. The reason for this may be that 
the international news agencies were likely to use these two newspapers as their sources. Consequently, 
	 180	
the terminology used to address the conflict stressed the problematic features of the conflict instead of 
using the metaphorical term that was used in the Thai media.  
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Bangkok Post 
Incidents Arsenal raid incident  Kruese Mosque incident  Takbai demonstration incident   
 
 
 
 
                           
Labels of the 
southern conflict 
Violence in the South; southern 
violence 
11 Violence in the South; southern 
violence 
20 Violence in the South; southern violence 6  
Unrest; southern unrest 3 Unrest; southern unrest 3 Unrest; southern unrest 4  
Southern problems 2 Southern security problem; 
southern problem 
1 Southern problems 4  
  Separatist Insurgency 1 Mayhem 2  
                                                                                            The Nation 
Violence in the South; southern 
violence 
12 Violence in the South; southern 
violence 
6 Violence in the South; southern violence 8  
Unrest; southern unrest 1 Unrest; southern unrest 6 Unrest; southern unrest 1  
  Conflict; problems in the South 2 Conflict; problems in the South 3  
Southern Turbulence 2 Southern carnage 7 Muslim insurgency 1  
  Southern crisis 1 Southern separatism 1  
                                                                                                                                            
Table 6.3: Labels of the southern conflict phenomenon in Bangkok Post and The Nation 
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                                                                                                                         Labels of the incidents 
   
Incidents Arsenal raid incident   Kruese Mosque incident   Takbai demonstration incident  	
 
 
 
 
                                  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
Bangkok Post  
The attacks (southern; Sunday's; 
coordinated; army camp; arson)  
31 Bloodbath; bloodshed (April 28's 
bloodbath; Wednesday's 
bloodbath) 
9 Bloodbath; bloodshed (Takbai) 
 
4 
 
		
Clashes (police station clashes; bloody 
clashes; Monday clashes) 
7 
The arson; school arson 6 Clashes (Wednesday's; April 28; 
last week's; Fights/Gun battle) 
12 
Raid (lethal; arms; weapon; 
Sunday's; on the military camp) 
10 
Violence (mosque; last week; 
April 28) 
5 Crackdown 6 
Torching of schools 2 Stand-off 3 
Raid 
Attacks 
 
 
20 
Riot  (bloody riot ; Takbai riot ; 
Monday riot ) 
15 
Looting of camp 1 
Theft 1  Uprising 10 The deaths; mass deaths  
(deaths of the Muslims in custody; 
deaths of 78 Muslim protesters; mass 
deaths in Takbai) 
10 
 
The killing; the massacre 3 The killing; the massacre 2 
The incident (Kruese Mosque; 
bloody; last week; April 28) 
3 
The incident (Takbai) 4 
The stand-off; the siege 3 Violence 2 
   Carnage 
 
1 
  Tragedy 1 Tragedy 7 	
      Table 6.4: Labels of the incidents in Bangkok Post's coverage 
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                                                                                                                           Word choices for the incidents 
 
Incidents Arsenal raid incident   Kruese Mosque incident   Takbai demonstration incident   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Nation 
The attacks (synchronised; 
coordinated; suspected separatist; 
schools; series of deadly; bloody) 
33  Attacks (bloody; Kruese Mosque; 
Wednesday's; coordinated; 
simultaneous; militants'); Raid 
40  Crackdown/Clampdown (heavy-handed; 
Monday's; bloody; Takbai; deadly; 
lethal) 
19  
Deaths (of 85 Muslim 
protesters/arrested protesters/Thai 
Muslims in Takbai/southern Muslims) 
 
15 
Arson (simultaneous; schools) 8 Clashes/fighting (bloody; violent) 28 
The incident (Sunday's) 4 Bloodshed/bloodbath/tragedy 10 Protest/Demonstration (violent; Takbai; 
bloody) 
 
10 
Violence (separatist-inspired; 
outburst of) 
5 
Killings (of 108 Muslim/Islamic 
militants);The shoot-outs (bloody; 
Kruese) 
 
12 Clashes (bloody; Monday's; brutal) 10 
The assault (on the south; brutal) 3 Massacre (against Muslims) 
 
4 Bloodbath/Bloodshed 7 
Crackdown 3 Incident/Crisis/Violence 7 
The burning of schools; blaze 2 
Uprising  
(Wednesday's violent; April 28) 
3 Massacre/Mass killing 7 
The raid (violent; dramatic; 
bloody) 
4 Riot 4 
Violence (Wednesday's; bloody; 
excessive) 
4 
Carnage (Monday's; Takbai) 3 
Well-coordinated terror campaign 1 Deaths 2 
Stand-off 2 
Stand-off 4 
Siege (of Takbai; of police station) 2 
  
  Turmoil; Massive turbulence; 
Unrest 
5 Tragedy 2 
 Carnage 2 Unrest 2 
     Table 6.5: Labels of the incidents in The Nation's coverage  
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    6.1.4.2. Labels of each of the three incidents in the    
    conflict coverage 
In this sub-section, I looked at the labels both English-language newspapers used when referring to each of 
the three incidents. As mentioned earlier, these three incidents differed in their situations and their 
implications on the southern conflict. Therefore, the word choices of the journalists when mentioning 
specific incidents changed accordingly. 
Type of labels to describe the 
arsenal raid incident 
Bangkok Post The Nation 
Aggressive actions (arsenal 
raid) 
 
attacks 31 attacks 33 
raids 10 raids 4 
looting/theft 2 assault 3 
Burning of schools arsons; school arsons 6 arsons 8 
 torching of schools 2 the burning of 
schools 
2 
Generic term - - incident 4 
 - - violence 5 
Negative term   well-coordinated 
terror campaign 
1 
Total (labels) =   51  60 
 
Table 6.6: Type of labels used in the reporting of the arsenal raid incident by Bangkok Post and The Nation 
 
In the arsenal raid incident, there were two main events that happened on the day. The first was the raid of 
an army camp that resulted in the deaths of four soldiers, and the second was the burning of 20 schools 
across the region. As a consequence, both newspapers chose to name the event on the 4 January 2004 by 
referring to either the army camp raid or the school arson attacks.  
 
The findings reveal that the label most frequently used by both newspapers for the incident was 'attacks' as 
it was used 31 times in Bangkok Post and 33 times in The Nation (see table 6.6). In my view, 'attacks' was 
used to describe the aggressive action of the perpetrators against the state. Bangkok Post used generic terms 
to modify the main words, for example, 'Sunday's', 'coordinated' and 'arson' to modify ‘attacks’, or 'lethal', 
'arms' or 'weapon' to describe the raid on the military camp (see table 6.4). Also, Bangkok Post was more 
likely to describe the event by stressing the attack on an army camp more than the burning of the schools. 
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To explain, most of the labels for the incident referred to the 'attacks' or the 'raids' on an army camp, and 
there were only eight occasions when the school arsons were referred to as an incident. Overall, the labels 
used by Bangkok Post to describe the arsenal raid incident were all action-based terms that stressed the 
'action' of the perpetrators, such as attacks, arson, raids, torching, looting and theft.  
 
In comparison to Bangkok Post, The Nation used a wider range of labels. Apart from the main 'attacks' 
label, other labels were also applied to describe the event as an action against the state such as 'attacks', 
'raids' or 'assaults', as well as 'arson' and 'burning' when referring to the burning of schools. Other 
terminology included generic terms that described the event as 'the violence' or 'the incident'. The Nation 
also stressed the attack on an army camp more than on the burning of the schools.  
 
Furthermore, The Nation used a wider range of qualifiers that carry negative and emotional meaning, such 
as 'dramatic', 'bloody', 'brutal', and 'deadly' (see table 6.5). These words were not found in Bangkok Post's 
coverage. Labels that carry a terrorism-oriented connotation, such as 'separatist inspired', 'suspected 
separatist' or 'the well-co-ordinated terror campaign, were found in The Nation but not in Bangkok Post. The 
analysis of labels used to describe the arsenal raid incident shows that both newspapers were likely to use 
words that stressed the action against the state, and that Bangkok Post used more neutral and generic terms 
to describe the event. 
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Type of labels to describe the 
Kruese Mosque incident 
Bangkok Post  The Nation 
 
Aggressive action  
attacks; raids 
 
 
20 
 
 
attacks 
 
 
40 
 
Disruptive nature of the incident - - turmoil; turbulence; 
unrest 
5 
Generic term Violence 5 
 
violence 4 
Incidents 3   
The killings and the deaths Killings 2 killings; shoot-outs 12 
 Massacre 1 massacre 4 
  carnage 2 
deaths 2 
The clashes between the two sides clashes; gun battle 12 clashes; fighting 28 
 Stand-off; siege 3 stand off 4 
  crackdown 3 
Emotive words bloodbath 9 bloodbath; bloodshed 9 
tragedy  1 tragedy 1 
Rebellious nature of the incident uprising 10 uprising 3 
Total (labels) =  66  116 
   
Table 6.7: Type of labels used in the reporting of the Kruese Mosque incident in Bangkok Post and The 
Nation 
 
In the coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident, a wider range of labels was found due to the complicated 
nature and the results of the incident. The analysis identified a total of 66 labels for the Kruese Mosque 
incident in Bangkok Post, and 116 labels in The Nation. In both Bangkok Post and The Nation, the same 
most frequently used main word was 'attacks', which stressed the actions of the perpetrators against the Thai 
state, with 20 instances of this term found in Bangkok Post and 40 in The Nation (see table 6.7).  
 
The second most commonly used labels by both newspapers stressed the clash between the two sides 
through the use of words such as 'clashes', 'fights', 'gun-battle', 'standoff', 'siege', and 'crackdown'. These 
labels were found in the coverage of Bangkok Post 15 times, and in the coverage of The Nation 35 times. 
The number of labels that placed emphasis on the 'killing' nature of the incidents in The Nation's coverage 
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was 6 times higher than in Bangkok Post. While Bangkok Post referred to the incident as 'the killing' and 
'the massacre' only 3 times across its coverage, The Nation used the labels 'killing', 'massacre', 'carnage', and 
'deaths' on 20 separate occasions.  
 
This suggests that Bangkok Post was more careful in choosing its words to describe the event, and was less 
likely place emphasis on the killing and the deadly nature of the event. It is interesting to see that the word 
'uprising', which stressed an act of resistance or rebellion from the attackers, was found in a higher 
frequency in Bangkok Post than in The Nation, while words that stressed the authority's action of killing the 
perpetrators, such as 'the killing' and 'the massacre', were used to a larger degree in The Nation. This may 
confirm the findings from the analysis on WJ/PJ indicators that, compared to Bangkok Post, The Nation was 
more open in criticising the government's handling of the situation.  
 
Other difference between the two newspapers was that The Nation used more qualifiers to describe the main 
labels (see table 6.5) such as  'bloody', 'violent', 'simultaneous', 'coordinated', 'Islamic militants' and 
'militants', most of which carry negative meanings. On the other hand, the qualifiers used for the labels in 
Bangkok Post placed emphasis on the 'when' or ‘where’ aspect of the incident, such as 'April 28 attacks', 
'Wednesday attacks' or 'mosque attacks' (see table 6.4), which are considered to be more neutral when 
compared to the qualifiers used in The Nation. 
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Type of labels used to describe 
the Takbai demonstration 
incident 
Bangkok Post The Nation 
 
Action of the attackers 
 
- - 
    
protest; 
demonstration 
10 
 
riot 15 riot 
 
4 
Disruptive nature of the incident - - unrest 2 
Generic term the incident 4 
 
incident; crisis; 
violence 
7 
violence 2   
The killings and the deaths -  -  
 the killing; the massacre 2 massacre; mass 
killing 
7 
carnage 1 carnage 3 
deaths; mass deaths 10 deaths 15 
The clashes between the two 
sides 
clashes 7 clashes 10 
 stand off 3 standoff; siege 4 
crackdown 6 crackdown; 
clampdown 
19 
Emotive words bloodbath; bloodshed 4 bloodbath; 
bloodshed 
7 
 tragedy 7 tragedy 2 
Rebellious nature of the incident -  - - 
Total (labels) =  61      90 
 
Table 6.8: Type of labels used in the reporting of the Takbai demonstration incident  
in Bangkok Post and The Nation 
 
In the coverage of the Takbai demonstration, the different choice of labels by both newspapers is clearly 
seen. As stated earlier, the incident on that day started with a demonstration by local people in front of 
Takbai police station. Surprisingly, the labels 'demonstration' or 'protest' were used only 10 times in The 
Nation, and not at all in Bangkok Post (see table 6.8).  
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Bangkok Post's main label was 'riot' (15 words), which placed more stress on the violent disorder of the 
demonstration, while The Nation's main labels were 'crackdown' and 'clampdown' (19 words), which 
stressed the harsh measures used to control the situation. The Nation's labels, together with the qualifiers 
'heavy-handed', bloody' and 'lethal', suggest that The Nation emphasised the restrictive and forceful 
measures used to restrain the disorder that happened on that day (see table 6.5). Bangkok Post also used 
labels that refer to the clashes between the two sides, such as 'clashes', 'standoff', and 'crackdown' on a total 
of 16 occasions, while these labels were used 33 times in The Nation.  
 
Second were labels that placed stress on the 'deaths' and 'killing' aspect of the incident, such as 'the killing', 
'the massacre', 'carnage', 'deaths' and 'mass deaths' (see table 6.8). As mentioned earlier, the deaths of the 
arrested protesters during the transfer was the final result of the Takbai event, and it has led to the criticism 
on the Thai government on many levels. The use of 'massacre' and 'mass killing' highlighted the 
mishandling of the situation by the authority that resulted in the deaths of 85 of the detained demonstrators. 
In total, the study found 12 labels that placed stress on the 'deaths' result of the conflict in Bangkok Post, 
and 20 in The Nation.  
 
The study found that both newspapers described the incident differently. That is, The Nation's labels mostly 
stressed the confrontation between the two sides and the authority's forceful power, while Bangkok Post 
first described the event as a violent public disturbance caused by the attackers. However, a focus on the 
killing nature and the emotional aspect of the incident were found in both newspapers, which suggests that 
both newspapers maintained their roles as mediators of the truth to the public, even though they employed 
different terms of reference for the incident. 
 
   6.1.4.3 The labels of the actors in the conflict coverage 
In recognising the situation in the south as a conflict between the Thai state and the Muslim minority, the 
representation of ‘the other’ warrants close and careful attention. A label analysis enables us to identify the 
framing process that the journalists attached to the Muslim attackers, which was often expressed within an 
‘us versus them’ dichotomy. My research looked at the labels used in reference to the actors of the three 
incidents in order to observe how they were characterised and represented, and determine whether or not 
any forms of discrimination emerged in the reporting.  
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a) Analysis on 'main label' 
Table 6.9 shows how both newspapers referred to the various actors in their coverage. My observation 
shows that The Nation mostly described the actors with 'insurgent-related' terms that connote the sense of 
military action and insurgency. For example, the label 'militants' was used 178 times in 166 news articles; 
the label 'insurgents' was used 60 times; and the label 'terrorists', which cannot be found in the coverage of 
Bangkok Post, was found in The Nation's coverage 15 times. Bangkok Post, too, mostly described the actors 
with 'insurgent-related' terms but less so than The Nation by 9.39%.  
 
This indicates that The Nation tended to describe the actors and their relation to insurgency more so than 
Bangkok Post did. The second most used type of label was 'action-based terms', which described the 
antagonists based on their actions, such as 'bandits', 'protesters', or 'armed men'. Labels in the categories of 
'legal terms', 'generic terms' and 'age range' are the type of labels that describe the antagonists neutrally but 
these types of labels were used in a low frequency in the coverage of both newspapers (see table 6.9).  
 
Moreover,  the 'religion-based' term 'Muslims' was found in the lowest degree as a main label in both 
newspapers because the word 'Muslim' was often used as a qualifier that was attached to the main labels. I 
will come back to explain this point in my analysis on the 'qualifiers' in the next section.
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Type of labels used to describe the 
perpetrators 
Frequency (times) 
Bangkok Post The Nation 
       Action-based terms (35.68%) (33.98%) 
bandits 30 7 
raiders 9 6 
armed men 10 12 
protesters 101 166 
demonstrators 7 15 
rioters 5 - 
arsonists - 2 
Legal terms (12.55%) (9.47%) 
detainees 51 32 
suspects 6 20 
culprits - 6 
Generic terms (4.62%) (7.18%) 
attackers 21 29 
perpetrators - 9 
assailants - 6 
   Insurgent-related terms (37.00%) (46.89%) 
insurgents 17 60 
militants 116 178 
rebels 22 10 
separatists 13 24 
terrorists - 15 
Religion-based terms (0.88%) (0.16%) 
Muslims 4 1 
Age range (4.40%) (1.47%) 
youths 20 9 
Other terms 22 (4.87%) 5 (0.85%) 
   
Total (labels) = 454 612 
 
 Table 6.9: Types of labels used in referring to the perpetrators of the three incidents in  
 Bangkok Post and The Nation 
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Furthermore, the findings revealed that both newspapers shared the same trend in their labelling. 'Insurgent-
related terms' were used mostly in the coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident. 'Legal-based terms' and 
'action-based terms' (protesters and demonstrators) were used mostly in the coverage of the Takbai 
demonstration incident. 'Action-based terms' such as 'bandits', 'raiders', 'armed men' and 'arsonists' were used 
mostly in the coverage of the arsenal raid incident.  
 
These patterns of labels used indicate that the situation of each incident affected the labelling of actors by 
both newspapers. To explain, labels with neutral meaning were found most often in the reporting of the 
Takbai incident, which signified the misuse of power by the authority; while insurgent-related labels that 
carry negative meaning were used mostly in the Kruese Mosque and arsenal raid incidents, which were the 
two incidents in which the main actors attacked the Thai state. 
 
b) The analysis of qualifiers used to describe the main words 
 
  Figure 6.25: The number of qualifiers (by type) used to describe the actors in Bangkok Post 
and The Nation (times) 
 
The previous section explained how the two newspapers described the antagonists of each incident. This 
section explains the analysis into the qualifiers that were attached to the main labels in order to identify what 
type of qualifiers both newspapers used. I classified these qualifiers into six categories: 'Age' refers to 
qualifiers used to describe the age group of the actors; 'Action' refers to qualifiers used to describe the action 
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of the actors; 'Location' refers to qualifiers used to describe the location of the actors; 'Religion' refers to 
qualifiers used to describe the religious identity of the actors; 'Neutral' refers to qualifiers that convey neutral 
meaning to a main word, such as 'suspected', 'unidentified’, and 'arrested'; and 'Negative' refers to qualifiers 
that convey negative meaning to a main word, such as 'separatist' (see figure 6.25). 
 
Overall, the study found 96 qualifiers used in Bangkok Post, and 162 qualifiers in The Nation. The findings of 
this analysis illustrate that Bangkok Post tended to use fewer labels and qualifiers to describe the antagonists, 
while The Nation used a wide range of both labels and qualifiers in its coverage. My observation focused 
mostly on 'religious' qualifiers because they stress the difference in the religious identity of the Muslims 
minority, which can create a sense of 'us and them' among the readers.  
 
The highest number of qualifiers found in the coverage of both newspapers was in the 'religion' group, with 
84 cases found in The Nation and 38 in Bangkok Post, which suggests that both newspapers firstly chose to 
emphasis the 'religious' aspect of the antagonists. At the same time, 'neutral' qualifiers were the second most 
used type of qualifier in The Nation, which shows that The Nation's choice of labels was not consistent. 
'Religious' qualifiers refer to words such 'Muslim' or 'Islamic', and I found that both newspapers used religious 
qualifiers most often in their Kruese Mosque coverage, where the incident had a religious undertone. The 
stress on religious differences can enhance the feeling of 'us and them' among ‘us’, the readers of the two 
English newspapers, who are mainly based in Bangkok, and 'them', who are the Muslims from the southern 
part of Thailand.  
 
According to the Greater London Authority (GLA) (2007 quoted in Allan 2010, p.87), prejudicial reporting is 
likely to "produce, provoke and increase feelings of insecurity, suspicion and anxiety amongst non-Muslims, 
while, at the same time, being likely to provoke feelings of insecurity, vulnerability and alienation amongst 
Muslims." For that reason, the stress on the religious aspect of the perpetrators can affect negative feelings for 
both sides, and even more so when these qualifiers are attached to insurgent-related terms such as 'Islamic 
militants' or 'Muslim separatists'.  
 
The description of religious and racial identity can lead to the creation of an 'us and them' dichotomy. The 
findings on the analysis of labels indicate that both newspapers used the same types of labels, and they mostly 
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described the antagonists with 'insurgent-related terms'. However, in comparison to the labels found in 
Bangkok Post, The Nation used more labels of this type. This, together with the higher number of 'religious' 
qualifiers found, made the labels used to describe the antagonists in The Nation more prejudicial than the 
labelling of Bangkok Post.  
 
   6.1.4.4 Comparison of findings: Bangkok Post vs The Nation 
In the analysis of labels used in reference to the southern conflict, both newspapers shared the same group of 
words. Labels that described the violent nature and the location of the conflict as 'southern violence' or 
'violence in the South' were the most frequently used terms when describing the conflict. After these, 
references to the southern conflict as a disturbance and public disorder were the second most commonly used 
terms, with references to the southern conflict as a problem being third in the list.  
 
In the analysis of labels used to describe each of the incidents, the study found that the situations of the 
individual incidents as well as the newspapers’ style of reporting influenced the word choices of both 
newspapers. In the coverage of the arsenal raid incident, both newspapers used labels that described the action 
of the perpetrators, either raiding the camp or burning the schools. In the coverage of the Kruese Mosque 
incident, both newspapers mostly used labels that described the actions of 'attacks' on the Thai state, followed 
by labels that described the 'clashes' between the two sides. In this incident, emotive words such as 'bloodbath' 
or 'bloodshed were found in both newspapers. Labels that placed stress on the 'killing' nature of the incident 
were used a lot more in The Nation than in Bangkok Post.  
 
What is particularly interesting, in my view, is that Bangkok Post seemed to place more stress on the clashes 
between the authority and the perpetrators, while The Nation seemed to stress the misuse of power by the 
authority through the use of words such 'the killings' or 'the massacre'. In the Takbai demonstration's 
coverage, too, Bangkok Post tended to describe the incident with a focus on the violent nature of the 
demonstration by using the label 'riot', while The Nation used the labels 'crackdown' or 'clampdown' so as to 
describe the authority's forceful reaction to the disorder. These findings somehow illustrated the inclination 
towards the government by Bangkok Post, and towards the people by The Nation, which can be supported by 
the findings from the analysis of WJ/PJ indicators (6.1.1), the analysis of news actors (6.1.2), and the analysis 
of news sources (6.1.3). 
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In the analysis of labels used in reference to the antagonists of the incidents, The Nation tended first and 
foremost to use 'insurgent-related' terms, and second, 'action-based' terms. This, together with the 
newspaper’s most-used 'religion' qualifiers, produced a negative feeling and a sense of 'us and them' among 
the readers since words such as 'Muslim militants' or 'Muslim separatists' could be found frequently in the 
coverage by The Nation. On the other hand, the study also found the same number of 'insurgent-related' labels 
and 'action-based' labels in Bangkok Post. The 'religion' qualifier was found in its highest numbers in Bangkok 
Post, but this was still two times lower than was found in the coverage of The Nation. This suggested that 
Bangkok Post was more careful than The Nation in choosing its words to describe the perpetrators. The 
findings from the analysis of labels can be used to support the findings from the analysis of the WJ/PJ 
language based criteria, which showed that The Nation used more war journalism language than Bangkok 
Post.   
 
  6.1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented findings from a content analysis of southern conflict coverage by the two English 
language newspapers at a specific context and time.  
 
The most frequently used WJ indicators found from the conflict coverage by both newspapers were as 
follows: WJ3 (elite-oriented), WJ2 (focus on the visible effects of the violence) and WJ5 (focus on here and 
now). WJ2 was found in a large number, which suggests that the representation of the conflict by both 
newspapers was with an emphasis on the visible effects of the violence. WJ5 reflects the focus on hard news 
when reporting violent incidents without giving any detailed background of the conflict. The substantial 
number of WJ3 indicates that both newspapers placed a high prominence on ‘high authority’ or ‘elite-
oriented’ as their main news actors and sources. War journalism features are hard to avoid when reporting 
violent incidents and it is the responsibility of the media to report the reality of the incident to the public 
because not doing so would be a distortion of the truth. Consequently, because the coverage dealt with the 
reporting of three major violent incidents, death tolls and damage, which are regarded as features of war 
journalism, were found throughout the coverage. 
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Elite-oriented and people-oriented elements were taken into the analysis of ‘news actors’ and ‘news sources’ 
in order to identify the prominence both newspapers placed on each category as actors in and sources of news. 
The findings indicate that both newspapers relied highly on ‘high authority’ both as news actors and as news 
sources. This confirmed Becker’s (1967) notion of ‘hierarchy of credibility’, which explains that the people 
who are at the top of a social or institutional hierarchy are assumed to have greater credibility and access to 
correct information than those among the bottom ranks. In the confines of this study, the main people from 
the 'high authority' group were: the Prime Minister, the Deputy Minister, the Defence Minister and the Army 
Commander. Findings from both analyses prove a surprising result that the 'local' category, which I 
considered to be the lowest position in the hierarchy, contributed to the coverage of both newspapers, either 
as the news leads or as the news sources, to a degree second only to 'high authority'.  
 
The study found that the implementation of war and peace journalism differed according to the intensity of 
the conflict, and that the situation of each of these three incidents influenced the way both newspapers 
reported the stories. To explain, the study of both newspaper's stories revealed a very close pattern in their 
application of peace journalism. That is, when the conflict first started, the study found the lowest number of 
peace journalism features and articles from both newspapers. The number of peace journalism features and 
articles increased substantially in the coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident, and it was in the coverage of 
the Takbai demonstration incident that the gap between war and peace journalism elements found in both 
newspapers was at its widest, suggesting that it was for this third incident that both newspapers applied a 
peace journalism approach in the highest degree.  
 
The peace journalism features found in the highest frequency were as follows: PJ7 (multiparty orientation), 
PJ5 (focus on the causes and consequences of the conflict) and PJ3 (people-oriented). The high number of PJ7 
shows the attempt by both newspapers to engage all sides of the conflict into their coverage. The frequency of 
PJ5 suggests that both newspapers placed their focus on the causes and consequences of the conflict rather 
than only focusing on the violent incidents, while the use of PJ3 show that both newspapers included the 
'voices' of the local people who were directly affected by the violent incidents in their coverage 
 
In the analysis of labels, as informed by war/peace journalism's language-based criteria, the findings indicate 
that both newspapers shared the same pattern of labels in referring to the southern conflict, to the three 
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incidents under scrutiny, and to the actors of these incidents. Nevertheless, when compared with Bangkok 
Post, The Nation used a wider range of words used in conjunction with emotive and negative qualifiers that 
stress the 'religious' difference of the perpetrators, while Bangkok Post was more likely to use more neutral 
terms. The use of language in The Nation proved to be one of the main limitations to its full implementation 
of peace journalism.  
 
The conclusion of the study will be provided in Chapter 8, Conclusions, we can now turn to the next chapter, 
which details the findings from semi-structured interviews. 
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Chapter 7  
The study of the production of southern conflict news 
 
The previous chapter presented the findings from a content analysis of the news coverage by the two English-
language newspapers under scrutiny. The study revealed that both newspapers implemented peace journalism 
to a large degree but also engaged in war-style reporting, especially through a focus on the visible effects of 
war, a focus on here and now, and a great dependency on the elites as their news sources from. The analysis 
of news actors and news sources also confirms this point, as authority figures were the most-frequently 
mentioned in the news leads and were also used as the primary source of information for the news reports on 
the southern conflict. Surprisingly, the frequency of local people as news leads and news sources was higher 
than expected, which indicates an attempt by both newspapers to incorporate the voices of the ‘voiceless’ into 
their coverage right  from the first year of the conflict. Furthermore, the analysis of labels used in the southern 
conflict phenomenon in general, the three specific incidents, and the various actors involved revealed that 
different incidents influenced the selection of labels in different ways and that emotive language was widely 
used in the coverage. 
 
The findings from the previous chapter demonstrated 'how' the southern conflict was represented within the 
approach of peace journalism. This chapter aims to find the answer of 'why' the conflict was represented in 
such ways by exploring the news production process of the two newspapers. To this end, semi-structured 
interviews with journalists and editors from The Nation and Bangkok Post and one director from a Thai media 
organisation were conducted. The interviews revealed key insights into the news articles’ production process, 
perceptions of the relative strengths and limitations in making reports of the conflict, and the possibilities for 
generating alternative approaches to improve the quality of news reporting in the conflict. The interviews 
contributed to an understanding of the southern conflict by opening up for critical scrutiny on perceptions of 
the nature of conflict reporting from journalists’ and editors’ points of view.  
 
This section is divided into four parts. The first part starts with the interviewees’ perception of the conflict 
and their views on the Thai media and the southern conflict. The second part explores the process of news 
production and journalists' involvement in southern conflict coverage.  The third part explores factors 
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influencing and limiting journalists when reporting the conflict, and the final part presents the conclusion and 
outlines possible recommendations for future practices.  
 
 7.1 Interviewees’ perception of the conflict 
  7.1.1 The causes of the southern conflict 
Given that the media are cultural institutions with their own interests and rules in shaping the perception of 
reality, their supply of news and information may be distorted to some extent according to their own purposes 
or those of other social institutions (McQuail, 2000). In the case of journalists who portray issues from the 
southern conflict to the public, their reporting will influence public understanding of the events in question. 
Therefore, it is necessary to understand the attitude and perception of the journalists with regard to the 
conflict. The journalists’ and editors’ perception of the conflict can also influence the production process of 
the articles, in particular, the selection of the top stories or the selection of labels when referring to the various 
actors or incidents.  
 
In general terms, it became apparent to me that all of the interviewees held quite similar views on the southern 
conflict. They see the conflict as a result of many contributing factors, for example, deep-rooted historical 
grievances, inequality and discrimination against the Muslim minority, Thai nationalism, flaws in the Thai 
education system, and the mentality of Thai people as a whole (the mentality of ‘us and them’, as described 
earlier).  
 
All of the interviewees saw the southern conflict as a result of a long history of conflict between the Thai state 
and the Malay Muslims. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the Thai nationalist movement, which included enforced 
cultural and educational assimilation, has built up grievances among the Muslim minority towards the Thai 
state and led to the emergence of resistance movements dating back decades. One journalist mentioned that 
the locals do not feel that the Thai state respects their religion, language and culture, and that the national 
curriculum, which focuses only on Thai-ness, Buddhism and Thai culture while ignoring the culture of the 
minority, was the reason why schools often became targets of the attacks.  
 
The interviewees shared the view that the current southern conflict has its grounds in this old resentment 
together with the Thai majority’s ignorance of the Muslim minority's culture and the negligence of the Thai 
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state to develop the economy, education and welfare system of the region in the same way as in other parts of 
the country. Another journalist pointed out that, in comparison to the north or the north-eastern part of 
Thailand, the economic development of the southern region is very low and the unemployment rate is very 
high. Two editors and one journalist expressed their opinions on the causes of the conflict as follows (Please 
note that all names are pseudonyms87) (See Appendix VI): 
 
"The southern conflict is an emotional conflict which arose from the feelings of the people being 
suppressed by the Thai state." 
 (Kowit, journalist, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013) 
 
"We cannot change history. The Muslims from the south do not see themselves as Thai because of 
the differences in ethnicity and religion, but they never wanted to separate from Thailand until the 
Thai people mistreated them and stole their natural resources. Now, they want to separate from 
Thailand." 
 (Chatri, editor, Bangkok Post, interviewed, 8th April 2013) 	
"Those young villagers do not really know the history of Patani but they saw the injustice and 
mistreatment that happened to their family and people from their village. The Thai authority 
sometimes accused the wrong people and treated them badly. There is a lot of tensions in the area 
between the authority and the locals." 
 (Somsak, senior journalist/ editor, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013) 
These quotes show that the interviewees perceive the causes of the southern conflict as the result of many 
factors. The conflict started from a long-standing resentment and intensified with the economic, social and 
cultural suppression inflicted on the Muslim minority by the Thai state. Also, the southern administrations 
that aimed at using military and police force to suppress the conflict were one of the main factors in 
worsening the situation and influencing the onset of violent attacks.  
 
As Chatri, an editor from Bangkok Post, stated above, the history of the southern conflict cannot be changed. 
The Muslim minority was resentful but passive until the Thai state mistreated and oppressed them. Somsak, a 
senior journalist and editor from The Nation, supported this view by stating that the injustice and 
mistreatment the local people faced from the Thai authority was one of the reasons for the local grievances 
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and violent incidents in the area. Another perception of the conflict shared among the interviewees is the flaw 
of the Thai social and educational system, which reflects in the Thai ‘ignorant’ and ‘prejudiced’ mentality. 
Three journalists expressed their views on the Thai system and how it results in the wrong perception toward 
the conflict and the Muslim minority. Their quotes can be seen as follows: 
 
 "The most important things are the way of thinking, the prejudice and the education system. This is a 
 national problem. It all ties up to the way we are taught about our nation building, the Thai-ness. Our 
 perception was forged since we were young. The Thai educational system and the values are very 
 important in this matter. The southern conflict stories are the most worrying because the things that 
 forged their southern identity are as powerful and strong as those that forged the Thai mentality." 
 (Patra, journalist, Bangkok Post, interviewed, 4th April 2013) 
 
 "Thai society is not a reading society. It is a very shallow society. People are ignorant about what 
happens in the south. People are only interested the southern conflict stories when there is a big 
attack that caused lots of deaths. The violent situation has been happening for almost 10 years now 
and Thai people have become used to it, to the level of being ignorant. What worries me most is the 
fact that the public never know about it from the victims’ side. The authorities working in the region 
use their power in the wrong way… there is lots of injustice and torture happening there that the 
public do not know about." 
 (Kowit, journalist, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013) 
"People in Bangkok have never been to the south. They have no idea what it is like. Still they always 
hold their prejudice against the southerners. Thai people should have more knowledge on the 
conflict. This is a very big problem, deep-rooted in the history and the media only is a small 
factor…For example, the soldiers sent to the south already have a bad perception of the local people 
from the way some journalists from the central area write up news reports on the conflict using 
emotional words and negative tone, while stories from the local stringers are more positive."           
(Suda, field reporter/ journalist, Bangkok Post, interviewed, 4th April 2013) 
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From the quotes above, we can see that the interviewees see the flaw of the Thai social and educational 
system as a big problem, as well as being one of the causes instigating the southern violence and the 
misunderstanding in Thai society. The Thai education system and the one-sided history curriculum only 
focuses on Thai-ness, Buddhism, the Thai Monarchy and Thai nation building, and it ignores the fact that the 
history of Pattani and the country’s 5% Muslim population are also a part of Thailand's history. The result of 
this education system is the creation of an 'us and them' mentality because most Thais know so little about the 
history of Pattani, the culture of the Thai Muslims and, most importantly, the complicated factors that have 
contributed to the southern conflict.  
 
Most Thais see the southern Muslims as 'the other' who kill Buddhist monks and burn Buddhist temples with 
the goal of gaining independence from Thailand. This point can be supported by the findings from the content 
analysis. The qualifiers that describe the main words in referring to the perpetrators are mostly 'religion' 
qualifiers, such as the words 'Muslim' and 'Islamic'. According to Suda, who is a field reporter and a journalist 
from Bangkok Post, this mentality is also reflected in the news organisations when sometimes the (Bangkok-
based) editors disagree with the southern regional reporters on which news should be the top story of the day.  
 
This ‘prejudiced’ mentality is a worrying cause because the conflict cannot be solved if the people in power 
hold prejudice against the Muslim minority. For example, Thai soldiers sent to the conflict area know little 
about the history and culture of the region, which often leads to the disrespect of the local culture and causes 
more disunity between the two societies, the most obvious case of which was the shooting incident at Kruese 
Mosque. Little is known about the southern conflict because the Thai education system does not give enough 
of its background and history, and the Thai people become ignorant and uninterested in learning about it, 
which results in the fact that, as a main national security issue, the southern conflict does not attract as much 
interest from the public as it should.  
 
Kowit, a journalist from The Nation who has covered the southern conflict news since 2004, expressed the 
view that this 'prejudice' is the foundation of everything. He maintained that the public's perception of the 
conflict and of the Muslims is the result of the whole system. The Thai media are a product of this system, 
and once people have a prejudice, they do not open up to other explanations. From this, we can see that Thai 
media, too, are a product of the flawed education system, the one-sided history, and the ignorant mentality 
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that sometimes affects the way the Thai media report the conflict. The next section summarises the views of 
the interviewees on the Thai media and the reporting of the southern conflict. 
 
  7.1.2 Southern conflict and the Thai media 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (3.4), we can see that the Thai media are criticised as being one of the factors 
instigating the violence. The complicated nature of the southern conflict, which is caused by many factors that 
include, for example, the long-history of conflict between the Thai state and the Muslim minority, the 
minority’s grievances, and authority's misuse of power, has provided a challenge for the Thai media in 
reporting on the conflict. The southern conflict deals with many sensitive issues and it is necessary for 
journalists to understand the dynamics of the conflict before reporting the news.  However, the fact that the 
Thai media have been widely criticised reflects that there is a problem with the Thai media and their 
reporting. In my opinion, many journalists lack a true understanding of the conflict, and at the same time, 
disregard the impact of their reporting. The southern conflict is a conflict 'within one nation' that involves 
sensitive religious and cultural issues, so journalists need to be more careful that their reporting does not add 
more complications to the conflict.  
 
Because this study focuses on how the media represent the conflict, it is necessary to know the perception of 
the interviewees, who are journalists and editors of the two English-language newspapers under scrutiny and 
one expert from a media organisation, in order to understand their views on this issue. The interviewees’ 
opinions varied when it came to the topic of ‘Thai media and the reporting on the southern conflict’. For 
example, some interviewees believed that the Thai media could help in reducing the conflict, while others 
believed that the Thai media are not able to provide a possible solution to the problem. Nevertheless, the 
interviewees shared one common belief, which is that the failure of the Thai media and their reporting of the 
southern issues are the results of a flaw in the Thai social and education system as discussed in an earlier 
section. One editor and one journalist shared their views on the issue as follows. 
 
a) Views on the flaws in the Thai social and education system that affect the Thai media culture: 
"The perception of Thai society is partly reflected in the main media. Thai people have prejudices, 
all arising from the education system and the one-sided version of history they are taught. The media 
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try to show the other side of the story, but this also depends on the receiver too. All of this is because 
of a problem in the education system of Thai people." 
 (Somsak, senior journalist/editor, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013) 	
"The reporting of the southern conflict did not fuel the violence but added more fuel to the 
misunderstanding of the public. Most of the time, there are no reports on the context or giving an 
accurate  picture of the incidents. The public see the southern region as a ‘besieged’ region, while in 
fact if  you go and see, you’ll see that life goes on as normal. It is just that the media did not choose 
to report that point. The media assign no space for reporting the background and context of the 
south." 
 (Damrong, field reporter/journalist, The Nation, interviewed, 23rd May 2013) 	
The quotes above suggest that the performance of the Thai media is partly a result of the flaw in the Thai 
social and education system, which focuses only on developing Thai-ness and ignores other ethnic and 
religious minorities. The southern conflict is a national problem that involves national security issues; 
however, the interviewees feel that Thai people know so little about it. The conflict has lasted for over 10 
years, and violent incidents have become so repetitive that the Thai public has become used to the news on 
violent incidents. The interviewees believed that because of the Thai education system, the Thai public has no 
real knowledge and understanding on the historical, religious and cultural aspects of the southern region. This, 
together with the continuous violent incidents that have been happening since 2004 have forged the mind of 
the Thai public to see the southern region as a 'troubled region' and the southern Muslims as 'the other'.  
 
In addition, the Thai media are a product of this system, which means the media people can also become 
'prejudiced and ignorant'. Damrong mentioned that the Thai media did not instigate the violent incidents, but 
they created misunderstanding among the public by not giving enough information on the conflict. To address 
this, it is more important that the media people understand the history, background and dynamics of the 
conflict, and know how to report the issue carefully. The Thai media have to perform a socially responsible 
role by providing enough information to the public, and also being aware that their reporting can influence the 
public. Nevertheless, as stated by Somsak, a senior journalist and editor from The Nation, the Thai media may 
be able to provide information and show incidents from 'the other side' of the conflict, but this also depends 
on the Thai public, or 'the receiver', as to whether or not they will receive the information.  
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The interviewees believed that the Thai media had taken part in instigating the conflict in the early years 
because the media had no experience of reporting conflict in a balanced manner, especially a conflict that 
happened within one nation. When the southern conflict first started in 2004, the Thai media reported violent 
incidents in the same way as they reported crime. They were not aware that the southern conflict deals with 
sensitive religious and cultural issues, and often reported within the 'good and bad' dichotomy of the 'Thai 
state vs the Muslim minority'. As a result, the 'us and them' mentality was unavoidably created and the Thai 
people often see the southern Muslims as 'the other' who are not Thais and want to gain independence by 
killing Thai people and instigating violence (Patra, journalist from Bangkok Post, interviewed, 4th April 
2013). Two journalists, one editor and one expert from a media organisation expressed their opinions on the 
media and their reporting of the conflict as follows. 
 
b) Views on the Thai media and how it is seen as one of the factors worsening the conflict: 
 
"It is true that the media are one of the factors worsening the situation...especially in the early years 
of the conflict. Some villages banned the Thai media and did not allow Thai journalists in their area 
saying that we called them 'southern bandits', which was disrespectful. Also, those journalists who 
are new to the southern conflict sometimes are not careful and often use generalised terms in their 
news reports. The way the Thai media report the conflict has developed in recent years but it is still 
not been a huge development."  
 (Somsak, senior journalist/ editor, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013) 	
"At first, the media did not have any concern that their reporting could fuel the violence. They just 
reported the conflict the same way as when reporting crime. They did not have any knowledge in 
how to report the southern conflict, which is different from stories from other conflict situations as it 
contains  historical, cultural and religious dimensions. At the breaking of the first incident, the media 
were shocked. They did not know how to cope with reporting the situation because a situation like 
this had never happened before. They did not know, for example, what words they should use, what 
is going to happen next and so on. Then, the media began reporting in a ‘generalised’ way, using 
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words according to the PM and the  authorities, without any concern for the sensitivity of the words 
they used." 
 (Pokin, director, TJA, interviewed, 3rd April 2013) 	
 "It is disappointing that the media take part in stimulating the conflict. People are interested in the 
 southern conflict when there is a big attack that causes great loss of lives, which in a way, creates 
 more cleavage, misunderstanding, and hostility in the society." 
 (Kowit, journalist, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013) 	
"The southern conflict reports are treated as prime news when the death tolls are high — always 
make a good headline. This is the nature of the whole industry – treating stories on the southern 
conflict mostly in a way that is favourable to the state because the main source of information is the 
state, and not the rebels... Southern conflict incidents differ from those in other conflicts because the 
media have to think of the consequence of the way they report the conflict. However, the reports on 
the southern conflict do not have fairness because the southern conflict implies a challenge to the 
notion of the Thai state and Thai-ness. The Thai media and Thai people have no sympathy for the 
Thai Malays; therefore, the sensitivity while reporting is low... Sometimes the journalists are the 
ones that stimulate the situation because it can make big stories and headlines. It’s just basic accurate 
information, but they don’t care. They have to look and think of the consequences, not just what the 
authorities said." 
 (Damrong, field reporter/ journalist, The Nation, interviewed, 23rd May 2013) 
From the quotes given, we can see that the Thai media and their problems in reporting the conflict arise from 
three factors. First is the incompetency of the Thai media to report violent incidents that deal with sensitive 
issues, especially when the conflict first started in 2004. However, the Thai media did not totally ignore the 
southern conflict because some of the media people were already reporting on the southern conflict long 
before the beginning of the major incidents as a few journalists had been sent to the conflict area to report on 
small violent incidents during 2001-2003.  
 
The second factor is the Thai media industry and the goal to 'sell' the news.  As mentioned earlier, the 
southern conflict has been going on for over 10 years, and the Thai public is now used to receiving news on 
violent incidents to the point that they become 'ignorant'. Consequently, news on the southern conflict can 
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only make headlines and catch the interest of the public when the attacks are big and the number of the deaths 
is high (Kowit, journalist from The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013). Lastly, because the southern conflict 
deals with issues of 'the Thai majority vs the Muslim minority' and because the main source of information is 
from the authority figures, it is possible that journalists become less sensitive to the local and prone to rely 
more on information from the authorities. 
 
To sum up, the interviewees agreed that the Thai media play a part in increasing the conflict when they 
mainly report on violent incidents that cause heavy loss of life and damage. They see the media as seemingly 
unaware of the wider social implications of their reporting. However, as will be further discussed, attempts by 
the Thai media institutions to give more news space to articles on the conflict and in trying to find justice for 
the people caught-up in the violence can also be seen.  
 
The question I asked was whether or not the interviewees believe that the Thai media can help to find a 
resolution to the conflict. The views on the topic are varied. Some interviewees maintained that news 
reporting of the southern conflict had improved in the past few years, and they consequently had an optimistic 
view that the Thai media can help in lessening the conflict, while some disagreed with this viewpoint. The 
views on Thai media and whether they can contribute to finding a resolution to the conflict can be summed up 
as follows. 
 
c) Views on the Thai media and whether or not they can help in finding a resolution to the southern conflict: 
"This is a very big problem deep-rooted in the history, and the media is only a small factor. The 
media cannot help much. It can only help in playing its socially responsible part. We can only 
provide updates on the situation but we try to give reports on other stories too. The Army once told 
me…if the media stop reporting on the southern conflict, the conflict will stop too…for me, I don’t 
see it that way. I think the media are only responsible for 20% of the situation." 
 (Suda, field reporter/journalist, Bangkok Post, interviewed, 4th April 2013) 
"The media still lack the learning process. Their understanding of the situation is still not enough; 
nothing has changed much. There is nothing we can do. It is the system ... Thai media could do more 
in helping the situation in the south and become the voice of the victims. There is not so much 
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investigative reporting in the Thai media. They just make the articles out of the information from the 
authorities because they are too lazy to get to the other side of the story." 
 (Patra, journalist, Bangkok Post, interviewed, 4th April 2013) 
 "Nothing has changed. The Issara project was not successful. There might be training but it is all up 
 to each of the journalists whether they will use that knowledge to improve their reporting or not." 
 (Kowit, journalist, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013) 	
The quotes above show the different viewpoints of the journalists, some of who believe that the media does 
not play a part in creating more violence and is only a small factor in the conflict scene. These journalists 
view the situation as the reporters only doing their duty in reporting. Patra, a journalist from the international 
desk of Bangkok Post, mentioned that she did not see many changes in the past 10 years. The Thai media still 
lack a learning process. Their understanding of the situation remains limited and their sources of information 
always come from the authorities. Kowit, a journalist from The Nation, expressed the same view by 
concluding that he did not see much change in the Thai media and he pointed out that awareness of the 
responsibility of journalists has to be created at the individual level.  
 
It is possible to see that the interviewees have various opinions with regard to whether or not the Thai media 
can help to find a resolution to the conflict. One interesting point I found from the interviews was that some 
of the journalists do not believe that the Thai media can influence the conflict, but that the violent events have 
changed the way the Thai media report the issue, especially the Kruese and Takbai incidents. They saw that 
the seriousness and the implications of both events have changed the whole dimension of the conflict and 
have stressed the role of the Thai media in the conflict scene.  
Both incidents show the misuse of power by the Thai authority. As a result, the Thai media have become 
more aware of their socially responsible role to report issues from all sides involved. The journalists 
maintained that after the Kruese and Takbai incidents, the number of news stories and feature articles on the 
lives of the southern Muslims has increased. In this sense, they believe that the media can help to bring 
greater understanding to Thai society and to open up spaces for public debate regarding the issues. Opinions 
on how the violent situations led the change in the representation of the conflict can be seen as follows: 
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"The injustice the Thai public saw from the Kruese and Takbai incidents has changed the way the 
Thai media reported the conflict. We, the media, want to play a socially responsible role by not only 
giving truthful information, but also all-round information. The Thai public needs to know how these 
situations affect the lives of the people in the deep south." 
 (Chatri, editor, Bangkok Post, interviewed, 8th April 2013) 	
"The Kruese and Takbai incidents created a great public reaction. People felt  sympathy, and there 
was huge criticism of the government. Both incidents have their own dimensions that can influence 
the media in covering the southern conflict. This is how the situation shapes the media…Takbai was 
a big change. It showed the Thai state’s incompetency and injustice with regard to the southern 
conflict. After Takbai, the media opened up more space, focusing on bringing justice and human 
rights for the people in the south. The situation showed that there is something wrong there. The 
media had to show this to the public." 
 (Patra, journalist, Bangkok Post, interviewed, 4th April 2013) 
Overall, the interviewees had various views on the southern conflict and the role of the Thai media. It was 
interesting to see that the ‘experienced’ journalists – or those who been reporting on the conflict since the first 
year, such as Kowit, a journalist from The Nation, and Suda, a field reporter and a journalist from Bangkok 
Post – held quite a pessimistic view on whether the Thai media could help with finding a solution to the 
southern conflict. Kowit saw that the southern conflict is a big problem in Thai society, and that the media is 
only a small part that could not make a positive contribution to resolving the conflict. The opinions of the 
participants varied in terms of whether the Thai media could or could not help with the situation. Most 
participants saw that the Thai media had not changed much, and there was still a lot to do in terms of 
improving the reporting.  
 
In addition, some of the interviewees viewed that the problems in reporting the southern conflict were at the 
individual level because some journalists have concerns over reporting principles and understanding of the 
situation, while others do not. Having understanding of the background of the southern conflict and 
experience in reporting the conflict are still not enough. It depends solely on the individual as to whether or 
not he or she wants to engage in investigative reporting. Howard (2003) stated that "Few journalists have any 
training in the theory of conflict. Having the skills to analyse conflict will enable a reporter to be a more 
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effective professional journalist (p.23)." From this, I believe that the understanding of conflict dynamics is 
one of the important factors needed to improve the conflict coverage.  
 
One area of common ground on this topic is that certain situations of the southern conflict, especially the 
Kruese and Takbai incidents, changed the way the Thai media report on sensitive issues. Improvements to the 
coverage can be seen either in the labels used or the selection of stories on the conflict.  This can be supported 
by the finding from the content analysis that peace journalism elements increased in the coverage of the 
Kruese Mosque incident and Takbai demonstration incidents in both newspapers. Awareness was created and 
the reporting became more sensitive after these two incidents, but the possibility of the Thai media to create a 
resolution to the conflict is still limited. 
 
 7.2 Process of stories production in this context 
This section looks into the process of the article production of each newspaper and their organisations' 
policies. It then moves on to discuss the journalistic practices of the members of the newspapers under 
scrutiny in their reporting of the southern conflict.  
 
  7.2.1 Southern news production process 
Bangkok Post 
When the conflict first started (January 2004), Bangkok Post had no policy with regard to the reporting of the 
conflict because it did not realise that the arsenal raid incident was the sign of the rebirth of the current 
southern conflict (Patra, interviewed, 4th April 2013). After the raid on an army camp, a team of reporters 
(Suda) and a photographer were sent to the area to stay attached to the army. Three weeks later, another team 
(Chatri, currently a Bangkok-based editor) was sent to help in reporting the situation. Suda and Chatri had 
previously been sent to the conflict area during 2001-2003 to report on minor incidents. Both teams took turns 
in reporting from the conflict area, returning to Bangkok once every 2-3 months.  
 
The journalists had no training in safety and in reporting in a conflict situation, so their skills in conflict 
reporting all came from their first-hand experiences. Bangkok Post directly hired local stringers, most of who 
are Muslims who can speak the local dialect and know the area well, but these stringers may also have 
worked for other newspapers.  
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"Those mainly involved in reporting the southern conflict are 1. the journalists with a strong tie with 
the army and 2. the stringers in the area. Our advantage is that we have a tie with the army, so we 
have access to official sources."  
(Patra, journalist, Bangkok Post, interviewed, 4th April 2013) 
As Patra put it, Bangkok Post receives news on the southern conflict in two ways. One is from official sources 
from the Thai army because journalists who cover southern news incidents have a close tie with the army. 
The tie with the army is beneficial to Bangkok Post because reporters can gain access to official information 
quickly and directly. This point can be supported by the finding from the content analysis that 'elite-oriented' 
(WJ3) was the most-commonly found WJ indicator in the conflict coverage of Bangkok Post, which 
underlines Bangkok Post's great dependency on authority as a source of information.  
 
Second is news pieces taken from local stringers who may also work with other news organisations. Since 
local people sometimes do not trust journalists from Bangkok, it is necessary to hire stringers who are based 
in the area in order to gain inside information. However, these two sources of information sometimes prove to 
be unreliable because the news from official sources is based only on the information from the authorities, 
while the news from the stringers may not be true and may have some hidden agendas. I will discuss this 
point later in the limitations in reporting on the southern conflict news section. 
 
Generally, Bangkok Post has a centralised system, the so-called ‘collective decision system’. The news stories 
from stringers or journalists are sent to the central office. The journalists will point out the main issue in the 
stories. The assignment editors will then decide what the main issues of the day are and will manage the 
information from many sources before sending it to the rewriters. The rewriters then revise and translate a 
story from Thai to English before sending it to the sub-editors to approve. The sub-editors, mostly foreign 
staff, will look at the draft articles and the issues again, and then make a decision on which are the most 
important issues of the day before writing the headlines.  
 
Bangkok Post had editorial meetings to discuss the main headlines and other issues including the format of 
the newspaper twice a day. In each meeting, editors from each news section will be involved, but after the 
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final meeting, if any big stories came up, the daily editor will have to make the final decision. At the final 
stage, the format of the newspaper will be approved then sent to be printed for the paper version, and later to 
be posted on the website.  
 
The Nation 
In the same way as Bangkok Post, The Nation had no policy in reporting on conflict during the first year of 
violence. The southern conflict incidents were mostly covered as ‘crime’ stories at first, so people who were 
responsible for writing the articles were people from the ‘crime’ and ‘regional’ desks, and the rewriters. The 
Nation sent journalists to the south with no prior training for the journalists so everything they learned came 
from their first-hand experiences.  
 
In the early years of the conflict, Somsak (currently a senior journalist and editor) and Damrong (journalist) 
were the main journalists covering the southern conflict. At present, the main journalists responsible for 
reporting on the southern conflict are those with experience in covering the conflict and those from the 
international stories table, because the southern conflict is a complicated issue and has many angles, which 
also relate to security matters, NGOs, OIC or neighbouring countries. The Nation has a photographer and 
correspondents based in all three southern border provinces. They also hire local stringers, who send their 
reports to the regional news desk every day.  
 
 "The quality (of the news) is not as good as there are too many editing processes. The central pool 
 system may be good for sharing information within the organisation but sometimes it leads to the 
 complication of where the news originally came from (which media outlet) and whether it is 
 accurate." 
 (Kowit, journalist, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013)  	
Compared to Bangkok Post, The Nation is a bigger organisation that owns different media outlets. It uses the 
system of a ‘central pool system’ where all stories from every media under the same organisation would be 
sent to a central pool database where they can share news and information.  In this way, a journalist can pool 
information from several sources when writing up a news story and one story can be edited, produced and 
reproduced by a different agency many times. In my reading, I observe that The Nation often names the 
author(s) of its news articles as 'The Nation' and the names of the individual reporters are rarely mentioned. 
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When I asked about this during the interview, Kowit said that this is a result of the central pool system 
whereby news and information have to go through several editing processes so it is hard to give credit to the 
author of the article. He was also of the opinion that the quality of the news is not as good because of the 
complicated system of the editing process.   
 
In reporting on the southern conflict, The Nation has a 'Southern news desk', which is responsible for news 
from the 14 southern provinces, including news on the southern conflict. In the same way as with news from 
other regional news desks, news from the 'Southern news desk' is sent to the 'central pool database' in 
Bangkok. Normally, stories from stringers are sent to the regional desk, and then to the central desk, but 
sometimes stringers can send the news pieces directly to Bangkok-based journalists who they have a close 
contact with. The rewriter will screen, translate and manage the copy and send it to the editors, who will make 
articles out of the material once they choose the important stories of the day. However, The Nation also faces 
the same problem with the reliability of news from stringers, which again, I will come back to discuss in the 
limitations in covering the southern conflict. The lines of production of both newspapers are shown in figure 
7.1. 
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Figure 7.1: The line of production of the southern conflict news of Bangkok Post and The Nation 
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In concluding this section, both newspapers are different in terms of their line of production as shown 
in figure 7.1. Because Bangkok Post is a smaller organisation, it does not have a 'regional news centre' 
like The Nation. News from the stringers or correspondents will be sent directly to the headquarters for 
the rewriter to translate, and then passed to the sub-editor to choose the stories to highlight.  
 
The Nation has a 'regional news centre' based in Songkhla for news from the 14 southern provinces 
including news on the southern conflict. News from stringers and correspondents will be passed to the 
regional news desk first, and later to the headquarters in Bangkok. The regional editor can ask the 
correspondents to investigate the information gained from the stringers. Because of the central pool 
system, news stories of The Nation can be edited and presented many times by other media under the 
same organisation.  
 
However, figure 7.1 displays the production of news from the southern conflict area, and not the 
southern conflict articles that are generated in Bangkok. It is worth noting that not all news on the 
southern conflict came from the southern area. From my reading, the news involves comments and 
reaction from the authorities (e.g. the PM, the Deputy PM, the Army Commander, the Ministers), 
religious leaders, scholars or even foreign sources. Many of these sources are based in Bangkok, which 
means that journalists from other news sections, such as politics, home affairs and international affairs, 
are also involved in the production of southern conflict news.  
 
From this, we can see that there are two groups of people who are involved in the production of the 
southern conflict news: first are the stringers, correspondents, reporters and journalists based in the 
southern area; and second are the rewriters, journalists from other news desks, editors, and sub-editors 
based in the Bangkok headquarters.The production processes of the southern conflict news of the two 
English-language newspapers may be different but they share one thing in common: the editorial 
process normally takes place at their Bangkok headquarters. It is the responsibility of the daily editors 
to make a decision about the stories of the day, the headlines, and the format of the newspapers, and to 
finalise the newspaper before sending the copy to the printing house to publish the final product.  
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This process of news selection is very much based on the news values that the journalists attach to 
certain events (Allan 2010). In this context, the selection of news is largely determined by the editors' 
perceptions and evaluations of the conflict. Journalists and stringers may help in contributing to a news 
story but it all comes down to the decision of the Bangkok based editors as to whether or not they see 
the importance of that story. Editors will allocate news space and position to each news item according 
to their own judgment. The process of selecting, editing and highlighting happens at this stage, so the 
representation of the southern conflict depends largely on this editorial procedure.  
 
  7.2.2 Policy in reporting the southern conflict 
Bangkok Post 
According to the interviewees who work for Bangkok Post, the newspaper had no official policy in 
reporting on the southern conflict; rather, every change they made depended on the situation, such as 
giving more space for social-cultural stories from the conflict area, or being more careful with the 
choice of descriptive vocabulary. Bangkok Post focuses more on hard topics that include violent 
incidents, the government's reaction, the southern administration and law enforcement. There is less 
news and articles on the social and cultural side of the conflict in comparison to the findings on The 
Nation. As Patra, a journalist from the international desk, mentioned (see quote on the next page), the 
journalists working for Bangkok Post are used to writing news in a hard news format, so it is hard to 
change their style of writing. The southern conflict news is often about violent incidents, which is often 
reported in a hard news format that involve details of deaths and damages.  
 
In addition, Bangkok Post encourages its journalists to produce more stories ‘from the other side of the 
story’ but the writing of the articles on cultural and social issues in the south depends on each 
journalist’s style and knowledge of the events. According to Chatri, an editor who used to be a field 
reporter when the conflict first started (see quote on the next page), Bangkok Post sees importance in 
presenting news on the social and cultural aspects of the southern regions. For instance, there were 
attempts in the past to make feature stories on specific issues. However, the production of news stories 
really depends on each journalist and if they have news space for the stories.  
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The attempt to present the social and cultural side of the southern conflict can be seen from the findings 
that 'people-oriented' (PJ3) and 'focus on the causes and consequences of the conflict’ (PJ5) features 
are regularly found the articles produced, with 60 indicators of PJ3 and 75 indicators of PJ5 in the 
coverage of the three incidents.  One journalist and one editor from Bangkok Post explained that the 
attempt to provide this angle of the conflict totally depends on each journalist and his or her style of 
reporting as explained in the following quotes: 
 
 "We all have worked in this format. We are used to it. Nobody wants to change the way we 
 work in writing the news articles. But it is quite open. Anybody can suggest anything they 
 want to write, but in reality the situation will lead us."  
 (Patra, journalist, Bangkok Post, interviewed, 4th April 2013) 	
"Writing social and cultural articles totally depends on the style of that journalist, but we do 
encourage them to write more stories on the other side. We used to do a series-scoop on the 
life of monks and teachers in the conflict area. We have tried process-based reporting, but 
everything is up to the space they give us too...The media have played a large role in showing 
Thai society what actually happens in the south. If we based our articles too much on the 
authority, the readers will believe one side of the story. So we try to give space to the locals, 
and try to write more balanced, not strict to one tone articles."  
 (Chatri, editor, Bangkok Post, interviewed, 8th April 2013) 
Bangkok Post has a policy of avoiding dramatic headlines when reporting deaths. Suda, a field reporter 
and journalist, mentioned that when reporting violent incidents that involve deaths, Bangkok Post tried 
to avoid making a dramatic or unduly sensational headline in order to respect the rights of the dead. 
Sometimes they chose not to give all of the details of a victim’s death, and in all cases, not to publish 
pictures of dead bodies. At the same time, however, they only provide a small amount of space for 
articles about the incidents where the death toll was low (Patra, journalist/ Bangkok Post, interviewed, 
4th April 2013).  
 
For labels, there was no agreement on the preferred words to be used. It totally depended on the 
rewriters because the journalists would submit the news reports in Thai and the rewriters would 
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translate them. Bangkok Post usually followed official descriptive vocabulary used by the government, 
which can be supported from the findings from the content analysis that, in comparison to The Nation, 
Bangkok Post used more neutral words with less emotive and victimising language (Chapter 6, 6.1.4).  
 
Later, when the conflict had reached the international level, Bangkok Post chose to follow the 
vocabulary used by international organisations. For example, Bangkok Post agreed on calling the actors 
‘insurgents’, thereby ceasing to use words such as ‘terrorists’ or ‘militants’. The findings from the 
content analysis also reveal that the term 'terrorists' was not used in any of the 132 news articles under 
scrutiny. However, the word ‘separatists’ was still used because the reporters believed that this was the 
agenda underlying the objectives of the attackers (Chatri, editor/ Bangkok Post, interviewed, 8th April 
2013). 
 
Between 2004 and 2006, Bangkok Post did not send any new journalists to the conflict area. The 
newspaper only used experienced journalists because the reporting of the conflict needed journalists 
with a firm background and experience in reporting from the conflict zone (Suda, field reporter and 
journalist/ Bangkok Post, interviewed, 4th April 2013). After the 2006 coup, Bangkok Post asked all 
journalists based in the area to return to Bangkok to help with the political crisis, which meant they 
only used stringers as sources thereafter. Bangkok Post stopped sending journalists to the area unless 
there was a big incident, and even then only for a few days. Suda mentioned that safety concerns may 
have been one of the factors but the real problem was the budget because Bangkok Post had to cover 
the cost of living for the journalists they send to the South, when in fact everyone can write up news 
reports without having to go to the conflict area.  
 
To conclude, Bangkok Post had no official policy with regard to the representation of the southern 
conflict but it had 'discussions' between editors and journalists on some issues, such as the labels they 
should use when referring to the actors, or the extent of the details and information they should give 
when it comes to reporting about deaths. From the interviews, I can see that Bangkok Post was 
concerned about the situation of the media and the southern conflict and saw the importance of 
reporting on social and cultural issues. However, most of the times, it depends on the individual 
journalists as to whether or not they want to write about certain angles. Also, another limitation in 
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reporting the conflict was Thailand's political crisis, which first started in 2006. The coup that ousted 
PM Thaksin and the political situation that ensued gained national interest, and made the southern 
conflict less newsworthy resulting in less news spaces being given to reporting on it.  
 
The Nation 
Recognising that the southern conflict had different angles that require careful reporting, the editors 
held discussions on their policy on reporting the conflict. Four to five months after the first incident, 
they had a call-out for those working on the southern stories. The guiding strategy adopted in most of 
the news reports, it seems, mostly focused on national security while expressing concern about the 
sensitivity of religious and cultural issues (Somsak, senior journalist/editor, interviewed, 2013). In the 
same way as Bangkok Post, The Nation did not use ‘new’ journalists to cover southern conflict news 
because new reporters may not have had enough experience to write reports on sensitive issues.  
 
The reporting of the daily incidents still continued because The Nation could not avoid event-based 
reporting. Nevertheless, The Nation tried to provide more process-based articles by giving context and 
background on the conflict, and showing a wider perspective informed by analytical thinking on the 
southern issues. This point can be supported by the findings from the content analysis that 74 indicators 
of 'focus on here and now' (WJ5) were found in the coverage. Also, peace journalism indicators, 
especially 87 instances of 'people oriented' (PJ3) and 109 instances of 'focus on the causes and 
consequences of the conflict”, were found from the coverage of the three incidents, which suggests that 
The Nation included both event-based and process-based reporting in its representation of the southern 
conflict.  
 
However, Somsak maintained that this also depends on sufficient space being made available for in-
depth reporting. The Nation's reporting principles on the southern conflict events can be summed up as 
follows: 
 
"We had a discussion that we cannot treat news from the southern conflict in the same way as 
other crime stories. We had a concern that it was necessary to  publish articles on history, 
	 220	
culture and people and that the journalists should go to the conflict area and talk to the local 
people in order to find the explanation for the incidents." 
 (Somsak, senior journalist/editor, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013) 
From the quote above, we can see that The Nation understood that the southern conflict deals with 
sensitive religious and cultural issues, so they cannot treat its violent incidents in the same way as other 
crime stories. They see the importance of reporting about the history, culture and people of the 
southern region in order to provide the readers with knowledge and understanding of the region. Also, 
the newspaper engages in investigative reporting when an incident happens and journalists will be sent 
to the area to talk to the local people and gain information from the other side of the story so as not to 
base their reporting only on information from the authorities.  
 
However, the use of various sources and the process-based style of reporting are partly influenced by 
the fact that The Nation has no close relationship to the army for gaining an official inside source in the 
same way as Bangkok Post does. This point can be supported by the findings from the content analysis 
that the 'multiparty orientation' (PJ7) indicator is found in the highest frequency, with 155 instances 
found from the coverage of the three incidents. From Somsak's interview (see quote below), we can see 
that The Nation's solution is to engage different sides of the conflict, such as academics, religious 
leaders and especially local people, in order to provide different aspects of the conflict to the readers. 
 
"The policy is to interview as many people as possible (because we do not have a close tie 
with the authorities like Bangkok Post), so we encourage our journalists to talk to the locals, 
academics, and religious leaders and then try to interpret the situation using the information 
they have gained. We encourage them to use more process-based reporting." 
 (Somsak, senior journalist/editor, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013) 
	
In my opinion, The Nation's weakness (in not having a close tie with the army as a source) has opened 
up the opportunity to report news from other angles by including voices from all sides involved in the 
conflict, and not using information from the authorities only, which helps open up opportunities to 
explore the truth from all sides. This point can be supported by the findings from the content analysis 
that 29 'truth oriented' articles were identified from the second study on the four broad WJ/PJ 
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orientations (Galtung 1998) (see Appendix V). The investigative reporting; the reporting on historical, 
social and cultural issues; and the use of sources from all sides, in my view, shows that The Nation 
engaged a peace journalism approach in its reporting. This is confirmed by the findings from the 
previous chapter, which indicated that The Nation included a large variety of sources in its coverage. In 
comparison to Bangkok Post, The Nation used more sources of information, especially from 'local', 
'academic', 'religious' and 'organisation' categories.88  
 
In terms of the labels used, in the early stages of the conflict, journalists experienced difficulty in 
choosing the right labels to describe the actors because they did not understand the situation and they 
did not know the identities of those behind the attacks. Kowit mentioned that because the perpetrators 
did not announce who they were and what their goal was, The Nation did not know the appropriate 
words to use when writing about them in the news.  
"We didn't have a guideline on the words to be used in the early years. Normally it was me 
and Damrong (pseudonym) who looked into the word choices, but because we are a big 
organisation and sometimes we cannot check every article before it is published, we know that 
our labels became a problem when we got complaints from our people based in the south as 
well as from the local people." 
 (Somsak, senior journalist/editor, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013) 
 
Because of the 'central pool system' that allows journalists and editors in the same organisation to edit a 
news story, different journalists will use different words in their report. Therefore, a wide range of 
labels was used, and with little consistency, as shown in the findings from the previous chapter. For 
example, in the coverage of the Kruese mosque incident, 193 labels were used in describing the actors, 
with words such as 'Muslims', 'detainees', 'suspects', 'youths', 'armed men', 'attackers', 'raiders', 'bandits', 
'rebels', 'insurgents', 'militants' and 'separatists'.  
The analysis of labels shows that The Nation used 'religion' qualifiers, for example, 'Muslim' or 
'Islamic', in the highest degree. A total of 84 such words were found from the 166 news articles. In due 
course, The Nation tried to avoid using ‘terrorists’ when doing so proved controversial, electing to use 
‘insurgents’ instead. Later, The Nation have further developed its policy by trying to avoid using labels 
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that contained religious connotations, such as ‘Muslims’. On those occasions, when it was necessary to 
identify religious belief, The Nation advised its journalists to be very careful to place such qualifiers in 
an appropriate context.  
This interview provides insights into how the southern conflict was being reported in relation to the 
policy of each organisation, and how such policy affected the news production process. The responses 
of the interviewees revealed that each newspaper had its own preferred procedures for making relevant 
journalistic and editorial judgements about what to cover, how to cover it and why it should be 
covered. Bangkok Post, a smaller news organisation in comparison to The Nation, had a centralised 
system where reports from the stringers and reporters were sent to a central desk, and the central 
editors then made a decision on which issues to highlight. The Nation, an umbrella organisation, used a 
more complicated news production process, where news pieces were sent to a central pool, and other 
media in the organisation were able to use the reports and edit the news piece again for their own 
purposes. Articles from The Nation have to pass many editing procedures before being published for 
the public.  
 
To recap, for each newspaper, the responsibilities for writing headlines and assigning space to the 
articles lay with the editors who do not have first-handed experience in reporting the conflict situation, 
which sometimes led to misunderstanding of the main issue. When the conflict first started, neither 
newspaper had an official policy about how to cover it, which meant that every change they made 
depended on the situation.  
 
Of the journalists sent to the conflict area by both newspapers, none of them possessed any prior, first-
hand knowledge of the conflict situation. Bangkok Post had more advantages because of its close ties 
with the army, while The Nation covered a greater variety of stories, in which the voices of the locals 
were heard to a greater extent. Both newspapers followed a policy of not using dramatic headlines, and 
being careful with publishing graphic pictures as well as with their use of labels.  
 
 7.3 Limitations in reporting conflict in this context 
This section looks into the responses from the interviewees with regard to what they perceive, on the 
basis of their experience, to be the main limitations in reporting the southern conflict. Figure 7.2 
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summarises the limitations in the production of the southern conflict news in the conflict zone and in 
the Bangkok headquarters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: The limitations in the production of the southern conflict coverage 
 
  7.3.1 Safety concerns 
As mentioned earlier, journalists who are responsible for reporting on the southern conflict include 
those who are based in Bangkok, where they cover issues from of the conflict that involve politics, 
home affairs, the justice system and foreign affairs, and those who are based in the conflict area, which 
includes reporters and stringers. This section only focuses on the safety concern issues of those who 
report from the conflict area. 
 
In the early years of the current southern conflict (2004-2006), both newspapers sent a group of 
journalists to report from the field, and some joined the Issara News project in 2005. However, the 
2006 coup and the political situation in Bangkok led both newspapers to withdraw their reporters from 
the conflict area. At present, they have stringers and correspondents based in the three southern 
provinces who send news piece on a daily basis, and the newspapers only send field reporters from 
Bangkok to the conflict area when there is a big incident.  
 
Normally, the reporters' responsibility is to cover the incidents when they happen, but in a normal 
situation, they are required to cover other issues of the conflict: economic, social, religious, cultural 
and local. However, reporting from the field is not an easy task, especially for the group of journalists 
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who were sent to the area in the first year of the incident, when they have little knowledge about the 
conflict and on reporting from a conflict zone, where they occasionally had to face threats and 
intimidation.  
 
Reporters from both newspapers (Suda and Chatri from Bangkok Post and Kowit and Damrong from 
The Nation) faced the same difficulties when they were sent to the conflict area in 2004. As discussed 
earlier, these reporters had no experience or training and they had to acquire a new set of skills in 
reporting the conflict and in living in the conflict zone. Suda mentioned that normally the attackers do 
not target journalists because they rely on the media to advance their public relations (PR) for their 
attack, but sometimes members of the press become victims too, especially in a second-bombing 
incident.89 Therefore, the usual newsgathering process of rushing rush out to the scene or travelling 
along the same route cannot be applied to this context.  
 
Because violent incidents happened repeatedly, sometimes a pattern of attacks emerged (in the same 
way as a second-bombing incident), and reporters can learn how to stay safe and avoid going to the 
scene.90 Sometimes, reporters avoid going to the scene to ‘report the news,’ preferring to wait at the 
police station or at some safe place out of fear for their lives. Typically the reporters do not write the 
reports from the scene but wait for their information to be reaffirmed by the authorities (Damrong, field 
reporter and journalist/ The Nation, interviewed, 23rd May 2013).  
 
Because of safety concerns, newspapers did not want to send their journalists to the area, preferring to 
rely on official sources where possible. This point shows that safety concerns lead to an inaccessibility 
of information because journalists cannot access the scene, so they cannot observe and investigate the 
site. As a result, they have to write their reports based on information from authorities and stringers, 
which may not be reliable.  
 
According to Blaesi (2004), armed conflict situations lead to limited access to places and sources and 
even if there are sources, journalists have to face the question of whether their sources are credible and 
if they can cross-check with other sources. For that reason, conflict coverage is sometimes based on 
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'uncertain and dubious' information without direct observation or investigation, the so-call 'second-
hand journalism'. 
 
From the interviews, the safety advice can be summed up as follow: 
- Reporters need to be careful about how they dress. They should dress in a neutral colour (not 
to stand out too much) but not in the colours of the authorities (army/khaki) to avoid 
misunderstanding. 
 - Reporters should learn basic Yawi to communicate with the locals. They have to learn 
 Muslim culture in order to avoid being disrespectful to the locals.  
 - Reporters should not rush to the crime/attack scene but should always double check if it is 
 safe before visiting the scene. 
 - Reporters have to always be cautious when travelling around. They should always check 
 their vehicles for possible sabotage and always change their travel route to avoid planned 
 attacks.  
 - Reporters should avoid travelling alone, especially at night. But most of all, they should 
 avoid travelling with authorities because sometimes authorities are the target.  
 
The safety advice mentioned above comes from the first-hand experience of the reporters based in the 
field. Most of the time, they have to use their own sense and their basic-instinct in order to survive. 
However, one piece of safety advice that proved to be problematic to the reporters, especially reporters 
from Bangkok Post, is that they should not be attached to the authorities. Suda. a field reporter and a 
journalist from Bangkok Post, mentioned that the good thing of being close to the authorities is that 
they are always the first to know when there was an incident and there is a warning of possible attacks. 
However, the bad side is that they can also easily become the target. From this, we can see that 
reporters in the field often face dilemmas that challenge their journalistic practices and change the 
whole way of reporting and living in such a threatening situation.  
 
According to Blaesi (2004), another necessary competency for journalists covering the conflict is 
general conflict competence. This means having a theoretical knowledge of conflict that encompasses 
conflict dynamics and methods of conflict resolution, as well as practical knowledge of how to behave 
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in the conflict area, including knowledge of necessary security precautions, the ability to weigh up 
risks, and knowing how to investigate under difficult situations. Hence, reporting from the conflict area 
requires specific skills and experience in order to stay safe, which proves a limitation in the production 
of the southern news.  
 
For both newspapers, safety is the most important issue in reporting the southern conflict, so they are 
reluctant to send their reporters to the conflict area. Therefore, they prefer to rely on information from 
the authorities or the stringers they hire, which also leads to difficulty on issues of accuracy and 
reliability. I will discuss this point in the next part.   
 
  7.3.2 News sources and accuracy 
 From the previous section, we can see that the safety concerns of field reporters can obstruct the 
newsgathering process and lead to the dependence on the authorities and stringers as primary news 
sources. The reliance on the authorities as the only source can lead to one-sided reporting, while the 
information from stringers cannot always be considered reliable. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the southern conflict has created mistrust and misunderstanding between the 
Thais and the Muslims in the area. Local people do not trust the Thai authorities, and often blame the 
authorities for causing the violent incidents. This growing mistrust between the two communities 
affects the work of the field reporters because the reporters are mostly Thais, and sometimes they work 
with the authorities. Local people who provided information for the journalists often placed themselves 
in danger by doing so. Most of the time, the interviewees maintained that the locals were not willing to 
co-operate by providing helpful information. Occasionally, local people neither welcomed the reporters 
to their village nor cooperated with them in giving information on the attacks.91 The reasons for this are 
that they mistrust the reporters and they conceal the truth to protect the people behind the attacks 
(Kowit, journalist/ The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013).  
 
For that reason, the writing of news articles based on first-hand information can often be difficult. 
Nevertheless, the supply of false information not only comes from the local side. There were times 
when the authorities did not tell the whole truth to the media, too. The most obvious case was the Tak 
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Bai incident. Before the news of the 78 deaths from suffocation during the transfer had spread, the 
reporters were kept in the dark, where the authorities, at first, tried to avoid giving details on the deaths 
to the media (Damrong, field reporter and journalist/ The Nation, interviewed, 23rd May 2013).  
 
 "However, we have to double-check the reports the stringers send because there is a high 
 competition between the stringers that sometimes may result in giving false stories." 
 (Kowit, journalist, The Nation,  interviewed, 1st April 2013)  	
Another difficulty is the communication problem. The reporters working in the area have a language 
barrier with the locals who speak the Yawi dialect. This is the reason why field reporters had to depend 
on local stringers for translations. The local stringers had more advantages in getting around and 
talking to the people; it was also safer if journalists are accompanied by local stringers when travelling 
in the area. However, as Kowit stated above, stringers often worked for more than one newspaper. 
They had to feed the market and ‘the market wants conflict’, so most of their stories were of daily 
violent incidents, whereas news ‘from the other side of the story’ was seldom seen. Mostly, it would be 
‘the outsider’ who went to the area and wrote up those stories (Patra, journalist/ Bangkok Post, 
interviewed, 4th April 2013). The stringers, striving to earn enough income, send their news pieces to 4 
or 5 agencies but sometimes the stakes are so high that the information they have could be dangerous 
so they have to maintain a good relationship with every side by not telling everything they know. There 
is strong competition between the stringers, especially where breaking developments in the conflict are 
concerned, which frequently leads to inaccurate information falling into reports.  
In addition, stringers can sometimes report the normal crime news as southern conflict news because 
they can sell the stories (Kowit, journalist, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013). We can see that, 
because they are not affiliated directly to any news organisation, the motivation of the stringers is only 
to 'sell' the news so they do not concern themselves about the accuracy of their information. 
Nonetheless, at times, the relationship between the sources of the stories and journalists and stringers 
was defined by mutual advantage, which meant that sometimes the information published was aligned 
with particular interests (Damrong, field reporter/ journalist, The Nation, interviewed, 23rd May 2013). 
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In summary, news sources and accuracy is one of the limitations in the reporting of the southern 
conflict. Journalists often face difficulties in processing news from first-hand information so they have 
to rely on information from other sides, which occasionally cannot be trusted. The incidents happen 
every day and journalists find difficulty in following up to investigate each incident since they do not 
have enough time and people.  
  7.3.3 Interference at the Bangkok headquarters 
Both newspapers faced similar problems in their production of southern conflict reports, especially in 
the final stage of the news production process at the Bangkok headquarters. The main factor is the 
newspapers' policy in reporting news, which involves editorial meetings at the last stage of the news 
production process, the attribution of credits to the authors, and the policy of sending reporters to the 
conflict zone.  
 
As discussed earlier in 7.2, we can see that the final stage of the process is the editorial meeting where 
the daily editors make a decision on the stories of the day and the format of the newspapers before 
sending the final version to the printing house. Normally, stringers and reporters from both newspapers 
suggest the stories to highlight. However, their ideas were sometimes ignored at the editorial meetings 
and only small spaces were given to their articles, which shows that some editors do not see the 
importance of the southern conflict and, at the same time, have a limited understanding about the 
conflict (Patra, journalist/ Bangkok Post, interviewed, 4th April 2013). In my opinion, this is due to the 
'biased' mentality, which is a result of the flaw in the Thai social and education system as discussed 
earlier in 7.1.  
 
Some Bangkok-based editors lack understanding of the situation in the south so they do not see the 
importance of presenting and prioritising the southern news accurately. McCargo (2000) confirmed this 
point by stating that the news production process was centralised to Bangkok, which led to the 
marginalisation of 90% of Thais, and so help exclude them from the political participation. Patra 
commented that sometimes editors only highlight the stories when the death toll is high, and on many 
occasions, they only give space to the stories when the locals did something wrong and not the 
authorities, which shows how the dependence on the authorities as a news source affects the way in 
which the news is reported. 
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For Bangkok Post, headline writing is the work of the subeditors who are foreign staff working in the 
head office. The foreign subeditors do not know the real issue to focus on and often change the main 
issue being highlighted by the journalists. According to Sabpaiboon (2001, p. 37), the Thai staff 
working at Bangkok Post had no decision-making power regarding policy or the objectives of the 
newspaper. Patra confirmed this point by stating that: 
 
 "These reporters and stringers have followed the conflict for a long time so they know which 
 stories or issues to highlight. Sometimes they complained that they wrote a good piece but 
 it was not chosen and sometimes Bangkok editors changed their whole point of the story." 
 (Patra, journalist, Bangkok Post, interviewed, 4th April 2013) 
The quote above shows that the selection of stories, the writing of headlines, and the allocation of news 
space all depend on the decisions of the editors and subeditors of the day, who do not have a true 
understanding of the southern conflict and may ignore or fail to understand the importance of the 
southern news. For The Nation, as discussed earlier in 7.2.1, all information is sent to the 'central pool 
system'. It is the responsibility of the news desks to choose which stories to highlight. These decisions 
are based on the judgment of the responsible journalists and editors, which are then presented in the 
editorial meetings every day.  
 
For that reason, stories provided by reporters can either be highlighted or ignored at the last stage of 
news production, and it is at this editorial meeting that the process of choosing, screening, highlighting 
and finishing occurs. The news format and the representation of the southern conflict news, therefore, 
depends largely on the decision of the daily editors.  
 
In addition, the interviewees revealed another flaw in the policy of their organisations in the production 
of news: the problem of attributing credit to the writers. Bangkok Post journalists mentioned that they 
are often frustrated about how the newspaper gives credit to its writers. Normally, if more than three 
journalists help in contributing to a news story, it will be credited to 'Post reporters', instead of giving 
names. On some occasions, this leads to misunderstanding because the daily editors forgot the names, 
or added names that had not been involved in the writing. Suda (field reporter and journalist/Bangkok 
Post, interviewed, 4th April 2013) mentioned that sometimes she worked hard in writing a report but 
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when the newspaper came out on the next day, her name was not mentioned, which was a bit of a 
'discouragement'.  
 
On the other hand, The Nation faced more difficulties on the issue of credibility because of the 'central 
pool system' whereby any writers from any outlets under the same organisation can edit the same news 
piece. Because of this complicated system, The Nation often used the by-line 'The Nation' as the 
accredited author of its articles to avoid complications. In the same way as Bangkok Post, journalists 
also found that it was hard for them to get credit as an author of their news pieces because of the 
system. Journalists from both newspapers expressed their disappointment because their organisations 
apparently do not see the importance in giving credit to them for their work. 
 
The policy of sending reporters to the field also prove a weakness in the southern news production 
process. For Bangkok Post, there was a controversy between editors as some of them wanted to send 
journalists to work alongside the army (a form of ‘embedding’) in order to get inside information, 
while others wanted them to stick with the locals to build good relationships, and to get news from the 
other side. However, there are no more journalists from Bangkok Post based in the conflict area due to 
safety reasons, which resulted in a lack of continuity in their reporting. According to Suda 
(interviewed, 4th April 2013), editors used safety as an excuse for not sending journalists back to the 
area, while the real reason was actually due to budget concerns. She said,  "Now anyone can go but 
only for a short period and writing articles from Bangkok is not enough. We need at least one journalist 
to be based there". The Nation faced the problem of a lack of staff and people to write the southern 
conflict articles. As stated by Kowit (journalist/ The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013), most 
journalists do not want to be responsible for the southern conflict articles because of the complex 
nature of the events as well as the fears about their personal safety.  
 
Newsworthy incidents happened every day, which meant journalists found it difficult to follow-up and 
investigate on or to return to stories from days earlier because they do not have enough time and 
people. The Nation does not have enough people to train, nor the budget to support sending more 
people to the area. As a result, the journalists who cover the stories on the conflict are often those who 
have worked on the conflict for years, and those who are willing to go to the field. 
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According to McCargo (2000), the freedom of the journalists is limited and controlled by the 
organisations, their relations to power and politics, and in particular by the Thai culture of respecting 
elders. The system in the Thai media organisations is based on hierarchism or seniority relationships. 
In this system, the juniors are irrelevant and voiceless and have to respect and obey the seniors, and 
they do not have the right to criticise (Ibid.). 
 
To conclude, the editorial meeting at the last stage of the news production process is a factor that 
largely affects the production of the news because it guides and influences the 'output' of the 
newspapers. It is true that stringers, reporters and journalists help in contributing reports on the conflict 
but what matters most is the final decision made by the daily editors. The representation of the southern 
conflict news is very much based on this final stage where editors choose, edit and highlight the news 
articles. 
 
The next part will discuss the recommendations for reporting on the southern conflict as proposed by 
the interviewees.  
 
 7.4 Recommendations 
The interviewees held quite similar views on their recommendations for Thai media with regard to 
reporting on the southern conflict. First of all, they all believe that it is important for people who work 
in the media to understand the background and dynamics of the conflict so that they can provide 
accurate information and understanding to the Thai public on the issue. According to Blaesi (2004), 
one of the necessary competencies for journalists in covering conflict is specific conflict competence, 
which means journalists should have knowledge on the concrete conflict, which includes the history, 
culture, language, society, actors and their interests. Kowit confirmed this point in the following 
comment: 
 
"Writing news on the southern conflict requires specific knowledge of the historical 
background including the cultural and religious differences in the area, all of which are 
sensitive issues. Thai media organisations should encourage their journalists to have 
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continuity in working on the issue and to have an understanding of the conflict before writing 
the news. The journalists who specialise in the southern conflict will be able to show Thai 
society a deeper understanding of the conflict, and to show the life and culture of the people 
from the South." 
 (Kowit, journalist, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013)  
The interviewees also recommended that the Thai media should raise the awareness of the reporters, 
journalists and editors based in Bangkok with regard to the important implications that the southern 
conflict has on Thai society as well as to their responsibility in representing the conflict to the Thai 
public in a way that can help bring about understanding, and not exacerbate the problem by creating an 
‘us and them’ attitude. The reporting would be more accurate if the journalists paid more attention to 
the conflict and its effects (Lynch 2007). On the responsibility of the media in reporting the southern 
conflict to the Thai public, Somsak made the following observation: 
 
"Thai people should know more about the southern conflict. They should know the history. 
They do not know the truth, and that is the biggest problem in our country. The southern 
conflict is a sensitive issue and so careful reporting is needed. The media can help the society 
by giving the people better understanding of the conflict and the stories of the people from the 
south, their culture, their way of life. There is so much to know, so many beautiful stories. The 
media can help by telling all these stories." 
 (Somsak, senior journalist/ editor, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013) 	
Secondly, all interviewees suggested that the Thai media should report the conflict from every side 
involved, especially the voices of those who are still unheard or the voices of the victims. In this way, 
the Thai media can help by providing more space for social and cultural news, and by giving more 
context and background to the southern conflict so that members of the Thai public would better 
understand its nature and possible solutions. Stories from all sides of the conflict need to be heard. As 
Patra and Suda put it: 
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 "The media should not base their reporting on information from the authorities only. They 
 should report from the other side of the story, too. Many voices are still unheard. It will be 
 a good start if the media people have this awareness." 
 (Patra, Bangkok Post, interviewed, 4th April 2013) 	
 "The media can be a speaker for the victims in asking for justice. This will gradually create 
 trust between the media and the local people." 
 (Suda, Bangkok Post, interviewed, 4th April 2013) 	
From the quotes above, we can see that the focus was not only on the making of social and cultural 
news, but also on representing the 'voices' that are still unheard. The interviewees believed that there is 
not enough news from the 'local' side, especially when they became victims of the violent incidents. 
According to Suda, a field reporter from Bangkok Post who covered the southern conflict news since 
2004, the victims have not received the 'justice' they deserved because of the slow process of the Thai 
legal system, and because the Thai public do not see this as important.  
 
For that reason, they believe that it is the responsibility of the media to be the 'voice' of the victims so 
that justice will be served, and at the same time, it is a way of creating trust between the Thai media 
and the local people. In this sense, from the peace journalism perspective, the media can act as a 'third 
party' to mediate between the sides in the conflict and facilitate their understanding of each other, 
which can further lead to a possible solution to the conflict (Peleg 2006).  
 
Lastly, the interviewees believed that each organisation should devote greater attention to the conflict 
and encourage their journalists to ensure that they are taking sufficient care to provide accurate 
information, and not to report in a way that can escalate the conflict. The organisations can support 
their journalists by providing more funds for skill training as well as sending their journalists to the 
area to get first-hand experience. In this way, the organisations would reduce their reliance on official 
sources of information. The conventions of reporting conflict also require attention, namely to widen 
the range of perspectives on offer to the reader, and to provide space for articles that provide different 
angles and contextual information to help explain the significance of events.  
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To achieve these outcomes, news organisations need to do more to support their journalists. For 
example, they should fund further training for the journalists and encourage continuity in their 
reporting of the southern conflict so as to deepen their expertise. Patra (journalist/ Bangkok Post, 
interviewed, 4th April 2013) proposed that a basic understanding of peace journalism could be helpful 
in this regard. At the very least, the reporters should be provided with enough knowledge to have a 
better sense of what should and should not be reported. Three interviewees expressed their views on 
how media organisations can contribute to better reporting of the southern conflict as follows: 
 
"The organisations have to see the importance of reporting in this conflict. They should fund 
and support the training of their own journalists, like BBC or CNN, in order to develop the 
potential of their human resources." 
 (Suda, field reporter/journalist, Bangkok Post, interviewed, 4th April 2013) 	
 "The organisations should invest more in sending their journalists to work in the south. This 
 will give them the first-hand experience which will lead to a better understanding, and a 
 better way of reporting." 
 (Kowit, journalist, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013)  	
"The media organisations should encourage the journalists to be critical. This will create the 
investigative reporting, which will bring more dimensions of the conflict to the public’s 
attention. This is a problem of Thai society. We have no culture of critical thinking. Because 
the southern conflict involves questions of Thai nationalism, nobody wants to be critical 
because they have a strong sense of nationalism." 
 (Damrong, field reporter/ journalist, The Nation, interviewed, 23rd May 2013) 
The quotes above represent the recommendations at the organisation level. The interviewees believed 
that news organisations should create awareness among their journalists and editors that the southern 
conflict is an important national security concern which requires a special way of reporting. For that 
reason, Thai news organisations should provide more funding and support for their journalists in the 
form of training on conflict reporting so that the journalists will have good journalistic practices and 
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skills in reporting the conflict. This will also be beneficial for the organisations because they will 
develop the potential of their own human resources.  
 
The interviewees proposed that it is important for journalists who cover the southern conflict to have an 
opportunity to work from the field instead of working from Bangkok. This will give them first-hand 
experience of reporting from the conflict zone, and will provide them with a better understanding of the 
effects of the conflict on the lives of the local people. Journalists who have experience in the conflict 
area seem to have more sensitivity to the conflict and to the local people.  
 
In my opinion, the three recommendations mentioned above are part of peace journalism practices. 
Peace journalism encourage journalists to fulfill their socially responsible role with the objective of 
promoting the resolution of the conflict (Galtung 1998, 2000; Lynch and McGoldrick 2005). When 
asked about peace journalism in the interviews, all of the interviewees agreed that it is good practice 
for journalists when covering conflicts. It may not be possible to achieve the goal of peace in the south 
yet, but good reporting can help to create a certain degree of understanding among society and 
ultimately change people’s opinions by better informing them.  
 
Studies of peace journalism in a different context setting, as mentioned in Chapter 4 (4.2.2.1), can 
support this point because different conflict settings have different degrees of peace journalism 
implementation. Thailand's southern conflict, too, deals with a long history of conflict; sensitivity of 
issues; and unequal development of social, economic, media and political institutions. Therefore, it is 
possible that peace journalism is not fully applied into Thai media practices. However, one good sign is 
that the Thai media have attempted to incorporate peace journalism into their media practices since the 
early years of the conflict. The interviewees maintained that peace journalism is seen as an alternative 
solution to the problem of reporting on the southern conflict. Pokin's recommendation is worth quoting 
at length:  
 
"The Thai media can play an important role in providing space, which will lead to the solution 
of the problem. We have to communicate for a better  understanding. Peace Journalism is a 
good start. Peace Journalism is a good practice. We launched a pilot project (Issara News 
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Center) two years after the first attack on the arsenal of the army camp, and it was a success. 
The TJA will have a project and training for the journalists who are interested in the near 
future. The Thai  media should send more journalists to the conflict area in order to portray 
different sides of  the story to Thai society. They should have fairer reporting and should be 
more careful in giving comments on issues that have not yet been concluded. All Thai media 
should provide space for all actors in the conflict, which will create the process of reporting 
with reason, and acting as a mediator." 
 (Pokin, director, TJA, interviewed, 3rd April 2013) 	
According to Pokin, peace journalism is good reporting practice for improving the southern conflict 
coverage. The Issara News Centre was a good example of how the TJA saw the importance of peace 
journalism and the problem of the Thai media in reporting the southern conflict. Books and articles on 
peace journalism and Thailand's southern conflict during the past 10 years show that the Thai media 
and scholars saw the value of peace journalism. There was a consensus that peace journalism can help 
to improve journalistic practices in conflict reporting and to bring understanding to the Thai public on 
the conflict, which could possibly lead to the ultimate goal of conflict resolution in the future.  
 
Pokin recommended that the improvements must come from two sides: firstly, journalists should be 
trained and educated on peace journalism in order to improve their skills of conflict reporting; and 
secondly, the Thai media should become more engaged in the southern conflict by sending more 
reporters to the conflict area so that they can report on other aspects of the southern community and not 
just the violence.  
 "The Thai media should introduce peace journalism into their practices as a reporting 
 principle. I joined TJA’s Issara News Center project in 2005 and I saw its potential in bringing 
 about good, balanced and fair reporting. The idea of peace journalism should be introduced to
 media students because now Thailand is facing many national conflicts, and not just the 
 southern insurgency. The teaching of peace journalism will be a good preparation for the 
 young generation of journalists in reporting conflict." 
 (Kowit, journalist, The Nation, interviewed, 1st April 2013) 	
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In addition, Kowit saw that it is better to promote peace journalism to media students at an early stage. 
He recommended that peace journalism should be taken as one of the media courses at university level 
in order to prepare the future journalists with good reporting practices. Kowit mentioned that he and his 
journalist friends only learned about peace journalism after the criticism of the Thai media’s reporting 
of the southern conflict. The southern conflict and the political situation in Thailand over the past 10 
years have divided Thai society, and completely changed the way the media report on national 
conflicts. For that reason, Kowit proposed that it is necessary for future journalists to be well-prepared 
and well-trained in reporting on conflict and other controversial issues.92 
 
In conclusion, all of the interviewees suggested that the media should continue to develop their role of 
social responsibility by presenting a greater diversity of information and background details on the 
conflict to the reader. In this way, the media can create a better understanding of the Thai crisis and 
lessen public prejudice against minority groups. The media must make a greater effort, they believed, 
to provide space for all sides involved in the conflict to have their voices heard in order to improve the 
reporting standards and create a stronger basis for balanced reporting. Peace journalism was mentioned 
as a good starting point for creating better understanding of how to report a conflict without escalating 
it, and how to explore the factors of  the crisis with a view to improving the prospects of conflict 
resolution. It was agreed that newspapers should not take sides in the conflict, but rather commit 
themselves to creating the conditions for all voices to be given a fair hearing.  
 
The interviewees suggested that the news organisations should implement peace journalism into their 
journalistic practices in order to encourage their journalists to engage in investigative reporting; to raise 
the awareness of the socially responsible role of the media; to motivate the journalists to understand the 
history and various aspects the conflict; and to help promote a better understanding in society. 
 
We can now turn to Chapter 8, the conclusions of this study. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
 
This research originated from my interest in the reporting of news from Thailand’s southern conflict, 
especially with respect to the potential to make recommendations that would help improve the prospect 
of conflict resolution. For that reason, I believe that the notion of peace journalism, with its stress on 
the socially responsible role of journalists, can provide the basis for alternative approaches to reporting 
conflict that will be fairer, more balanced, and sensitive to conflicts. From this point of departure, the 
research was designed with the intentions to explore how the two English-language newspapers in 
Thailand – Bangkok Post and The Nation – represented the southern conflict; to investigate their 
journalistic practices in reporting the conflict; to identify strengths and weaknesses in the news 
production processes with regard to the significant features of what might be termed ‘war journalism’ 
(WJ) in relation to ‘peace journalism’ (PJ); and to find a way to promote appropriate media practices in 
order to help enhance journalistic contributions to conflict resolution. To meet these aims and 
objectives, the research examined the representation of Thailand’s southern conflict in the news 
coverage of these two English-language newspapers over a specific time period and explored the news 
production process in this setting by conducting interviews with several journalists and editors 
involved in reporting the southern conflict since it first started.  
 
Comprised of three parts, this final chapter starts by revisiting the research questions and providing 
answers to them together with discussions on the key findings. The second part acknowledges the 
limitations of the study, while also highlighting the significance of the study and its implications for 
future research. The last part offers several recommendations concerning Thai journalism in order to 
make the most of what I consider to be the value of peace journalism as an alternative to war 
journalism.  
 8.1 Research questions revisited 	
RQ1: How has the coverage in the two English language newspapers in Thailand (Bangkok 
Post and The Nation) presented the southern conflict?  
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Based on the findings from the content analysis, both of the newspapers used both war and peace 
journalism elements in their reporting, albeit with differing degrees of implementation. There are five 
main points for discussion which I can summarise from my findings. 
 
 A) Peace journalism was applied in the conflict coverage of the two English-language 
 newspapers from the first year of the southern conflict. 
The study found a surprising number of peace journalism elements in the coverage of both newspapers. 
This result was unexpected given that the context was on the first year of the southern conflict, and 
that, at the time, peace journalism had not yet been introduced to the Thai media. Both newspapers 
shared the same main peace journalism indicators, namely: multiparty orientation (PJ7), focus on the 
causes and consequences of the conflict (PJ5), and people-oriented (PJ3). This point shows that both 
newspapers not only looked into the background and information of the conflict, but also included the 
'voices' from different sides and the 'voices of the locals' in their coverage right from the beginning of 
the conflict. While 'high authority' was the category most often referred to as news actors and news 
sources, the findings reveal that the 'local' category was the second most frequently used in the conflict 
coverage, which indicates that the 'local' perspective was not neglected in the conflict coverage of both 
newspapers.  
 
The findings from the second analysis of the four broad WJ and PJ orientations (Galtung 1998) 
revealed that the truth-oriented frame and people-oriented frame were the main peace journalism 
frames applied in the coverage of both newspapers. This suggests that the newspapers not only 
included different voices into their conflict coverage, but also practiced investigative journalism on the 
incidents. However, even though the peace journalism features and frames found from the study were 
presented as characteristics of peace journalism, they do not stress the interventionalist role of the 
journalists in seeking peace as the solution to the conflict, which is the ultimate goal of peace 
journalism. In the second analysis, the study revealed a small number of solution-oriented articles (20 
articles from a total of 298). Some of the news headlines can confirm this point, for example, 
'Comment: Will our country be the same again?' (The Nation, 29 April 2004), and 'Muslims: Revive 
Chaturon's peace plan' (Bangkok Post, 29 April 2004). For that reason, I can conclude that aspects of 
peace journalism, especially with regard to the involvement of different parties and the focus on causes 
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and effects, were applied to the writing of the articles by the two newspapers, but the goal of finding a 
solution to the conflict was still inadequately addressed. This finding is, in fact, a good sign that, within 
the first year of the southern conflict in 2004, a solution-oriented frame had already been applied in the 
reporting.  
The findings of this research seem to contradict the criticism that the Thai media reported the conflict 
with a war journalism approach. Based on my findings, the criticism cannot be fully applied to the two 
English-language newspapers because a high number of peace journalism elements were found in the 
conflict coverage during the first year of the conflict. This point can be supported by Changkamol's 
doctoral thesis (2013, p. 5), which argued that English-language newspapers exhibited more signs of 
‘peace journalism’ than the popular and quality Thai-language newspapers, and that the conflict 
coverage of the English-language newspapers engaged two indicators, reporting the causes and the 
visible effects, which are not being presented in the Thai newspapers. On this point, it can also be 
stated that, because Bangkok Post and The Nation are seen as quality newspapers with a high 
journalistic standard and good journalism practices that adhere to the values of fair, objective and 
balanced reporting, which is also a basis of peace journalism. As a consequence, the main peace 
journalism features found in the study also represent the qualities of objectivity in good journalism.  
The findings of this study contrast those of previous researches on peace journalism, including the 
research of Lee and Maslog (2005) and Lee (2010), whose methods I applied by operationalising 
Galtung's 13 WJ/PJ indicators (1986; 1998) on the conflict coverage. Lee and Maslog concluded that 
the coverage of the four Asian conflicts is dominated by war journalism. The explanatory factors for 
the differences in the findings could be: 1) Lee and Maslog used a quantitative approach in the analysis 
by counting war and peace indicators only, while the analysis of this research also applied the four-
broad orientations of war and peace journalism (Galtung 1998) as the second approach, and this second 
analysis requires a subjective form of analysis by looking into war and peace frames in writing news 
articles; 2) Lee and Maslog explored the conflict coverage of the four Asian conflicts (India-Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines) and these conflicts had been going on for decades at the time 
of the study, while this study only explored conflict coverage of Thailand's southern insurgency during 
its first year of occurrence and only the coverage of the English-language newspapers. For that reason, 
the length and the intensity of the four Asian conflicts, especially the Kashmir conflict which involved 
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the two countries (India and Pakistan), are different from the context of this study, which could be a 
reason why more war journalism features were found from the coverage of these conflicts. 
 B) 'War journalism' elements were found throughout the conflict coverage of the three violent 
 incidents. 
Based on the findings, the reporting of the conflict incidents that caused a high number of deaths and 
significant damage to the society on many levels included features of war journalism to a large extent. 
The analysis showed that Bangkok Post and The Nation shared the same three main war journalism 
indicators in their coverage: focus on the visible effects of the violence (WJ2), elite-oriented (WJ3), 
and focus on here and now (WJ5). The findings from the analysis of news actors and news sources also 
revealed that both newspapers gave prominence to 'high authority' as both a news lead and a source of 
information, which indicated the use of the 'elite-oriented' features of war journalism in the coverage. 
The second analysis on the four broad war and peace journalism frames confirmed this because the 
war-oriented frame was the most used frame in Bangkok Post, and the second most used frame in  
The Nation.  
 
Both newspapers categorised the southern conflict incidents into the following topics: 'violent incident'; 
‘law enforcement & follow-up investigation'; 'southern policy & security measures'; ‘government's 
reaction'; 'criticism'; 'international'; 'impact on lives'; 'socio-economic impact'; 'history'; 'religion'; 
'aftermath'; human rights'; and 'solution'. The news topics identified from the coverage indicate that 
both newspapers used an event-based style of reporting, which focuses only on the incident at hand, as 
well as process-based reporting, which requires a look into the background and wider aspects of the 
conflict when writing the news. Moreover, the southern conflict is a national concern that deals with 
issues of governance, southern policy, and security measures; thus the reliance on 'elite' or 'high 
authority' as news actors and news sources is clearly seen from the analysis. It is important to 
acknowledge that this study covers a period of seven days of coverage for each of the three incidents. 
As a result, it is possible that the reason for the high number of war journalism features found in this 
study can be attributed to the newspapers adopting a clearer focus on event-based reporting during the 
first days of reporting these violent incidents than applying a process-based style of reporting. 
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In addition, the analysis of the war journalism language-based criteria indicates that features such as 
demonising language (WJ12) and emotive language (WJ13) were present in the conflict coverage. The 
study found these features more in the conflict coverage of The Nation than in that of Bangkok Post. 
The demonising language identified in the coverage portrayed one group as wicked and threatening 
through the use of words such as ‘brutal’ or ‘terrorists’, while emotive language was used to report the 
violent incidents in a more dramatic way that can affect the readers' emotional response through the use 
of words such as ‘bloodbath’, ‘massacre’, and tragedy. Due to the violent nature of the three incidents, 
these features, together with details on death tolls, damage, and official announcements, which are 
regarded as attributes of war journalism, were found throughout the conflict coverage. This reflects the 
'mediation' concept of the media (McQuail 2010) and refers to how the media portray social reality to 
the public where they cannot directly observe it by themselves. It is the responsibility of the media to 
report 'what' happened in the conflict because not doing so would be a distortion of the truth.  
 
 C) The length and the intensity of the conflict affected the implementation of peace 
 journalism in the conflict coverage. 
Continuing on from the previous sub-section, the findings revealed that the specific situation of each of 
these conflict incidents is one of the factors influencing the way Bangkok Post and The Nation reported 
the events. To explain, these three incidents differed in their situations and implications to Thai society. 
As a result, the representation of the incidents and the engagement of peace journalism in the reporting 
changed accordingly.  
 
Both newspapers shared the same pattern of peace journalism implementation. The findings revealed 
that the number of peace journalism indicators found was the lowest in the coverage of arsenal raid 
incident. This was also the incident in which war journalism elements exceeded peace journalism 
elements in the conflict coverage. The arsenal raid incident was considered the first incident that 
marked the start of the current southern insurgency, when the Thai state was under attack on a scale 
that had never happened before. This goes some way to explaining why war journalism features, such 
as the visible effects of war (WJ2) and elite-oriented (WJ3), were found throughout the coverage of 
this incident by both newspapers. At the time when the incident took place, the Thai government and 
the media struggled to find out what was happening and who the attackers behind the incident were. 
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The interviews suggested that, because the Thai media did not know the full implication of the arsenal 
raid incident and the Thai government was reluctant to admit that the incident was a part of the 
southern conflict, most of the media covered the incident as a 'crime' story. The findings show that the 
coverage relied heavily on the authorities as the main news sources, and the labels used to describe the 
actors were mostly action-based terms. 
 
The Kruese Mosque incident and the Takbai demonstration were considered to be the most shocking 
incidents of the southern insurgency. They were also the incidents that involved the most excessive use 
of force by the Thai government, which resulted in heavy damage to lives and society, and wide 
criticism of the government on human rights issues. Information gained from the journalists and editors 
interviewed in this study suggested that these two incidents changed the way both newspapers reported 
the southern conflict; both newspapers started to question the government's administration and to seek 
truth and sources from somewhere else. For that reason, the study found that the number of peace 
journalism indicators increased substantially in the coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident, while the 
gap between war and peace journalism elements found in both newspapers was at its widest in the 
coverage of the Takbai demonstration incident, suggesting that it was during the reporting of this 
incident that both newspapers applied a peace journalism approach in the highest degree. 
 
The religious implication of the Kruese Mosque incident was also reflected in the labels used to 
describe the actors. It was also during the reporting of this incident when 'religious' qualifiers such as 
'Muslims' or 'Islamic' were used to the highest degree, while the actors were referred to mostly with 
'insurgent-related' terms. It was also in the coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident that the two 
English-language newspapers started to include all sides involved in the conflict, especially the sides 
that criticised the southern administration of the Thai government such as the 'opposition', 
'organisation' and 'foreign source' categories, as well as the sides considered as having expertise on the 
southern conflict including cultural and religious issues, such as the 'religious group' and 'academics' 
categories. The violent situations of the Kruese Mosque and Takbai demonstration incidents opened up 
opportunities for all of the sides involved in the conflict to assert their voices on the conflict scene. 
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Based on these findings, I can conclude that the intensity and length of the conflict affected the 
implementation of peace journalism practices by the two newspapers, including the use of news 
sources, news actors and labels. The situation of these incidents, especially the Kruese Mosque and 
Takbai demonstration incidents, brought about a change in the reporting styles of both newspapers 
because they not only confirmed to the Thai public that the southern violence had returned, but they 
also showed the flaws in the government’s southern administration. Because of this, both newspapers 
began to implement an investigative style of reporting. The findings of this study confirm this point as 
the peace features found in the conflict coverage increased gradually. Nevertheless, it is necessary for 
me to acknowledge here that this study only explored the coverage of the southern conflict over a 
specific period of time, and the findings can, therefore, only be applied under this context.   
 
 D) 'High authority' was the main news actor and news source but the 'voices' of the voiceless 
 were included in the conflict coverage to a large degree. 
The results from the analysis of news actors and news sources help to understand the dynamics of the 
southern conflict by showing the degree of prominence given to the sides involved in the conflict, and 
their contribution of information to the conflict coverage. Apart from the 'high authority' and 'local' 
categories, which were found to be the first and second most frequently used news actors and sources 
respectively, other categories identified in the reporting include 'opposition', 'official source', 'local 
authority', 'foreign source', 'academic', 'organisation' and 'religious group'. 
 
In the analysis, I looked at the sources of the news (by name), and the number of times (frequency) that 
the sources in the same category were mentioned. The study revealed that the 'high authority' category 
was presented as the most credible news source and news actor in the coverage of the three incidents 
by both newspapers. This also confirms the notion of 'news value' of Galtung and Ruge (1965), which 
stated that one of the contributing factors to newsworthiness is when the elite and the powerful are 
mentioned. Also, because no sides claimed to be responsible for the violent incidents when it first 
started, the media had to rely on 'high authority' as a source of information. However, it is surprising to 
see that the 'local' category was given the second highest prominence, which suggests that at least some 
degree of peace journalism, with its focus on people, was put into practice by both newspapers right 
from the first year of their reporting on the southern conflict. The study found that both newspapers 
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used the 'local' category accounted for the highest number of sources, but 'high authority' was the 
source that was mentioned most frequently in the news. This can be related to Becker’s (1967) notion 
of ‘hierarchy of credibility’, which explains that the people who are at the top of a social or 
institutional hierarchy are assumed to have greater credibility and access to correct information than 
those among the bottom ranks. The main people from the 'high authority' group were the Prime 
Minister, the Deputy Minister, the Defence Minister and the Army Commander. The 'local' category 
refers to the people who were directly affected by the violent incidents and the people who live in the 
area where the violent incidents took place. 
 
Nevertheless, the study on the conflict coverage of the Thai-language newspapers by Changkamol 
(2013) revealed different results, concluding that the voices of the voiceless were not considered as 
news source in the Thai newspapers. This important point cannot be applied to the English-language 
newspapers. On the contrary, both newspapers under this study applied peace journalism's people-
oriented element in their conflict coverage. The use of the 'local' category as news actors and sources 
gradually increased in the coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident and the later Takbai demonstration 
incident, which were the two incidents that most directly affected people's lives. Moreover, the study 
found that all of the categories that criticised the Thai government, such as 'opposition', 'foreign source' 
and 'organisation', in addition to sources that have expertise on the southern conflict, such as 
'academics', were engaged in the conflict coverage by both newspapers, which shows how both 
newspapers attributed news space to other sides involved in or affected by the conflict. The analysis of 
the distribution of news sources and news actors confirmed the findings from the content analysis that 
'multiparty-orientation' (PJ7) and 'people-oriented' (PJ3) features were the main peace journalism 
features applied by both newspapers.  
 
 E) The labels used in Bangkok Post are more neutral than labels used in The Nation. 
Based on the findings, the study found that both newspapers mostly focused on the violent nature of the 
conflict when describing the southern conflict phenomenon, using labels such as 'violence in the South' 
and 'southern violence'. In the analysis of the labels of the three incidents, the study found that both 
newspapers described the incidents as 'attacks' on the Thai state, and 'clashes' between two sides. Both 
newspapers shared the same main labels in describing the three incidents, but The Nation used a wider 
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range of labels and qualifiers than Bangkok Post, while Bangkok Post was more consistent in its choice 
of labels. It was also observed that the labels used by The Nation emphasised the misuse of power by 
the authorities and the seriousness of the situation through the use of labels such as 'the killings' or 'the 
massacre', which signified the attempt of The Nation to challenge the authorities and call for justice for 
the victims. On the other hand, Bangkok Post tended to use words with more neutral meaning; emotive 
labels were found in the Bangkok Post too, but at a lower rate of occurrence. 
 
The findings from the analysis of labels used to describe the actors indicate that both newspapers 
mainly described the actors with two types of labels: action-based and insurgent-related terms. Action-
based terms describe the actors through their actions such as 'attackers', 'raider' and 'protesters'. 
Insurgent-related terms describe the actors with a sense of military action and insurgency, such as 
'militants', 'insurgents' and 'separatists'. Compared to other types of labels, The Nation used insurgent-
related terms in the highest degree, while Bangkok Post described the actors with both terms. The study 
found six types of qualifiers attached to the main labels: 'age', 'action', 'location', 'religion', 'neutral' and 
'negative'. The most used qualifiers were 'religion' qualifiers, such as 'Muslims' and 'Islamic', which 
were found in The Nation twice as often as in the coverage of Bangkok Post. These qualifiers can 
create the sense of 'us and them' between the readers and the southern locals because the stress on the 
difference, especially the religious aspect of the actors, can affect the negative feeling from both sides. 
 
The answers from the semi-structured interviews with journalists and editors can explain the choice of 
labels by both newspapers. Bangkok Post depended highly on official sources, and thus the labels used 
to describe the incidents and actors were the same as the labels used in the official documents. On the 
other hand, The Nation is an umbrella organisation operated with a central-pool system, meaning that 
one news piece can be edited by different media under the same organisation before sending it back to 
the pool system. Because of this editing system, various types of labels and qualifiers were found from 
the conflict coverage. In my observation, the language used in The Nation was less consistent and more 
emotive than the language in Bangkok Post. This point leads us back to the findings from the analysis 
of WJ/PJ indicators whereby, compared to the coverage of Bangkok Post, more war journalism 
language-based indicators were found in The Nation. The findings from the analysis of labels proved 
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that despite the higher number of peace journalism news stories in The Nation, one of the factors that 
limited the application of peace journalism to its full extent was its use of language items.  
 
RQ2: To what extent do the two newspapers follow war oriented and/or peace oriented 
approaches in covering the southern conflict?  
Based on the findings, it can be concluded that both newspapers engaged both war and peace 
journalism approaches in their reporting of the southern conflict but the extent of their engagement is 
varied. In comparison to Bangkok Post, The Nation engaged more peace journalism approaches in its 
conflict coverage. 
 
In The Nation's coverage of all three incidents, the number of PJ indicators found was higher than the 
number of WJ indicators, and in the second analysis, the number of peace-oriented articles was also 
higher than the number of war-oriented reports. The main PJ features are multiparty orientation (PJ7), 
focus on the causes and consequences of the conflict (PJ5), and people-oriented (PJ3). The frames most 
frequently applied in The Nation’s coverage were people-oriented, war-oriented and truth-oriented. 
Moreover, the findings from the analysis of news actors and news sources can be used to reaffirm this 
point. The highest number of 'local' news actors and news source was found in The Nation’s coverage, 
even though the newspaper gave the most prominence (frequency of occurrence) to 'high authority'. 
The prominence of the 'local' category as news actors and news sources came second to 'high 
authority', which suggests that apart from people in positions of authority, The Nation gave a high 
degree of prominence to people in the 'local' category. However, The Nation fell short in the analysis of 
labels used in describing the southern conflict incidents and actors. Compared to Bangkok Post, it used 
more emotive and sensational language. This study found a high number of 'insurgent-related' terms 
and 'religion' qualifiers, which stress the difference between 'us’ and ‘them'.  
 
As for Bangkok Post, the findings suggest that it engaged both war and peace approaches in its 
reporting. However, when compared to The Nation, Bangkok Post engaged fewer peace journalism 
elements in its conflict coverage. The main peace journalism indicators found in Bangkok Post were 
multiple orientation (PJ7) and people-oriented (PJ3). Other than this, the representation of the conflict 
was engaged very much within a war journalism approach because the highest number of indicators 
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found were elite-oriented (WJ3) and the focus on the visible effects of war (WJ2), which demonstrated 
the high dependence on people in positions of authority as main actors and sources as well as the focus 
on the visible damage to lives and property aspect of the conflict. In the second analysis, articles 
written under a war-oriented frame were found in the highest numbers, followed by those with people-
oriented and truth-oriented frames. However, this does not mean that Bangkok Post's representation of 
the conflict was largely governed by a WJ frame. The study demonstrated an increase in the 
implementation of peace journalism elements during the coverage of the three incidents. Unlike The 
Nation, the use of WJ indicators and frames was clearly seen in Bangkok Post. The findings from the 
analysis of news actors and sources can be used to support this point since 'high authority' was found in 
the highest number in the coverage, followed by 'official', which indicates that the most prominence 
was given to people in positions of authority. Lastly, in the analysis of labels, Bangkok Post's labels 
were more in neutral compared to those of The Nation. The reason could be that Bangkok Post 
depended on official sources, so the journalists were more likely to follow the labels used by the 
authorities. 
 
Both newspapers applied both war and peace journalism features into their representation of the 
conflict but, overall, The Nation applied peace journalism to a larger extent than Bangkok Post. More 
features of peace journalism can be seen from The Nation's coverage, while Bangkok Post's 
implementation of peace journalism was clearly seen in its attempt to engage different voices, 
including the voices from the ‘local’ category in the conflict coverage. Nevertheless, the findings 
demonstrate that the solution-oriented element, which is the desired result of peace journalism, was not 
seen in any degree of significance (in my readings, The Nation had more solution-oriented articles than 
Bangkok Post). This result can be used to answer RQ2 that peace journalism was implemented in both 
newspapers to the extent that 'the voices of the voiceless' and 'investigative reporting' were included, 
but the sacred goal of the resolution of the conflict, at this stage, was not clearly seen. 
 
Additionally, the findings prove that my prior assumption was wrong. Before conducting the study, I 
assumed that the conflict coverage would be highly war-oriented and more war journalism elements 
would be found. This assumption was influenced by two main factors: firstly, the study was conducted 
on the southern conflict coverage of the three major violent incidents; and secondly, peace journalism 
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practices had not yet been introduced to the Thai media organisations at the time. It is true that the 
study found a high number of war journalism elements in both newspapers, but the number of peace 
journalism elements identified in the study was surprisingly high, especially the multiparty orientation 
element (PJ7) and the focus on the causes and consequences element (PJ5). This was particularly 
surprising given that the study was based on conflict coverage from the first year of the insurgency. 
Taking these two main elements into consideration leads to the finding that both English-language 
newspapers represented the southern conflict during its first year in a 'fair' manner; that is, all voices 
were included and the causes and consequences were investigated.    
 
However, these elements can also be said to be a part of 'good journalism', which promotes truth, 
fairness, independence and social responsibility to the public. However, the solution-oriented element, 
which is the ultimate goal of peace journalism, was found in only a small degree in the coverage. 
Therefore, it is my argument that despite their different style and format of reporting, the coverage in 
the two English-language newspapers analysed in this study exhibit elements of 'good and quality' 
journalism, which are also components of peace journalism practices. In order to fully implement peace 
journalism, the coverage needs to be developed further to include more solution-orientation elements in 
their reporting.   
 
RQ3: What are the journalists’ and editors’ perceptions of the factors influencing the 
strengths and weaknesses of the conflict coverage? 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to answer RQ3. The findings suggest that different 
factors influenced the strengths and weakness of the southern conflict coverage. Factors contributing to 
weak coverage include safety concerns, inaccurate information and interference from the Bangkok 
Headquarters, while the reporting was strengthened by factors such as support from the organisation 
and the reporters’ level of expertise and experience in covering the southern conflict.  
 
For the weaknesses in the production of news articles in this context, safety concerns are considered an 
important concern of journalists who report violent incidents from the field. The interviews also 
suggested that another problem in covering the southern conflict was that the journalists had 
insufficient continuity in their reporting to develop necessary expertise or specialisms. Only a few 
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journalists have reported on the conflict since it began because many of the journalists were assigned to 
cover other events and news on certain occasions, which means that the responsibility for covering the 
conflict fell on other journalists who sometimes had no background in reporting the conflict. Most 
journalists do not want to go to the conflict area because their lives could be placed at risk. Therefore, 
most of the time, they rely on information from local stringers and official sources.  
 
This leads to the second factor that contributes to the weakness in the coverage: inaccurate information. 
Information from local stringers cannot always be trusted, and journalists have to waste time double-
checking information before writing the articles. Sometimes journalists also have to check whether a 
violent incident is just a normal crime story or a part of the southern conflict. However, journalists 
cannot rely only on information from 'official' or 'high authority' because this will be one-sided and 
biased, and because authorities sometimes conceal information about the incidents. For that reason, 
information gained from either stringers or official sources can prove to be inaccurate, and this is one 
of the weaknesses in the production of southern conflict news.  
 
The third factor is the interference from the Bangkok Headquarters. As discussed earlier in Chapter 7, 
the final stage of news production happens in daily editorial meetings when daily editors make a final 
decision by selecting which issues to highlight and performing the final edit before sending the copy to 
the printing house. The final framing process occurs at this stage; news articles are presented according 
to how the editors responsible for making these decisions perceive them. Consequently, Bangkok 
editors’ perception of the southern conflict and the degree of significance they attach to individual 
events influence the daily production of the conflict coverage. It is also worth mentioning that 
journalists and editors sometimes represent violent incidents from the southern conflict as normal 
'crime' stories'. 
 
On the other hand, major factors influencing the strengths of the conflict coverage were the support 
received from the news organisations and the level of expertise and experience of the journalists who 
cover the conflict. News organisations and their policies have a great influence on the work of their 
journalists. Firstly, the organisations will prioritise whether their journalists have a firm knowledge and 
background of the conflict. These findings suggest that a firm knowledge is crucial because the 
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journalists with knowledge of the conflict will know what to report and what not to report. They are 
able to give the readers the necessary information and background on the conflict. Secondly, the 
organisations can support or fund the training of journalists in covering the southern conflict in order to 
reduce the risk of exacerbating matters, and help journalists improve their conflict reporting skills. 
Since the southern conflict concerns sensitive religious and cultural issues, careful reporting is 
required. It is, therefore, important for news organisations to educate their journalists on peace-oriented 
reporting and investigative journalism.  
 
Another factor influencing the strength of the reporting is the level of expertise and experience of the 
journalists covering the southern conflict. Because of the complicated nature of the conflict and the 
sensitivity of its issues, journalists who cover the conflict are required to have a firm knowledge of the 
background of the conflict. This includes skill in reporting subtle complexities in a responsible manner. 
Most of the 'experienced' journalists are those who stayed on to report on the conflict since the first 
year of the insurgency, which has enabled them to develop a deeper understanding of the dynamics of 
the conflict and continuously improve their skills of conflict reporting over time. These journalists have 
first-hand experience of living in the conflict zone, so they are more sensitive to the conflict and the 
local people, and they have experienced more than just the main issues of the conflict, such as 
religious, cultural, economic and social problems. It is these journalists who can portray the stories 
from the South to the Thai public in a responsible manner. In my view, the conflict coverage can be 
improved and strengthened if journalists report on other issues from the area so that more aspects of the 
wider picture will also be publicised. Therefore, the level of expertise and experience of the journalists 
is important and can benefit and improve the conflict coverage.  
 
RQ4: What can be an alternative way of covering the conflict in this specific context? 
The interview data confirmed that peace journalism is not a new idea for the Thai media (from the 
establishment of the Issara News Center in 2005). It became apparent in the interviews that the 
journalists and editors saw the positive aspects of peace journalism and were thus willing to consider 
how best to incorporate relevant aspects of the peace journalism approach into Thai journalistic 
practices. Most of the recommendations from the interviews are different aspects and features of peace 
journalism. In this sense, the suggestions to improve the quality of the reporting of the southern conflict 
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involve the implementation of peace journalism into the conflict coverage, together with support from 
media people and media organisations at different levels. The findings reveal that the interviewees saw 
the flaws of the Thai media in reporting the conflict, and they accordingly suggested alternative ways 
to improve the conflict coverage. 
 
First of all, at the individual level, journalists who cover the southern conflict news should have a firm 
knowledge of the southern conflict and of conflict reporting, especially on how to report a conflict 
fairly without escalating the violence. Efforts need to be made to continue developing journalism’s 
social responsibility role, including providing the public with correct information and the background 
of the conflict in order to create a better understanding, and to lessen prejudice in Thai society 
regarding the issues at stake. Journalists need to be aware that they should not cover the southern 
conflict news in the same way as when reporting other 'crime' news because of the sensitivity of the 
religious and cultural issues.  It is also worth mentioning that the findings from the content analysis 
suggest that 'multiparty-orientation' (PJ7) and 'people-oriented' (PJ3) were two of the main features of 
peace journalism found in this study, which indicates that some aspects of PJ were successfully applied 
in the conflict coverage. Therefore, journalists should be encouraged to include some other aspects of 
PJ into their conflict coverage in order to improve its quality. Journalists should be aware that they can 
be a part of this peace process by performing a pro-active role in seeking solutions to the conflict, 
which is regarded as the ultimate goal of peace journalism. 
 
Secondly, Thai news editors need to be aware of the seriousness of the southern conflict and the 
sensitivity of the issues involved. The interviewees suggested that one of the limitations in reporting on 
the southern conflict is the interference from the Bangkok Headquarters. In the news production 
process, for example, the selection of stories, the writing of headlines, and the allocation of news space 
all happen during the editorial meetings in Bangkok. As a result, the draft reports provided by the 
journalists could be highlighted or ignored at this stage. In order to improve the conflict coverage, the 
Bangkok-based editors’ and sub-editors’ awareness of the conflict should be improved. It is important 
that they have a clear understanding of the southern conflict’s significance to Thai society so as to 
lessen their negative perceptions. The news managers can do their part by encouraging the journalists 
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to write articles on social and cultural issues, and by allocating more news space to the southern 
conflict news.  
 
Furthermore, media organisations should provide more funding for skills training, and for sending 
journalists to the conflict zone. According to the journalists and editors interviewed in this study, the 
conflict reporting skills and level of experience of the journalists who cover the southern conflict is 
important, as is their knowledge of the background of the southern conflict. Reporters need to be 
trained not only in how to report violence in a sensitive manner — the do’s and don’ts of peace 
journalism — but also in how to conduct themselves in conflict zones so as to reduce the risks to their 
own personal safety. Reporting from the field will help them understand the conflict better, and they 
would be able to provide insights into the lives of the local Muslim community, religious and cultural 
aspects, economic aspects and other social problems. In this sense, journalists who have first-hand 
experience of conflict zones will become more sensitive and thus better able to portray these issues to 
the Thai public.  
 
 8.2 Significance of the study 
  8.2.1 Limitations of the study 
As mentioned in Chapter 5 (5.4), this study has several limitations in its methodology and empirical 
analysis. Although I believe the findings have demonstrated that the chosen methods were sufficient to 
address the research questions in meaningful ways, it is, nevertheless, necessary to discuss the 
limitations of the research.  
 
With regard to the limitations in the methodology, while the with qualitative and quantitative 
approaches employed in the content analysis may have delivered result that were rich and diverse, there 
is no guarantee that other researchers would achieve the same results due to the subjective form of 
analysis. For the limitations in the scope and data, this research is a micro study that explored the 
southern conflict coverage of the two English-language newspapers in Thailand over a specific period. 
Consequently, the results can only be applied under the specific context of this study, and not to the 
larger context of the Thai media. The findings reveal evidence of peace journalism elements in both of 
the English-language newspapers under scrutiny; however, the findings could have been different if, 
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for example, more newspapers had been studied, the timeline had been extended, or other types of data 
(e.g., photos, charts) had been included in the analysis.  
 
Lastly, semi-structured interviews also have certain limitations. As I mentioned in Chapter 5 (5.4), the 
flexibility of the method can lessen the reliability of the data; the information I gained depends on the 
honesty of the interviewees; and the analysis depends on the experience and skills of me as a 
researcher. It is important to acknowledge that my background as a researcher from Bangkok  
did not affect the results of the study, and it is my best intention to remain as neutral as possible during 
the research process. The limited number of journalists interviewed must also be acknowledged. This 
study involved seven interviewed subjects with the aim of seeking an explanation for how and why the 
two English-language newspapers reported on the three major incidents in 2004 as part of their conflict 
coverage. The subjects interviewed in this study are experienced journalists and editors who had been 
reporting on the conflict since it first started in 2004; therefore, it is my stance that the information I 
gained from the interviews is sufficient to answer the research questions and to explain the results from 
the content analysis. 
 
  8.2.2 Implications of the study for future research 
It is my hope that my research can serve as a foundation for future studies in the areas of reporting on 
Thailand’s southern conflict and of peace journalism. Future studies may consider the use of different 
methods, such as Fairclough (1995)'s Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), to explore individual news 
texts in greater linguistic detail. A more traditional content analysis could also be used, particularly for 
a longitudinal study involving a larger number of news stories. Future studies may also consider 
applying the two methods used in this research with different types of data or in different conflict 
settings.  
 
The limitations discussed earlier can be taken as a basis for developing an alternative approach to open 
up new lines of enquiry. For instance, the scope and timeline of my research study can be extended by 
either looking at different events and times, or at different types of data, such as photos or editorial 
pieces. In order to examine different journalistic practices, for example, new studies might consider 
Thai-language newspapers, vernacular-language newspapers, or reports from foreign news agencies. 
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Particular attention may be directed towards considering, amongst other issues, whether such news 
organisations afford more opportunities to develop new, alternative types of reporting with the 
potential to contribute more effectively to conflict reconciliation than the two newspapers examined in 
this study. These are only some of the possible areas for future studies in peace journalism and conflict 
reporting. 
 
  8.2.3 Contribution of the study  
This study endeavoured to contribute to the existing knowledge in media research on two levels. 
Firstly, it aimed to provide insights into the application of peace journalism in the Thai context. Peace 
journalism is an approach developed in the Western world and this research has considered its 
application in the context of the news reporting of Thailand’s southern conflict. The data were drawn 
from the Thai media, which allowed the investigation of peace journalism and its application from a 
non-Western perspective. The social, cultural and media institutions in Thailand are distinct from those 
in other parts of the world. Thus, it can be said that this study provides new knowledge and a wider 
understanding of peace journalism in a part of the world where the nature of the conflict is different 
and the media institutions operate differently. The findings indicate the limitations of peace journalism 
practices in this context, which will lead to my proposal of specific recommendations in the next 
section.  
 
In addition, unlike other studies on peace journalism that applied Galtung's (1986; 1998) 13 WJ/PJ 
indicators as a quantitative mode of analysis, such as in the research of Lee and Maslog (2005) and 
(Lee 2010), this study also applied Galtung's four broad orientations of war and peace journalism 
(1998) as a second mode of analysis for looking into the war and peace frames used in news reports, an 
also included an analysis of the news actors, news sources, and labels on the incidents and actors. The 
categorisation of the news articles into war, peace and balanced news stories based only on the 
frequency of  war and peace features may not be sufficient. As framing theory forms the foundation of 
peace journalism (Lee and Maslog 2005; McMahon and Chow-White 2011; Fong 2009; Ross 2007), I 
see the importance of looking into the frames when writing news articles and so this study applied the 
four broad war and peace frames to add qualitative elements to it, which can also help with cross-
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checking and validating the data. It can be stated that I applied both quantitative and qualitative forms 
of analysis into the study of peace journalism in the context of this study.  
  
Secondly, this study contributes an insight into an often-overlooked aspect of the Thai media – that is, 
English-language newspapers. As previously mentioned, most studies on the Thai media and the 
reporting of the southern conflict have focused on the Thai-language media; therefore, this study can 
fill this gap. The emphasis here was to examine how the two main English-language newspapers in 
Thailand have reported Thailand’s southern conflict, and to understand the reasons behind their 
editorial choices and the news production processes. Despite the amount of war journalism elements 
found in the two newspapers under scrutiny in the study, the number of peace journalism elements was 
surprisingly higher than expected. This finding is in contrast to the previous researches on Thai-
language newspapers (Changkamol 2013; Kularb 2013), which found a high number of war journalism 
features in the conflict reporting. 
 
The findings indicate that both English-language newspapers employed certain aspects of peace 
journalism and have represented the southern conflict in a more balanced manner than is outwardly 
apparent. The study’s findings add to the academic knowledge on the problems associated with the 
reporting on this specific conflict; that is, despite the criticism of the Thai media and the reporting of 
the southern conflict, the English-language newspapers – as part of the Thai media – were proven to 
have an inclination towards peace journalism approaches to reporting. The reasons for this are that both 
English-language newspapers practice 'objective' journalism to international standards (McCargo 
2000), that they both encourage the engagement of all sides in the coverage, and that they are 
committed to producing quality news that includes investigate journalism. It is also hoped that other 
media practitioners and policy-makers use the journalistic practices of the two newspapers under 
scrutiny as a starting point to find ways of incorporating more peace journalism practices into the wider 
Thai media. 
 
 8.3 Recommendations  
With the aim of bringing an end to Thailand’s southern conflict, peace talks have been taking place 
since 2013.  Even though the process was disrupted by the change of government in 2014, the efforts 
	 257	
from all sides to end the 10-year-long conflict have given hope to all Thais that one day the southern 
region could return to peace. The peace process requires support from various groups in Thai society, 
namely the Thai government, official local agencies, local authorities, academics, religious groups, 
government and non-government organisations, the media agencies, and especially the Thai public. At 
the media level, peace journalism is seen as one of the main factors that can help promote this peace 
process, or at least, foster the idea of educating the public on the conflict and other social and cultural 
issues. In this way, the Thai media could help in creating better understanding in Thai society, which 
can further lead to public support for peace. The findings of the research highlight a range of 
possibilities and problems in reporting the southern conflict and the implementation of peace 
journalism into Thai media practices. Recommendations can be made from these findings, which will 
be presented at four levels: the Thai government, media organisations, journalists and the public. 
 
The Thai government can help support media institutions in promoting the notion of 'peace' journalism, 
and in encouraging the media to improve their conflict coverage in a way that can help to bring about a 
peaceful solution to the conflict, rather than exacerbating the situation. The Thai media play an 
important role, not only in providing the Thai public with information on the southern conflict, but also 
in influencing public opinion to either support or oppose the government's southern policy. For that 
reason, in this peace process, the government needs the media, as well as other agencies in society, to 
help contribute to bringing about a resolution to the conflict. The interviews undertaken for this study 
suggested that non-governmental organisations, such as the Issara News Center (INC) or the Thai 
Journalists Association (TJA), do not have sufficient funding or support from the government and so 
are unable to implement peace journalism practices to their full extent. Therefore, it is important that 
the government see the importance of these media agencies and support them in promoting peace 
journalism so that the quality of the Thai media in general and the conflict coverage in particular can be 
improved.  
 
At the media level, the findings suggest the need for media organisations to enhance the sense of social 
responsibility in their journalistic practices, for example, by encouraging their journalists to provide 
facts from all sides of the conflict, and not just from those in positions of authority; or by providing 
background on the conflict so that the public can have a better understanding of its structural causes 
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and how they might be addressed. This will lead to fairer and more balanced news coverage. News 
organisations can enhance their social responsibility by improving the quality of their reporting in 
accordance with the public interest. The interviews suggested that journalists who have first-hand 
experience are more sensitive to the conflict and to the locals; therefore, support and funding from the 
organisations to send their reporters to the conflict zone can also help in creating more valuable human 
resources. Media organisations can also encourage their journalists by giving more space in their 
newspapers to the social and cultural aspects of the conflict so that journalists can provide alternative 
types of information with the aim of widening the perspectives of their readers.  
 
For the journalists, they should be aware that the Thai public still lacks adequate knowledge about the 
complicated background and history of the southern conflict, and so it is their responsibility to give a 
fair, balanced and accurate view of the conflict. Since the public gains much of its knowledge and 
information from the media, the way that journalists report issues can influence the public’s 
perspectives about the crisis and how it may be resolved. The interviews from this research suggest that 
the way in which the journalists write their reports is entirely dependent on the individual journalists in 
terms of their personal knowledge of the issues and their skills in conflict reporting. While journalists 
may have different personal perspectives on the issues of the conflict, they have to be careful how they 
report them because their coverage may affect the locals and the perception of the general Thai public. 
Because the southern conflict involves sensitivity on historical, religious and cultural issues, it is 
necessary for the journalists who cover the conflict to have a firm knowledge and understanding of the 
background of the conflict, and on how to report the conflict without worsening the situation. The Thai 
media were criticised before as one of the factors worsening the situation. The idea of peace journalism 
is helpful in this regard, offering as it does a basis for reconsidering traditional practice in order to 
deliver balanced and fair reporting, with the ultimate goal of offering a solution to the conflict. In this 
sense, journalists not only act as a medium, but can also act as one of the factors in the peace process.  
 
The public can help media organisations maintain standards and credibility in their journalistic 
practices by voicing their concerns when they see a biased report or articles that carry inaccurate 
information. In addition, the advancement of media technology and social networks these days has 
opened up ways for the public to become part of citizen journalism by reporting on events and opening 
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up public comments on social issues. In the same way as the media, the public should be aware of the 
effects of the information they share on social media. The use of social media and the information these 
channels provide have raised ethical issues that are much-debated topics for public discussions these 
days, ironically, often on the social media that have become so pervasive in modern society. On the 
other hand, the public also have the power to perform the role of monitoring the media and demanding 
that the media perform their duties responsibly and in a way that serves the public interest. The public 
can help monitor the work of the media by revealing any improper conduct if found, and supporting 
those news organisations that are committed to a high standard of social responsibility and morality in 
their profession. 
  
There is clear evidence to suggest that peace journalism can be implemented into Thai media practices. 
The effort to engage with its tenets has been received positively, as shown by this study. The 
journalists and editors who participated in the interviews expressed strong support for the idea. 
However, this does not mean that it will not be a formidable challenge to implement alternative, 
people-centred forms of reporting. As the findings indicate, peace journalism has been implemented in 
Thai journalistic practices since the first year of the southern conflict, but the goal of solution-
orientation is yet to be achieved. As we have seen, there are several structural and operational 
limitations that stop Thai journalistic institutions from embracing peace journalism in a more 
wholesome manner, and it is important that the government, media organisations, journalists and the 
public work together to overcome these and promote meaningful and viable peace practi
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since the reign of King Rama V corrupted the purity of Islam. He was famous for issuing the ‘seven 
demands’: which called for power to be devolved to the Malay Muslims in the region. He was arrested 
in 1948 and murdered in 1954, after being released (Aphornsuvan 2007, 2008; Funston 2008). 
18 The Dusun Ngor rebellion in 26-28 April 1948 lasted for two days and involved around 1,000 men in 
anopen battle. The clash caused the deaths of at least 400 Malay Muslims and 30 policemen. It also 
resulted in the release on bail of Haji Sulong. According to Aphornsuvan (2008), the Thai authorities 
viewed the events as a ‘rebellion’; however, Malay Muslims referred to it as ‘perang’ or ‘kebangkitan’: 
meaning war. 
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19 The Civilian-Police-Military Command 43 (CPM 43) was based in Yala in order to reduce the 
military’s power and give the civilian and police a wider security role. CPM 43 was a part of the 
Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC). The Southern Border Province Administration Centre 
(SBPAC) was created as a part of a Centre for Coordination of Southern Affairs in Yala, but increased 
its role and power over time. It used to be under the Fourth Army Commander; then the Ministry of the 
Interior, headed by the deputy permanent secretary. The SBPAC acted as a medium between the Malay 
Muslims and the government. It set up institutionalised consultation with local Muslims, organised 
seminars and provided new administrators in the region. 
20 Jitpiromsri and McCargo (2010 p.180) argued that it is true that some violent incidents in the region 
can be explained as ordinary crime; but the way in which the government denied the reality of the 
insurgency is entirely pointless. The attackers lack a united sense of their objectives: which range from 
a separate Patani state, to some form of autonomy, or simply a desire to lash out at Thai rule. In this 
way, the political offensive from the state could undermine the will of the militants to continue their 
struggle. 
21 The Nation, 2005. Takbai and Kruese official report, The Nation [online]. Available from: 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/takbai/p2.htm [Accessed 6 December 2013].  
22 Berjihad di Pattani (The struggle for Patani) was described as a distorted version of the Koran and 
false interpretation of orthodox Islam: prescribing a programme of radical insurgency as a religious 
duty for youth. The document was written in 2002 in Yawi script. The authors of the leaflet announced 
jihad against the Thai state by urging Muslims to take up armed struggle and fight for separatism. It 
was taken as the only authentic, detailed proof of the radical Muslim militant movement in the southern 
conflict (Sagunnasil 2006). However, Islamic leaders in southern Thailand firmly rejected radical Islam 
(Albritton 2010). Cline (2007, p. 280) highlighted that “The document also directs that ‘hypocritical’ 
Muslims should be attacked along with Thai security forces. Significantly, it does not mention global 
sufferings of the Muslim community (the umma), or the creation of a regional caliphate; instead, it 
focuses solely on local issues, albeit in more intensified religious terms.” 
23 Aphornsuvan (2008) noted that Kruese resulted in a revival of the 56-years-old Dusun ngor uprising 
among the public. The date, their weapon of choice (primarily knives and machetes), and their 
willingness to use their weapons against guns showed that they were willing to die fighting as martyrs 
(Satha-Anand 2006). The attack on the mosque by the state officials “…has cut into cultural ties that 
bind together peoples of differences in a political community… Once broken, these ties will be difficult 
to mend” (Satha-Anand 2006, p. 24). 
24 Funston (2008, p. 29). 
24 Funston (2008); Cline (2007). 
26 Wahhabism is a conservative and intolerant form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia 
27 The ‘Network Monarchy’ is a set of power structures linked to the palace. In his theory, McCargo 
(2006b) argued that Thaksin was engaged in a competition for power within the monarchical 
institution; and that he used the southern conflict as a battleground for this. “The South” was no longer 
about the South: it was about the legitimacy of the Thaksin government, and of the Thai state itself.” 
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28 These included an academic, Srisompob Jitpiromsri; former NRC members, including Gothom 
Ariya; academic philosopher, Mark Tamthai; and former deputy NSC chief, Jiraporn Bunnag; former 
NRC vice chair and leading social critic, Prawase Wasi; ex-premier, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh; and 
former interior minister Chalerm Yubamrung (McCargo 2010, p.279). 
29 Hassan Taib from BRN led the talks; while the Thai government's team was led by the Secretary-
General of the National Security Council, Lieutenant General Paradon Pattanatabut: tasked by Prime 
Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Hassan demanded Thailand to withdraw troops from the south, to give 
an amnesty for insurgents and to declare the area a special administrative zone.  
Available from: http://www.xingyimax.com/wiki/?title=South_Thailand_insurgency [Accessed 12 
June 2014]. 
30 Corben, R., 2013. Thailand Looks to Restart Southern Peace Talks, Despite Little Progress. VOA 
news [online], 30 October 2013. Available from http://www.voanews.com/content/thailand-looks-
restart-southern-peace-talks-despite-little-progress/1779764.html [Accessed 4 December 2013].  
31 Bangkok Post., 2014. Opinion: Back to the Peace Talks, Bangkok Post [online], 4 March 2014. 
Available from: http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/398044/back-to-the-peace-talks. 
[Accessed 23 April 2014].  
32 From a public discussion of civil society, "On the (Peace) Road Again: Pa(t)tani in New Conditions": 
Wanpen Khongkachonkiet, the Director of the Cross Cultural Foundation, proposed that the martial 
law should be lifted to open up talking space; Asst. Prof. Bussabong Chaijaroenwatana, Director of the 
Institute for Peace Studies, Prince of Songkla University, put forward that local people are interested in 
the peace talk and that public participation is needed in the peace process. From Deep South Watch. 
2014. On the (Peace) Road Again: Pa(t)tani in New Conditions. Deep South Watch [online], 18 
December 2014. Available from: http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/6548 [Accessed 12 February 
2015]. 
33 In 2014, there were a total of 806 violent incidents happened with 341 deaths and 672 casualties. 
From Deep South Incident Database (DSID), 2015. Deep South Watch [online]. Available from: 
http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/dsj/6631 [Accessed 12 February 2015]. 34	Currently, Thailand is under the 2014 interim Constitution under General Prayuth Chan-ocha, who 
led the coup against Yingluck Shinawatra's government in 22 May 2014. This Constitution then 
replaced the 2007 Constitution, and was drafted without public consultation. 	
35 Lèse-majesté in French means ‘the crime violating the majesty’. In Thailand the monarchy is a 
highly respected institution, and defamation of the Royal Family is an offence. This law is generally 
respected by all Thais (Article 19 2009; Paireepairit 2012). 
36 The Thai monarchy and the military have a close relationship. The Thai military culture has been 
established on the foundation of respect and protection for the monarchy, the King does not have an 
executive power over the Thai politic but has a high symbolic power to the Thai society and the Thai 
military as a whole (Chongkittitavorn 2010). The Thai army sometimes intervened in the Thai politic, 
the 2006 and the 2014 coups can best support this point.   
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37 Supinya Klangnarong, the Secretary General of the campaign for Popular Media Reform (CPMR) 
and editor of Thai Post, was sued in October 2003 with other two editors, on the basis of her interview 
published in the Thai Post, which related to Thaksin and the profit his Shin Corp made during that 
period. The case has brought worldwide condemnations from organisations such the International 
Federation of Journalists (IFJ), the Committee for the protection of Journalists (CPJ), Human Rights 
Watch (HRW), SEAPA and the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) (Article 19 2009, p.81-83). 
38 Thammasathien (2010) claimed that deception and inaccurate information is a constant problem for 
covering the southern conflict as the dangerous situation led the Thai press to rely more on government 
sources, thus created a credibility issue with the locals. The information from the local stringers cannot 
be trusted since they are not journalists by profession and they often act to their own self-interest. Also, 
no more reporters are sent to the south except for a special report on some occasions. Some editors 
claimed that there is no new angle of the southern conflict to present to the public and that the stories 
become repetitive.  
39 In The Structure of Foreign News, Galtung and Ruge (1965), identified 5 key factors of 
newsworthiness in the coverage of international conflict in the Norwegian press. Threshold (a big story 
that has extreme effects on a large number of people); Negativity (Bad news is more exciting); 
Frequency (events that occurs suddenly and fit well with the news organisation’s schedule); 
Unexpectedness (the unordinary event that will have a great effect); Unambiguity (events with clear 
implications make better copy). Later, Galtung (1998) adopted this basic insight to propose a ‘four-
factor news communication model’. Negative events, befalling elite individuals in elite countries, were 
top stories. Positive processes, benefiting non-elite groups in non-elite countries, were non-stories. 
40 Which are: level of conflict escalation; the cognitive framework of the conflict; entanglement in the 
conflict; societal belief; text genre; and the audience and its interpretation of journalism. 
41 In her Master thesis, Kanwerayothin (2006) studied the performance of INC by focusing on the 
coverage of two hostage incidents in 2005 and 2006 and found that the INC encountered problems of 
human resources, capacity and a lack of understanding of peace journalism. However, this did not 
mean that the idea of peace journalism had failed. The findings suggested that this was because the idea 
of peace journalism is still new in Thailand, and many reporters and journalists do not understand it 
very well, and were still used to their style of reporting in a sensationalist way. These journalists had a 
strong commitment and tie with their newspapers, which resulted in their lack of commitment to the 
centre and the responsibility to promote peace journalism.  
42 Deep South Watch: About section. Deep South Watch [online]. Available from: 
http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/about [Accessed 23 October 2014].  
43 Deep South Journalism School Website. Deep South Watch [online]. Available from: 
http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/dsj [Accessed 23 October 2014]. 44	'International' topic refers to news on the southern conflict from International perspectives.  45	The Dusun ngor incident in 1948 is considered to be one of the violent incidents that happened in the 
history of Thailand's southern conflict. It was a battle between the state and the local people that caused 
the deaths of around 400 locals and 30 policemen. 	
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46 That is, the study found no indicator of PJ11 (avoidance of victimising language), one indicator of 
PJ13 (avoidance of emotive words), and 13 indicators of PJ12 (avoidance of demonising language). 
47 Examples of headlines from the arsenal raid incident in Bangkok Post that have WJ3 (elite-oriented) 
as one of the indicators: 
 - PM lambastes army, Wan Nor (2/132, 5th January 2004)   
 - New command post to be set up: Defence minister wants full-scale   
  force (4/132, 6th January 2004) 
 - Deadline: 7 days to catch raiders: Angry Thaksin sends ministers    
  back South (8/132, 7th January 2004) 
             -             Thaksin says martial law necessary: Denies investment will be   
  affected (26/132, 10th January 2004)  
 - PM to develop 3 provinces: Shots in arm for Yala, Narathiwat,   
  Pattani (31/132, 11th January)  
 
48 Examples of headlines from the arsenal raid incident in Bangkok Post that have WJ5 (focus on here 
and now) as one of the indicators: 
 - Soldiers die, schools burn: Arms stockpile stolen; martial law    
  declared (1/132, 5th January 2004)  
 - Bombs explode in Pattani: Disposal experts die defusing explosive   
  (3/132, 6th January 2004)  
 - Police station attacked: ‘Hell tour’ patrols take on insurgents 
  (12/132, 8th January 2004)  
 
49 Examples of headlines from the arsenal raid incident in Bangkok Post that have PJ3 (people-
oriented) as one of the indicators: 
 - Sixth-graders greet news of trip to capital 
   (23/132, 9th January 2004)  
 - Muslims upset over arrest of teachers 
   (25/132, 10th January 2004) 
 - Released Islamic teacher insists he is not a terrorist 
   (34/132, 11th January 2004) 
 
50 As mentioned earlier, the Kruese Mosque incident represented an attack on the Thai state when 
Muslim assailants planned coordinated attacks on 11 government and police outposts across the region. 
However, the difference was that the incident ended when the assailants retreated to Kruese Mosque 
and were later killed by the Thai army. The incident caused wide public criticism as it contained 
religious undertones when the Thai army killed the Muslim attackers in the holy mosque of the region. 
Because of the nature of the incident, Bangkok Post changed its style of reporting to include more PJ 
indicators.  
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51 Examples of headlines from the Kruese Mosque incident in Bangkok Post that have PJ7 (multiparty 
orientation) as one of the indicators: 
Voices of the local people 
 - Woman’s prayers answered: Spared from an agonising death     
  (38/132, 29th April 2004) 
  - Families of slain deny rebel links (52/132, 30th April 2004)  
  - Bereaved families struggle to explain what went wrong  
   (54/132, 1st May 2004)  
  - Widow of slain Muslim wonders how to bring up four children:   
    Jobless, and a fifth child due next month (88/132, 5th May 2004)  
Voices from the Muslim community  
  - Muslims say mosque storming ‘overreaction’: Will lead to further   
    violence, they predict (45/132, 30th April 2004) 
Voices from the human rights organisation/international organisation 
  - Rights group calls for govt investigation: Troops’ use of lethal force   
   questioned (48/132, 30th April 2004) 
  - UN rights chief urges probe: Treaties cite ban on use of excessive   
   force  (57/132, 1st May 2004) 
Voices from the opposition/senators 
        -      Senators want PM to give explanation: To submit motion seeking   
  answers  (70/132, 2nd May 2004)  
  - Chaun slams comparison of mosque, hospital standoff  
   (71/132, 2nd May 2004)  
Voices from neighboring country 
  - Joint Thai – Malaysian checkpoints to open  
   (83/132, 4th May 2004) 
  -      Malaysia says poverty main cause (85/132, 5th May 2004)  
 
52 Examples of headlines from the Kruese Mosque incident in Bangkok Post that have WJ5 and WJ2 as 
one of the indicators: 
 - Rebels die in bloodbath: Militants in dawn attacks; Soldiers storm   
  mosque; Senior army man removed 
  (35/132, 29th April 2004) 
  - Mosque drenched in blood (36/132, 29th April 2004)  
  - ‘Jihad Warriors’ died in siege: Panel says militants sacrificed their   
   lives (46/132, 30th April 2004) 
 
53 For example, 
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       -              Historic Krue-Se knows tragedy (51/132, 30th April 2004) 
       -              Hearing on Krue Se bullet holes (68/132, 2nd May 2004)  
 
54 The Takbai demonstration incident started from a demonstration of around 1,000 Muslim villagers in 
front of Takbai police station in Narathiwat demanding of the release of six Muslim suspects. The 
situation got out of control and the police started to fire tear gas and guns to disperse the demonstrators. 
The incident ended when the demonstrators were arrested and put into trucks to be transferred to the 
Army camp in Pattani. When the trucks reached the destination, 78 demonstrators were found dead due 
to suffocation. The incident signified the mistreatment of the southern Muslims by the Thai 
government and again caused wide public and international criticism and condemnation on the issue of 
human rights violations. Therefore, it is foreseeable that Bangkok Post would use a peace journalism 
approach in its reporting of the incident.  
 
55 Examples of headlines from the Takbai demonstration incident in Bangkok Post that have WJ2 
and/or WJ5 as one of the indicators: 
 - Bloodshed, mayhem in South (91/132, 26th October 2004) 
 -  81 more dead; riot toll hits 87 (93/132, 26th October 2004) 
 - Death toll secrecy deplored (96/132, 26th October 2004)  
 
56 Examples of headlines from the Takbai demonstration incident in Bangkok Post that have PJ7 as one 
of the indicators: 
 Voice of High authority 
  -  Thaksin: I’m not quitting; no snap poll 
    (107/132, 29th October 2004) 
  -  PM in TV appeal for understanding (110/132, 30th October 2004) 
  - Thaksin urged to offer apology (110/132, 30th October 2004) 
 Voices of people affected by the incident 
 - Kin of the missing demand explanation: Hundreds flock to army camp in Pattani  
  (95/132, 26th October 2004) 
 - Violence in the South: Relatives doubt suffocation claim  
  (99/132, 28th October 2004) 
  - Detainees tell senators of stompings, beatings  
   (104/132, 29th October 2004) 
 Voices of the Muslim community 
 -            Islamic leader: troops overreacted (92/132, 26th October 2004) 
  - Muslims to ask King to change govt: Want HM to appoint a royal   
   administration (103/132, 29th October 2004)  
 Voices of the opposition/senators  
  - Senators cast doubt on govt claim rioters suffocated  
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   (100/132, 28th October 2004) 
  - Senators want CSD to assure detainees’ safety 
    (117/132, 30th October 2004) 
 Voices of international organisations/human rights organisations 
  - NHRC begins probe into Tak Bai crackdown  
   (116/132, 30th October 2004) 
  - UN rights watchdog urges probe  
    (120/132, 30th October 2004) 
 Voices of neighbouring countries 
  -  Indonesian press vent fury at Tak Bai deaths  
   (108/132, 29th October 2004) 
  - Mahathir suggests self-rule negotiation 
    (119/132, 30th October 2004) 
 
57 Examples of headlines from the arsenal raid incident in The Nation that have PJ7 (multiparty 
orientation) as one of the indicators: 
 
  - New approach to security needed 
   ACADEMICS AND SECURITY veterans say the latest spate of violent  
   attacks in the southern province of Narathiwat calls for a rethink of how the long-
   standing violence in the Muslim-dominated region should be handled. 
   (13/166, 7th January 2004) 
  - Kuala Lumpur briefed on ‘terrorists’ 
   Thailand has informed Malaysia that it suspects terrorists were involved in a series of 
   deadly attacks in the south, Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar told reporters  
   yesterday. Syed hamid told reporters Thailand considered the attacks as  
   those of terrorists and not bandits. 
   (19/166, 8th January 2004) 
  - Tourism groups fear a lengthy curfew 
   THE TOURISM industry yesterday warned that visitor arrivals will plummet if  
   enforcement of martial law in the Kingdom’s southernmost provinces prolonged. 
  (20/166, 8th January 2004) 
 
The examples given show that The Nation included different sides involved in the conflict in its 
reporting. Apart from voices from academics and security forces, voices from Malaysia and from 
tourism groups were also represented in the examples above. In addition, there are also voices from the 
government, from the oppositions, from religious teachers and from the people affected by the incident 
in the coverage.  This point indicates that The Nation attempted to give news space and voices to all 
sides involved and did not put emphasis only on the voices of those in high authority.  
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58 Examples of headlines from the arsenal raid incident in The Nation that have PJ5 (causes and 
consequences) as one of the indicators: 
  - Govt approach ‘wrong from the start' 
  THE GOVERNMENT cannot solve the problem of violence in the South if it  
  continues to hold the wrong people responsible for it,  
  Democrat Party chief adviser Chuan Leekpai said yesterday.   
  (3/166, 5th January 2004) 
 - Iron-fisted response may worsen the crisis: Thaksin govt’s lack of sensitivity has 
  alienated locals, who now fear more violent suppression. 
   ...In the past three years, more than 50 officials have been killed in   
   organized criminal gangs who wanted to rob weapons to sell    
   overseas. (6/166, 5th January 2004) 
  - A Troubles legacy:  
   Pattani’s history is a tale of constant tug of war, of self-rule    
   versus Siam 
   Pattani IS a land under a curse.  At the heart of the province lies an ancient mosque, a 
   brick structure under the curse of a young Chinese woman Lim Kuan Yew who  
   cast a spell and took her own life after failing to persuade her brother to return  
  home to  their mother in China. (32/166, 11th January 2004) 
  - Letter from south: Pattani picks up the pieces 
  Smiling people take recent turbulence in stride as life slowly returns to normal 
   ONE WEEK after insurgent groups attacked a nearby army battalion and a bomb 
   killed the two police officers who were trying to defuse it, life is slowly returning to 
   normal in the Islamic South. 
   (33/166, 11th January 2004) 
 
From the examples above, we can see that The Nation represented the conflict by looking into its 
causes and consequences. The first example suggests that one of the causes of the conflict was the 
government's approach; the second example suggests that a hard response from the government would 
worsen the crisis, with a brief background on the history of conflict also given; the third example 
explains the long history of the conflict between Siam and Pattani; and the last explores the 
consequences of how the conflict affected the lives of the local people. All of the examples given show 
that The Nation explored the formation of the conflict before representing it in its coverage.  
 
59 Examples of headlines from the arsenal raid incident in The Nation that have PJ3 (people-oriented) 
as one of the indicators: 
  - Teachers improvise as 90% of students return to class 
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   TENTS, canteens and parking lots served as makeshift classrooms   
   as students from the 20 schools damaged in Sunday’s arson attacks   
   in this southern provinces yesterday returned to class.  
   (7/166, 6th January 2004) 
  - Family struggles to deal with loss of father 
   MONDAY’S BOMB blast in Pattani, which claimed the lives of two policemen, 
   occurred shortly before one of the victims was due to travel to Bangkok for a family 
   reunion with his two daughters.  
   Pol Sr Sgt Major Sarit Lakatep had been eagerly looking forward to catching up with 
   his daughters, who study at a Bangkok college, his wife Kolima said yesterday. 
   (12/166, 7th January 2004) 
 - Students want culprits caught 
   STUDENTS FROM Narathiwat province flying into Bangkok today to celebrate 
   Children’s Day said the greatest gift Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra could give 
   them was to catch the terrorists who torched their schools. 
  (26/166, 9th January 2004) 
  -  Hoaxes, stray bags cause panic among jittery southerners 
   SEVERAL SOUTHERN provinces were plunged into panic yesterday as police  
   rushed to deal with a number of hoax bomb alerts and other false alarms. 
  (18/166, 8th January 2004) 
  - Mullahs, teachers, fleeing homes 
  Govt warned that random arrests will play into the dissidents’ hands 
   The detention on Thursday of the local school teacher Muhammad Haji Wae Sahoh 
   and his neighbour Isma-ae, who senior officers said were members of the Bersatu 
   gang, has persuaded many other religious teachers that they themselves could be 
   arrested without clear charges, said the local Muslim leader.  
   (28/166, 10th January 2004) 
 
The coverage that has PJ3 as one of the indicators has five main voices: the students whose schools 
were burnt, the teachers, the local people affected by the incident, the families of the soldiers killed in 
the incident, and the accused religious teachers. This point indicates that The Nation engaged different 
voices of people affected by the conflict to a great degree. However, it is worth noting that the number 
of the most frequently used WJ indicator, WJ2 (focus on the visible effects of the violence), found in 
the coverage was the same as the number of PJ3 indicators. As discussed earlier, because the study 
looked into the reporting of a violent incident, I expected to see a focus on the visible effects of the 
violence. 
 
60 The Nation's voice: 
 - “Comment: Will our country be the same again?” 
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  WE THAIS woke up yesterday to a new reality.  The televised images of  
  bloodstained streets, of an ancient mosque riddled with bullet holes, and of machetes 
  still in the firm grips of dead young militants were so surreal that they took some 
  time to register, but they eventually merged to give us a rude awakening. What  
   happened yesterday morning may change Thailand forever.   
  (37/166, 29th April 2004)  
 - Restoring peace: Does Chaturon’s plan still have a chance?” 
   MANY REGARD the “peace plan” proposed by Deputy Prime Minister Chaturon 
   Chaisang exactly two weeks before last Wednesday’s bloodbath to be history. 
It seems, perhaps, a bit naïve to talk about peace when we are reinforcing our 
defense,  dispatching more troops and heavy weaponry – including tanks – to the 
region and beginning to worry about suicide-bombing attacks in Bangkok. 
  (101/166, 5th May 2004)  
 61	Examples of headlines from the Kruese Mosque incident in The Nation that have multiparty 
orientation (PJ7) as one of the indicators: 
Voices from high authorities 
 - Reaction of top officials: Contradictory statements 
  Chetta, Chavalit sing different tunes over circumstances 
   of yesterday’s bloody clashes in the South, with one side playing   
   down political aspects of the drama and the other warning the worst is yet to come. 
  (43/166, 29th April 2004)  
 - High death toll ‘was necessary’ 
  THE FOREIGN MINISTRY yesterday said the government regretted that the  
  crackdown on Muslim militants on Wednesday had resulted in a high death toll, “but 
  it was necessary to preserve public security and safety”. 
  (65/166, 1st May 2004)  
Voices from the opposition/senators 
 - Opposition warns killing only adds to the climate of fear 
   THE OPPOSITION yesterday warned that the government’s killing of Muslim  
   militants in the Southern provinces would heighten the violence and the fearful  
   atmosphere there, saying relatives of those killed had honoured the dead as holy  
   warriors. 
  (59/166, 30th April 2004)  
 - Senate lets PM off hook 
   THE SENATE YESTERDAY dismissed a motion summoning the prime minister to 
   answer questions on the security situation in the South. 
  (95/166, 4rd May 2004)  
Voices from the Muslim community  
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 -  Chula Rajamontri calls for unity 
   THAILAND’S MUSLIM spiritual leader Sumalyasak, the Chula Rajamontri, urged 
   the Kingdom’s people to unite and uphold the monarchy as the guiding light in a 
   bid to quell the restlessness in the South following Wednesday’s carnage. 
  (51/166, 30th April 2004)  
Voices from other countries 
 - Washington expresses its concern 
  THE UNITED STATES expressed concern on Wednesday over the militants killed 
  in clashes with security forces and the bloody raid on a mosque. 
  (55/166, 30th April 2004)  
 - Malaysia worried over border clashes 
  MALAYSIA IS WORRIED the bloody clashes that killed more than 100 people in 
  neighbouring Thailand could spill across its border, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad 
  Badawi said yesterday. 
  (58/166, 30th April 2004)  
Voices from human rights organisations/international organisations 
 - Human rights activist question why so many dead 
   VILLAGERS’ ACCOUNTS of Wednesday’s clashes that ended with the loss of 
   more than 100 lives beg the question whether authorities used excessive force against 
   the militants, the National Human Rights commissioner said yesterday. 
  (70/166, 1st May 2004)  
 - Kingdom’s image: UN wants swift probe 
   Govt told to investigate deaths of 108 militants 
   THE UN’s top human rights official yesterday called on the Thai government to  
   investigate the deaths of more than 100 people in clashes between security forces and 
   Muslim separatists in southern Thailand on Wednesday. 
  (72/166, 1st May 2004)  
Voices from the academics 
 - Govt told to consider alternatives to violence 
   Thai academics from five universities yesterday called the government to reconsider 
   the deputy prime minister’s plan for resolving conflict in the South and to stop using 
   violence. 
  (78/166, 2nd May 2004)  
 - Militants, govt ‘must initiate dialogue’ 
  A DIALOGUE must be initiated between the government and Islamic militants on 
  the issue of separatism and independence movements, an historian at Thammasat 
  University said yesterday. 
  (84/166, 3rd May 2004)  
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62 Examples of headlines from the Kruese Mosque incident in The Nation that have WJ2 (focus on the 
visible effects of war) as one of the indicators: 
 - Kingdom shaken 
  107 suspected militants killed; Pattani mosque littered with    
  bodies after raid; PM upbeat, but more attacks expected 
  BODIES of more than 100 Muslim militants, most of them teenagers, littered the 
  roads and a revered mosque yesterday following clashes across the deep south  
  between  insurgents and security forces. 
  (36/166, 29th April 2004)  
 - Troubled South’s worst day of violence 
   BODIES LAY ON the roads in pools of blood, armoured personnel carriers  
   patrolled the streets, and a mosque was left bullet-scarred and smoking. 
   In one of the most violent days in Thailand’s history, 107 suspected Muslim  
   separatists and five members of the security forces were killed in the Muslim  
   dominated southern provinces. 
  (42/166, 29th April 2004)  
 
63 Examples of headlines from the Kruese Mosque incident in The Nation that have people-oriented 
(PJ3) as one of the indicators: 
 - Peace shattered at ancient mosque 
   HAJI NISENG NILASH, the 75-year-old caretaker of Krue Se Mosque, was doing 
   his usual rounds at around 8.30pm on Tuesday when a group of young men carrying 
   bags arrived and told him to get out. 
  (38/166, 29th April 2004)  
 - Residents describe their ‘greatest fear’ 
   LOCAL RESIDENTS of three southern border provinces say they have been gripped 
   by “the greatest fear in their lives” following yesterday’s bloody clashes between 
   security forces and Muslim separatist militants that left more than 100 dead. 
  (45/166, 29th April 2004)  
 - Militant tells: ‘It was a sacrifice for God' 
  Says he was not paid, but part of separatist group 
   A MILITANT arrested during clashes in Yala on Wednesday said he was part of a 
   separatist movement and not paid to attack police. 
   “All of us were sacrificing ourselves for God,” Mana Matiyoh, a native of Pattani’s 
   Nong Chik district, said yesterday during a brief encounter with reporters during a re-
   enactment of the attacks. 
   (53/166, 30th April 2004)  
 - Villagers surprised at ‘quiet, devout’ teacher’s role 
	 274	
																																																																																																																																																														
  ALL WHO knew Sakariya Yuso personally said the quiet religious teacher was a 
  most unlikely leader of a group of Muslim militants who participated in attacks on 
  security forces in the South on April 28. 
  (85/166, 3rd May 2004)  
 
64 Examples of headlines from the Takbai demonstration incident in The Nation that have multiparty 
orientation (PJ7) as one of the indicators: 
Voices from Muslim community 
 - Muslim anger spills over 
   Religious leaders urge govt restraint 
  THE LEADER of a Muslim group and Muslim academics yesterday attacked the use 
  of violence by authorities in suppressing protestors outside Tak Bai district police 
  station, saying it would prolong hostilities in the South. 
  (111/166, 26th October 2004)  
Voices from the senators 
 - Independent probe needed: senators 
   SENATORS YESTERDAY called for a judicial inquiry into the deaths of Muslim 
   protesters in Narathiwat on Monday. Senator Panas Thassaneeyanont said the  
   government should quickly dispel doubts over the high death toll by allowing judicial 
   proceedings to run its course. 
  (140/166, 31th October 2004)  
 Voices from Muslim community 
  - Muslim leaders demand action against officials 
   Muslim leaders yesterday stepped up pressure on Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
   to bring to justice those officials responsible for the 85 deaths in the Tak Bai  
   crackdown. 
  (157/166, 29th October 2004)  
            -  15 Muslim groups: bucks stop with PM 
An ALLIANCE of 15 Muslim organizations submitted an open letter yesterday 
calling on Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to take responsibility for the deaths of 
85 protesters during and after last week’s demonstration at Tak Bai. 
  (161/166, 1st November 2004) 
Voices from human rights organisations 
  - Troubled South at ‘point of no return’ 
  Rights groups call for govt to open investigation into Monday’s carnage 
   THE THAKSIN government has lost its legitimacy for taking the Kingdom to “the 
   point of  no return” with its latest mishandling of the violence in the deep South,  
   leading human-rights groups said yesterday. 
  (120/166, 27th October 2004)  
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 - Govt urged to launch independent probe 
   THE NATIONAL Human rights Commission yesterday called upon the government 
   to establish an independent committee to investigate the alleged use of excessive 
   force to suppress the demonstrators in Tak Bai, Narathiwat. 
  (126/166, 28th October 2004)  
 - Tak Bai Independent Inquiry: ‘ Whole truth’ pledge 
  Nominated panel chief promises full transparency, openness to media in  
  investigation 
   PICHET SOONTORNPIPIT, a former Ombudsman who will lead a government-
   assigned independent inquiry into the deaths of 78 people detained in the wake of the 
   Tak Bai demonstration, has pledged total transparency in his attempt to answer the 
   public’s  questions. 
  (158/166, 1st November 2004) 
 
65 Examples of headlines from the Takbai demonstration incident in The Nation that have PJ5 (focus on 
the causes and consequences) as one of the indicators: 
 
  - Anger, concern, defiance 
  The clampdown on Muslim protesters as well as scores of avoidable deaths due to 
  suffocation has ………… the country and led to condemnation.  Here, leading 
  figures speak to The Nation while the prime minister minces no words in his  
  response. 
  THE CONFLICT in the Deep South has become more severe than ever.  Before this 
  government, there were some tensions now and then, but there was never really any 
  bloodshed.  The root cause is government policy. 
  (125/166, 28th October 2004)  
 
  - Comment: Body count spirals during PM’s reign 
   It was yet another black day for Thaksin Shinawatra’s premiership.    
   When more than 80 Thais perished at the hands of Thai troops in the deep South on 
   Monday – six in the clash between protesters and security forces and 78 reportedly 
   from suffocation after being rounded up and put in the back of military trucks –  
   everything else that has marred his highly controversial reign now pales in  
   comparison. His contempt for human rights has resulted in a scattering of personal 
   tragedies, masked by the proclaimed success of the war on drugs.  But now this  
   flawed trait of his leadership is threatening to plunge the country into the bitterest 
   and most detrimental divide between the people and the state. 
  (114/166, 26th October 2004) 
 
	 276	
																																																																																																																																																														
66 The article "Anger, concern, defiance" (125/166, 28th October 2004) was placed on the second page 
under the section "Takbai aftermath". For the first time in the coverage of the southern conflict 
incidents, The Nation featured opinions of leading figures in many fields in its coverage of the Takbai 
incident. Voices of the leading Thai monk, Muslim leaders, senators, a professor and peace scholar, an 
ex-southern Army commander and the Prime minister were placed together on one page, all sharing 
their comments on Takbai, and on the southern conflict as a whole. In this sense, the readers were 
provided with views on the conflict from different sides. I believe that this is the way not only to widen 
their perspective on the issue but also to encourage them to use their own judgment by balancing 
accounts from different perspectives. Another example was in a 'comment' piece on the front page, 
where The Nation expressed its opinions and stood its ground in judging the PM and his mishandling 
of the conflict. The background of the conflict was presented together with comments that the southern 
conflict had worsened and the death toll increased during the time of PM Thaksin. The Nation did not 
support the government and also blamed the government for its mishandling of the conflict. The 
examples given not only show how The Nation explored the formation of the conflict from different 
perspectives, but it also indicates that The Nation placed itself as one of the actors in the conflict by 
giving its comments and standing its ground in disagreeing with high authority. The positioning of the 
comments and opinion articles on the front and second page of the newspapers also show that a high 
prominence was given to these news pieces.  
 
67 The examples of headlines from the Takbai demonstration incident that have WJ2 (focus on the 
visible effects of war) as one of the indicators: 
 - Six killed in bloody clashes with troops 
  PM visits scene after day-long siege of police station ends in bloodshed; curfew 
  imposed in 8 districts 
   AT LEAST six people were killed and more than 20 others injured yesterday when 
   government troops clashed with about 3,000 Muslim protesters in the southern  
   province of Narathiwat. 
  (110/166, 26th October 2004)  
 - 78 perish in custody 
  Protesters suffocated in military trucks; More than 60 still missing; Activists  
  demand PM’s resignation 
  SEVENTY-EIGHT protesters died of suffocation or from convulsions after they 
  were arrested and herded into military trucks for detention following a bloody clash 
  on Monday in Muslim-dominated Narathiwat province. 
  Autopsies performed on the victims found no bullet wounds on their bodies, just 
  bruises and small cuts on their faces, said Dr Pornthip Rojanasunand, deputy director 
  of the Justice Ministry’s Central Institute of Forensic science. 
  (113/166, 27th October 2004)  
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 The first example was the news story from the front page of the 26th October. At the time, the public 
as well as the newspapers only knew about the clash between the police and the local demonstrators 
that caused deaths of six people at the scene. The second news story was published the day after when 
the truth about the death by suffocation of the 78 demonstrators broke out. The number of deaths was 
given but the tone of the news was of fact-finding and investigating the incident.  
 
68 For example, The Nation put a small box on the front page with the title 'What do you think?' asking 
the readers to give comments on the southern conflict incidents, and on the second page printed the title 
'Aid sought', asking for its readers to donate learning-equipment and money to the schools that had 
been attacked (6th January 2004). On the next day (7th January 2004), The Nation printed some of the 
comments received from its readers on the front page. 69	On 11th January 2004, The Nation published a report on the history of Pattani and the power struggle 
with Thailand on the front page under the title 'A trouble Legacy', as well as an article on the life of the 
local people seven days after the attacks, titled 'Letter from the South: Pattani picks up the pieces' (see 
Appendix IV (a)).  	70	On the first day of the reporting, Bangkok Post assigned the whole front page, page 3 and page 4 
under the section 'Violence in the South' to reporting the Kruese Mosque incident. The news on the 
front page had a focus on here and now, the visible effects of the violence, and the use of emotive 
words as seen from the main headline 'Rebels die in bloodbath', and the small headline 'Mosque 
drenched in blood' (29th April 2004) (see Appendix IV (b)). The main headline reported the timeline of 
the incident which happened on the day before in a breaking news format together with the death toll 
and accounts from people in positions of high authority.  
Inside the newspaper, various voices were featured in the news. For example, the voice of an unnamed 
cabinet source criticised the government's decision in an article titled 'Crackdown may trigger terror 
attacks'; the voice of the local people who were at the scene were represented in 'Woman's prayer's 
answered'; the voice of a human rights organisation was presented in 'Concern over rights abuses'; and 
the voice of the opposition commented on the incident in 'Opposition urges govt to restore peace'.  
The article 'Muslims: Revive Chaturon's peace plan' focused on the possible resolution of the conflict 
by suggesting that the government should impose the peace plan formally proposed by the Deputy 
Prime Minister Chaturon Chaisaeng. 	71	On the first day of reporting of the Kruese Mosque incident, The Nation too gave the whole front 
page, page 2 and page 4 over to reporting the incident (see Appendix IV (b)). The main headline, 
'Kingdom shaken', presented the voices of the local officials and eyewitnesses with a focus on the death 
tolls and the use of sensational language.  In the same way as for the arsenal raid coverage, The Nation 
put its own comment piece on the front page in 'Comment: Will our country be the same again?', which 
was presented with a worrying and remorseful tone supported by the excessive use of emotive 
language. I can see that The Nation tried to perform its social responsibility role by asserting its view 
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on the situation to the public and putting it on the front page. The Nation provided little space for 
presenting a brief background of the southern conflict timeline, and the death toll since 1973.  
Also, its news articles on the front page were all people-oriented, and references to high authority were 
made on the front page. The news on the second page was put under the section 'Southern carnage', and 
featured accounts from high authority on the follow-up investigation into the incidents. A large amount 
of space was given for a map and a timeline of the attacks on districts across Pattani, Songkhla and 
Yala and also for the timeline of the Kruese Mosque incident. 	72	On the first day of reporting on the Takbai demonstration incident (26th October 2004), both 
newspapers reported the incident with a high use of WJ2 (focuses on the visible effects of the violence) 
and WJ5 (focus on here and now). Bangkok Post presented the incident with the emotive headline 
'Bloodshed, mayhem in South', together with a description of what happened in the incident that 
culminated in the clashes between the police and the demonstrators, which caused six deaths at the 
scene. The Nation, too, presented the incident with an emotive headline incorporating the death toll, ' 
Six killed in bloody clashes', while its report was on what happened in the incident supported by the 
accounts of witnesses, religious leaders, the PM and the Army commander. The Nation used the whole 
of page 4 to publish photographs and a report of the incident, as well as the timeline of what happened 
at the demonstration. It is worth noting that on the first day of reporting this incident, the Thai public 
still did not know about the deaths from suffocation of the detainees during the transfer to the Army 
camp in Pattani. The reporting on the first day thus was only on the clash at the scene of the 
demonstration. 
 
In the second day of reporting (27th October 2004), the news on the incident became a national 
headline after the truth about the deaths of the detainees during the transfer came out. Both newspapers 
used headlines with emotive language and the number of deaths, with The Nation's '78 perish in 
custody', and Bangkok Post's '81 more dead, riot toll hit 87'.  Again, both newspapers presented the 
incident with a focus on here and now and on the visible effects of the violence, by reporting on what 
happened to cause the deaths during the transfer and on the number of missing people. 	
73 The categories can be classified as ‘local’ with 20 sources, ‘high authority’ with 15 sources, ‘foreign 
source’ with 8 sources, ‘other’ with 7 sources, ‘official source’ with 6 sources, ‘opposition’ with 5 
sources, ‘local authority’ with 5 sources, and 'religious' with 2 sources. 
74 The number of sources and the times mentioned for other categories are ‘opposition’ 20 times, 
‘official’ 24 times, ‘local authority’ 14 times, ‘foreign’ 15 times, and ‘others’ 26 times 
75 There were 115 sources, comprised of ‘local’ with 30 sources, ‘high authority’ with 18 sources, 
‘local authority’ with 16 sources, ‘opposition’ with 11 sources, ‘official’ with 10 sources, ‘others’ with 
8 sources, ‘academic’ with 6 sources, ‘organisation’ with 6 sources, ‘foreign’ with 5 sources, and 
‘religious group’ with 5 sources. 
	 279	
																																																																																																																																																														
76 That is, ‘foreign sources’ with 19 sources, followed by ‘local’ with 17 sources, ‘opposition’ with 15 
sources, ‘high authority’ with 14 sources, ‘religious group’ with 11 sources, ‘academic’ with 8 sources, 
‘others’ with 8 sources, ‘official’ with 6 sources, and ‘local authority’ with 3 sources. The use of ‘local’ 
was half as much and ‘local authority’ one fifth, but the use of ‘foreign’ sources was 4 times higher 
than in the reporting of the Kruese mosque incident.  
77 That is, 33 ‘local’ sources, followed by ‘high authority’ with 13, ‘foreign source’ with 12, ‘local 
authority’ with 9, ‘academic’ with 9, ‘official’ with 8, ‘other’ with 5, ‘opposition’ with 4, and 
‘religious’ with 3 sources. 
78 'High authority' was mentioned 85 times, and 'local' was mentioned 65 times. 'Foreign source’ and 
‘academic’ were mentioned 31 times each, while the number of times other groups were mentioned 
were 'local authority' (22), 'official source' (20), 'other' (20), 'opposition' (16) and 'religious group' (10) 
times. The only one category not cited was the ‘organisation’ group.  
79 The highest number of sources were from the ‘local’ category with 51 sources, almost twice as high 
as for the first incident. There were 25 sources from ‘high authority’, 22 sources from ‘local authority’, 
20 from ‘organisation’, 13 from ‘foreign’, 10 from ‘official’, 8 from ‘scholars’, 6 from ‘opposition’, 6 
from 'other', and 2 from 'religious'.  
80 'Religious' with 13 sources and 39 citations and 'Foreign' with 22 sources and 68 citations. 
81'High authority' was mentioned 177 times, followed by ‘local’ at 101 times. 
82 The remaining numbers were ‘opposition’ with 25 sources, ‘official’ with 23 sources, ‘local 
authority’ with 40, ‘academic’ with 24, ‘organisation’ with 33, ‘religious’ with 27 and ‘other’ with 15. 
83 Compared to Bangkok Post, The Nation used ‘high authority’ as a source 13 more times, ‘local 
authority’16 more times, ‘foreign source’ 15 more times, ‘academic’ 10 more times, ‘religious’ 9 more 
times, ‘local’ 45 more times and used ‘official source’ the same number of times.  
84 'Local' accounted for 67 sources in total, compared to 112 sources used by The Nation. 
85 Bangkok Post used 'high authority' for 47 sources while The Nation used it for 60 sources. Again the 
third in rank was ‘foreign source’ for both newspapers: 32 sources from Bangkok Post and 47 from The 
Nation. The least used sources from Bangkok Post were ‘academic’ and ‘organisation’, 14 and 15 
respectively, while the least used source of The Nation was 'others' with 15 sources. 
86 Apart from ‘local’, which ranked second at 175 times (different from the top one by 219 times), 
those in mid-rank positions (‘other’, ‘foreign’, ‘local’, ‘official’, ‘religious’ and ‘oppositions’) were 
mentioned between 70-83 times. The least-mentioned groups were ‘academic’ and ‘organisation’, at 49 
and 44 times respectively. ‘Local’ groups came second in the coverage of The Nation in the frequency 
analysis too. Meanwhile, ‘official source’ and ‘religious group’ were mentioned the same number of 
times in Bangkok Post as in The Nation. Other groups, comprised of ‘foreign source’, ‘organisation’, 
‘academic’ and ‘local authority’, were mentioned more times than in Bangkok Post, by 82, 56, 45, and 
27 times respectively. ‘Opposition’ was the only group mentioned more times by Bangkok Post than by 
The Nation.  
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87 As mentioned in Chapter 5 (5.2.2.3), because the interviews may contain opinions on sensitive 
issues, the use of pseudonyms is required to protect the identities of the interviewees and to preserve 
the confidentiality of the data. I assigned unique Thai names to each interviewee. These pseudonyms 
have no relation to their real names. However, the gender identity of the interviewees and the name of 
the organisations they work for were not changed. The profiles of the interviewees are provided in 
Appendix VI 
88 From the analysis of news sources, The Nation has 112 sources from 'local', 47 'foreign', 37 
'organisation', 27 'religious group', and 25 'academic', while Bangkok Post has 67 'local', 32 'foreign', 18 
'religious', '15 'organisation', and 14 'academic'.   
89 A 'second bombing incident' is when attackers plant the first bomb so that the authorities and those 
involved go to investigate the scene. When these figures are present at the scene, a second bomb is then 
detonated. One journalist was killed from a second bombing incident. 
90 As discussed in Chapter 3, the Issara News Project was set up in 2005 in order to educate journalists 
and reporters on reporting the southern conflict. The training also included information about the 
background of the conflict, investigative reporting, safety skills, and how to live in a conflict zone. 
91 The most obvious case was the 'Tanyong Limo' incident in 2005, when two marines were held 
captive in Tanyong Limo village after being accused of the drive-by attack that caused the death of one 
local the day before. The villagers closed the village to block the security forces from entering the area 
and demanded that journalists from Malaysia come to report the incident because they did not trust the 
Thai media. The two marines were later killed before the Malaysian press arrived.  92	Currently, the Faculty of Communication Science, Prince of Songkla University has announced a 
plan to so set up a center of education and development of peace communication. The center reflects a 
concrete idea that the academic institutions see the importance of peace journalism, and that it is seen 
as part of the solution to the southern conflict.92 The center will provide a platform for local people, 
media professionals, academics, organisations and other sides involved to discuss and exchange ideas 
on the southern conflict and the path to peace. The center also aims at educating local people and other 
actors in peace communication so that they can act as a 'messenger' and a 'receiver' in support of the 
peace process in the area. From Changkamol (2015) "Peace Communication", Deep South Watch 
[online]. Available from: http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/6926. [Accessed 8th April 2015}. 
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Appendix I 
Extracts from the Constitution of Thailand (1997) 
Chapter III ‘Rights and Liberties of the Thai People’ 
Section 37:  
‘A person shall enjoy the liberty of communication by lawful means. The censorship, detention or 
disclosure of communication between persons including any other act disclosing a statement in the 
communication between persons shall not be made except by virtue of the provisions of the law 
specifically enacted for security of the State or maintaining public order or good morals.’  
Section 39: 
‘A person shall enjoy the liberty to express his or her opinion, make speeches, write, print, publicize, 
and make expression by other means. 
Section 40: 
‘Transmission frequencies for radio or television broadcasting and radio telecommunication are 
national communication resources for public interest.’ 
Section 41: 
‘Officials or employees in a private sector undertaking newspaper or radio or television broadcasting 
businesses shall enjoy their liberties to present news and express their opinions under the constitutional 
restrictions without the mandate of any State agency, State enterprise or the owner of such businesses; 
provided that it is not contrary to their professional ethics.’ 
Section 45: 
‘A person shall enjoy the liberty to express his or her opinion, make speeches, write, print, publicize, 
and make expression by other means.’ 
Section 48: 
‘A person holding a political position shall not own or hold shares in a newspaper, radio or television 
broadcasting or telecommunication business.’ 
 
Available from: The Administrative Court of Thailand [online] 
http://www.admincourt.go.th/amc_eng/02-LAW/laws/ContitutionBE2540-1997.pdf.  
[Accessed 10th January 2014].  
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Appendix II 
 
Coding category I: 13 indicators of War and Peace Journalism 
 
War Journalism Peace Journalism 
 
Approach-based criteria 
1. Reactive (waits for war to break out, or about to 
break out, before reporting) 
1. Proactive (anticipates, starts reporting long 
before war breaks out) 
 
2. Reports mainly on visible effects of war 
(casualties, dead and wounded, damage to 
property) 
2. Reports also on invisible effects of war 
(emotional trauma, damage to society and culture) 
 
3. Elite-oriented (focuses on leaders & elites as 
actors and sources of information) 
 
3. People-oriented (focuses on common people as 
actors and sources of information) 
 
4. Focuses mainly on differences that led to the 
conflict 
 
4. Reports the areas of agreement that might lead 
to a solution to the conflict 
 
5. Focuses mainly on the here and now 
 
5. Reports causes and consequences of the conflict 
 
6. Dichotomizes between the good guys and bad 
guys, victims and villains 
 
6. Avoid labeling of good guys and bad guys 
 
7. Two-party orientation (one party wins, one 
party loses) 
 
7. Multiparty orientation (gives voice to many 
parties involved in conflict) 
 
8. Partisan (biased for one side in the conflict) 
 
8. Nonpartisan (neutral, not taking sides) 
 
9. Zero-sum orientation (one goal: to win) 
 
9. Win-win orientation (many goals and issues, 
solution-oriented) 
10. Stop reporting aftermath of war 10. Stay on reporting aftermath of war 
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Language-based criteria 
11. Uses victimizing language (e.g., destitute, 
devastated, defenseless, pathetic, tragic, 
demoralized) that tells only what has been done to 
people 
 
11. Avoids victimizing language, reports what has 
been done and could be done by people, and how 
they are coping 
 
12. Uses demonizing language (e.g., vicious, 
cruel, brutal, barbaric, inhu- man, tyrant, savage, 
ruthless, terrorist, extremist, fanatic, 
fundamentalist) 
 
12. Avoids demonizing language, uses more 
precise descriptions, titles, or names 
 
 
13. Uses emotive words, like geno- cide, 
assassination, massacre, system- atic (as in 
systematic raping or forcing people from their 
homes) 
 
13. Objective and moderate. Avoids emotive 
words. Reserves the strongest language only for 
the gravest situation. Does not exaggerate. 
 
 
From Galtung (1986, 1998) in TRANSCEND (2000), a peace and development network. Conflict 
Transformation by Peaceful Means (Transcend Method): Participant-Trainer’s Manual, United 
Nations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 298	
Appendix III 
 
Coding category II: Four broad categories of War and Peace Journalism framework 
 
 
 
From Galtung (1986; 1998) in Lynch and McGoldrick (2005, p. 6). Peace Journalism. Hawthorn Press: 
Gluocestershire.  
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Appendix IV 
 
 
Samples of news coverage from Bangkok Post and The Nation 
 
a) The coverage of Arsenal raid incident 
 
 
 
 
From Bangkok Post, 5th January 2004 (front page) 
 
 
 
From The Nation, 5th January 2004 (front page and page 2A) 
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From The Nation, 11th January 2004 (front page) 
 
b) The coverage of Kruese mosque incident 
 
 
 
 
From Bangkok Post on 29th April 2004 (Front page and page 4) 
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From The Nation, 29th April 2004 (Front page) 
 
c) The coverage of Takbai demonstration incident 
 
 
 
 
 
From Bangkok Post, 27th October 2004 (Front page) 
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From The Nation, 27th October 2004 (Front page) 
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Appendix V 
 
 
The findings from the second analysis on four broad orientations of WJ/PJ of Bangkok Post and 
The Nation 
From the total 298 articles analysed, the most recurrent frame found was war-oriented, with 72 articles, 
followed by people-oriented (69 articles), and truth-oriented (54 articles). As explained earlier, I 
applied the four broad WJ/PJ orientations to the news coverage in order to identify the framework used 
when reporting the conflict.	The	four	main	orientations	of	WJ	and	PJ	each	consist	of	two	opposing	frames:	war/peace,	propaganda/truth,	elite/people	and	victory/solution.	News	that	cannot	be	categorised	into	any	of	these	frames	would	be	marked	as	a	'neutral'	article.		
It is, perhaps, not surprising to see that the most prominent framework was war-oriented. The study 
focused on the news reports of the three major incidents in 2004, so it is hard to avoid a WJ frame 
when reporting on violent incidents. War-oriented refers to when a news report focuses on the conflict 
arena; on the visible effects of violence; on a two-party orientation; one goal to win; and on the 
dehumanisation of the opposite side of the conflict (in this study the Thai state and the Muslim actors).  
For example: 
                                                   Rebels die in bloodbath 
 
Militants in dawn attacks; Soldiers storm mosque; Senior army man removed 
One hundred and seven southern militants, most of them teenagers, died yesterday in a series of 
battles with troops and police in Yala, Pattani and Songkhla provinces.  It was the bloodiest day in 
the history of Thailand’s restive South. There were five deaths on the government side. 
(Bangkok Post, 35/132, 30th April 2004) 
 
 
The example above is a news report that was published one day after the Kruese Mosque incident. The 
focus on the visible effects of war refers to when the news story emphasises the details of the amount 
of deaths, wounded and damage, for example: 'Rebels die in bloodbath' and 'one hundred and seven 
southern militants...died yesterday in a series of battles...' and '...five deaths on the government side'. 
The focus on war refers to when the news reports presents the incident from a here and now 
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perspective that does not provide any background of the conflict but focuses more on the conflict 
scene. For example, 'militants in dawn attacks', 'soldiers storm mosque' and '...series of battles with 
troops and police...' Because of the focus on different aspects of war (casualties and arena), the above 
article was categorised in the second stage of analysis as a war journalism report with a war-oriented 
frame. 
 
The second highest frame found in the study was people-oriented, which suggests the attempts of both 
newspapers to present more than the simply the official side of the conflict by including the voices and 
stories of the people, some of whom were seen to challenge the authorities, and also to position them 
centrally in the news reports. People-oriented is when the story focuses on giving voices to people 
affected by the conflict and not only on giving voices to people in authority.  
For example: 
Detainees tell: ‘We were kicked, beaten, and hit with rifle butts’ 
Demonstrators packed five high in the back of trucks ‘like bricks’; senator confirms rough 
treatment, blames PM 
POLICE AND SOLDIERS beat and kicked protesters before piling them up “like bricks” for a five-
hour truck ride to an Army camp, according to Muslim detainees who spoke yesterday about Monday’s 
brutal clash with security forces. 
 A rubber tapper, who did not want to be identified, described how police packed hundreds of men 
into trucks after the protest on Monday, resulting in the deaths of 78 from suffocation. 
(The Nation (138/166), 29th October 2004) 
 
The example above was published four days after the Takbai demonstration incident. The story focuses 
on the account of the detainees on what happened in the incident. The detainees told that they were 
beaten and hit by rifle butts by those in positions of authority, before being stacked up in the back of 
the trucks. The report brings into focus the first-hand experience of the detainees who survived the 
incident, and challenges the authorities with the truth from 'the other side of the story'. Because of the 
giving of voices to the 'voiceless' feature, I categorised the reports as a peace journalism article with a 
people-oriented frame. 
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The truth-oriented news indicates the attempt to perform investigative journalism by exposing the truth 
and uncovering lies, which suggests, in my reading, that the newspapers have a sense of responsibility 
to the public. I classified the reports into 'truth-oriented' when the article involves an investigation into 
the truth behind each incident, and not only reports the authority's account of what happened.  
For example: 
                                                   Senators want PM to give explanation 
                                                     To submit motion seeking answers 
A group of senators plans to seek a Senate resolution to demand that Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra explain the government’s handling of violence in the South. 
 
Bangkok MP Chirmasak Pinthong said a number of “independent” senators including himself were 
gathering signatures to support a motion seeking the resolution. 
 (Bangkok Post, 70/132, 2nd May 2004) 
 
The example above was published four days after the Kruese Mosque incident, which caused public 
criticism of the government's mishandling of the conflict, which resulted in the deaths of the Muslim 
attackers, and damage to the sacred mosque. The news report focuses on the senators' demand for an 
explanation from the government and the Prime Minister, which shows that the newspaper attempted to 
challenge the version given by the authority. I categorised the reports as a peace journalism article with 
a truth-oriented frame because of the exposing of the truth and uncovering of lies features of the report. 
 
The next part will feature an explanation of the findings on both newspapers.  
 
Bangkok Post 
Figure A illustrates the findings from the analysis of WJ/PJ indicators in the coverage of the three 
major incidents in 2004 by Bangkok Post as informed by the four broad WJ/PJ orientations.  
 
The findings show that out of 132 articles analysed, 60 reports were categorised as WJ, 58 as PJ and 
the remaining 14 as neutral (see figure A). In addition, it is interesting to see that the number of war 
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and peace reports was quite close, which also confirmed the findings from the first stage of analysis 
that revealed a very similar number of war and peace indicators in the coverage. 
 
 
 Figure A: The number of war journalism, peace journalism and neutral reports as classified by 
 the four broad WJ/PJ orientations (Galtung 1998) in the conflict coverage of Bangkok Post 
 
          
 Figure B: The number of war journalism, peace journalism and neutral reports as classified by 
 the four broad WJ/PJ orientations in the conflict coverage of each of the three incidents under 
 scrutiny in Bangkok Post 
 
A closer analysis into the WJ/PJ frames applied in the coverage of each of the three incidents is 
needed. It is interesting to see that the results from this stage of analysis revealed similar patterns to the 
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findings from the analysis of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators. That is, the reporting began with a pro-war 
stance in the coverage of the arsenal raid incident, included pro-war and peace elements in the 
coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident, and evolved into a pro-peace stance in the coverage of the 
Takbai demonstration incident (see figure B). I believe that the nature of each incident influenced the 
reporting style of the newspaper. The fact that the results from both stages of analysis revealed similar 
trends indicates that the application both of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators, and of the four broad WJ/PJ 
orientations in the content effectively helped to validate and cross-check the data.  
 
 Arsenal raid Kruese Mosque Takbai demonstration 
War-oriented 12 16 8 
Propaganda-oriented 1 2 - 
Elite-oriented 6 6 7 
Victory-oriented 1 - 1 
Peace/conflict oriented - 4 4 
Truth-oriented 1 10 9 
People-oriented 8 9 5 
Solution-oriented 3 3 2 
Neutral stories 2 6 6 
    
Total (news)= 34 56 42 
 
 Table A: The number of articles classified under each of the four broad orientations of WJ/PJ 
for each of the three incidents 
 
Table A shows the findings from a content analysis of the four broad WJ/PJ orientations in the conflict 
coverage of Bangkok Post across the three major incidents. The findings reveal that a war-oriented 
frame was mostly used in the reporting, especially in the coverage of the arsenal raid (12 articles) and 
the Kruese Mosque incident (16 articles). A war-oriented frame involves reporting a conflict from a 
here and now perspective, an us and them paradigm, and with an emphasis on the visible effects of 
violence. War-oriented and elite-oriented, which are the two frames of war journalism, were used 
consistently across the three incidents. The results can be validated by the finding from the content 
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analysis of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators that the WJ indicators found in the highest frequency across the 
three incidents were also 'focus on the visible effects of war' (WJ2) and 'elite-oriented' (WJ3). The 
victory-oriented and propaganda-oriented frames were the least used in the coverage, which suggests 
that Bangkok Post maybe relied highly on high authority figures as news actors and sources but it did 
not allow itself to be used as the government's tool for publishing its propaganda and winning the 
conflict. 
 
The second most used frame was people-oriented, which involves focusing on the people affected by 
the incident. The study found a fair number of people-oriented reports from the coverage of the arsenal 
raid incident (8 articles) and the Kruese Mosque incident (9 articles). It is surprising to see that only 5 
articles were categorised as people-oriented in the coverage of the Takbai demonstration, while 7 
reports were categorised as elite-oriented, which creates an interesting discussion point because it was 
the incident that most directly affected the lives of the local people. To explain, I expected to see more 
truth-oriented and people-oriented news from the coverage of the Takbai demonstration because this 
incident was considered to show the government's incompetency in its handling of the southern 
conflict, with the victims of the situation being the local people. The reason for this may be attributable 
to the fact that Bangkok Post relied greatly on high authority as its sources. The newspaper’s close ties 
with the government may have been a major reason that influenced its reporting style.  
 
The third most used frame was truth-oriented, which involves an investigation of the truth from all 
sides. The truth-oriented frame was found the most in the coverage of the Kruese mosque incident (10 
articles) and in the Takbai demonstration incident (9 articles). This point indicates that Bangkok Post 
attempted to practice investigative journalism by focusing on 'what really happened' in the incidents 
and did not rely only on the information provided by the authorities.  
 
Another interesting point was the number of solution-oriented articles. Solution-oriented refers to when 
news reports focus on seeking a resolution of a conflict and reconciliation of all sides. I believe that 
solution-oriented is one main and strong feature of peace journalism that stresses the social 
responsibility role of the media by offering ways to find a resolution of the conflict. Overall, the study 
found 8 solution-oriented articles across the three incidents, which indicates that Bangkok Post engaged 
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a peace journalism approach to its style of reporting, even though a large number of WJ frames were 
still in use. The use of solution-oriented frames shows that Bangkok Post did not only focus on 
reporting on what was happening in the conflict, but also sought answers from all sides involved on 
how to resolve the conflict.	
To conclude, the analysis of four broad WJ/PJ themes showed that the most used frame in Bangkok 
Post’s reporting of the southern conflict was 'war-oriented'. Other main frames were: people-oriented, 
elite-oriented, and truth-oriented. The findings from the second analysis are in accordance with the 
findings from the main analysis of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators. The second analysis shows that ‘elite-
oriented’, ‘multiparty orientation’, and ‘focus on the visible effects of violence' are the indicators found 
in the highest frequency in the coverage of all three incidents. This point indicates that Bangkok Post 
relied highly on high authority as news actors and sources, and at the same time reported the incidents 
with a focus on the visible effects of the violence.  
The number of multiparty orientation (PJ7) articles found also indicates that Bangkok Post engaged a 
peace journalism approach by including voices from sides of the conflict in its news reports.  
 
The findings of both stages of analysis revealed quite a similar pattern and one main reason behind the 
style of the reporting was the nature of the situation of the three incidents. It can be concluded that the 
reporting style was pro-war in the arsenal raid incident, before changing to include both pro-war and 
pro-peace aspects in the coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident, as seen from the fact that the number 
of WJ and PJ articles was quite similar in both stages of analysis. Finally, the style changed to pro-
peace in the coverage of the Takbai demonstration. Both stages of WJ/PJ content analysis in Bangkok 
Post’s coverage of the three incidents can help with validating the data in comparative terms. That is to 
say, the analysis of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators helped to identify the most used WJ/PJ elements in the 
news coverage, while the analysis using the four broad WJ/PJ frameworks helped to look at the main 
themes of each news story, all of which can reveal the orientation and reporting style of the newspaper 
in question  
 
 
The Nation 
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Figure C illustrates the findings from the analysis of WJ/PJ indicators in the coverage of the three 
major incidents in 2004 by The Nation as informed by the four broad WJ/PJ orientations. 
 
 
 Figure C: The number of war journalism, peace journalism and neutral articles as classified by 
 the four broad WJ/PJ orientations (Galtung 1998) in the conflict coverage of The Nation 
 
The findings at from the second stage of content analysis show that out of 166 news reports analysed, 
92 were categorised as peace journalism articles, 54 as war journalism articles and 20 as neutral 
articles. The results indicate that The Nation's representation of the southern conflict incidents mostly 
incorporated a peace journalism approach. Most of the news under the war journalism approach placed 
an emphasis on giving details on the number of casualties and the visible damages of war. A closer 
analysis into the categorisation of WJ/PJ in the news articles from the coverage of each incident is 
provided in figure D. 
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 Figure D: The number of war journalism, peace journalism and neutral articles as classified by 
 the four broad WJ/PJ orientations in the conflict coverage of each of the three incidents under 
 scrutiny in The Nation 
 
Figure D reveals the trend of the war, peace and neutral articles in the coverage of the three incidents. 
In the coverage of the arsenal raid incident, the number of WJ and PJ reports was very close, and the 
number of PJ articles was only slightly higher than the number of WJ reports. The trend changed and 
became more obvious in the reporting of the Kruese Mosque incident when the number of PJ articles 
was two times higher than the number of PJ articles found in the coverage of the arsenal raid incident. 
The difference in the number of WJ and PJ articles became more distinct over these two incidents. 
Lastly, in the coverage of the Takbai demonstration, there was a sharp contrast between the number of 
WJ and PN news articles when the number of PJ reports was more than two times higher than the 
number of WJ articles.  
 
From Figure D, presented above, it can be concluded that The Nation's style of reporting was pro-peace 
in all of the three incidents, as seen from the fact that the number of PJ articles increased from the 
coverage of the arsenal raid incident to the coverage of Kruese Mosque incident and the Takbai 
demonstration. On the other hand, the number of WJ reports was lower than the number of PJ articles 
in the coverage of all three incidents. It is worth mentioning that by comparing the findings from the 
classification of WJ/PJ articles from the two analyses — the main analysis of the application of 13 
WJ/PJ indicators and the four broad WJ/PJ orientations — the results on the number of war, peace and 
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neutral/balanced news reports are in the same direction. At this point, I believe that the two stages of 
content analysis worked efficiently in the validation and cross-checking of the data.  
 Arsenal raid Kruese Mosque Takbai demonstration 
War-oriented 13 17 6 
Propaganda-oriented 1 3 4 
Elite-oriented 1 5 4 
Victory-oriented - - - 
Peace/conflict oriented 2 6 5 
Truth-oriented 4 12 13 
People-oriented 9 14 15 
Solution-oriented 3 5 4 
Neutral stories 2 12 6 
    
Total (news)= 35 74 57 
 
 Table B: The number of news articles as classified by the four broad orientations of WJ/PJ in 
 each of the three incidents. 
 
Table B shows the findings from a content analysis of the four broad WJ/PJ orientations to the conflict 
coverage of The Nation across the three major incidents. People-oriented was the frame most used in 
the coverage; 38 out of 166 articles were classified as having people-oriented frames. People-oriented 
refers to when a news report focuses on local people as news actors and sources. The number of 
people-oriented reports identified for each incident was 9 in the arsenal raid coverage, 14 in the Kruese 
Mosque coverage and 15 in the Takbai demonstration coverage. It is also worth mentioning that the 
number of articles found in this study that were produced under the opposite elite-oriented frame was 
surprisingly low; a total of 10 articles had elite-oriented as their frame. This point stresses the peace 
journalism style of reporting of The Nation, which placed more emphasis on people than on the 
authorities.  
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The study found a total of 36 news articles with a war-oriented frame, which makes war-oriented the 
second most used frame in The Nation’s coverage of the three incidents. War-oriented refers to 
reporting a conflict from a here and now perspective, an us and them paradigm, with an emphasis on 
the visible effects of violence, and placing 'war' as the main focus of the story. In the coverage of the 
arsenal raid and Kruese Mosque incidents, war-oriented articles were found in the highest number (13 
and 17 articles, respectively) compared to other frames. However, the number of war-oriented articles 
dropped substantially to 6 in the reporting of the Takbai demonstration. In my reading, the Takbai 
demonstration signified the injustice and mistreatment of the Muslim minority by the Thai state, and 
the findings show that The Nation chose not to put 'war' as the focus of its articles but instead to place 
'people' as the main focus of the coverage of the Takbai incident. 
 
The third most used frame was truth-oriented, accounting for 29 articles. Truth-oriented refers to a 
news report that focuses on uncovering lies, and exposing truths from all sides. It is interesting to see 
that the truth-oriented frame was applied to the news reports in a much higher proportion than 
propaganda-oriented and elite-oriented frames, which suggests that The Nation made an attempt to 
investigate the truth behind the incidents more than relying solely on the authorities as its sources. 
Truth-oriented reports were largely found in in the coverage of the Kruese Mosque incident (12 
articles) and the Takbai demonstration incidents (13 articles). The reports in The Nation with a truth-
oriented frame often echoed the voices of different sides involved in or affected by the conflict in an 
attempt to uncover the truth and for justice to be served. The two incidents share one thing in common: 
the government was seen as the wrongdoer. This point is reflected in the finding that The Nation used 
the elite-oriented and propaganda-oriented frames less as time progressed, and placed more emphasis 
on producing articles with truth-oriented and people-oriented frames in the representation of the 
incidents.  
 
In sum, the findings from the analysis of the four broad WJ/PJ orientations show that the most used 
frame in The Nation’s representation of the southern conflict was 'people-oriented', while the second 
most used frame was 'truth-oriented', and the third was ''war-oriented'. On the other hand, the findings 
from the analysis of the 13 WJ/PJ indicators show that ‘multiparty orientation’ (PJ7), 'focus on causes 
and consequences' (PJ5) and ‘focus on the visible effects of violence' (WJ2) were the main indicators 
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found in the highest frequency in The Nation's coverage. The findings from the two analyses illustrate 
that The Nation engaged a peace journalism approach in its reporting by including voices from all sides 
involved in or affected by the conflict, and providing the background of the conflict in its reporting. 
However, at the same time, the newspaper also employed a war journalism approach, especially its 
focus on the visible effects of violence, in its representation of the conflict.  
 The findings from the two analyses reveal somewhat similar results and it can be concluded from this 
that the style of reporting used in the coverage of the three southern conflict incidents by The Nation 
followed a peace journalism approach. 
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Appendix VI 
List of the Interviewees (presented with pseudonyms) 
 
1. Chatri (Editor, Bangkok Post) (interviewed 8th April 2013) - Chatri was sent to the south to work in 2004, and worked on the southern conflict until 
2006. Chatri joined the Issara News Center in 2005 when it was first set up. He is now an 
editor, working from the newspaper’s Bangkok desk.  
2. Damrong (Field reporter/journalist, The Nation; Freelance journalist) (interviewed on 23rd 
May 2013) 
-        Damrong is considered to be one of the journalists most specialised in the southern 
conflict. He has been working in the conflict area and has a good relationship with the 
locals. Damrong has published books and many articles related to the southern conflict.  
3. Kowit (Journalist, The Nation) (interviewed 1st April 2013) - Kowit has been working on covering the southern conflict from 2004 until now. He is 
considered to be one of the journalists most specialised in the southern conflict because of 
the continuity in his work. Kowit joined the Issara news Center when it was first set up in 
2005. Kowit currently writes articles on the southern conflict for Issara News Agency's 
website. 
4. Patra (Journalist, Bangkok Post) (interviewed 4th April 2013) - Patra works at the foreign and international news desk. She has never been sent to the 
conflict area; however, she has covered the southern conflict news (since 2004), 
especially when other countries or international organisations are involved.  
5. Pokin (Director, the Thai Journalists Association) (interviewed 3rd April 2013) - Pokin used to work for Bangkok Post. He currently works at the TJA. He has published 
books and articles on the southern conflict under the TJA.  
6. Somsak (Senior journalist/editor, The Nation) (interviewed 1st April 2013) - Somsak worked on covering the southern conflict during 2004-2006. He has close ties 
with the academics in the field. He has also published two books on the southern conflict. 
He currently works on the international news desk. In 2013, Somsak went to Malaysia 
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with a group of representatives from the Thai government for the latest rounds of peace-
talks.  
7. Suda (Field reporter/journalist, Bangkok Post) (interviewed 4th April 2013) - Suda was sent to the conflict area during 2001-2003, and has been working in the area 
since. She joined the Issara News Center when it was established in 2005. She has built a 
good relationship with the locals and the army. She is considered to be one of the 
journalists most specialised in the southern conflict.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 		
 
